Chapter 19

The Inevitability of Methodology

The number of rational hypotheses explaining any given phenomenon is infinite. — Persig’s Postulate

Many of the theoretical ideas of socionics are so simple that they are rediscovered again and again, at the level of revelation, by ever-new generations of socionists, and are often presented by them with great pomp as something new and original. — A socionic observation

It is interesting and instructive to listen to a non-professional when he tries to set forth his conjectures in a subject area in which he is incompetent; but it is deplorable when a non-professional tries to impose his homegrown and immature views in a sphere alien to his profession. It looks especially repugnant and immoral when such people make use of their special position in society. — Observations of the dog Pfafik

Ethical nuances and moral technologies

Thanks to the methodological potential of socionics we can now assert that the methodological instruments of science fall into four large groups — sensory, logical, intuitive and ethical. This list is complete, since one cannot add to it any group qualitatively distinct from those enumerated, nor can one remove any of these groups. To the sensory methods belong, for example, observation, measurement and experiment; to the logical ones — classification, proof, analysis and so forth. Intuition, as something “introspective,” has indeed been acknowledged in science, but always with large reservations, whereas to the intuitive methods one may of course assign induction, the advancing of hypotheses, and the synthesis of new ideas. But to intuition, alas, also belongs the most ordinary understanding, about which a great many scholarly works have been written but whose depth-psychological mechanisms nevertheless elude the rationalistically limited mind. And whereas the first three groups of methods, numbering dozens of intellectual instruments, have been investigated in detail by methodologists, the ethical moments in science were not considered methodological at all; they were mentioned only as accompanying factors under the heading “ethics in science.” Socionics for the first time raises the question of singling out ethical relations as a separate methodological group.

And indeed, much in science is possible only because scholars come to agreement among themselves, make some compromise, support one another, display solidarity, treat one another with respect, negotiate, hate, despise, intrigue and so on. In socionics all of this belongs to the aspects of ethics. These aspects cannot be discounted when analysing the processes in science as a social institution. Ethical instruments in science can be a powerful catalyst of its development, promoting new discoveries and the obtaining of valuable results that may be turned into technologies. But those same processes taken, so to speak, with a minus sign — the ethical defects widespread in science and in society — lead to stagnation, to the falsification of scientific activity, and to personal tragedies. Here too belongs science’s eternal companion, pseudoscience, with its numerous modifications. In this chapter, alongside the sensory, logical and intuitive methods, the ethical moments of interaction in science will also be discussed.

With respect to its demographic spectrum, science is no exception among other social institutions. Into it, just as into trading at the bazaar, praying in a monastery, making a revolution, or securing one’s means of existence in the sphere of art, come people of every type and with every kind of basic attitude. Apparently the percentage of scholars who make discoveries of one level or another is quite low. It is hardly above the figure fifteen, and most likely significantly lower. The remaining mass of people “inhabiting” science are more or less accidental people who could have worked in other spheres of social life, sometimes with considerably greater effect both for themselves and for society. Among this part there are fellow-travellers, rogues, adventurers, charlatans, intellectual killers (and professional ones too), and representatives of all the other socially negative attitudes and valences. As yet there exist in society no natural regulators that would prevent such mixing and “mis-sorting.” Sometimes scholars are led by people holding corrupt degrees and titles who are in essence far from scientific ideals but know how to subordinate the motley mass of people of science to themselves, asserting themselves at their expense while objectively doing damage to society.

The history of science, alongside positive phenomena, knows many dramatic and tragic cases. In ancient Greek Alexandria a mob of religious fanatics could quite easily burn the richest library of manuscripts — the evidence of reason’s first attempts to make sense of the surrounding world and of itself — and at the same time tear apart a woman mathematician, flaying her alive. Medieval inquisitors dealt cruelly with dissenting scholars who tried to take the next step in the comprehension of truth — let us recall at least Vanini Vanini and Giordano Bruno. As a result of the fascist and communist “purges,” an enormous number of scholars were destroyed who might have constituted the glory of their people and contributed to its flourishing. The ideological and bureaucratic interference in the process of scientific creativity by ignoramuses vested with power brought Russia and the countries connected with it to the brink of survival. And the contemporary extraction of enormous quantities of talented scholars from some societies and their transfer to others — the notorious “brain drain,” and simply forced emigration — remains even now an important factor in the confrontation of civilizations.

In the scientific and para-scientific milieu one can meet people ready to commit any baseness, to organize any machination, to slander, blackmail, profane, gossip, doctor the facts and commit forgeries, to vilify, to defame, and to cross the line into utter lawlessness. The Internet, together with all its remarkable virtues, offers intellectual hooligans and scum the opportunity to publish gossip and lampoons on websites.

Only scum, by definition, can speak maliciously about the physical defects or the age-related peculiarities of an opponent. If Russia ever perishes (Lord, save Russia!), it will perish because of the scum and the lawless, who for the sake of their own momentary advantage are prepared to turn their literary talent into a spiteful lampoon — but pay for it they will have to, even if in the seventh generation. Then their perhaps entirely honourable great-great-grandchildren will perish and degenerate without even suspecting the causes of this. To these specialists a simple test of “professional fitness” may be offered: for how many dollars are you prepared to take a sweet away from a child, or to put a stone in a beggar’s hat. Throughout the whole history of the intellectual life of society one may encounter the type of the intelligent-gossip, the intelligent-scoundrel, the intelligent-traitor and informer, while the genre of the lampoon-cum-gossip has always been in the arsenal of envious intellectuals. It was precisely such people who in Stalinist times wrote denunciations of their more talented colleagues and marched in the front ranks of the intellectual pogromists. What moves such people? Baseness, envy, natural malice? We can only note with regret that such people have always existed and have not died out in our time either.

Scientific divergences in socionics

One of the problems of socionics is the divergence of a number of authors in the exposition, understanding and interpretation of the basic socionic concepts introduced by Aushra Augustinavichute. Even in the description of the socionic types — the principal product of socionics, so to speak — one may observe a significant difference, to say nothing of the diagnosis of the types of well-known people.

To the present time (2007) about three dozen books have been written on socionics, but apart from the books of Aushra Augustinavichute, I. N. Kalinauskas, G. R. Reinin, V. V. Gulenko and V. D. Ermak, these are in the main more or less conscientious retellings of what the authors heard at conferences or read in others. There is almost no scientific contribution of their own there, apart from the artistic peculiarities of style. Undoubtedly, many of the books written contain original empirical material and reveal the methodological position of their authors — often a highly simplified one, of which many authors apparently do not even suspect. Some of the books, alongside more or less reliable knowledge, replicate socionic myths and errors, interpreting socionic terms and concepts in a simplified or homegrown way. Since the criminal code does not regard such actions as constituting an offence, it is better to view this as the result of the spontaneous development of a new scientific branch. In the end, if socionics turns into a mature science, it will do so in part precisely by overcoming these negative phenomena. The chief value of these books is that they at least somehow enlighten people about their typological peculiarities and about relations between partners. These books are popular in character and cannot pretend to strict scientific validity. Yet they quite deservedly enjoy success with the broad public, since in these books readers find for the first time answers to the most important questions connected with the peculiarities of their behaviour in real life. Strange as it may be, official psychology has not been able to come so close to the interests of the ordinary person.

At the same time one can quite understand the position of scholarly psychologists with respect to the content of such books: from the point of view of the high methodological requirements of modern science it may appear to them not only theoretically unfounded but, chiefly, unverified in laboratory experiment. And this to a significant degree corresponds to reality. Besides, in reading some books on socionics one gets the impression that their authors care least of all about the scientific reliability of the material set forth, that they possibly do not even suspect the existence of such notions, but are simply hurrying to share as quickly as possible their often superficial and hasty impressions on the subject. Well, and under conditions of pluralism and liberalism nothing can hinder the uncontrolled dissemination of approximate and unreliable knowledge. Yet a principled scientific critique of such works by professional psychologists would be apposite and desirable, for nothing hinders that either. But perhaps scholarly psychologists consider that to enter into polemics with “rootless” socionists is beneath their dignity. As a result a large and new field of scientific work remains without attention from specialists.

Of course, socionics does contain serious scientific results, but they are concentrated in a small number of sources and for various reasons do not become generally accessible and generally recognized. One of the main reasons here is socionics’ lack of official scientific status.

One of the possible ethical norms in science is the right to discuss the scientific results of scholars — belonging to one and the same or to different scientific directions — that have been published in the open press and presented at conferences. In science there has long existed a conception of the optimal regime for scientific discussion; it is called the academic style. According to the rules of this style, discussion must be conducted in calm and restrained tones with the use of logical (and not negative ethical!) argumentation. Any malice, arrogance, bureaucratic conceit, baseness and other negative attitudes are out of place here; but by virtue of the natural presence in science of parasitic, accidental and destructive elements alien to it, arriving at a pure academic style is not at all simple.

Therefore, in proceeding to a discussion of certain works by socionists who are attempting to penetrate into the depths of socionic concepts and are developing new theoretical constructs, I ask that what I say not be regarded as hostile and aggressive attacks in general, or even as criticism in particular. I state my position as my private attempt to make sense of how others understand socionics, how they arrive at their conceptions, and to what extent, in my view, what they do satisfies minimal logical norms. In any case, this is my subjective point of view, concerning which I should like to receive logical clarifications and not the malicious gutter abuse in which contemporary reality is so rich. Besides, I assume the admissibility of, and reserve the right to, discussion of the socionic type of any scholar who publishes his works, since this important parameter may exert a substantial influence on various characteristics and on the evaluation of his work — its orientation, style, depth, novelty, originality, groundedness, dependence on the environment, and even the reliability of the scientific result. Undoubtedly the point should not be the hanging of socionic labels, but the working use of parametric information. Of course, no one has abolished criticism in science, but within the framework of the academic style it must be principled, correct and benevolent, which gives the person criticized the possibility of “saving face.” Unfortunately, in socionics one may meet with criticism that borders on intellectual banditry. Several examples of such “criticism” may be encountered on the Internet, where, for example, some intelligent-gossip in the form of travel notes shares “collected information” about the Kiev school of socionics, not disdaining dirty insinuations against particular scholars who are simply doing their job. No, he does not analyse their articles and reports; but as an “experienced psychologist” and lampoonist he makes fun of their appearance, their health and their age.

When at socionic conferences the theme is raised of socionics’ disintegration into a multitude of poorly coordinated schools and of the impossibility of arriving at a consensus, then, out of the most general methodological conceptions of scientific truth, an intuitive protest arises in me. I believe (but, alas, for science this is not enough!) that there may be various approaches to the working-out of socionic problems, that there may be various directions in socionics and different socionic schools, but that at their base must lie strictly proven scientific truths. Here we approach the difficult and eternal philosophical question of what truth is. In many psychological schools this question is decided pragmatically: philosophical questions are assigned to the category of the incorrect, while as the scientific result one considers the results of experiment processed in one way or another. Such processing is often of a very conditional character, but sometimes it may be characterized as simplified, primitive, superficial and even frivolous. Be that as it may, the majority of scholars adhere to the notions established in the concrete branch of science and, more narrowly still, in that concrete scientific school to which the scholar belongs. By the majority of scholars such notions are assimilated as self-evident and not subject to revision, since they have no sufficient grounds for such revision. This set of notions, accepted by default by the representatives of a scientific direction, is precisely what constitutes the content of their scientific paradigm. However, as soon as a scholar changes something in this paradigm, adds something to it or removes something from it, he is in essence already dealing with another paradigm, which may be accepted by other scholars or rejected by them. Incidentally, a third variant is often met with here as well: the new paradigm is neither accepted nor rejected, but is not considered, not used, or simply passed over in silence. In this connection one may consider several concepts derived from the concept of paradigm and thereby refine that concept. The concept of paradigm itself may at present be understood in two senses: as a list of key concepts used as a support for the understanding and interpretation of the available empirical facts, and as a system of paradigms — understood in the first sense — coexisting in a given subject area. Here we are obviously dealing with an implicit homonymy.

Using Greek prefixes, one can obtain several new terminological forms which it is not hard to semanticize proceeding from the pressing scientific situation. So then: paradigm, antidigm, adigm, protodigm, quasidigm, pseudodigm, infradigm, metadigm, ultradigm… What might all this mean? Do corresponding proto-senses exist in scientific reality? Let us try to reconstruct them in part. With the term antidigm it is not hard to associate a paradigm opposing another concrete paradigm, when two paradigms stand in a relation of antagonism, contradict one another or mutually exclude one another.

With adigm it is natural, presumably, to associate the complete absence of a paradigm. In any case, a scholar entering an as yet unexplored sphere of cognition may find himself in an adigmatic state. Of course, a layman too may perceive certain scientific facts and make use of scientific results without being aware of, and without feeling any need to be aware of, their foundations, which may likewise be associated with adigmacy. However, between a scholar accomplishing a creative breakthrough and a layman uninterested in “lofty matters” there is, presumably, all the same a difference. It is quite plausible that a scholar who is as yet only groping for the foundations of new knowledge may accomplish the transition from adigm to protodigm, the first intuitive sketch of a future paradigm, whereas the pragmatic layman may simply have no concern whatever for theoretical subtleties.

The concepts quasidigm and pseudodigm correspond quite well to the various cases, respectively, of conscientious error generating artefacts, and of outright charlatanism parasitic upon society’s lack of adequate defence mechanisms. Apparently a suitable example of a quasidigm may be the case of phlogiston — caloric — by whose transfer from one body to another the physicists of the seventeenth century tried to explain the processes of the heating and cooling of bodies. It is quite possible that a quasidigm may turn into a pseudodigm when the creator of the quasidigm begins to persist in his errors.

The concept of the infradigm could be associated with certain evolutions of paradigmatic knowledge, when it spreads at a semi-conscious level among the broad masses and turns into a gnoseological background, appeal to which is perceived as something self-evident or accepted by default.

With the concept of metadigm it is natural to correlate the ascent to a meta-level with respect to some concrete paradigm, or with respect to a multitude of coexisting paradigms which have a certain quantity of common conceptual elements but all the same differ sufficiently among themselves. The ascent to the level of a metadigm must have sufficient grounds and must be realized in the form of a developed and well-argued metatheory. In socionics at least two people — E. Shepetko (Li) and V. Pavlov (Li) — declared their readiness to construct a metasocionics, but it seems these were hasty and insufficiently grounded aspirations.

An ultradigm is not a metadigm; it is, most likely, a paradigm generalizing already existing knowledge, the next step in the development of established views. A good illustration here may be the story of non-Euclidean geometry, the transition to which represented a bold generalization by Lobachevsky (lI) and Bolyai (lI?) of the geometrical axiomatics existing in their time. Connected with this too are highly dramatic personal relations in the milieu of mathematicians. Gauss (Ls), upon whom the recognition or non-recognition of the new idea in geometry depended, drove the son of his Hungarian friend Bolyai to fury and tormented the Russian Lobachevsky with his silence. Being a mathematician of genius, he perfectly well understood the correctness of their reasoning, but for complex psychological reasons took up an insidious position with respect to them both — in particular because he had long since arrived at analogous results himself, but had been afraid to publish them, not hoping for understanding on the part of the mathematical community. One may speak of different paradigmatic levels in science depending on the size of the set of common elements. The paradigms of Bolyai and Lobachevsky differed from the mathematical paradigm generally accepted in their time by only one element, namely the recognition or non-recognition of the axiom of parallel lines. Subsequently Riemann and Gödel reached still more general paradigmatic levels, creating new ultradigms.

As soon as the followers of Aushra Augustinavichute began to use, develop, interpret and introduce changes into her paradigm, different intra-socionic paradigms began to appear — having much in common with one another, yet differing in the understanding of certain important components of socionics. Sometimes such divergences may be assessed as not very significant, but then the absence of a consensus seems all the more incomprehensible. In particular, the differences between the paradigms of official psychology and of socionics are not so great that it should be necessary to reject socionics as something unacceptable.

If one compares the approaches to socionics of such scholars as G. Reinin, I. Kalinauskas, A. Bukalov, V. Gulenko, V. Ermak, G. Shulman, E. Shepetko, I. Litvinenko, S. Filimonov, V. Pavlov, E. Litrovnik, A. Shiyan, T. Yakubovskaya, S. Shteinikov, S. Savchenko, N. Prilepskaya, S. Churyumov, P. Tsypin, A. Trekhov, A. Krivorukov and others, then alongside what is common one may discover among them significant differences in the understanding of one or another element of socionics. Sometimes these differences are so great that they reach the paradigmatic level. Analysis of the various formulations of socionic concepts gives grounds for the conclusion that this is the result of the application of the socionist-scholars’ own methodological complexes to the core of the socionic paradigm proposed by Aushra Augustinavichute. And since people have come into socionics from the most varied areas of science, it is not at all surprising that, using their own methodological complexes, they have obtained and continue to obtain very different results. Moreover, one can now say with confidence that as new cadres of scholars appear in socionics the number of interpretations of the basic concepts introduced by Aushra Augustinavichute will grow; and, taking into account human nature and the real personnel “line-up” in science, one may make the pessimistic forecast that it will be impossible to bring all these different conceptions to a common denominator. But perhaps there is no necessity for this either. It is desirable only that the basic socionic product — the description of the socionic types — be well coordinated. As for the purely theoretical differences, scholars may continue to clarify their cause, and this may prove interesting in itself. In particular, it may be very interesting from the point of view of science studies, the psychology of science, and methodology.

Personally it seems to me that the problem of the formation of the methodological complex of each concrete scholar is important in the psychological, the philosophical and the science-studies respect. Important too are the methods of identifying such complexes and their marking. In particular, in the course of expounding the material of this chapter I try to sketch approaches to such marking, but I make no claim whatever to any final solution. It is curious that I have already encountered a negative reaction from individual scholars to the designations I have used for their methodological complexes. Some of them perceive such work as the hanging of labels — and this is the reaction of scholars who have chosen as their profession the identification of typological markers in order to use them for characterizing people. A marker of a methodological complex is no more than a convenient designation which may be used in science-studies work for the possible construction of typologies of such complexes. Therefore, if anyone has claims against me concerning the inadequacy of the terms I use, I am always ready to discuss them with the interested party.

Categorization

Before going further, let us dwell on the question of the appearance of scientific terms and concepts and of the means of their use. One of the primary instruments of science is categorization, manifested in the terminological marking of generalizing concepts. The generalizing concepts themselves appear as a result of the intuitive processing of experimental material. Although such processing is a mysterious intuitive process whose mechanism is unknown to science, it — intuition — is counted in the arsenal of the means of science and is accessible to any normal person. Categorization is in most cases performed by scholars so easily that as a rule no doubts arise in them as to its groundedness. Categories established in the language of science are perceived by scholars as universal concepts and are easily transferred, without special justification, to concepts more or less similar to the primary ones but not necessarily identical with them. Thus the concepts of hysteria, epilepsy, psychasthenia and so on, once established in psychiatry, were in their time generalized by Kretschmer and then, with various additions and modifications, used in the typologies of the MMPI, of Leonhard and of Lichko. These three typologies became the psychological “brands” of their time and to this day enjoy popularity among psychologists and enter the curricula of psychology faculties. However, their theoretical groundedness leaves much to be desired; but this, it seems, troubled practising psychologists little then and troubles them little now — they are satisfied with the possibility of practical application, and the results of such application evidently seem to them quite acceptable.

Sometimes it is simply astonishing how scholars who obtain high-quality theoretical and practical results permit themselves elementary terminological and logical errors, and, when these are pointed out directly, seek a way of proving that this is not an error at all but a perfectly admissible concept. Let us consider several examples.

V. V. Gulenko

V. V. Gulenko has made a great contribution to socionics. He is a talented scholar who from the very first day of his acquaintance with socionics has been developing socionic concepts with great persistence. He has obtained a whole series of remarkable results; however, one not infrequently gets the impression that he is in too much of a hurry to introduce his intuitive insights. Some of the constructs he has proposed are logically contradictory, and besides that he has terminological miscalculations which, in the harsh version, may be regarded as damage inflicted upon the Russian language. In any case, his developments — like the developments of all socionists, including my own — must be approached with extreme caution and, above all, critically. Some of his early constructs Gulenko has wholly or partly renounced, but other socionists had already managed to assimilate them uncritically and use them without the proper theoretical justification.

There are other unfounded constructions in V. V. Gulenko as well. For example, he has no justification for the sequence of types in the socion used in his works — it corresponds neither to Lyashkyavichyus’s table nor to the one adopted in the journal SMiPL. This sequence follows from the logic of the Churyumov square, to which Gulenko gives no references. Nor does Gulenko have any justification for the idea of the parallelism of TIM and IR [intertype relations], and yet only in this way could one tie them to the Jungian dichotomous axes and distribute the IRs according to the Augustinavichute–Reinin traits. Incidentally, for this it would have been sufficient to refer to the principle of the duality of TIM and IR earlier substantiated by Churyumov. Gulenko has no such reference either.

V. V. Gulenko’s references to pluralism and to a “many-windowed” vision of the world as a justification for the discord among socionists may in part be regarded as a psychological defence. Here too, apparently, one must assign the concept of humanitarian socionics as the shell of his research, where, as he considers, non-strict and blurred concepts constitute the very essence of the subject area. Probably it is a matter of the scholar’s taste which concepts — blurred or strict — he uses in his research; but in order for there to be a real choice here, these concepts need to be substantiated and verified.

Giving a generalized methodological assessment of V. V. Gulenko’s work, one may say that he has begun to master a wholly reliable and promising niche of humanitarian positivism in socionics. This niche is convenient above all because in it one can obtain a large quantity of practically valuable results; but its drawback is the empirical approximateness of the constructs used, characteristic of all positivist approaches.

”Sociotype” and “socioanalysis”

The terms “sociotype” and “socioanalysis” used by V. V. Gulenko, in accordance with linguistic practice, are naturally correlated with sociology and not with socionics; and even if these terms are specially stipulated, they are perceived as words containing errors and exert a negative psychophysiological effect on the person reading and pronouncing these words in a socionic context — such are the laws of NLP and of the psychosemantic norms of language. It is hard to escape the impression that one is dealing with a spoilt word, since one physically senses that in the words “socioanalysis” and “sociotype,” as applied to socionics, a letter has been omitted, and that they ought to sound like “socionanalysis” and “socion-type” — which, though correct, is rather cacophonous. In my editorial corrections of socionic texts I would on no account let such a term pass, and would everywhere replace it with “socionic type” — pending a clarification of matters with the author. And if the author said that he had in mind a social and not a socionic type, then I would ask him why he uses such an abbreviation in a socionic context and, with the necessary clarification, would replace the term “sociotype” with “social type.”

Of course, under conditions of pluralism and democracy an author is free to use any words, right up to those once reckoned obscene and now referring merely to non-normative lexicon. In doing so he might consider such words euphonious. In the end, the term sociotype in a sociological context sounds entirely natural, and one can hardly bring any claims against it outside socionics. And in general, the analysis of a single term may be considered petty fault-finding; yet one must after all somehow defend one’s native language.

On the other hand, the term “sociotype” may also be regarded as a claim to a certain theoretical novelty, since in the sociological literature it is not used, and it would be a splendid scientific achievement to single out the true social types, that is, sociotypes. Here sound definitions are necessary. However, I think that sociotypes do not coincide, or do not fully coincide, with socionic types. In any case a deep theoretical elaboration is necessary here. It may be that socionic types really are some variant, variety or particular case of social types. But before identifying socionic and social types, this must first be proved, and that is no trifle.

With the term “sociotype” is connected one of the subtle semantic diversions, as a result of which some socionists began to identify social types with socionic ones. This led to the appearance of such names for socionic types as “seeker,” “mediator,” “enthusiast,” “analyst” and so forth. The concepts standing behind these terms correspond to the profiles of special generalized kinds of social activity. Unfortunately, in sociology this theme has been insufficiently developed — there exists no theoretical grounding of the concept of a social type, but only empirically found sets of activity profiles, devised for particular practical tasks, with the corresponding terminological designations. In sociology, among other things, no conception has been developed of the different levels of social infrastructures and of socially demanded activity. Yet there is a great difference between the conceptual specification of a concrete profession — for example, salesperson, librarian, carpenter, accountant, administrator, cashier, security guard and so on — on the one hand, and the conceptual specification of generalized behavioural tendencies such as ascetic, hero, saint, keeper, master, professional, swindler, bribe-taker, scoundrel, traitor, bandit, prostitute, on the other. Where does the boundary between psychological and social types run? Of course there is an essential difference between a profession, a social role, a social position, a generalized kind of activity such as craftsman, expert, mentor, sponsor, patron or protector, and an accentuated psychological trait such as, for example, cunning fellow, silent type, lawless one, womanizer, romantic, optimist.

The identification of sociotypes with TIMs is a vivid example of a theoretical and methodological error. When a socionic theorist illegitimately identifies, for example, the social type of the analyst with the TIM LII, he commits at least three errors: 1) he confuses the subject areas of socionics and social psychology; 2) he asserts the possibility of using these terms synonymously; 3) at the level of presupposition, that is, of self-evident givenness, he creates a suggestive construction which will automatically have an effect on thousands of readers. These readers will accept such an identification, will believe in it, and will use this identification not only themselves but will also spread it among other people. A priori it is clear that any socionic type may be any social and psychological type; but on the other hand it is not excluded that social types may be represented by structural models resembling socionic ones. Yet in order to assert this, one must carry out the corresponding research work. And so long as this has not been done, it would be irresponsible to identify social and socionic types.

To assert the identity of a sociotype and a TIM, one must prove that a sociotype possesses the structure of Model “A,” and this has been done by no one. A sociotype may be formed on the basis of occupation, profession or social role; but as practice shows, any TIM may appear in any social role, though possibly with differing effectiveness. Incidentally, this too must be proved. Such a proof could be based on the identification of the semantic and functional structure of sociotypes. One could speak of the preferability of one or another social role or sociotype for a given TIM only depending on the greater or lesser homeomorphism of the semantic and/or functional structures of the corresponding TIMs and sociotypes.

A subtler but likewise negative effect on the psyche and intellect of the reader is produced by purely socionic neologisms belonging to professional jargon, such as “ethics of emotions” and “ethics of relations” — almost correct from the point of view of the literary norm, and for that very reason all the more dangerous. Especially the latter. This combination of common words sounds quite plausible and natural, except that the discussion concerns not common words but socionic terms, and therefore it is not specified here what kind of relations are meant (namely, ethical ones) — this is socionic jargon superimposed upon the terminology introduced by Aushra Augustinavichute, itself not indisputable but specially stipulated and, most importantly, reinforced by special symbols possessing their own heuristic meanings. In arbitrarily generated jargon the combination “ethics of relations” of course does not denote the concept of “rules of behaviour,” but corresponds to “white” or “introverted” (or, according to Aushra Augustinavichute, “introtim”) ethics, and according to C. G. Jung to “introverted feeling,” which is perceived far better but still does not solve the terminological problems. And all the same it would be simply splendid if socionists were to use the term “extraverted feeling” instead of the jargon combination “ethics of emotions.” The combination “ethics of emotions” quite frankly misleads the uninitiated reader, creating the illusion that the subject is rules of decent emoting, whereas what is meant is “extraverted feeling.”

And again the question arises: who can forbid the use of terms established in one or another socionic school? Why, no one! It is a matter of taste, and what is there to talk about. In the end, what terms do not exist in science — coloured quarks, strangeness, megapascals. And yet, in that case, in what way are less concrete, initially more general terms such as “introverted sensorics” or “extraverted thinking” worse than “sensorics of sensations” and “business logic”? Extraverted thinking is nothing other than the technological process of obtaining a real product. It is everything that modern production occupies itself with, but here belongs also less large-scale activity, such as preparing food, lighting a fire, picking bananas from a tree and even eating them. And therefore one may ask why, instead of the term extraverted thinking, one should not use the simpler and in this case quite adequate term “technology.” It seems to me that although this can and should be done in a regime of synonymy, it is nevertheless useful to preserve the term extraverted thinking, in which thinking loses its traditionally introverted character and appears as activity. Activity is precisely extraverted thinking. The homonymic transformations of the concept of thinking may here have a deep theoretical sense.

”Signs of functions”

In connection with the concept of the methodological complex it is interesting to analyse the situation with the signs of the functions, which in their time were introduced precisely by V. V. Gulenko; but although he later renounced them (at least partly), a part of socionists, including V. D. Ermak, consider them an inalienable part of Model “A.” That identical functions in different types certainly differ in some way is clear to everyone who has occupied himself for a sufficient time with socionic diagnostics. Yes, the extraverted intuition of Don Quixote and of Huxley, I(ILE) and I(IEE), is different; but should this difference be identified with the signs plus and minus? Those arguments which V. V. Gulenko proposed[^1] in defence of introducing signs of functions strongly recall Ptolemy’s explanation of the motion of the planets in his geocentric astronomy — one can calculate the position of the planets, but reality is distorted.

Gulenko correlated with the signs four properties which they express in the functions — these are the plus-minus quality; scale, indicating globality or locality; distance, which may be short or long; and direction, inward or outward. Already from this list (which, incidentally, can be extended) it is evident that the simple mathematical semantics of the signs plus and minus has been considerably complicated. And, most importantly, it has been changed qualitatively: the single criterion of opposite directedness in mathematics has been replaced not merely by a multiple criterion — which in itself could be a natural generalization of the known concept — but all these criteria fail to express the mirror symmetry which mathematical signs possess. Even in the case of the concept of quality, what is at issue is not mirror symmetry but antisymmetry: for white does not turn into black in a mirror, nor does “good” turn into “bad,” “abstract” into “concrete,” or “love” into “hatred.” Therefore it is necessary to explain what exactly the signs will distinguish — symmetry or antisymmetry — since it would be incorrect to assume that everyone knows this by default. But if in the case of quality the introduction of signs can be justified as a description of the positive and the negative, in the case of the other criteria this can no longer be done. Thus within the global there may be its own internal oppositions, its own positive and negative manifestations. And the same may be said of the local. The matter stands analogously with distance. When people communicate at a short distance, both negative and positive moments may appear in their relations, and the very same moments may appear in communication at a long distance as well. As for directedness, if this does not substitute for extraversion and introversion, then it is simply unclear what is being talked about. V. D. Ermak explained this situation in such a way that “plus” is when information works only in the positive domain, while “minus” gives the possibility of working in both the positive and the negative domain. Probably this is a very “ethical” description, but what relation has it to logic and to the mathematical conception of a sign? The semantics of a sign is connected with the conception of opposites. For intuition this could be the true and the false; for ethics — good and evil; for logic — the false and the true, the correct and the incorrect; for sensorics — the useful and the harmful, and so on. But the IAs [information aspects] in all positions in all types cover these opposites, which makes signs superfluous for expressing them.

Here it is appropriate to recall the use of signs in the designation of psychological traits in Cattell. When this remarkable psychologist introduces the designation A+ (affectothymia) or A− (schizothymia), what is at issue is exact polar oppositions fixed in explications. It is another matter that Cattell’s constructs differ sufficiently from the corresponding psychological concepts established in the everyday practice of the people; but that is what science is for — to seek truth and to refine what seems perfectly clear. V. V. Gulenko, however, and after him V. D. Ermak, introduces complex, multidimensional constructs with a skewed semantics (here “skewed” is a term, not an insult) — that is, here polar constructs have different logical extensions: “plus” refers only to the positive domain, while “minus” refers to both the positive and the negative.

Of course, if the introduction of signs represents nothing more than conventional marks introduced in order to make sense of material difficult to understand, then this can be understood; but when scholars turn conventional marks into a theoretical construct, we are already dealing with a pseudodigm. The point is that on the question of signs there is no unanimity in socionics. This was well shown by the concluding discussion at the XXI socionic conference. And Aleksei Trekhov even offered his considerations on how to reconcile the two already existing ways of ascribing signs to functions — the Gulenko–Ermak way and Bukalov’s. Very briefly, these considerations came down, as it were, to the different working of functions in different regimes: for the reception and for the output of information. According to Gulenko–Ermak, the signs of identically named but differently verted IAs in the mental and vital rings are opposite; according to Bukalov they are the same. Ermak argues for the difference in signs on the grounds that “otherwise the functions of the vital and the mental will not interact.” The basis of the argument is clear: opposites attract. Bukalov, however, as an argument for his way of arranging signs, points out that the SUPERID must correspond to the EGO of the dual, which is the basis for dualization. In other words, the extraverted ethics in Don Quixote’s SUPERID must have the same sign as the extraverted ethics in Hugo’s EGO, otherwise the corresponding functions, in accordance with the semantics of the signs according to Gulenko, will not interact — to which Ermak objected with the words “Nothing of the sort,” and went on repeating what he had said before.

All the same, let us note that a conventional introduction of signs for functions may prove convenient for didactic purposes, in order somehow to contrast identical functions in different types when explaining this theme to students; but it is precisely here that the comparison with Ptolemy becomes justified.

Let us try to approach this problem without prejudice.

So then: the scholars mentioned above speak of the signs of functions, but ascribe them to the aspects connected with the functions, since in describing the semantics of a sign they proceed from the semantics of the IA, that is, they speak of the modalities of emotions, relations, sensorics and so on. Here we are dealing with an essential distinction. The point is that the semantics of the functions is composed of two semantics — positional and aspectual. The positional semantics of the functions is the same in all TIMs — this is the maximally generalized sense of the functional systems. The aspectual semantics of the functions, however, is particular to each TIM. Therefore, if it made sense to ascribe signs to anything, they would have to be ascribed to the IAs, since the signs of the functions in all types would simply coincide. However, an IA represents such an ultimate generalization that it contains within itself both of the opposites which are supposed to correspond to the signs.

I consider that the first functions of Don Quixote and of Huxley differ not in sign but in their conjugation with the IA of the second function, when both functions work in tandem, which is what secures the information-metabolic product of the TIM. Therefore the “sign” of the first function is the IA of the second, and vice versa. Thus it will be natural to consider that the intuition of the ILE is logical and thereby, in accordance with the semantics of the IA of logic in socionics, directed at the cognition of the laws of nature, whereas in the IEE the intuition is ethical and directed at contact with the inner world of a person. But in both cases extraverted intuition represents the capacity to penetrate into the essence of phenomena. The explicit ascription of the signs plus and minus to IAs deprives them of the internal variability characteristic of symbolic constructs. For the matter stands thus, that every IA may have both positive and negative manifestations — in the ILE as well as in the IEE — and not in such a way that Don Quixote has only positive manifestations along extraverted intuition and Huxley only negative ones. It is another matter that within both the one and the other intuition manifestations of both poles are possible: prospect and unpromisingness, meaningfulness and meaninglessness, positive and negative potential, and so on [7]. If someone has the need to consider some function separately, then there is no necessity to ascribe a sign to it; it is sufficient to write the corresponding aspect with an index designating the neighbouring function. For example, I_l or I_e, which will mean logical and ethical intuition. The “signs” introduced in the manner described above are merely surrogates which indirectly, through a system of extra-socionic conventions, give a defective hint at the function adjacent to them. But in the hands of a master anything can work.

Let us compare P. Tsypin’s description of the “signed” functions of Don Quixote and of Huxley.

I+(Ki), that is, extraverted intuition with a plus sign in Don Quixote, Tsypin understands as meaning that this type is “in captivity” to his own understanding of possibilities and prospects; that for the sake of embodying his original ideas in life he may go to great lengths, that this is a person given to excitement and inclined to adventures; and that he is best aware of concrete, momentary possibilities [40]. Strange as it may be, in this quotation everything correct is trivial and everything non-trivial is incorrect. To say of a type that it is “in captivity” to its program-potential function (PPF) is correct; but since this applies not to Don Quixote alone but to all types, it does not distinguish Don Quixote among the other types, and therefore it is trivial. All types put forward original ideas along the aspect of the PPF, and “for the sake of embodying their original ideas in life may go to great lengths.” And this is correct, but for the same reason trivial. That Don Quixote is “a person given to excitement, inclined to adventures” follows not from the PPF but from the MMF (motivational-mobilizational function). Situations of excitement stimulate his emotional complex. As for adventures, one adventure is not the same as another. And if [Jack] London with excitement enters upon adventures in business — including being capable of creating fraudulent schemes leading to the “lawful” appropriation of what is “lying about” — then Don Quixote is adventurous only in the cognition of the laws of nature. That is to say, although the subject of the adventure is determined by the IA of the PPF, the adventurousness itself is determined by the IA of the MMF. So, as we see, the elements of behaviour mentioned are determined not by signs but by functions and their filling. But as for Don Quixote being “best aware of concrete, momentary possibilities,” this, though not trivial, is alas incorrect. Don Quixote works with maximally fundamental and by no means momentary problems. If in the socion this is not done by Don Quixote, then by whom?

As for Huxley with his I−, Tsypin says that he “is best aware of a situation when prospective possibilities are absent” [40]. Of course one would like above all to understand what Tsypin meant here. What are these situations “when prospective possibilities are absent”? What was that situation when the real Huxley, the prototype of the type Huxley, a relative of Darwin, inspired the latter to publish The Origin of Species as quickly as possible, evidently understanding both the prospective and the potential possibilities both of this remarkable work and of its author? Perhaps Tsypin means that Huxley is perfectly aware of situations when prospective possibilities are present, but is “even better aware of a situation when prospective possibilities are absent”? This would justify the explication of the signs proposed by V. V. Gulenko. For in that case the extension of intuition to the positive and negative domains of “the presence of possibilities” would correspond precisely to the “socionic” (according to Gulenko) understanding of the semantics of positivity and negativity. As far as I understand, Huxley’s extraverted intuition, coloured by introverted ethics, helps people of this type to penetrate into the psychic sphere of other people and to orient themselves freely in it, including understanding their potential possibilities. But such an understanding does not require the introduction of signs of functions. Aushra describes Don Quixote’s EGO as “abstract cognition of the object,” and Huxley’s EGO as “abstract cognition of the subject” — but what have signs to do with it?

Let us give one more example of Tsypin’s interpretation of the program-potential functions of Dumas and Gabin.

Dumas with his s+ “surrounds himself with objects giving the maximum level of comfort, thirsts for new sensory sensations, values every momentary pleasure” [40]. Gabin, who has s−, “avoids negative impressions, rigidly fences off his living space, is oriented toward a general approach in evaluating what is harmonious, natural and pleasant and what is not” [ibid.]. If one looks closely at these descriptions, one can see that they are not quite about the same thing. That is, here introverted sensorics in the position of PPF is being interpreted, but for each type a different frame terminology is used. In the case of Gabin the talk is of living space, while in the case of Dumas it is of the use of objects. One might pay no attention to this difference, considering it purely stylistic; but in this case the use of different frames creates the impression that the difference between the types under consideration is considerably greater than it actually is, and even that it is connected with a positive sign in the one and a negative in the other. Of course both the one type and the other actively form their space and surround themselves with objects consonant with their type. Only Dumas, in accordance with his KZF adjacent to the PPF, does this with a view to an emotional response, whereas Gabin does so with a view to productive work. Therefore their living spaces turn out to be different; but according to socionic concepts Gabin’s space is quite accessible to Huxley and less “permeable” for Don Quixote. Dumas’s space, presumably, is more open to Don Quixote and less “permeable” for Huxley. And conversely, Dumas’s space will be “closed” to [Jack] London. These interpretations are simple enough and stand in no need of the hypothesis of signs. In any case, one must construct the discussion in a uniform terminology; otherwise it is said of Dumas that he “surrounds himself with objects” and of Gabin that he “fences off his space,” as though surrounding oneself with objects were not the same thing as fencing off one’s space.

If you impose upon functions signs with some assigned semantics, then thereafter you already include this semantics in your interpretation. And if such semantics has proved inexact, then this inexactitude turns into a systematic error entering into the composition of all subsequent reasoning. Let us note also that V. D. Ermak borrowed the signs from V. V. Gulenko even before he began to develop his idea of a systems-theoretical grounding of the socionic model, and from his systemic constructions of the model the signs in no way follow; that is, the functions in Ermak’s model (Model “E”) appear without signs, and he inserts the signs already into the model of a concrete type, explaining them by “systemic interactions in the socion.” That is, here again we see that in essence the sign is referred not to the function but to the IA.

Nevertheless, the distinctions proposed by V. V. Gulenko for characterizing the working of socionic functions are not in themselves meaningless, and if they were not tied to signs they could structure quite well the content of the functions and the boundaries of their activity. But since these categories themselves in no way follow from Model “A” and are the result of V. V. Gulenko’s intuitive-empirical creativity, the standard methodological questions about the completeness of the list of proposed categories, its consistency, and the mutual independence or correlation of the proposed categories remain unanswered. Therefore V. V. Gulenko’s list, like practically all the other categories of socionics, requires theoretical grounding and experimental verification. Unfortunately, even such theoretically advanced scholars as A. Trekhov and P. Tsypin, who quite justly called into question the correctness of a number of socionic concepts in their common execution, accepted this Gulenko–Ermak construct uncritically. It must, however, be noted that V. V. Gulenko — and this does him credit — has partly renounced the use, considered above, of the signs he once proposed. Other theorists of socionics, though, have already “grown accustomed” to using signs, but often propose their own original versions of their semantics.

And yet in socionics there is one case of an adequate introduction of signs. This was done from the very beginning by Aushra for the mental and vital rings. If, for example, we compare the sequence of functional aspects in the mental rings of Ki [Don Quixote] and Ge [Huxley], we shall see that the sets of aspects themselves are the same in both, while the sequence is directly opposite. If we accept that in Ki the aspects in the ring are arranged clockwise, then in Ge they are arranged counter-clockwise. In Ki: I, l, S, e; in Ge: I, e, S, l. And comparing the arrangement of aspects in the functions of the mental and vital rings of duals, we shall, in order to preserve their identical sequence, have to come to the conclusion that they “rotate” in opposite directions. Thanks to the introduction of the signs + (clockwise) and − (counter-clockwise), Aushra manages to find a subtle semantic shade in the basic attitudes of types with different signs of the mental rings. She designated this difference by the terms “positivism” and “negativism.” As best she could, she tried to interpret this difference, though with time it became clear that her descriptions do not exhaust this difference and, possibly, that it cannot be reduced to them at all. Deep research is needed here.

It is rather strange that many socionists forget about the signs of the rings introduced by Aushra, which have a perfectly clear semantics, and try to ascribe signs to aspected functions, departing from the natural semantics of the mathematical signs plus and minus, connected with opposite directions.

The theory of “subtypes”

The history of the term “subtype” in socionics is interesting. The subtlety here consists in the fact that, in beginning to develop a new scientific field, scholars often use general scientific concepts without specifying their meaning in the new subject area, and this often looks quite natural and arouses no suspicion. Therefore it is easy to imagine that as soon as the beginning Kiev socionists had become slightly familiar with the concept of the socionic type, had begun to distinguish its manifestations in real bearers and had encountered the diversity of characters within one type, they were ready for a deeper understanding of the socionic type. And for this it was very easy to use the term “subtype” — it fairly begged to be used.

The concept of the subtype in socionics was introduced by V. Gulenko (a logical type) together with A. Didenko (an ethical type). Let us note that A. Didenko, if I am not mistaken, was the first to whom this idea occurred. These co-authors began to distinguish intuitive and sensory, logical and ethical subtypes of the basic type depending on which function — the first or the second — proved, in their opinion, to be more pronounced in a concrete person. It would seem that everything is in order — there is a type and there is a subtype. Of course, here it is easy to go further, introducing distinctions within a subtype and thus obtaining a subtype of a subtype. And if one continues further, one can obtain a subtype of a subtype of a subtype, and so on. Well, this is the usual taxonomic procedure. However, not everything here is so simple.

The problem here is that in socionics the talk is not simply of the subtypes of some object belonging to a definite type, but of the subtypes of types of information metabolism, which are not merely more or less accidental empirical objects but represent highly structured theoretical constructs even possessing a graphical representation in the form of Model “A.” And this, by virtue of the well-known logical requirement of preserving the criterion of classification throughout the whole division of the basic concept, means that a subtype of information metabolism must also be represented by an analogous model — which not only was not done when socionic subtypes were introduced, but simply never occurred to any of the authors of the idea, since everything is so simple and clear. In the case of a theoretically ungrounded introduction of the subtype, the issue may be the widespread logical error of “substitution of the basis of classification” or of “passing into another genus.” Such an error, to some extent pardonable in an ethical type, is unpardonable in a logical one.

Without a strict theoretical grounding, socionics descends to the level of a typology, where the model is replaced by an empirical specimen which is to a significant degree a subjective image and which for this reason cannot be unambiguously verified. Under a typological motivation of the concept of subtype there occurs a mixing of the theoretical model with empirical adaptations, which from the point of view of methodology may be characterized as eclecticism or theoretical bad taste. Of course, under conditions of liberalism, pluralism and many-windowed vision every scholar may proceed from his own theoretical preferences and methodological taste, disregarding the level of world developments in the theory of science; but all the same homegrownness is worth avoiding.

Later Gulenko changed his attitude to subtypes and, in particular, began to call subtypes of socionic types the dominant, creative, normalizing, harmonizing [42] and other psychological types belonging to other typologies. These types are not derived directly from Model “A,” and in any case such work was not carried out, if one does not count intuitive references to the connection of such types with a possible strengthening of the sensory, intuitive, logical or ethical function respectively. Probably this is not bad as a hypothesis, but then it should be called precisely that, and not spoken of as a theory of subtypes. Without a strict model-based and empirical grounding of the connection of the types listed above with socionic concepts, it would be incorrect to consider these types subtypes of socionic types. They are simply the types of another typology (S. Dellinger).

It is curious also to note that during the first two years of his acquaintance with socionics V. V. Gulenko considered the “black” aspects introverted and interpreted them accordingly in his works; and when he discovered his error, he even wrote an article in which he argued that if one redefines the aspects with respect to their vertness, then the model and the description of the type on its basis will not change [5]. About this, of course, one might not recall, all the more so since in one of Aushra’s early manuscript works the corresponding symbols were, possibly through an oversight, filled in incorrectly; but the matter concerns theoretical problems and not some nuances in the descriptions of types. In itself this idea of Gulenko’s is beautiful and deserves special logical and mathematical investigation, but without such investigation it remains simply a hypothesis whose psychoanalytic sense apparently consists in the fact that its author is right in any case and is able correctly to explain any shift of emphasis. This undoubtedly does credit to his wit. But how are things with truth?

Let us cite several fragments from this work, which will make it possible to understand the author’s position:

“Let us introduce designations. We shall denote the subject by S and the object by O. A directed action we shall denote by an arrow, and a state by an ellipsis. With a cross we shall mark that instance from whose point of view the given action or state is considered. … As a result we obtain the following classification of the elements of IM: Dynamic elements (actions): E: S+ ← O (the subject takes energy from the object, becoming excited in the process). According to [1], these are internal processes.”

Here the author introduces his own conception of such an aspect of IA as E (extraverted feeling). He proposes a quite correct scheme in which the interaction of subject and object is represented; however, he interprets it in an energetic and not in an informational sense. Of course this is the author’s personal affair; but since in socionics the basic concepts are the IAs, it is more plausible that energetic phenomena and situations ought to be described in informational terms. As I understand it, and in accordance with the conceptions of Aushra Augustinavichute, this aspect is an informational reflection of internal energetic processes. This is a subjective modelling of energetic processes by energetic processes. Here the subject is in empathic contact with the object. How this happens must still be sought out and investigated, but in a first approximation one may suppose something on the principle of vibrational or wave adjustment or tuning.

“S: S ← O+ (the object transmits energy to the subject, acting upon this state). According to [1], this is the internal situation of the object among other objects, their effect on its well-being.”

Here the author, as I understand it, is trying to make sense of the aspect of introverted sensorics, and likewise in energetic concepts. In informational concepts, the talk here ought to be of a sensory model of the external features of the object. In terms of vibrational tuning this could look like tuning to the external vibrations of the object. Here a legitimate question may arise: what are these vibrations, what are these tunings? But the fact that radio receivers and televisions are tuned to a definite wavelength is well known and scientifically explained. It is quite natural to suppose that the human psyche also somehow uses the principle of tuning. At least at the level of a hypothesis this should hardly call forth any special objections; but if physiologists were to discover such mechanisms, this would become a good basis for the confirmation of socionic hypotheses. But, after all, sight and hearing are based on the decoding of vibrational-wave processes.

“T: S → O+ (external changes of the object under the influence of the subject). According to [1], this is the external situation of the object among other objects, that is, its situation in time.”

Here, it seems, the conclusion is in no way connected either with the content of the initial assertion or with reality. For external changes of the object under the influence of the subject are the result of the activity of the subject, which belongs to the aspect of technology and, correspondingly, of logic, and not of time! Changes connected with time occur independently of the subject, and thus the scheme proposed by the author proves inadequate to the observed phenomenology. Further the author reasons in an analogous spirit, and as a result draws the conclusion that “not one of the rows of the structural classification of the elements of information metabolism contradicts their content in A. Augustinavichute.” It is already hard to agree with this, since even the cursory analysis presented above shows that V. V. Gulenko proposes certain definitions of his own — possibly not at all bad ones — but that there are substantial differences from what Aushra Augustinavichute proposes.

And further the author says that “all the white symbols are oriented toward the object, and all the black ones toward the subject: look at the cross-mark,” and that “therefore it is logical to come to the conclusion that the white symbols are extraverted and the black ones introverted.” That the symbols in the scheme are oriented toward the object or the subject depends on how the author of the article himself arranged and interpreted them; whereas the “logical” conclusion contradicts the basic definition of extraversion and introversion in socionics.

And one more fragment from the same article, from which one can understand how the author understands the relativity of extraversion and introversion. “Jung repeatedly stressed that the whole point is not in the absolute magnitude but in the preponderance of one or another orientation. For example, we see that although the elements L and R are both extraverted, L is more extraverted than R. This is clear from the practice of typological research: ethical evaluations are always more subject-oriented than logical ones.”

Here it is interesting that the experienced theorist and practitioner V. V. Gulenko evaluates in just this way these two most important parameters of the human psyche. He considers, and even with a reference to Jung, that informational aspects may be extraverted or introverted to a greater or lesser degree. However, if we understand introversion as a generalized parameter characterizing an internal model of the environment, and extraversion as a generalized parameter characterizing an instrumental model, the technological state of a subject mobilized for the transformation of the environment, we shall have to acknowledge that both elements considered by V. V. Gulenko are introverted to an equal degree.

I have no intention whatever of refuting anything here — that would be senseless, since according to the logical tradition one does not dispute about definitions, and the author’s position is the author’s position. However, even a cursory glance at the cited fragment of text is sufficient to make the supposition that the author has a certain axiomatic basis which is not explicitly declared but is used as something entirely self-evident. I wish to draw attention only to the fact that the pathos of the article is directed at asserting the idea of the possibility of a theoretical grounding of a view of extraversion-introversion opposite to that which exists in socionics, and to the evaluation, present at the end of the quotation, of the degree of extraversion-introversion, which in the author’s opinion, and with a reference to C. G. Jung, may be greater or lesser.

Let me at once state my position of principle. Extraversion-introversion represent fundamental categories which are the denotations of real properties of our world, and as such they bear an absolute and not a relative character. Their illusory relativity appears later: not in their primary archetypal determinateness, but in their everyday perception. I proceed from the hypothesis (which, it goes without saying, still needs to be grounded) that the archetypes of extraversion-introversion are the result of the dichotomous quantization of a primary reality which represents a unified whole but possesses an immanent capacity for self-transformations of various kinds. These transformations-restructurings do not destroy the primary wholeness of the one, but create the illusion of multiplicity, fragmentation and chaos. Without such fundamental suppositions, accepted as axioms, all the constructions of socionics acquire an accidental, non-obligatory, arbitrary and subjective character, which is justly held against it by orthodox-minded psychologists.

If the hypothesis indicated is correct, then from it necessarily follows the conclusion that extraversion-introversion, as it enters into the structure of Model “A,” has an invariant character, and that its apparent variations owe their origin to the superimposition of the semantic fields of other fundamental categories of socionics.

As for the evaluation of the relative vertness of the concepts designated by the symbols L (introverted thinking) and R (introverted feeling), then, again on the basis of the hypothesis expressed, this evaluation is of an empirical and not a theoretically conditioned character. The theoretical unclarity and incompleteness of such questions entails the absence of a methodologically verified foundation for the test methods with whose help socionists try to diagnose the socionic type. Apparently this circumstance is one of the causes of those difficulties which socionists encounter in attempting to establish the TIM of a concrete person or of a literary hero.

Model “G”

At present, in view of the wide dissemination of V. V. Gulenko’s works, many — and even, possibly, the majority of — socionists use not Model “A” at all but Model “G,” which is a certain reinterpretation of Model “A.” The problem here is that V. V. Gulenko apparently sincerely considers that he is using Model “A,” and did not even think it necessary to designate his model in any special way. Of course this may be put down to modesty, but the main thing here is that it is unclear to what extent V. V. Gulenko himself is aware of the difference between his model and Model “A.” Anyone who turns to the primary source will easily discover the difference between Model “A” and Model “G.” The most important difference is that in Model “A” identically named, differently verted functions work in parallel and not in series as in V. V. Gulenko, and therefore the numbering of the functions there is quite different from that in Model “G.” The working of Model “A,” unlike Model “G,” begins not with the program function (the first function in V. V. Gulenko) but with the adaptational-load function (Churyumov), or normative function (Gulenko), and the expectational-resource function (Churyumov), or suggestive function (Gulenko). In Aushra Augustinavichute these are functions, or half-beats, 1/1 and 1/2. Gulenko’s reinterpretation of Model “A” led, for example, to the appearance of a hard-to-explain jump from the painful function to the suggestive one, which does not exist in Aushra Augustinavichute; and subsequently this led to A. V. Bukalov, in assigning dimensionalities to functions, failing to take into account the symmetry of the painful and mobilizational functions, and also of the role and suggestive functions, which of course leads to distortions in the interpretation of Models “G” (Gulenko) and “B” (Bukalov).

Let us note the unconditional scientific achievement of V. V. Gulenko in the elaboration of the concept of temperament. I am convinced that he succeeded in finding the truth of this phenomenon, long known to mankind, whose theoretical and experimental grounding was worked on by many psychologists and physiologists, including such outstanding figures in science as I. P. Pavlov and P. V. Simonov, but whose theoretical structure nevertheless remained incomplete. V. V. Gulenko correlated the classical temperaments with those foursomes of socionic types in which the same informational aspects are connected with the first and third functions, which secures a high level of similarity in the temperamental manifestations of the corresponding types. As a result the classical temperaments acquired typological determinateness and a theoretical structure. I consider this an achievement of world level. It is interesting that before V. V. Gulenko several socionists had tried to establish a correspondence between temperaments and socionic types, but something was lacking in their attempts, and their work was never brought to completion.

Incidentally, another evaluation of the socionic temperaments singled out by Gulenko is also possible, on which the latter are merely analogous to the temperaments of Hippocrates–Galen and are not their theoretically grounded representation. In that case Gulenko’s temperaments have to be regarded as the designation of one of the possible groupings of socionic types; but then it is unclear why other groupings cannot be connected with the concept of temperament as well.

V. Meged and A. Ovcharov

Immediately adjoining V. V. Gulenko’s works, as far as I can judge, are the works of V. Meged and A. Ovcharov. This follows from the predominant references, from the terminology used, and also from elements of their approach to the elaboration of socionic problems. Like Gulenko, they criticize the author of socionics, pointing out, for example, that the system of names of the socionic types proposed by Aushra Augustinavichute “bears a figurative-artistic and humanitarian rather than a scientific character” [31]. This remark is interesting in that an evaluation of the scientific character of the construct proposed by Aushra Augustinavichute is introduced, and this must at least mean that the authors have a criterion of scientific character of their own. However, in science eponymous terms such as amperes and joules are widely used, and from the scientific point of view there is nothing reprehensible here — a perfectly scientific logical theory of naming imposes no prohibition here.

The authors’ attempt to name the types according to one or another functional feature can hardly in itself call forth objections; however, the concrete names for types and “subtypes” proposed by the authors not only fail to bring harmony into socionic terminology but, on the contrary, create the false conviction that the task has at last been solved, whereas the reader is frankly being misled, since the social-role terms offered him will easily suit not one type but several at once. And this does not merely reduce the diagnostic possibilities of such terms, it reduces them to zero. To fix the name Innovator to the ILE is of course possible. But this by definition and by default presupposes that no one apart from this type can be an innovator, which is obviously untrue. Properly speaking, representatives of all types can be innovators, but each in his own sphere and in his own manner. “Even” Don Quixote’s conflictor Dreiser may put forward innovative ideas in the aesthetic sphere and in the sphere of maintaining morality. And this is explained by the fact that representatives of all types can do everything and can appear in any social role, though with differing effectiveness. The untenability of the socially-role-motivated type names proposed by Bates and Keirsey was masked by the underdevelopment and theoretical immaturity of the American typology, for all its artificially created “brandedness.” Therefore the pairings Salesman — ESE (Hugo), Seeker — IEI (Yesenin) look obviously absurd. Completely one-sided are attempts to connect the concept of the Scientist with the LII (Robespierre) or of the Inventor with the ILE (Don Quixote), as though among scientists there were only Robespierres and all Robespierres were scientists, and as though the best inventors were Don Quixotes. Not at all. Statistically, in fact, there are more inventors and rationalizers among Robespierres, and as for Jacks, Gabins and Stirlitzes there is nothing even to be said. Perhaps a successful find of these authors proved to be the name Keeper for Dreiser; but it seems that a misunderstanding occurred here, since the American term “Guardian,” used by Keirsey, is more often understood as guardian, trustee, superior of a Franciscan monastery, good genius, or even a parachute, and only in the combination “guardian angel” does the meaning taken in the Russian translation appear. And nevertheless the name Keeper as applied to Dreiser, according to socionic concepts, looks quite acceptable. This gives hope that motivated names may be found for the other types as well. Unfortunately, all the names proposed by V. Meged and A. Ovcharov for types and “subtypes” do not stand up to criticism and are fit at most as exploratory attempts, but they should hardly be taken outside the bounds of the scholars’ intellectual laboratory. Especially unsuccessful and weakly motivated look the combinations of the general name of a type and two names of “subtypes.” For example, the authors propose the name Communicator for the type Hugo, and Popularizer and Guardian for its “subtypes.” Quite apart from the fact that the concept of Communicator is not a differentiating characteristic for the type Hugo, since Napoleons, Huxleys and Hamlets are by no means worse communicators, the concepts Popularizer and Guardian are also not correct logical divisions of the concept Communicator, since they are not more concrete varieties of it.

It is clear that the use of the term “subtype” in socionics is theoretically unmotivated — this was said above. Far better suited here are the terms “variety” or “variant”; however, it seems that the authors, displaying theoretical indiscriminateness or else stepping onto the shaky ground of empirical typologies, see no difference here.

The authors’ attempt to explain the diversity within a type is interesting. In my view they correctly single out the zones in which differences between people of one type are manifested. These are anatomy and physiology, the psyche, social position and ethnic peculiarities, religious and political preferences, intellectual peculiarities. Differences along these indicators they explain by “the manifestation of accents of character — the strengthening (accentuation) of definite traits of character within the framework of the given personality type.” As far as I can understand, an accent of character must mean something intermediate between a “norm of character,” that is, character without accent, and the various accentuations of its components — traits of personality and temperament, so definitely described in Leonhard. Accentuations according to Leonhard bring the personality to the boundary beyond which pathology begins. So what then is the role here of the “accents” of which the authors speak?

Judging by the text of the book [31], an accent of character, or “bio-accent,” strengthens the IA of the TIM, which secures for the personality a high level of abilities that can be connected with this aspect. The authors establish the following correspondences under an accent of an IA: accent e — PEACEMAKER; accent E — ROMANTIC; accent l — LOGICIAN; accent L — PROFESSIONAL; accent i — FORECASTER; accent I — FANTASIST; accent s — EPICUREAN; accent S — VICTOR. How is all this to be understood? What do the categories set in italics mean? Obviously these are names of sociotypes, that is, of generalized social roles. Why precisely these roles have been singled out? Perhaps they are basic, or most frequently encountered, or most preferable? It would seem that this follows from nowhere. And it seems that we are returning to the same idea of socially motivated namings of socionic types. And if the authors’ idea is correct, then, for example, the best PEACEMAKERS are the bearers of types which have e in their leading functions. These are four types: Dostoevsky, Dreiser, Huxley and Napoleon. It is quite possible that bearers of these types may be good PEACEMAKERS, but there are no grounds whatever for considering that in the role of peacemakers Hugos, Hamlets, Dumas and Yesenins will be worse — simply because they are ethical types too. But the main thing here is all the same that the concepts singled out belong to the class of the blurred, and they may be understood within wide limits depending on subjective preferences.

In introducing the very unfortunate, in my view, term “accent,” and all the more “bio-accent” (here “bio” is obviously connected not with biology but with biography), for designating the emphasis of some parameter of the personality, and in setting it in opposition to Leonhard’s system of accentuations, the authors commit at least two errors. First, the term “accent,” from a general scientific point of view, indicates the conscious singling out of something (“to place an accent”); but in the case of a TIM there can be no question of a conscious emphasizing by the bearer of the type of the IAs of his functions. If such functions and their aspects prove to be singled out, then this may be designated by the term “accentuation” as a strengthening not controlled by the will of the subject, but by no means by the term “accent.” And secondly, the term “accent” is a poor replacement also for the term “psychic radical,” connected with the works of E. Kretschmer, in relative continuity with which appeared the developments of Leonhard, the typology of Lichko’s laboratory, and the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI).

On the whole the authors are stepping onto the path of theoretical eclecticism, when into one conglomerate (but not into one whole!) fragments from various theoretical and semi-empirical developments are gathered. Possibly this is not bad raw material, a semi-finished product for further research, but it is not the product which a scholar brings out for general view. The impression of the authors’ eclectic position is strengthened still more when one learns that they are trying to build into socionics even Dellinger’s psycho-forms — a product plainly intermediate, though skilfully and to great personal advantage exploited by its author. No, it is not that this simple little construct is altogether bad. Undoubtedly it reflects some moment of reality, but alongside socionics it looks like an underdeveloped though viable larva, and to build it into socionics as something independent is all the same as attaching cart wheels to an aeroplane instead of a landing gear. This construct is entirely covered by socionics. It is another matter that the observations gathered under it can, with the necessary labour expended, be identified with the phenomenology of the socionic functions. But that is not what the authors are talking about.

An unconditional achievement of the authors is their consideration of eight shades of the concept of love, of which two belong personally to them and had not been considered in the literature before — analita and victoria. It is quite plausible that the six shades of love known already in Ancient Greece are not the complete set, and that in the light of socionics it could be supplemented to eight categories if one supposes that to each IA there corresponds its own shade. And the pages devoted to this theme are perhaps the best in their book [31]. This theme is considered in somewhat more detail in the chapter devoted to love and sex.

The book of V. Meged and A. Ovcharov may prove useful and interesting for people unacquainted with psychology, since there are many psychological concepts in it that intrigue the imagination. The book is written with temperament and gathers a large array of psychological information which, outside the eclectic conception, represents a certain value for whose sake this book may be used as a reference aid. As for the theoretical eclecticism, against the background of the lowered requirements many contemporary scholars make of their own work there is no special harm in it, provided it is not imposed on uninitiated people as the last word of scientific methodology. There are whole directions in psychology which pride themselves on an eclectic approach, that is, on the ability to use heterogeneous material taken from different sources for the solution of diverse practical tasks, while the theoretical quality of the constructs developed is already a matter of taste.

A considerably more verified and effective exposition of socionic typology may be found in the books of V. Stratievskaya, E. Filatova, or E. Udalova and L. Beskova.

Bukalov A. V.

Bukalov A. V., one of the founders of the Kiev school of socionics, director of the International Institute of Socionics (IIS), is an exceptionally talented and broadly erudite scholar. His knowledge in theoretical physics, history, psychology, sociology and other sciences is deep and varied. He long ago settled on his methodological basis, which may be designated as intuitive physical fundamentalism. He himself designates his approach as integral. When I first began discussing socionic problems with him back in 1987, I was struck above all by the extreme coincidence of many elements of our thinking. When he began to speak of quantization, fields, spatial dimensionalities and so on as applied to the psyche — these were precisely the terms I had used in an article never sent off to Znanie–Sila. I experienced no difficulties whatever in understanding what Bukalov said, nor, incidentally, do I now. More than once I have had occasion to discover with surprise that he refers to and cites books and articles from rare journals which, as I thought, no one in the socionic crowd apart from me had read. Characteristic of A. V. Bukalov is a reliance on physical and physicalist conceptions in general and on quantum-mechanical conceptions in particular. Properly speaking, there is nothing surprising in this — all those who came into socionics from other spheres of science brought with them the methodological complexes they had absorbed there. What is surprising is that, from my point of view, quantum-mechanical concepts proved adequate as applied to socionics. I know that far from all socionists accept A. V. Bukalov’s ideas, especially those concerning generalized social conceptions — for example, the law of the succession of quadras or the integral descriptions of ethnoi — but this is precisely the case where people’s methodological complexes fail to mesh. One of his remarkable achievements is the complex model of society built on the basis of Model “A” [4]. This model makes it possible to describe instrumentally the structure of society, its state, the relations between its structural elements and much else.

However, it is not by chance that I called his methodological complex intuitive physical fundamentalism. His ideas and works have a fundamental sweep. Unfortunately, his intuitive insights — vivid, substantial and inspiring, but not reinforced by equally fundamental empirical research — are often perceived by a broad audience as the prophecies of the Delphic oracle. Why, if he approaches any self-respecting psychologist with ideas about a psycho-informational space and its quantization, then at best he will not be understood, and he may quite reasonably be asked what fundamental experiments in psychology confirm all this. References to a few psychics, and moreover without properly drawn-up protocols, will be received not only as unserious but most likely as provocative, since in the scientific paradigm psychics are as yet not valued. And until it proves possible to demonstrate empirically that a psycho-informational space really exists (I personally have no doubt of this), that it can be subjected to measuring procedures and possesses experimentally confirmable properties such as quantization, interference or diffraction, all of A. V. Bukalov’s remarkable ideas, despite the practical value of the theoretical results he has obtained, will remain no more than hypotheses. A scientific attitude to the matter requires that ideas not confirmed in a specially organized experiment be qualified as hypotheses. Neither the author’s personal conviction, nor practical usefulness, nor the internal logical coherence of theoretical constructions, nor yet recognition by individual members of the scientific community, constitute proof of the truth of hypotheses. Only a specially organized experiment accessible to repeated reproduction by other scholars turns a well-structured hypothesis into a theory.

Thanks to A. V. Bukalov’s witty idea of the fractal structure of the psyche and of the phenomena connected with it, we can imagine how macro-groups are formed. The small group of 7 people well known in psychology may be understood as a truncated group of 8 people; that is, structural-energetic laws presuppose and secure the existence of a corresponding structure of 8 elements. However, by virtue of some empirical limitations, psychologists have managed to discover the existence only of the seven-element structure, whereas theory says that this is a defect of observation and that a complete structure consisting of 8 elements must exist. One can just imagine how people will be found to ridicule this eight as socionists’ idée fixe. But ridicule is the simplest of matters; whereas to unfold an adequate theoretical construction capable of setting something against this idea is far from within everyone’s power.

In any case, this idea proposed by a theorist quite permits empirical verification, and the socionic eight is simply the third level of dichotomous quantization, described by the formula N = 2ⁿ; which means that the eight is preceded by a four, and the four by a two. And after the eight follow sixteen, thirty-two and so on.

V. D. Ermak

Undoubtedly this is a remarkable enthusiast of socionics. He is a strong theorist and a strong logical type. He has done much for the promotion of socionics, and personally he arouses in me unfeigned admiration for the virtuosity with which he operates the concept of a model in general, and of Model “A” in particular. Besides, he possesses excellent oratorical and pedagogical skills. His methodological complex may be designated — and here hardly anyone will object — as theoretical-systemic realism, with which he came into socionics from his previous place of work.

But there is a point in his theoretical constructions on which I differ from him in principle. And this would of course be my personal affair if it did not concern socionics. The matter concerns his uncritical use, as I understand it, of systems-theoretical concepts. It would seem: what limitations could there be in the use of such a splendid discipline as systems theory with its colossal achievements in the field of engineering? Systems theory may by right be called the methodology of engineering. And when I listened to his reports on this theme, I thought that a splendid methodological move had really been found, capable of grounding socionic concepts. However, a deeper analysis led me to the conclusion that systems theory is not competent to give such a grounding. The point is that the level of abstraction of socionics is higher than the level of abstraction at which systems theory stands. Of course, representatives of socionic practice may disagree with me, since they apply socionics to the solution of quite concrete problems. The socionic model represents an algebraic category [8], and thus corresponds to the level of mathematical abstraction. Systems theory, at best, represents merely a subset of mathematical equations and their interpretation. And it is obvious that systems theory cannot be applied to mathematics, because mathematics is primarily systemic; whereas the reverse — applying mathematics in systems theory — is of course possible, exactly as one can apply systems theory in agriculture but cannot apply agriculture to systems theory, precisely because of the difference in the levels of abstraction. But one methodologist will not be able to explain this to another because of the difference in their methodological complexes.

Nevertheless, V. D. Ermak’s book [9] on socionics is one of the best to have appeared in the last several years. In it, for the first time, from a unified methodological position with systems theory at its base, he has tried to explain and ground the basic socionic concepts. The author sincerely believes in the effectiveness of the systems-theoretical approach as applied to socionics, and his confidence is captivating. Good style and impeccable logic belong to the unconditional merits of the book. The book contains a significant quantity of methodological landmarks, which has special significance for the further development of socionics. Unfortunately, he did not manage to do without generally offensive words such as “verbal debauchery” and “drivel” with respect to a presumed but unnamed opponent, and this is precisely what constitutes a departure from the academic style of discussing contentious questions.

The author, relying on the ideas of Medvedev, quite logically, having accepted the initial suppositions, introduces such basic concepts as informational aspects, and then, using the theoretical propositions of systems theory, tries to disclose the internal mechanism of the psyche represented by Model “A.”

However, what he obtains, though it undoubtedly has a right to existence, is no longer Model “A” but represents one of its interpretations, and may therefore be named after its author Model “E.” This is a not bad, quite correct model, and possibly it will find not a few followers, although the semantics of the functions proposed by the author with the use of systems-theoretical concepts does not coincide with the semantics of Model “A.” On its basis one may effectively analyse the peculiarities of the corresponding TIMs, but its basic drawback is of a methodological character and comes down to the fact that systems theory, used as a theoretical base for grounding a model of the psyche, is not competent in this field and itself stands in need of a grounding, which is precisely what is to be expected from the side of socionics.

G. A. Shulman

G. A. Shulman, who has done much for socionics and in socionics, is from the point of view of the methodological problems of socionics of special interest — he is almost the only one who has reflected upon and clearly formulated his methodological principles [25–27], which of course makes his position more vulnerable to criticism. But, as the saying goes, if you call yourself a mushroom, get into the basket.

Since G. A. Shulman in his appearances at conferences often, within the framework of ethical argumentation, uses a hint at “someone” who considers his theoretical developments idiocy (he puts it just so: “…Shulman’s idiocy…”), I shall at once stipulate that I personally do not consider G. A. Shulman’s developments idiocy. I have known him for many years and am deeply convinced that he is a talented poet-translator, a talented pedagogue, a talented orator and a talented journalist; but of course all these talents do not belong among the logical arguments that prove the truth of his socionic constructs. However, from a scientific point of view, the story of G. A. Shulman’s configuration (KSh — see the chapter on socionic configurations) is of interest in many respects. G. A. Shulman has been occupied with socionics from the very beginning of its appearance in Kiev. He does this with maximum dedication. He is undoubtedly one of the best connoisseurs of socionics. Thanks to him a large number of people have become acquainted with socionics and have become his students. He worked for many years in a scientific research institute and has great experience of scientific work. His scientific work at the Paton Welding Institute was marked by a state prize. And since this is an authoritative scholar, his scientific work in socionics is of interest even in the case that certain of its links have proved erroneous or even merely open to doubt. On the one hand, errors do occur in the work of scholars. On the other hand, it still has to be proved that such errors have taken place. And besides, an analysis of such errors, if of course they exist, may prove instructive above all in the methodological respect, and as an admonition to new generations of socionists, lest they think that creating a science is an altogether simple matter. Alongside remarkable creative achievements, heavy disappointments and even tragedies are possible here. And nevertheless truth demands a principled attitude. Therefore, having offered all possible apologies, let us try to make sense of one of the most contested constructions in socionics.

The methodological principles of G. A. Shulman

Among the principles formulated by G. A. Shulman as having direct relation to scientific research there are such as the principle of relative reliability, the principle of the error of the measuring instrument (brought by him from the technology of metalworking), and also the principle of beauty as a criterion of truth. This makes it possible, purely conventionally and by way of the ordinary terminological marking of an observed phenomenon, to designate his methodological complex as instrumental-aesthetic relativism. If anyone has objections, I am ready to discuss this question. However, I shall say at once that since he formulates his methodological propositions at the level of principles, this by definition presupposes their thoroughgoing use in scientific work, and as a totality of principles they deserve the generalized name given above. These principles deserve special discussion above all because they lay claim to fundamentality on a par with the principles used in the methodology of science. Besides, they are interesting as the methodological creativity of a scholar who is not a professional in the field of methodology.

When the talk is of the principle of relative reliability, then in this case, behind the general scientific sense of the words used here, one may fail to grasp that in G. A. Shulman the matter concerns not — or rather, not only — the ordinary incompleteness of human knowledge at one or another stage of the development of science. As far as I could understand when listening to his explanations concerning this principle, what is presupposed here, among other things, is the non-justiciability of a result obtained by a scholar by criteria external with respect to the result; and within the framework of socionics such a criterion becomes the “TIM-ic” position of any other person. Therefore no one can judge the scientific results of a scholar whose type is, for example, IEI, if the critic has a different TIM. This is not always pronounced, but is well felt in the subtext (“information flows in one direction,” “no one hears me”). Yet it is obvious that here G. A. Shulman at best unconsciously distorts the situation, and at worst is being disingenuous, since it is generally known that among his students and admirers there are different types who, it turns out, do hear him and information does flow in one direction — from him to them.

There is another aspect of this principle too, which may be caught in the following words of G. A. Shulman: “Let us suppose that the result obtained is correct, and let us see what comes of it.” Here we at once fall into the trap, well known in logic, of circularity in proof. If, having supposed that the result is correct, we obtain from it conclusions which we shall perceive as correct, then on this basis we must acknowledge the correctness of the result as well — which had been supposed in advance. In practice this reasoning may be sufficiently masked and hard to detect, but its essence remains the same. Possibly G. A. Shulman, having supposed the correctness of the initial premises he adopted in KSh, considers the results obtained from these premises correct, and, having acknowledged the results obtained to be correct, on the basis of the principle of relative reliability considers the initial premises to be correct.

In article [25] G. A. Shulman describes this principle in the following words: “The principle of relative reliability, postulating the direct obtaining of a result in dependence on the premises laid down — naturally, with a certain coefficient of system response, in the present research conventionally taken as tending without limit to 1.” Perhaps to someone the formulation cited seems very clear and self-evident, but I do not belong to the number of such people. Therefore I shall try to elucidate its sense, at least for myself. It is not excluded that my understanding is incorrect.

So then: there are certain premises. These premises depend on us, because we laid them down. From these premises we obtain a result directly (that is, without any mediating links?), but this is possible not thanks to the rules of logic but precisely thanks to the principle of relative reliability. If the talk were of logical rules, then these could be, for example, the rules of logical syllogisms and their figures. But the talk is not of logical rules for obtaining a result from premises, which would guarantee one-hundred-per-cent reliability, but of a principle of relative reliability. This I understand to mean that if it seems to us that the result is plausible to at least some degree, that is, that it possesses at least some reliability, however relative it may be, then this is sufficient for us to be able to accept such a result.

True, there is also the coefficient of system response. Possibly this coefficient is somehow calculated; perhaps it can be obtained as the result of some empirical procedure. Besides, it is not very clear to me what “system response” means. The most I can extract from myself is that, interacting somehow with the system, we may sense the degree of reliability of the result obtained. But what happens if the coefficient of system response tends without limit to 1? As I understand it, then reliability, from relative, tends without limit to absolute. If anyone understands the cited formulation of the principle of relative reliability differently, then please explain. But if my understanding is correct, then this must mean that G. A. Shulman considers the reliability of the construct he has built to be absolute. Even if he denies this, it is indicated by that deep conviction with which he persuades his students of it, and by that persistence with which he defends the result obtained by him from the premises accepted in that distant time when we were only just becoming acquainted with socionics and, as I now understand it, understood very little in it.

One may also try to grasp the sense G. A. Shulman puts into this principle from the following explanation in his article: “…from my point of view, virtually the whole of modern science is built on this principle — at least since the moment of the introduction into scientific terminology of the concept of ‘ideal gas’.” Here, it seems, something quite different is meant than in the previous explanation. A real object, because of its complexity, is replaced by an “ideal object” which possesses only a part of the characteristics of the real one but is well described mathematically, and this description is then accepted as a first approximation to the real object. But this is nothing other than the method of modelling accepted in science. Yes, a model does not fully coincide with the object of modelling. And therefore the results obtained with the help of a model reflect the behaviour of the real object only partially. And in this sense they may be called relative (because they are not absolute); but, while not reflecting all the parameters of the object, the results obtained with the help of modelling do reflect the essential and real parameters of the object under investigation, and in this sense they are absolute. And here relativity acts not at all as ephemerality and non-obligatoriness, but only as partiality. And therefore “ideal gas” has no relation whatever to the principle of relative reliability in the sense of arbitrariness. But all the same it is not very clear what the analogy is between “ideal gas” and G. A. Shulman’s configuration (KSh), or, what is the same thing, PSSSh — Shulman’s periodic system of the socion.

The principle of relative reliability, as a possible methodological category, deserves to be examined more attentively. The point is that without additional explication it may be construed in different ways. Above all, if we accept the concept of relative reliability not in itself, as a limitation that has its place in this world, but as a principle, then this may mean, for example, the recognition that reliability is always relative and never absolute. In such a formulation this principle acquires a negative potential, condemning the researcher to a likewise relative effectiveness and limiting his search from above at the expense of lowering the requirements of reliability. Or else, another possibility: the acceptance of such a principle may mean that we take upon ourselves the obligation to follow this principle undeviatingly and at all costs, consciously orienting ourselves toward results whose reliability may be any at all, including doubtful. Incidentally, such an obligation may not be formulated explicitly at all, but may function in an unconscious regime as an unformulated conviction. In both cases this principle begins to work as a self-fulfilling prophecy, provoking and justifying a lowered verifiability.

An understanding of the simple fact that reliability may fluctuate within wide limits from zero to the maximum possible is a useful landmark in the work of a researcher, prompting him so far as possible to raise the degree of reliability. But the acceptance of the relativity of reliability as a fundamental principle belongs to the level of a world-view of relativist type with all the negative consequences flowing therefrom. But of course, under conditions of pluralism and liberalism every scholar may adhere to any views whatever.

When relative reliability is proclaimed as a principle, then a working scholar often finds it hard to set anything against it. For on the philosophical level one can easily insist that reliability is always relative. And if one adds a reference to the physical limitations of measuring instruments, then not everyone will find what can be objected here at all. Everything, it would seem, is obvious. However, there is a great difference between a practical evaluation of the degree of reliability in each concrete case and the ultimate generalization of the concept of relative reliability to the level of a philosophical principle. At this level a simple working fact turns into a monster whose unsleeping eye will zombify the working scholar day and night. In NLP there are indications of the limiting, blocking and demoralizing role of such generalizations.

Personally, since I construct my thought somehow entirely differently, I should very much like to understand in what manner G. A. Shulman thinks (as, incidentally, do all other socionists) and to reproduce, to model his thought and result, in order to understand what stands behind it; but since a quite different socionic type corresponds to me, this is not at all simple to do.

Let us take on trust that the principles set forth constitute the basis of G. A. Shulman’s convictions and that he consistently uses them not only in his scientific but also in his everyday practice, and also that I am expounding them in accordance with his understanding. If, however, I understand him incorrectly, then all my reasoning has no relation whatever to G. A. Shulman. And then their only use is that they show how complexly and ambiguously the bearer of one socionic type may perceive the bearer of another socionic type. And this may serve as an additional illustration of why in science generally, and in socionics in particular, there is so much mutual misunderstanding. In any case, the present text may be regarded as “material evidence” of the interaction of two socionic types at the theoretical level.

Since G. A. Shulman is a talented poet, his carrying-through of the principle of beauty in everyday life can hardly call forth objections — it is so natural that from a poet’s point of view everything should be beautiful, and this can be understood. But the acceptance of the principle of beauty as a scientific criterion in no way corresponds to the existing scientific paradigm, where the principle of objectivity reigns; and about tastes, which determine what is beautiful and what is not, as the saying goes, one does not dispute — de gustibus non disputandum. And from a scientific point of view it would be entirely absurd to take for truth socionic symbols beautifully arranged on a sheet of paper. Of course, if scientific results are set forth beautifully, hardly anyone will argue against that, but they must above all be true. Yet there have been cases when truth was inscribed in a crooked hand on a scrap of paper, and did not thereby lose its dignity.

I am the bearer of a different socionic type, and if I were asked which principle I would put in first place in life, I would name the principle of truth. Everything must above all be true, and only then — and even then only after several other principles (kindness, justice, nobility) — let everything be beautiful as well. And beauty alone, beauty for beauty’s sake, has never saved the world and never will, as one of the secondary heroes of the great writer hoped. It is not surprising that a true theory may possess aesthetic features and merits; but a beautiful theory — and, by the way, what would that mean? that the author likes it? — will by no means necessarily prove true. The principle of beauty belongs to art, and in science it can at best play a heuristic but by no means a probative role. In order finally to bury the principle of beauty as a criterion of scientific reliability, let us present one of the possible variants of proof by contradiction as applied to KSh (of course, this proof may prove rather disagreeable, but logic is logic).

The untenability of the principle of beauty as a criterion of scientific reliability. Proof by contradiction

Let us suppose that KSh, which meets the criterion of beauty since it has an ultimate coefficient of harmony, is also the bearer of a certain scientific truth, and that this truth is determined precisely by the high coefficient of harmony. Moreover this coefficient, on the author’s testimony, is even somewhat higher than that of the Egyptian pyramids. This coefficient is calculated on the basis of the parameters of geometrical form and in no way depends on what is inside the pyramid (though this too could be taken into account) or on what is written on its surface by accidental or non-accidental passers-by. And since this coefficient relates to the geometrical form of the configuration, then apparently it does not depend on the filling of the configuration, which in that case represents a highly artistic frame into which the most varied content may be inserted. And since the principle of markedness does not influence the calculation of this coefficient, one may insert into KSh any conflict pair whatever. The coefficient of harmony would not thereby change, and consequently the aesthetic quality of the configuration would not change, and it, by virtue of the principle of beauty, would guarantee the truth of the content inserted there, with all the consequences flowing therefrom. But if the truth of the content depends above all on the markedness of the corresponding conflict pair, then what has the principle of beauty to do with it?

However, G. A. Shulman believes in the principle of beauty, and in his work “A Picture of Intertype Relations” of 1998 one may see an instrumental attempt to use this principle when he writes: “…taking into account the fulfilment of the requirements of the Principle of Beauty, I introduced a second interaction of TIMs along identically named heteroverted functions (along functions of identical form but different vertness). And immediately the Principle of Beauty manifested itself once again (emphasis mine — S. Ch.)….” Note: not according to the sense of the interaction of real bearers of TIMs, which, by observing people, one could discover empirically, but formally, because it will be beautiful that way. One may agree with the heuristic hint contained in the symmetry and connected with the guess of joining heteroverted functions by analogy with the joinings of homoverted functions; but further, according to scientific notions, it is necessary to confirm empirically the existence of such connections between real bearers of TIMs, and not to consider such connections really existing on the basis of the principle of beauty. Alas, such work, so far as I know, has not been carried out. And that means that heterogeneous connections may be considered at most a beautiful hypothesis.

I, on various indirect indications, consider this hypothesis improbable, and as an argument can say the following. The interaction between mono-aspect functions G. A. Shulman evaluates as a system of orders, and the interaction of functions with identically named but differently verted aspects as a system of requests. However, no empirical grounds are visible for introducing into socionics the concepts proposed by G. A. Shulman, since socionic relations are relations of types, not of people. Socionic relations are determined by the positional connection of mono-aspect functions, and not by the content of the verbal constructions which bearers of TIMs may use when interacting with one another. But to see the inappropriateness of the concepts proposed by G. A. Shulman it is sufficient to consider the interaction of identicals. In Model “AYu” all their functions have identical filling, but this does not mean that identicals exchange exclusively orders and ignore requests altogether. Besides, the supposition about heteroverted connections loses all sense when not Model “AYu” but Model “A” is used, since in it there is a full set of functions and homoverted connections may be drawn between all of them.

According to another of G. A. Shulman’s principles, referring to the error of the measuring instrument (and in socionics the measuring instruments are people who are bearers of a definite type), the bearer of any TIM, working with any object, from the point of view of any other TIM inevitably permits an error. But if in the objective world, dealing with a real object at the practical level, one can still somehow coordinate one’s behaviour, then in the space of subjective theoretical constructs this cannot possibly be done because of TIM-ic differences, and therefore such constructs are not subject to criticism. They are simply accepted or not accepted.

I think that the word error in this context distorts the essence of the matter. A different vision, a vision of an object or situation from the point of view of another TIM, is not an error or a mistake — it is simply a different vision, a different picture, a different angle, a different aspect, which expresses a definite part of the truth. And if this different vision discloses the corresponding part of the nature of the object, then it reflects the corresponding part of the truth; and if it does not disclose it, then references to the relativity of vision are here beside the point. G. A. Shulman’s use of methodological devices dubious from a scientific point of view in itself compromises the possible results in advance, though it does indicate its author’s ability to create original methodological constructs.

Having set forth these preliminary considerations, let us pass to an attempt to make sense of what G. A. Shulman calls PSS — the periodic system of the socion. But let us at once stipulate a simple and obvious condition, according to which the discovery in any socionic configuration of magical, mystical and other non-logical symbols has no relation to the scientific value of the construct. Therefore, if in the configuration, with certain additional efforts, one succeeds in discovering the Chinese monad or the remarkable star of David and the seal of Solomon, then, despite the beauty and magical power of these symbols, this cannot serve as proof that the socionic sense declared with respect to the configuration can be extracted from it.

Probably the author has the right to name his construct as he considers necessary. However, until the circumstances are clarified I shall use for this the term “Shulman’s configuration” (KSh). I might have called it G. A. Shulman’s system, but undesirable semantic associations are possible in that case. I choose the term configuration for two reasons. First, I wish to make sense of whether KSh possesses the properties declared with respect to it; and secondly, the term “configuration” is neutral and reflects the geometrical form and structure of this construct. So that in any case, whether KSh is what G. A. Shulman thinks it is or is not, a configuration it is by definition, and this in no way diminishes its potential possibilities and merits.

From the very first moment when G. A. Shulman, somewhere in 1987, showed me the very first sketch of this configuration, two impressions arose in me intuitively at once. First: how beautiful this is. Second: can this really, with such a quantity of weakly motivated assumptions, correspond to the postulated sense? Since then, over the course of many years, I have tried to make sense of it — does it correspond or does it not? — and the results of my attempts I tried to convey in a very mild form to G. A. Shulman. I did not use abusive words. I used only logical arguments. Of course they might have been inadequate, since initially, by definition, I was not supposed to understand the deep sense of the configuration proposed. Even now I do not insist that I understand it, but I am prepared to sit an examination on PSS and I should like to receive logical answers to my doubts. I should not like to receive, in reply to my logical reasoning, ethical objections. Objections of that kind are called, in the theory of argumentation, tricks.

To such tricks belong references to authorities, references to good people who share the author’s opinion (argumentum ad hominem), negative emotional reactions directed at the opponent, hints at the opponent’s malice and baseness, the use of the means of NLP — which any experienced pedagogue, orator and journalist commands — for the non-logical implantation of one’s ideas in the consciousness of students, and so on.

The basic logical method which I used in attempts to communicate my point of view and my doubts to all interested parties is parallel modelling. I never once said that G. A. Shulman’s configuration does not correspond to the declared sense; I simply proposed an analogous configuration in which I changed one, two, three or more parameters, and proposed that we look at what comes of it. But so far I have not been heard. At this I take no offence — among people, and all the more among scholars, this happens often.

Of course, apart from the negative result — that I have apparently made myself an enemy (an ethical argument) — there were positive ones too: logical argumentation began to come in to me as well. The weightiest and best-grounded was the argument about the markedness of the conflict pair LSE–IEI. Here I am especially grateful to A. Pereverzev for his splendidly argued report presented by L. Prudnikova at the XX socionic conference. The basic sense of A. Pereverzev’s argumentation in favour of the markedness of the tetrads declared consists in the fact that all the elements of the LSE tetrad may be described as connected with the concept of discreteness, while all the elements of the IEI tetrad may be described as connected with the concept of continuity, continuality. To a logical argument I shall reply with a logical argument. Lads, did you try to find the integral concepts standing behind the remaining tetrads? If not, then there is nothing to be contrasted with, and there is no background against which one can stand out. Of course, unless one counts as markedness the fact that the authors occupied themselves with precisely this conflict pair.

I carried out the corresponding work and formulated it as the theme “The problem of markedness in socionics.”

The problem of markedness in socionics

Let us pose the question directly and simply. Do marked types exist in the socion? From the most general methodological considerations the answer must be negative, since the combinatorial mechanisms lying at the base of the construction of the types do not create conditions for the appearance of markedness. In the natural series of numbers, as a combinatorially neutral set, there are no marked elements, although there are no identical ones among them. If, however, someone wishes to single out some number, this can be done only by introducing a definite criterion. If you wish to single out unity in the natural series by posing the question of which number is the very first, then in exactly the same way you may single out the five by posing the question of which number is the very fifth. Analogously, you may single out Don Quixote in the socion by posing the question of who in the socion is the most intuitive-logical extravert. In exactly the same way you may choose a criterion for singling out any type in the socion. This is possible because every TIM represents a certain vividly expressed quality. And in this sense all TIMs are marked. But precisely by virtue of their equality of rights with respect to the criterion of markedness, not one type in the socion is marked.

In exactly the same way there are no marked relations. Simply because each of them may lay claim to this role, since behind each relation there stands a certain vividly expressed quality. The same reasoning is applicable to any of the 256 possible pairs of socionic types. To discriminate against any pair of TIMs whatever would be a manifestation of socionic chauvinism (an ethical argument).

If we now take the eight conflict pairs and ask whether there is a marked one among them, then, from the most general methodological considerations, the answer must be negative. To single out a pair from this set is possible only according to some criterion. If we are invited to see the homogeneity in the tetrads of Stirlitz and Yesenin according to the criterion discreteness–continuity, then of course this homogeneity is not hard to see, because it is there, and any perceptive person will be able to discover it. But if one poses the question of which conflict pair stands out according to the feature change–preservation, then the marked pair proves to be Don Quixote–Dreiser. In exactly the same way, each of the remaining pairs corresponds to a certain criterion, as is shown in Table 19.01.

In the last pair I preferred to replace the integral quality discreteness–continuity by “discipline–unconstraint,” by virtue of the psychological rather than physical character of the objects under consideration; however, if someone wishes to pass to more abstract integral qualities of the tetrads, then of course he can easily do so. Only in that case it is necessary to pass to a consideration of the corresponding abstract objects.

Table 19.01

Conflict pair	Criterion of markedness
Don Quixote–Dreiser	change–preservation
Jack–Dumas	production–consumption
Hugo–Balzac	pressure–restraint
Hamlet–Gabin	dramatism–practicality
Huxley–Maxim	improvisation–order
Zhukov–Dostoevsky	dictatorship–humanism
Napoleon–Robespierre	lawlessness–justice
Stirlitz–Yesenin	discipline–unconstraint

I do not insist on the absolute unambiguity of the criteria singled out, and their semantics may be refined; but I do insist on the existence of an integral quality inherent in each tetrad, and on the fact that according to the criterion of such an integral quality each conflict pair may be considered marked. For a better survey of all the tetrads, the corresponding data are presented in Table 19.02. Note that the poles of the tetrads in this table form a regular structure, thanks to which the poles are distributed evenly in the table, and this too may be considered a heuristic hint against the hypothesis of markedness. Here we are dealing with a tabular form of the representation of a law.

Table 19.02 (ex = extraversion, in = introversion; ir = irrationality, ra = rationality; it = intuition, sn = sensorics; lg = logic, et = ethics)

Ki–Dr	Dyu–Dzh	Gyu–Ba	Ro–Na	Gm–Gb	Go–Ge	Zhu–Do	Es–Sht
ex-in	in-ex	ex-in	in-ex	ex-in	in-ex	ex-in	in-ex
ir-ra	ir-ra	ra-ir	ra-ir	ra-ir	ra-ir	ir-ra	ir-ra
it-sn	sn-it	sn-it	it-sn	it-sn	sn-it	sn-it	it-sn
lg-et	et-lg	et-lg	lg-et	et-lg	lg-et	lg-et	et-lg

Of course, a scholar may have subconscious motives for singling out one or another socionic concept. Such a motive can be identified in a psychoanalytic session, but such motives belong to the category of values and consequently cannot be considered logical arguments. One may, for example, suppose that Aushra Augustinavichute placed Don Quixote at the head of the socion because she herself belongs to this type. However, I think that in Aushra Augustinavichute’s case her sharpened logical intuition worked, and that she placed Don Quixote precisely where he ought to stand; but the logical arguments in favour of this I have given in the chapter on differentiating traits.

Of course it goes without saying that if one substitutes another conflict pair into G. A. Shulman’s configuration, then, other things being equal — that is, preserving all the peculiarities of G. A. Shulman’s configuration except markedness — the conclusions from it will already be different. So that if the argument about non-markedness is accepted, then logical argumentation against the remaining arbitrary assumptions in G. A. Shulman’s configuration will already be superfluous.

An example of filling G. A. Shulman’s configuration (Fig. 9.08) on the basis of the conflict pair ILE–ESI is presented in Table 19.03. This configuration differs in nothing from KSh except for one thing: instead of the conflict pair LSE–IEI, the conflict pair ILE–ESI has been inserted into it. Of course this is possible only in the case that we do not accept the idea of markedness. Personally I have no logical grounds for accepting this idea. Therefore the configuration presented above is for me not a whit worse than KSh; but now in the same places stand entirely different types, and on the same grounds as in KSh. And this means that all the calculated coefficients preserve the same values for the same places, but no longer for the same types. Thus, for example, what G. A. Shulman calls KI — the coefficient of relative intensity — will prove identical for different pairs occupying identical places in different variants of the filling of KSh (Tables 19.04 and 19.05). The matter stands analogously with the coefficient of disharmony KD, which will reach its maximum at the poles of the conflict dyad over which the configuration is built up; and in the end, if one considers all eight polar configurations, this maximum will be ascribed to all the types of the socion. So how then is all this to be interpreted?

Table 19.03 (KSh built on ILE–ESI, with the codes of Table 19.02’s binary notation)

LIE 0111	SEI 1000	EIE 0101	SLI 1010
SLE 1011	EII 0100	ILE 1111	SEE 1001
LII 0110	ESI 0000	IEE 1101	LSI 0010
IEI 1100	LSE 0011	ILI 1110	ESE 0001

Table 19.04

LSI 0111	IEI 1000	ESI 0101	ILE 1010
LIE 1011	SEI 0100	LSE 1111	EIE 1001
SLI 0110	IEI 0000	ESE 1101	ILI 0010
SEE 1100	LII 0011	SLE 1110	EII 0001

Table 19.05

ILI 0111	ESE 1000	IEI 0101	LSE 1010
SLE 1011	EII 0100	ILE 1111	SEE 1001
LII 0110	ESI 0000	IEE 1101	LSI 0010
EIE 1100	SLI 0011	LII 1110	SEI 0001

Thus all the substantive conclusions which were drawn by G. A. Shulman from KSh rest on the assertion of the markedness of a concrete conflict pair and of the tetrads connected with it. And so, just as in the old military anecdote, when the commander of an artillery battery in a report to a superior officer enumerates seventeen reasons why the battery could not open fire, naming as the first the absence of shells, and the superior officer writes on this report that this one reason alone is quite sufficient — so too in the case of KSh, if we deny markedness to the pair LSE–IEI, then there is no need to refute anything else. But since the discussion concerns an analysis of possible methodological errors, this work should be carried through fully.

The hierarchy of dichotomies

The next assumption lying at the foundation of G. A. Shulman’s configuration is the assertion that the poles of the Jungian dichotomies in the tetrads must be arranged in only one single way and in no other; namely, in first place must stand “-nality,” that is, irrationality or rationality; in second, the irrational components — sensorics or intuition; in third, the rational components — logic or ethics; and in fourth, “vertness” — extraversion or introversion. In this case G. A. Shulman uses the concept of a hierarchy of dichotomies. Yes, a hierarchy of dichotomies exists — I have proved this logically. But, alas, my hierarchy of dichotomies does not coincide with what G. A. Shulman proposes. This does not mean that my variant must be better; it means that an unprejudiced logical type can compare them and draw his own conclusion.

Above all let us note that the problem of the hierarchy of dichotomies may, in mathematized terminology, be interpreted as the problem of the ordering of the set of dichotomies. This is an insignificant terminological substitution — simply a tribute to my own TIM, but it is more convenient for me to think and reason that way. Besides, I consider that in discussing and attempting to solve this problem one must consider not only the four Jungian dichotomies but the whole set of Augustinavichute–Reinin traits (ARТ). In my time I proposed a solution to this problem [20], where within the framework of an accepted axiomatic basis I tried to prove that this set is, first, ordered, and secondly, uniquely ordered — that is, ordered at the level of the natural series — and that therefore the traits-dichotomies, alongside their substantive designations-names, may also be designated by ordinal numbers which will have not a relative character admitting arbitrary permutation, but an absolute one. The scheme of the proof of this theorem is also presented in the chapter devoted to differentiating traits.

In Table 6.04 the row “AA” gives the numbers of the traits in Aushra Augustinavichute, and the row “Chu” the order of the traits at which I arrived as a result of prolonged and logically ordered reasoning. From this table, if it is correct, it follows that the hierarchy of the four Jungian dichotomies is as follows: 1) vertness; 2) intuition–sensorics; 3) logic–ethics; 4) “-nality.”

Now the “correct” filling of G. A. Shulman’s configuration on the basis of the conflict pair LSE–IEI will look as in Table 19.04. The configuration presented differs from KSh only in that “vertness” and “-nality” have here changed places; but now in the same places there prove to be already different types, and consequently different conclusions will have to be drawn from the configuration. This same configuration may be filled on the basis of any other conflict pair. For example, in Table 19.05 an analogous configuration is presented on the basis of ILE–ESI. A comparison of such tables shows that there exists no single unique way of filling KSh.

Nor can one agree with the opposition of the dichotomy of “-nality,” as alternative, to the three others as supposedly “rheostatic” — that is, with the view that in the first there is a polar opposition, only this or only that, whereas the remaining dichotomies are distinguished by “blurredness” or by the presence of a multitude of intermediate values. This blurredness is apparent, non-invariant, since it is the result of the superposition of a multitude of factors, as a result of which the impression may be created that a person is an ambivert, that is, something intermediate between an extravert and an introvert. Such a conception is possible only in “approximate” psychology and in empirical typologies, but not in socionics, where extraversion and introversion are qualitatively determinate polarities without any transitional zones between them. So that a type as a classificatory category may be either extraverted or introverted. The same applies to all the other dichotomies as well. In doing so it is not at all presupposed, for example, that a logical type has no ethics or that a sensory type has no intuition, and vice versa. They simply stand not in dominant but in subdominant positions. As for the character of a real person, an extravert may seem an introvert and vice versa, but this concerns the definition of concepts and the difficulties of determining the type.

The unfoundedness of the understanding of KSh as a projection of the four-dimensional cube of the socion

As one of the indirect arguments in favour of the adequacy of KSh to its hypothetical content, G. A. Shulman refers to the supposition of one of his students and to the statements of other socionists that the KSh configuration is a projection of the structure of the socion in the form of a four-dimensional cube onto a plane parallel to the main diagonal.

Independently of whether the socion is merely a convenient theoretical construct or represents a real object in a hypothetical psycho-informational space, one of its geometrized models could be a four-dimensional cube. Then on each of its sixteen vertices one may place one of the TIMs.

Since we cannot directly observe the hypothetical structure of the socion in four-dimensional space, it is natural to use its projections onto three-dimensional or two-dimensional space.

If one takes into account that projection is a mathematical operation and obeys definite regularities, then it will be clear that a projection cannot look arbitrary, but will have a form depending on the parameters of the projection. Before considering the projection of a four-dimensional cube, let us consider the projection of a three-dimensional cube, which is simpler and will help to see certain peculiarities of such projections.

The configuration in Fig. 19.01a is obtained as the projection of a cube onto a plane perpendicular to one of the main diagonals, and therefore in it there is one doubled point. The same projection, rotated by 30°, as applied to G. A. Shulman’s configuration, is shown in Fig. 19.01b. If here one takes as the initial figure the half-beat cube (HBC), then one of the possible socionic configurations corresponding to this projection could look as in Table 19.06. This is a plane configuration with a double point, as the projection of the HBC onto a plane perpendicular to the main diagonal of the cube. In this projection one may see a certain analogy with Shulman’s configuration, but of course this analogy cannot be complete, since it relates to a three-dimensional cube. In KSh there is no double point. Therefore, in order to strengthen the analogy, let us project the three-dimensional cube onto a plane parallel to its main diagonal. We obtain the image shown in Fig. 19.02. One of the possible plane configurations of the HBC onto a plane parallel to the main diagonal is presented in Table 19.07.

Note that in the configuration obtained in the manner described above, all the introverted aspects stand in the second column and all the extraverted ones in the third. This is no simple coincidence — here the real arrangement of the elements in the half-beat cube is reflected.

Now we are prepared for the projection of the four-dimensional cube of the socion (CS). Of course one can obtain an infinite set of projections of the CS, but this set may be sharply restricted if one takes into account that we are interested in configurations symmetrical with respect to the projection of the main diagonal of the four-dimensional cube of the socion. One of the suitable projections of this type will be the projection with five double points in Fig. 19.03. In this case the main diagonal is inclined to the plane of projection at a certain angle. That it is not parallel to the plane of projection is in this case inessential, because in any case all the vertices of the CS are located in four-dimensional space at distances different from those of their projections.

In order to split the doubled projections and at the same time not to depart greatly from the symmetrical form of the configuration, one may change the angle of inclination of the main diagonal — whose projection in this configuration is the horizontal plane of symmetry — and instead of a parallel projection use a central one, and also even out the distances between the projections of the vertices; then, up to the order of arrangement of the vertices, one obtains the configuration presented in Fig. 19.04.

So that we still do not manage to obtain anything resembling G. A. Shulman’s configuration. However, there is one further possibility of splitting the doubled points in the projection in Fig. 19.03 — one may, before projecting onto the plane, rotate the CS by a small angle lying in the plane perpendicular to the plane of projection and passing through the vertical axis of symmetry of the configuration (for the topology of the configuration, small differences in the magnitude of this angle are of no great significance). But in doing so, in order to remove the small and conceptually inessential deviations of the nodes of the presumed configuration, one will all the same have to correct slightly the distances between the projections of the vertices of the CS. As a result one obtains the configuration presented in Fig. 19.05. It is obtained from the configuration of Fig. 19.03 by means of a preliminary rotation of the CS and a cosmetic correction of the result of its projection. This configuration has occurred in the works of V. V. Gulenko, and with a certain approximation it may be considered a projection of the CS; but it undoubtedly has sufficient differences from G. A. Shulman’s configuration. All the same, one may try to obtain the second from the first. For this one may split the middle vertical row of nodes of V. V. Gulenko’s configuration into two links of three nodes each and displace them with respect to the centre until G. A. Shulman’s configuration is obtained. But this will already be hard to describe as a projection of the CS onto any plane whatsoever. So that, it seems, the talk about G. A. Shulman’s configuration being a diagonal projection of the CS is not confirmed geometrically.

Here it is appropriate to note that V. V. Gulenko in his work uses the method of tetrads but does not refer to G. A. Shulman, who was the first to propose it. This moment relates precisely to the neglect of ethical parameters in science.

PSS as a basis for evaluating interaction between TIMs

Now let us read closely G. A. Shulman’s text presenting the conclusions from PSS, regarding this text not as a poetic object — in that respect it is impeccable: tremulous and piercing — but as an attempt to convey scientific truth. And here one at once runs up against contradictions (possibly apparent ones).

G. A. Shulman writes: “…any person whose TIM is located in the PSS to the right of and below the TIM of his interlocutor can only wish or attempt to prove something to a person of any of the TIMs located to the left of and above him, or to convince him of anything. However, he may also not attempt to do this — the result will be the same: the second will simply not hear the first….”

Now let us look at KSh. The SLE stands higher than all, and by the logic of KSh he ought not to hear anyone from below. Let us accept this as a hypothesis. To refute a hypothesis one counter-example is sufficient, but there are many here.

1. The ESI easily takes the SLE “by the throat” with the piercing and disconcerting timbre of his voice. In a first contact in this pair the SLE, in the case of an aggravation of the situation, is knocked off his stride. A woman of the ESI type very quickly puts the SLE in his place if he crosses a line, or if it merely seems so to her. A man of the ESI type, even in a lesser weight category, displays such superior ferocity that he has the advantage even in a fight.

2. The EIE easily finds contact with the SLE and by no means looks browbeaten in this contact (recall the famous pair of Lilya Brik (EIE) and Vladimir Mayakovsky (SLE)).

3. SLIs listen very attentively indeed to the convinced and sincere speech of ILEs, although they may consider their ideas insufficiently practical.

4. All duals have direct behavioural access to one another, provided of course they do not try to act in the role of a supervisor uncharacteristic of them and impose ideas on the partner along his leading function.

Look more attentively at KSh and convince yourself that one of the key assertions of its author is not confirmed.

Now note what socionic relation is discernible in the phrase “…can only wish or attempt to prove something to a person of any of the TIMs….” This is the semantics of the relation of supervision or of being supervised. And since not one type is the socionic supervisor of all the remaining types, it cannot be effective in this position. But this is precisely what socionics teaches. Therefore there is no necessity whatever to deform the well-understood socionic relation of supervision by offering its masked and complicated depiction in KSh.

When G. A. Shulman writes that “people of the six TIMs named (LSI–EII, EIE–ESI and LII–SLI) are sometimes pairwise indistinguishable (or almost indistinguishable), so that it is sometimes very hard to determine a person’s TIM (one of the two TIMs). And it would be good to take this into account when typing people,” then apparently this is a conclusion from KSh and from the calculation of the corresponding coefficients. However, in socionics there is nothing of the sort — all TIMs are pairwise distinguishable, otherwise there simply would be no socionics. Of course, there are difficulties in determining the TIM of a concrete person, but this is a problem of testing, not of the theoretical identification or opposition of socionic types. Therefore, if from KSh a theoretical conclusion is drawn about the indistinguishability of types, then this must be understood as an abolition of the theoretical conclusions of socionics about the existence and qualitative determinateness of the types.

Real bearers of different types may be similar, but only may be, and are by no means necessarily so. However, this similarity of bearers is determined by other causes — for example, by similar life experience — and not by the position of the types in KSh. So that these arguments of G. A. Shulman too do not stand up to logical criticism.

Reading again and again into the descriptions of KSh, it is hard to escape the impression that the author seeks out the peculiarities of the configuration he has built, and then, within the framework of a hasty identification, transfers them to the socionic types, considering that these types are obliged to possess the peculiarities indicated by KSh. Here is an example of the principle of relative reliability in action! The direct result obtained from the premises made is accepted as relatively reliable; and then, apparently forgetting about the presumed reliability, from the result obtained a conclusion is drawn regarding the socionic types, and this conclusion is no longer considered relative.

The “phenomenon of the 0-contact” does not relate to the socionic types but is connected only with the nodes of the geometrical part of KSh, and depends on the numerical value of the functional field defining the metric in KSh. Of course, if we believe that the socionic types must stand strictly in the places assigned to them in KSh, then this phenomenon ought to relate to them as well. But this conclusion can be drawn only on the basis of the principle of relative reliability, which in normal science has never been formulated in this way.

The attempt, interesting in itself, to find exact numerical magnitudes characterizing socionic relations has unfortunately so far proved untenable. But of course this does not mean that there are no such magnitudes.

Let us once more examine several assertions of G. A. Shulman taken from his descriptions of KSh.

1. “…here we are awaited by the paradox mentioned above: in what way does the TIM SLE, whose ‘energetic power’ reaches only 7 (0111 = 7), win a sensory single combat against such powerful ‘energeticians’ as the LSE (15)…” [26] — there is simply no paradox at all, because a low energetic power was assigned to the SLE formally, in accordance with the construction of KSh. The empirical fact of the natural power of representatives of this type is here simply ignored in favour of a subjective conviction of the truth of a creatively suffered-for construct.

2. “It is characteristic that the ‘energetic power’ of the TIM IEI under such a designation proves equal to zero” [26].

It is clear that formally one may designate anything in any way one likes. But if a designation contradicts reality, then it is precisely this that is an indication that it is wrong. Is it really impossible, looking at this zero which denotes the complete absence of energetics in all representatives without exception of the type IEI (recall at least Gagarin), to have come at once, as in the well-known anecdote, to the supposition that something here is not right?

3. “Indeed, in a sensory situation the IEI loses practically in any dyadic contact — his ‘rating’ is characterized by a negative magnitude (−38.6 in the range −38.76…38.76), ‘outstripping’ only the TIM IEE” [25].

Here there are several contradictions at once, but let us dwell on only one of them. Does G. A. Shulman really think that the IEE is even more “helpless” than the IEI? Let us take into account that the author insists on “helplessness” in “sensory situations.” Let us clarify what this means. It means [25] to whom “the victory will go” in the “tug of war” with the “psychological rope” in a sensory situation — “here-and-now.” What sort of situations are these? Let us suppose that a young lad, an SLE, at a party is trying to flirt with a girl, an IEI. And if the talk is of “here-and-now,” will she really not find something to answer him if his advances do not suit her? Perhaps some “more” sensory situation is needed? For example, a bandit SLE meets on the outskirts of a city an unknown bandit IEI, and both are armed with Kalashnikovs. What sort of “rope” will they be tugging here? Let us suppose it is the “rope” called “on-whose-side-will-the-initiative-be” or “who-will-suppress-the-other’s-will-to-resist.” Does socionics really permit one to assert that in all possible variants the SLE will manage to suppress the IEI’s will to resist? It would be incorrect to represent all IEIs as timid and browbeaten — socionics gives no grounds whatever for this. IEIs are troublemakers and brawlers (their second function is extraverted ethics), and a representative of this type may quite easily say: “Uncle, you’ve lost this time, drop your weapon!” — and his voice will be very ringing and piercing indeed. If an IEI has a grenade in his hands, then in extreme conditions he will not stop short of blowing himself up together with his opponent.

Let us take a less strained situation. A chief who is an SLE summons a subordinate recently taken on, an IEI, in order to find out what he is worth as a worker. According to socionic notions a dual situation is formed, in which the IEI will have a real chance of making a pleasant impression on the chief. Or, conversely, a chief who is an IEI summons a subordinate SLE in order to reprimand him for having been rude to a client. Will he really be unable to do this? The scenarios here may be various, but among them it is not hard to imagine one in which the SLE acknowledges the inadmissibility of his behaviour and gives a serious assurance that it will not be repeated. And he will keep his word. Who has “tugged the rope” here?

As for the IEE, in analogous situations he will act still more confidently; and in a street fight, other things and weight categories being equal, he will in no way yield to the SLE, because he has extraverted sensorics in the position of the third function.

It is another matter if into “tugging the psychological rope” we put some other, special sense. For example, a man who is an IEI finds himself compelled to spend a long time alone with a man who is an LSE (in a hospital ward or a prison cell) and tries to prove to the latter something obviously absurd — for example, that solar eclipses occur at full moon, in which he himself, as a result of a conjunction of circumstances, sincerely believes. Here he will hardly succeed, if the LSE knows even a little about this question. But if the IEI tries to convince of this people who have never heard of it — for example, adolescents who have become his pupils — and if he possesses a teaching or oratorical talent, then he will successfully cope with the task set, whatever types may be sitting in the audience. After this the newly-fledged “experts” will sacredly believe in the infallibility of the truths received and will on occasion set about disseminating them further. As for the IEE, he will cope with such a task still more easily.

So socionic theory and empirical data do not confirm the formal conclusions which, on the basis of the principle of relative reliability, may be obtained from KSh. I am prepared to take part in the work of any round table devoted to KSh, in order to make use of the personal experience of scholars interested in solving this question. Perhaps someone has a bank of empirical data confirming the absence of energy [25] in representatives of the type IEI, but I cannot possibly agree with this. Can such a conception of this type really arise in those who remember Gagarin (IEI)?

Let us try to proceed from the assumption that, when G. A. Shulman wrote the lines cited above, before his inner gaze there was a “here-and-now” situation in which any intuitive type always loses to a sensory one. What sort of situation must this be? I think that the characterization of such a situation must fully coincide with the characterization of the corresponding sensory function of a sensory type. Then this simply means that an intuitive type is not a sensory type and vice versa. But this is precisely what the sense of the socionic definitions consists in. Socionics is founded on the fact that all types are different and that not one of the types is any other type but itself. So why must this very same thing be explained in some very complicated way with the use of formal magnitudes taken from KSh?

4. “The interpretation of a person’s TIM as a cloud may apparently serve as a mathematical proof of the impossibility of constructing a generalized model of the human psyche in general. And this is splendid! For it is impossible to imagine a complete prosthetization of the human being — the transformation of a person into a machine” [25].

The beautiful, poetic image connected with the transformation of a TIM into a cloud finally blurs the socionic determinateness of the TIM and in fact devalues socionics, throwing us back to the initial situation in which the human mass, in the psychological respect, is perceived as weakly differentiated. The whole pathos of socionics is directed at the discovery of a structural psychic invariant, which is precisely the ordered set of generalized psychic functions whose informational filling concretizes the TIM. And it is quite unclear why “the impossibility of constructing a generalized model of the human psyche” is evaluated as something splendid, with an exclamation mark — within the framework of the principle of beauty, is it? And why is it necessary to blur the achieved determinateness of a sound theoretical construct? I may be told that I, being a different type, do not understand what G. A. Shulman is saying; but I am after all trying to do so. So help me! Tell me: is “the complete prosthetization of the human being” about socionics, or a generalized evaluation of the whole of science?

If among socionists there are supporters of KSh, I very much ask them to try to defend G. A. Shulman’s theoretical constructions, but only within the framework of the academic style. I would do it myself, but alas, as a result of logical reasoning I arrived at different conclusions, and logic is a stubborn thing.

”The socion as a means of the asynchronous evolution of man”

Now let us turn to the work of L. Prudnikova [11]. For me personally it is important that L. Prudnikova is well oriented in methodology and understands its necessity, and that her logical function is in a strong position. And even in her article she uses socionics as a methodological instrument, which I perceive as an important event connected with the introduction and use of the methodological potency of socionics in other sciences, and on occasion I shall refer to this example.

The author’s basic idea is fully presented in the title of the article: “The socion as a means of the asynchronous evolution of man.” Asynchronous evolution is a concept introduced by V. Geodakyan for characterizing sexual dimorphism in the reproduction of living beings as a special biological strategy. The non-additive components of this strategy are two sufficiently different strategies — the strategy of the class of males and the strategy of the class of females.

This exceptionally interesting and productive theme may be traced in all species of animals and plants with dioecious reproduction, but presumably in each concrete case it will have its own instructive modifications.

Asynchrony, that is, non-coincidence in time, must characterize the differences in the role which each of the sexes plays in relation to the change and transmission of genetic information.

Of course, if sexual asynchrony were an exclusive peculiarity of man, then the conceptual purity of applying this theory to the species Homo sapiens would be obvious. However, bisexuality is a universal biological strategy, and there is no occasion to speak of any uniqueness of it in relation to man.

One could even formulate a general regularity indicating that the more the reproductive strategy approaches the K-type, the more noticeable must be the asynchrony in the evolution of its gender halves. And indeed, in plants and in such animals as, for example, oysters with their r-strategies of reproduction, even sexual dimorphism is reduced to a minimum. Apparently one can speak of gender evolutionary asynchrony only where there is a sufficiently noticeable dimorphism of females and males, both in their appearance and in their individual and social (if such exists) behaviour. In man such dimorphism is obvious at the biological, the psychic and the social level, while the K-strategy with respect to offspring reaches, apparently, optimal values in the animal world. This, incidentally, is expressed in the longest childhood in the animal world. Therefore the asynchrony in the evolution of man ought to be the greatest (a hypothesis).

Now let us note a semantic peculiarity in the use of the term “evolution” in the concept of asynchronous evolution. Obviously the evolution of a species as a whole and the evolution of its gender parts have different temporal scales and different population volumes, and are therefore different concepts. The evolution of a species as a whole relates to the whole population and to the whole time of the species’ existence. Asynchronous evolution relates only to intraspecific differences of individuals of opposite sexes and may be characterized by temporal segments with a weakening or strengthening of gender differences in behaviour. In any case, in humans this is in particular manifested in the fact that men are the first to master new existential forms, while women, gradually overcoming a protective conservatism or achieving a further stage of emancipation, master these forms with a certain delay. So it was, for example, with smoking, with alcoholism, and with the mastery of a whole series of professions previously considered male.

L. Prudnikova writes: “The object of socionic research is the most complex phenomena and processes which proceed on the basis of bio-informational mechanisms, although they go beyond their framework. Therefore the socion will inevitably bear within itself features characteristic of biological systems; most vividly these features are discernible in Shulman’s Periodic System of the Socion.” Bio-informational mechanisms, as I understand it, are means of transforming information in living organisms, while “go beyond their framework” is an indication of a connection with social and perhaps some other processes as well. I should like to note the strong theoretical assertion that “the socion will inevitably bear within itself features characteristic of biological systems.” Here there is a recognition of the socion as a theoretical construct of such a degree of generality that it may be effective when used, already as a methodological instrument, in biology as well.

But the assertion that the “features characteristic of biological systems are most vividly discernible in Shulman’s Periodic System of the Socion” is immediately alarming. Independently of whether KSh expresses some truth as a whole, L. Prudnikova, possibly without noticing it herself, confuses a particular peculiarity of KSh — its bipolarity — with its general structure. Bipolarity in this case is an accentuated opposition of two socionic types and their tetrads, which may be done independently of KSh as well. But that the general structure of KSh with its KI, KD, “zero-contacts” and so on is adequate to biological processes — that must be proved separately. Otherwise the logical error is committed of “moving from a conclusion about the truth of a part to a conclusion about the truth of the whole.” Therefore let us separate these two parts and work with bipolarity in itself, independently of its presence in KSh.

Further L. Prudnikova asserts that the polarity of the types LSE and IEI, from the point of view of biology, bears a gender character, while the maternal tetrads — T_LSE and T_IEI — represent two opposite sexual strategies. At the level of a hypothesis this is easy to understand. Yes, there is such a supposition. And in its favour certain arguments are adduced.

For this purpose a list of ethological-psychological differences of the sexes, named by Geodakyan, is used. Among them are the following:

• men — active influence upon the environment (resourcefulness, inventiveness, search behaviour), abstract thinking, spatial imagination, right-hemisphere asymmetry of the brain;
• women — adaptivity (educability, trainability, conformity), concrete thinking, methodology, emotionality, weak asymmetry of the cerebral hemispheres.

It is clear that these features cannot be absolutized. Men are capable of adapting, they learn, they yield to upbringing, they are creators and bearers of methodological instruments. In this sense they are not so utterly hopeless. Women in extreme, and not only in extreme, situations are capable of influencing the environment very actively — part of which environment, for them, turns out to be men as well. All this is clear. But possibly it is presupposed that the features enumerated are statistically more often manifested in one sex. Of course, one would like to have an evaluation of these statistics, because for a theory this is important. But in the given case a supposition is sufficient.

Nevertheless, in the opposition of active influence on the environment and adaptivity one may discover a semantic inexactitude: to active influence one ought (by the concept) to oppose passivity, and not adaptivity. To adaptivity, conceptually, is opposed either the inability to adapt or the remaking of the environment to suit oneself, which may be an active action but does not reduce to that alone.

Therefore, when L. Prudnikova writes that “here the basic socionic dichotomy rationality–irrationality is unambiguously recognized,” here too one may discover an inexactitude: an active action is by no means necessarily rational. Moreover, an active action, being connected with a volitional manifestation, necessarily contains within itself an irrational component. So that activity along extraverted sensorics is irrational, while along extraverted logic it is rational. Therefore to endow the male half of humanity with an exclusive or even merely a predominant rationality would be a non-correspondence of theory and facts.

Part of L. Prudnikova’s subsequent reasoning may also be assigned to the category of premature inferences, that is, such where the argument base has not been sufficiently verified and has not passed a preliminary expert evaluation. For example, the opposition of logic and extraverted sensorics in the male “portrait” to introversion and ethics in the female is asymmetrical. For semantic equilibrium there ought to be either an opposition of logic and extraverted sensorics in the male “portrait” to introverted intuition and ethics in the female, or of logic and extraversion in the male “portrait” and introversion and ethics in the female. Because of such inexactitudes the reasoning loses its probative determinateness. But in any case the opposition of men and women according to the feature of “-nality” does not seem convincing. Recall Jung’s four basic categories characterizing the correlation of the masculine and the feminine: the feminine static is emotionality; the masculine dynamic is volitional pressure; the masculine static is logic; the feminine dynamic is intuition. We see that the rational and irrational components are distributed evenly between the masculine and feminine principles.

I should in no way wish to argue with Geodakyan — his theoretical constructions have their own sense. I am against an erroneous socionic interpretation of his work. But I am convinced that a useful socionic interpretation of Geodakyan’s theory is also possible. I think that the theme of gender strategies, very valuable in itself, may be developed in biology taking into account that there exists not one opposed conflict pair but eight. And each of them may characterize different strategies, not necessarily realized by humanity but possibly present in other animal species. But it is likewise not obligatory to limit models of behavioural strategies to the image of conflict alone, that is, to initial mutual incomprehension and hostility. And why not duality? For biologically men and women are complementary, and this is one of the aspects of duality. From the point of view of asynchronous evolution the pairs ILE–SEI, ESE–LII, SLE–IEI look simply splendid, while the pair LSE–EII is simply remarkable. What boundless patience and understanding, what an astonishing ability to find a way out of difficult situations, what a magnificent capacity to invest one’s whole self in the rising generation on the part of the female half; what a sense of responsibility and reality, what enterprise and capacity for work on the part of the male.

However, I think that semantically the forefathers of humanity Adam and Eve, even if mythical and symbolic figures, must have had the types ILE and SEI respectively. Of course there may be other opinions, but a good argument in favour of the proposed variant is that cognition (ILE) and consumption (SEI) are dual, and cognition, with the intellect connected with it, is the basic distinction of man from animal.

It would not be a bad thing to check other relations too, and then the thesis “the socion bears within itself features characteristic of biological systems” would acquire an enriched and structured sense.

And what looks like an altogether hasty or even subconsciously motivated opposition is that of primitive man and primitive woman according to the feature of possessing strategic thinking. Well, of course, hunting, virtually the basic factor of the gender evolution of man, required of him the development of strategic thinking, while his sensory pressure was there from the beginning because of the special role of testosterone in his hormonal complex. And his role in caring for offspring was never limited to insemination alone, as L. Prudnikova writes. In K-strategies testosterone provokes the male to be a defender and a provider, and the very genotype of the male is a source of the necessary motivation directed at care for offspring. And it is somehow altogether “unbiological” to oppose males and females too sharply with respect to offspring — both act in accordance with the strategies which the species has worked out. In Homo sapiens the roles were distributed unevenly, and men too got a far from easy role, which is expressed, among other things, in their shorter life expectancy. But for the sake of women and children they, as a gender whole, do not spare their lives and never will spare them, defending their family, their home and their homeland, though psychologically this may be framed in very different ways.

In any case, for the grounding of an integral “gender” of men and an integral “gender” of women, the hasty though large-scale and theoretically justified reasoning of L. Prudnikova adduced in her article is insufficient. Therefore for the present there are no grounds for considering that the male and female evolutionary strategies accord with the tetrads of the LSE and the IEI. As for KSh, it has no relation whatever to this problem and, all the more, is not an evolutionary vector, since for that it would be necessary to ground biologically the position of every TIM in the structure of KSh, and not only its entrance and exit, between which, a priori, anything at all may turn out to be.

It is a matter for regret that scholars who know the value of methodology use a weakly argued construct which has not passed a running-in within the socionic community as a methodological instrument for the treatment of a deep and promising biological theme.

Seven correct and seven incorrect answers concerning KSh

So then, there are seven parameters on which claims may be brought against KSh as a theoretical construct.

1) The choice of the relation for unfolding the configuration — why precisely conflict?

A bad answer: this is a marked relation, because there is not a single common element in the tetrads of the partners. This answer is limited to the four Jungian dichotomies; but if one takes the full set of ARТ, then any partners, including socionic conflictors, have eight common traits. And if one takes any other, non-Jungian basis, then there will be different tetrads there, to which quite different primary interpretations correspond.

The correct answer: why not investigate the semantic field of conflictors? Undoubtedly the relation of socionic conflict is not a whit worse than all the other relations, and it is worth investigating, like all the rest.

2) The choice of the pair of polar TIMs — why LSE and IEI?

An incorrect answer: this is the marked pair of conflictors, the rest are unfit for this purpose.

The correct answer: it is necessary to investigate the polar conflict configurations built up over all the pairs of conflictors.

3) The choice of the hierarchy of dichotomies — why is “-nality” in first place?

An incorrect answer: in the hierarchy of dichotomies it stands in first place.

The correct answer: a hierarchy of dichotomies exists, but it has a different structure and cannot be assigned arbitrarily.

4) The choice of the geometrical structure of the configuration — why 1-4-3-3-4-1?

An incorrect answer: this is the only configuration answering to the principle of beauty and having the maximal coefficient of harmony; and besides, this corresponds topologically to the projection of the four-dimensional cube of the socion onto a plane parallel to its main diagonal, and therefore only it can be laid at the base of an investigation of the special properties of the socion inaccessible to discovery by other means.

The correct answer: as a model of the structure of the socion one may use a configuration adequate to the socion, and its adequacy must have sufficient grounds. However, there exists no such projection of the four-dimensional cube of the socion onto a plane parallel to its main diagonal. Besides, there are eight such diagonals, and there are no grounds for preferring any one of them to the rest. Moreover, at the vertices of such diagonals stand not conflictors but duals.

5) The choice of the order of filling the configuration.

An incorrect answer: the filling of the configuration must correspond to the principle of beauty.

The correct answer: the configuration cannot be filled arbitrarily; the positions of the types in the configuration must correspond to their position in the socion or to the real properties of the TIMs and the relations between them.

6) The choice of the space in which the configuration is embedded — why Euclidean?

The correct answer: a discrete set of types may be embedded in any space and any functional field may be built up over it, which will mask the real connections between the types, whereas it is more natural to use the types’ own space, which is discrete.

7) The choice of the metric.

An incorrect answer: the properties of the relations between types are best expressed by a quasi-Pythagorean metric in a quasi-Riemannian space.

The correct answer: the distance between types will depend on the configuration chosen. In particular, if one takes as such a configuration a fifteen-dimensional space, then all the types may be placed at the vertices of a sixteen-vertex tetrahedron at equal distances from one another. If as the reference configuration one takes a four-dimensional cube, then, taking the side of the cube as the unit of length, such distances may be calculated by the Pythagorean formulas. There are other possibilities as well, but all of them must have a theoretical grounding and empirical confirmation securing a mechanism for extracting sense from the configuration.

A little about the periodicity of KSh

And a little about periodicity. True, in one of his works G. A. Shulman expresses himself to the effect that the matter here is not periodicity but the presence of periods! Of course, if into the term “period” one puts only the notion of “division of the configuration,” and stipulates this specially, then there are no questions. But if KSh lays claim to periodicity, that is, to even an ultimately generalized homeomorphism of divisions, then presumably there must be some feature — preferably an essential one — whose direct or modified manifestation may be observed in the periods and groups. Unless, of course, these are simply beautiful terms. Can this feature be discovered between the first and the second period, between the second and the third, the third and the fourth, and so on? That the right half of KSh is conflict-related to the left is not a property but the principle of its construction. This principle ought to have disclosed certain properties which ought to have been periodically repeated, but this is not observed.

I do not know what the causes are of KSh proving, in my view, vulnerable at all points — from the choice of the basic polarity, the invention of the structure and the grounding of the hierarchy of dichotomies, to the arrangement of the TIMs in the positions of the configuration and the specification of metric relations in the discrete set of socionic types — but I do not consider that this work was carried out in vain. It raised a whole stratum of socionic subject matter which of course must be developed. Configurations occur in the works of many socionists and may quite well be used as a methodological instrument, and therefore their logic must be worked out.

Despite the negative result following from all the reasoning adduced above, one may draw the tentative conclusion that although KSh in the capacity of PSS does not correspond to the sense declared by its author, G. A. Shulman’s work is not meaningless. However, possibly it is, first, incorrectly interpreted by the author, and secondly, unfinished. It is not excluded that on the basis of his work a system of configurations with a rationally motivated structure may be built. In such a system of configurations one may try to find a mechanism for extracting sense which will help to find subtle regularities in the connections between types (a hypothesis).

One may ask why, all the same, despite several arbitrary assumptions, the impression is created that there is some sense in G. A. Shulman’s configuration. One may suppose that the semantic field of the socion is so stable that even several accidental transformations preserving antisymmetry are incapable of destroying it entirely.

In 2007 there appeared G. A. Shulman’s splendidly produced little book Socionics from Within. I personally perceive it as the memoirs of an elderly and experienced man who has something to say and to recall. In this book you will find a large quantity of splendid verses, including translations by its author; there is unique information on qigong, information about the views of certain scholars on the structure of the Earth as a crystal, and of course you will find there the author’s developments in socionics. In analysing certain of Shulman’s constructs I referred to his articles, but the same material may be found in the book too. Shulman is a talented writer, and readers with a suitable socionic type will derive great pleasure from reading his text; however, one must treat his theoretical constructions with caution.

Why “even” socionists find it hard to reach a consensus

In 1999, by the efforts of Dnepropetrovsk enthusiasts of socionics, and above all thanks to the initiative and organizational abilities of V. V. Pavlov, a unique experiment was carried out on the testing and comparison of various methods of socionic diagnostics. From the point of view of methodology this was a remarkable event. Some day historians of science will be able to appreciate this Experiment at its true worth as an attempt by a young science to pass through a further stage of its development.

This Experiment, despite individual shortcomings — quite natural ones, incidentally — will some day enter the anthologies of the history and theory of science, since it has no precedent: there has not yet been a case in which some young science, at one of the initial stages of its development, in the person of its representatives, undertook analogous efforts in order to reflect upon its own foundations.

Far from all socionists took part in the Experiment (indeed that would probably have been impossible), and far from all who did take part in it agreed among themselves not only about the methodology of the Experiment itself but also on many theoretical questions of socionics. And of course a special problem is presented by the sufficiently large difference in the results of the testing of one and the same people by representatives of different socionic groups.

It would seem that socionists precisely might come to an agreement among themselves faster than the representatives of other sciences — for by definition they possess an understanding of the deep differences between people, they accept as an initial premise the postulate that people are different and that therefore one cannot approach everyone with a single measure, and yet… many socionists go about, and continue to go about, without socionic boots.

That representatives of other scientific directions are often unable to arrive at a single point of view is, on the whole, understandable: they are not necessarily professionals in the sphere of communication and one need not necessarily expect communicative self-reflection from them. But why can scholar-socionists not arrive at a consensus? What is striking is precisely that intelligent, and often very intelligent, people not only fail to hear and understand one another, but demonstrate a complete absence of the professional technical skills that would allow them to achieve at least a preliminary convergence of positions.

As a first approximation to a description of this problem I would propose the following symbolic formula:

D = Δ [A, S, M, O]

where D is the communicative and cognitive distance between the partners’ positions, Δ is a functional dependence, A is ambitions, S is socionic level, M is differences in the methodological complex, and O is the absence of professional skills for coordinating scientific positions.

I have taken part for many years in socionic (and not only socionic) conferences and, apart from the subject information proper relating directly to socionic concepts, I attentively track the methodological aspects of research in any science and in socionics in particular, as well as the methodological positions of the participants in the socionic movement.

Although the astonishing lectures on socionics with which Aushra Augustinavichute appeared in Kiev in 1985–1986 were new, unexpected and inspiring, only a small group of enthusiasts became imbued with her ideas and took up the study and development of the new science. There were several psychologists among them, but the greater part of them soon withdrew from socionics, leaving it entirely to representatives of other professions — pedagogues, mathematicians, physicists, engineers — in general, to non-professionals. But these non-professionals tried very hard. For a couple of years they gathered in different places under the direction of I. Vaisband-Onufrienko, and later A. Bukalov, V. Gulenko and V. Ermak organized a permanent seminar at the House of the Teacher. At first the participants of the seminar were fully immersed in the paradigm proposed by Aushra Augustinavichute and were for the most part occupied with penetrating into the subtleties of the new scientific direction. However, soon differences began to tell between the methodological complexes of the creator of socionics and of her followers, all the more so since at that time few people gave thought to methodological problems in connection with socionics. Everything seemed self-evident, and almost no one supposed that even small differences in the methodological attitudes of scholars would lead to significant divergences in the understanding of the basic elements of the new science. And so it soon turned out. Even within the framework of the Kiev group united around the socionic seminar at the House of the Teacher, by 1995 there were already several positions so different that one could speak of different socionics: the classical socionics of Aushra Augustinavichute, the introverted and then humanitarian socionics of V. Gulenko, the quantum socionics of A. Bukalov, the systemic socionics of V. Ermak, the periodic socionics of A. Shulman, the deductive socionics of S. Churyumov, the stadial socionics of S. Shteinikov, the symbolic socionics of S. Savchenko, to say nothing of the instrumental socionics of I. Kalinauskas and so on. The matter was aggravated still further by the fact that, since each of the socionic leaders conducted classes with groups of people wishing to make sense of human relations, students soon began to gather around them, and one could already speak of different socionic schools.

So then: one part of socionists does not understand, does not accept and cannot come to an agreement with another.

Ambitions

With ambitions everything is more or less clear — this is the ordinary and widespread obstacle to the coordination of positions. And since by definition there must exist sixteen types of ambitions, only the representatives of a single quadra ought to arrive at a consensus, while with other quadras, by definition, no one will be able to come to an agreement unless a special technique for exiting from conflict situations is used.

Socionic level

As for “socionic level,” that is, the depth and breadth of socionic knowledge, then since socionics has not yet become an official science, there is as yet no one to issue official certificates as to who is cleverer and who is stupider in socionics, and the level is determined by ambitions. Of course it would be quite convenient to evaluate socionic level by the ability to diagnose TIMs; but the Dnepropetrovsk Experiment showed precisely that all the participants consider themselves to stand at the highest level in this respect (see Ambitions), while the result of the Experiment shows that things here are not going well. Of course, it is not excluded that among the participants of the Experiment there was, for example, one person (let us suppose it was V. D. Ermak) who determined all the TIMs absolutely correctly; but how could he prove this to all the rest, since each considers that it was precisely he or his group who did this work with absolute accuracy (see Ambitions). And for the present the general level of socionic knowledge is determined by the degree of agreement of the results obtained as a result of conducting the Experiment.

There exists another possibility as well — the irreconcilable struggle of different schools, when each will prove that he is better than the others (see Ambitions), and then only time and history will judge who was right.

The methodological effect

By the methodological effect I understand the manifestation of that difference in methodological instruments and their use which undoubtedly exists between socionists in general and between the participants of the Experiment in particular. Of course, from an abstract-logical point of view one may imagine that all the participants of the conference stand on one and the same methodological positions; however, even a superficial observation of socionists’ behaviour during the discussions of the testing results shows that this is not so. Even such conventionally generally accepted methodological instruments as analysis, synthesis, deduction, induction, the use of formal logic, the handling of classificatory and definitional procedures, command of the mathematical apparatus and so forth, can hardly be at one and the same level in a randomly formed group of scholars.

The methodology which lies at the base of the scientific work of any scholar consists not only of logical means; as was shown in [21], besides logic it includes sensory, ethical and intuitive components. And these components have not been, and cannot be, normed to the degree to which logical means are subject to norming. Besides, one must take into account that methodology as an academic discipline was formerly not taught at all in higher educational institutions; it was assumed that a person, in becoming a scholar, masters it while studying other subjects, and also in the process of communicating with other scholars, above all with the representatives of that scientific school to which he belongs. And since scientific schools become different because they adhere to different methodological principles, it is understandable that to achieve a coordination of methodologies is very difficult, if not impossible. In a conventionally full volume methodology is elaborated and studied by philosophers, and it is easy to understand that since they — the philosophers — “still” (for two and a half thousand years now) cannot arrive at a single opinion, what is there to say of non-philosophers: for them to do this is still harder, and perhaps beyond their powers.

A very important moment in the formation of a scholar’s methodological complex is also that many of its components are assimilated unconsciously and enter into the value core of the personality, that is, into what is evaluated by the given person as unconditional truth. Therefore, when the discussion of a problem touches upon uncritically assimilated parts of methodological complexes, then, without the use of special communicative procedures, it is by definition impossible to come to an agreement.

Aushra Augustinavichute

Aushra Augustinavichute is a woman scholar of genius. One can only guess how, as a result of an illumination under the influence of studying the works of C. G. Jung, K. Leonhard, A. Kępiński and many others, the idea of a model of the psyche arose in her. Much, however, can be understood by reading her work [2]. There she writes, for example: “And much has to be discovered anew in order to be convinced that in Jung this ‘already existed’ — only not fully unfolded, not clearly formulated.” This is a very subtle observation which may be understood in the sense that Aushra Augustinavichute, in reading Jung, arrives at her own conclusions. This is usually how it happens with scholars when reading primary sources. Then she develops the ideas that have arisen, brings them to a conceptual level, and afterwards in other books of Jung discovers passages which more or less correspond to what she has done; but it remains a very large question whether Jung himself would have reached these constructs if he had continued work in this direction. What Aushra Augustinavichute did is not a mechanical continuation of C. G. Jung’s work — it is a synthesis of the ideas of many scholars. For example, Jung did not have the idea of information metabolism — it came to Aushra from A. Kępiński, who was by no means a like-minded associate of C. G. Jung. Aushra’s thought works clearly, though of course from the point of view of an intuitive logical type. And it is in vain that V. D. Ermak reproaches her with slovenliness — those are his literal words, spoken by him on 22 May 2000 at the socionic seminar in the Kiev House of the Teacher. It is simply that Aushra Augustinavichute thought in Lithuanian and did not always translate into Russian with impeccable observance of the rules of Russian stylistics; and besides, as socionics teaches, the perception of one person by another depends on their types. Here is what Aushra Augustinavichute says about Jung’s terminology: “Not infrequently Jung is charged with unscientificness, unclarity and incomprehensibility of the terminology used. But he, working in the first half of the twentieth century (1875–1961), found himself in the sphere of unidentified objects. The majority of the terms used by Jung play the role of, as it were, initial, conventional ‘nicknames,’ needed in order to distinguish one part of a not fully understood phenomenon from another (emphasis mine — S. Ch.). Without this the further comprehension of the object under study is impossible. A scholar trying to solve the riddle of the human psyche is in the position, let us say, of a physicist studying deep processes which cannot be seen with one’s own eyes and information about which is gathered only on the basis of observation of the external interaction of objects.” An analogous evaluation of the terminology introduced by Aushra in socionics may be met with even now. Yes, a pair of her terms — namely logic and ethics in the socionic understanding — were at first not perceived unambiguously by everyone, although she did explain her choice. These terms she proposed in place of Jung’s thinking and feeling. She said that thinking and feeling everyone has, and that within their framework logical and ethical processes unfold whose character is typologically different. Now, when we have grown accustomed to the terms logic and ethics in the socionic sense and do not confuse them with the general scientific and everyday usage, we understand that they are no better than Jung’s, but habit has made them quite convenient.

One should not forget that Aushra Augustinavichute introduced the remarkable socionic symbolism, which is precisely what should be regarded as a designation of what is hard or altogether impossible to define and to which the terms point only indirectly. And work on terminology must be continued. The core of Aushra Augustinavichute’s methodological complex may conventionally be designated as the level of the brilliant conjecture and the capacity for intuitive construction.

Certain of the terms she used proved altogether erroneous,[^2] but this in no way diminishes her scientific feat.

I. N. Kalinauskas

I took trainings with Igor Kalinauskas in Kiev in 1987, and in many respects I regard him as one of my teachers, which I always recall with gratitude. Already then I was struck by the breadth of his erudition, the brilliance and the extraordinary generosity of his talents. He not only handled freely information from sources then unknown to me, but easily, in the course of things, created interesting constructs distinguished by freshness and novelty. Here one at once sensed a mature Master. I. Kalinauskas is one of the first students of Aushra Augustinavichute — students with a great creative potential, with non-standard thinking — and his approach to socionics is of special interest. By the moment of my acquaintance with this approach I had already become thoroughly acquainted with socionics from the lips of Aushra Augustinavichute, and it was interesting for me to compare I. Kalinauskas’s interpretative version of socionics with the socionics created by Aushra Augustinavichute.

Properly speaking, the result was as it were the same: the same types, approximately the same descriptions of typological peculiarities, the same relations; but the model of the personality and the semantics of the functions were somehow different. Frankly speaking, at that time I did not fully realize this, because I did not yet command socionics to a sufficient degree. I saw that I. Kalinauskas constructs his exposition of material by then generally familiar to me somehow differently, but I perceived this as a variation on the basic theme agreed with Aushra Augustinavichute, and merely tried to master the material offered by I. Kalinauskas.

However, as I understood later, the socionic model which I. Kalinauskas used, the famous “Kalinauskas Steering Wheel,” was a creative application of the method of qualitative structures (MQS) developed by him under the influence of the works of Yu. M. Lotman and M. M. Bakhtin [32]. It was precisely this method that became for I. Kalinauskas the methodological instrument for processing and refracting the ideas of Aushra Augustinavichute.

In itself the MQS is a remarkable theoretical instrument which may be applied with success not only for the analysis but also for the synthesis of new constructs connected with the conception of wholeness and qualitative distinctiveness. This is especially topical “in such fields as the description of the psyche, the study of complex social and ethnic processes, the solution of ecological problems” [32]; however, in the present work I do not intend to consider the MQS in all its details. I shall only cite a passage from book [32] where an authorial evaluation of this method is given: “The method of qualitative structures is in fact a heuristic principle for considering any object conceived as a whole.” Here, however, from the point of view of the influence of I. Kalinauskas’s methodological complex on his exposition of the ideas of socionics, I should like only to note that I. Kalinauskas replaces Aushra Augustinavichute’s method with his own method and in fact proposes an interpretation of the ideas of socionics with the help of the MQS. Here one may at once pose such questions as: to what extent is such an interpretation effective, useful, adequate and legitimate? Presumably, without answering these questions one simply cannot apply any instrument to any object.

The basic categories of the MQS are:

1. The aspect of coordination, postulating and securing the wholeness of the object.
2. The aspect of functioning, describing the functioning of the whole object in the external (with respect to the object) World.
3. The aspect of organization, reflecting the structure of the object.
4. The aspect of connection, answering for the connection of the object as a whole with the surrounding environment.

I shall not analyse the MQS here. Presumably this method possesses many merits. Here it is important for me to note that I. Kalinauskas commands his own developed methodological instruments and has his own attitudes toward their use, and that he uses, in comparison with Aushra Augustinavichute, different methodological means for unfolding and interpreting the ideas of socionics. Therefore it is not excluded that his results may prove not only non-identical with those of Aushra Augustinavichute, but even contradictory to some of her findings.

In expounding socionics, I. Kalinauskas stops at the level of four functions, which on closer examination prove to be close to the functions of Model “AYu” [32]. He at first as it were fully preserves their primary semantics, but then virtuosically projects them onto the basic elements of the MQS: the aspect of organization (AO) is correlated with F1, the aspect of functioning (AF) with F2, the point of the coordinator (PC) with F3, the aspect of connection (AC) with F4. But what happens in the process? Does Model “AYu” thereby prove to be merely a particular case of the basic set of categories of the MQS? Can such a replacement be considered an indication of a deeper and perhaps more secret and true sense of the socionic functions? Or does I. Kalinauskas, using his method, obtain a simpler and perhaps in some respect more convenient and even more comprehensible model of the psyche and of the personality, but one differing in something perhaps essential from Model “A”? In any case he declares his interpretation of socionics as “instrumental socionics” [32]; but what role then remains to the “classical” socionics of Aushra Augustinavichute? Is it less instrumental, less convenient, unable to explain something that I. Kalinauskas’s socionics easily explains? Or is the talk perhaps only of the convenience of the author’s exposition?

And now, when we turn to the full unfolding of the type of IM, to the “Kalinauskas Steering Wheel” proper (see Fig. 19.06), we as it were pass to an eight-functional model. However, as I understand it, it is here that a subtle semantic trap awaits us — alas, this is not an eight-functional but the same four-functional model, only now to each function two signs are ascribed, plus and minus, and it appears in Model “K” twice, but with different signs. And it is here that the illusion arises that the functions have become eight, but this is not so.

If, for technical reasons and without damage to the sense, one slightly simplifies the graphical depiction of the “Steering Wheel” (we preserve its reduced symbol in the central cell), then Model “K” (Kalinauskas) will look as in Fig. 19.07. But of course this model may be depicted in the form of a linear scheme without the suggestive “steering wheel” in the centre (see Fig. 19.08).

Fig. 19.06. The “Kalinauskas Steering Wheel.” A diagram with the axes BAD −I / I GOOD; MUST; WANT — PROBLEMS; SOLUTIONS; DON’T WANT; and the labels: Zone of ignoring; Principle of existence; Zone of norms; Creativity; Zone of fear; Self-evaluation; Motives.

Fig. 19.07. Representation of Model “K” in tabular form (note the “steering wheel” in the middle):

F3 — problems (self-evaluation)	F2 — must (creativity)	F4 — want (motives)
−F1 — bad (zone of ignoring)	F1 — good (principle of existence)	−F4 — don’t want (zone of fear, suspiciousness)
−F2 — must not (zone of norms)	−F3 — solution of problems

Fig. 19.08. Representation of Model “K” in linear form without the “steering wheel”:

F1 — good (principle of existence)	F2 — must (creativity)	F3 — problems (self-evaluation)	F4 — want (motives)
−F1 — bad (zone of ignoring)	−F2 — must not (zone of norms)	−F3 — solution of problems	−F4 — don’t want (zone of fear, suspiciousness)

Fig. 19.09. An attempt to correlate Model “A” and Model “K” (the half-beat coordinates of Model “A” follow each entry):

F1 — good (principle of existence) 3/1	F2 — must (creativity) 4/1
F3 — problems (self-evaluation) 2/1	F4 — want (motives) 1/1
−F3 — solution of problems 2/2	−F4 — don’t want (zone of fear, suspiciousness) 1/2
−F1 — bad (zone of ignoring) 3/2	−F2 — must not (zone of norms) 4/2

And now it is at once clearly visible that these are the four primary Jungian functions, but with signs separating the opposite values of the semanticizing categories. However, the sign changes not the vertness of the function but indicates opposite manifestations of the same essence, and therefore extraverted intuition, sensorics, ethics and logic cannot turn into the corresponding introverted IAs. For example, if extraverted feeling with a plus sign is joy, rapture, exultation, then with a minus sign it is grief, sorrow, depression — and not, for instance, a relation between people or a critical evaluation. Moreover, if we try to arrange I. Kalinauskas’s semantic variables in the suitable places of Model “A,” we shall be directly convinced that Model “K” and Model “A” are two different models (see Fig. 19.09).

And this means that a reader who presupposes the equivalence of these two models is being misled. The point here is not that the numbers of the functions are designated differently — that is easy to correct. The point is that the whole conceptual structure of these models is different, while the similarity of the conclusions and reasoning proves to be an illusion.

Of course, this by no means signifies that Model “K” is bad, incorrect or has no right to existence, and that recommendations based on it are wrong. It signifies that it is simply another model, with another conceptual base, though one partly coinciding with the conceptual base of the “classical” socionics of Aushra Augustinavichute. Moreover, since the upper part of Model “K” is close to the upper part of Model “A,” the interpretations within the corresponding limits may be sufficiently close; but the similarity of the interpretations of the lower parts of these models arouses suspicion.

But in the hands of a master anything can work.

G. R. Reinin

The outstanding socionist G. R. Reinin, a mathematician and psychologist, one of the first students of Aushra Augustinavichute, used the mathematical apparatus as his basic methodological instrument in introducing the concept of psychological traits essential in socionic typology. He showed mathematically that there must exist exactly fifteen traits allowing a set of sixteen elements to be divided into “correct” eights. This is a non-trivial result.

First, because before Reinin none of the socionists knew this — the newly-fledged socionists, some with joy and some with difficulty, learned that sixteen socionic types are obtained as a result of a certain combinatorics of four traits. Here an underwater rock already awaited people not well versed in mathematics, since, for example, the number of permutations of four elements is not sixteen but twenty-four, and the remarkable psychologist-journalist A. Afanasyev [3] laid precisely such a combinatorics at the base of his system of typing people. The point is that the traits were bipolar, and the discussion ought to have been of combinations of eight, not of four, traits. These are combinations of eight taken four at a time, but with restrictions. In mathematics this is called precisely that — combinations with restrictions. The restriction here consists in the fact that into a single combination only one pole of each dichotomy may enter, as a result of which one obtains sixteen. There is also another possibility — to represent this combinatorics as a numeration in the binary system; then the number sixteen is obtained still more simply. However, from a methodological point of view, what is essential here is that behind all this combinatorics there stands a quite definite theoretical moment — here nothing can be assigned arbitrarily (as A. Afanasyev did), and the whole construction obeys a strict logical reasoning. Be that as it may, as a result of Reinin’s theoretical elaboration and its primary interpretation by Aushra, socionists obtained a further eleven (!) traits.

Secondly, one can divide a set of sixteen elements into eights not in fifteen but in C(16,8) = 12870 ways — this is the number of combinations of 16 taken 8 at a time. But these will be “wild” eights, not taking into account the systemic connections within the socion, linearly independent. The eights of types in the socion and the eights of traits are not linearly independent. And under the given conditions of the formation of the socion on the basis of the four traits of Jung, together with the sixteen types there appear fifteen traits with whose help these types can be divided into fifteen “correct,” antisymmetrical eights. And independently of what the history of the concept of differentiating traits is, and now also independently of what G. Reinin thinks about this, it is a sound theoretical construct with which one can and must work, and which has proved not at all so simple as it might at first have seemed. And reasoning to the effect that Jung did not have four traits but only three (Lis) changes nothing in this apart from historical details. Even so intelligent a man as Jung, it turns out, did not understand everything in his own developments, and many of his contemporaries and subsequent critics understood still less. Only socionics disclosed the true sense of Jung’s typological work, but this by no means signifies that all socionists understand everything in it.

Aushra Augustinavichute at once responded to Reinin’s theoretical elaboration and, as far as she could, investigated it in the work “Reinin’s Traits,” which, incidentally, gives grounds for calling these traits the Augustinavichute–Reinin traits (ART). However, strange as it may be, the traits are all the same not fifteen but, as O. Karpenko and S. Churyumov have shown, sixteen. No, mathematics did not err. Reinin, in considering the multiplicative group of traits within the socion, possibly did not take into account the group identity, that is, the element whose presence is on the one hand theoretically absolutely necessary and on the other hand whose action changes nothing. Therefore one may speak of fifteen differentiating traits and one non-differentiating, or rather zero-differentiating, trait. Simply, the sixteenth trait opposes nothing to nothing, or rather “zero-opposes,” being a degenerate form of opposition.

As the core of G. R. Reinin’s methodological complex one may take, above all, an intuitive understanding of the apparatus of mathematical combinatorics and a logical precision of definitions, which has also been splendidly demonstrated in his other works. Besides, one should not forget that this is a scholar formed in St. Petersburg, a city with long-standing scientific traditions and simply a high intellectual culture. So there is a chance of coming to an agreement here — if only the arguments bear a scientific character.

In 2005 his book [33] appeared. It is interesting in many respects. This is a text written not simply by an intelligent man, but moreover by a man who has attained the age of wisdom, a doctor of sciences with great psychological experience and experience of teaching as well. In the book there is a large quantity of valuable psychological observations and recommendations by an experienced psychologist. And nevertheless a significant part of the information placed in the book I perceive as para-socionic, written in connection with socionics, on the occasion of socionics, even within the framework of socionic concepts, but sometimes very subtly and sometimes plainly entering into contradiction with them. This is connected with the fact that G. R. Reinin in his work relies not on Model “A” but on Model “K,” whose principled divergences from Model “A” were assessed in the section on I. Kalinauskas.

Therefore, when G. R. Reinin describes a type relying on the semantics of the functions of Model “K,” the result comes out “almost entirely different” from that of Aushra Augustinavichute, and the set-theoretical intersection of his descriptions with the descriptions based on Model “A” is either altogether absent, or bears an accidental character, or looks like a correct conclusion from incorrect premises.

Let us give examples. To say of Don Quixote that his principle of existence is expressed by the phrase “The world must always be whole and harmonious” [33, 27], relying on an interpretation of extraverted intuition, means that it is simultaneously acknowledged that for other types (at least for some of them) such a position is uncharacteristic, and that for them the wholeness and harmoniousness of the world represent no value. Such a state of affairs looks extremely dubious. The wholeness and harmony of the world is a basic condition of existence for any normal person and, in general, for any living being. And even scum and lawless people defend the wholeness and harmony of their world, simply because this is a direct consequence of the instinct of self-preservation. Self-preservation is precisely the equivalent of preserving wholeness and harmony. From the point of view of NLP, such an assertion, being universally valuational and consequently trivial, is easily perceived as true. Look closely at the behaviour of any bearer of any type, and you will understand that along the program-potential function people always fight for the wholeness and harmony of their world, and that the suppression of this function is equivalent to a severe psychological disorder. And when G. R. Reinin writes further: “It is not normal when someone tries to destroy the wholeness of the external situation,” then this must relate not only to Don Quixote but in general to all types.

Further, in describing what in Model “K” is called the minus-first function, where in Don Quixote introverted intuition is located but which in no way corresponds to the imperative function of Model “A,” G. R. Reinin interprets this aspect as “ignoring the wholeness of the internal situation,” which he then deciphers as “an inability to immerse oneself in oneself” [33, 27]. If “the ability to immerse oneself in oneself” is understood as introspection or self-reflection, then in the species Homo sapiens this capacity, though present, is on the whole poorly developed, and only individual persons from birth and independently of type are capable of performing this operation in a conventionally full or at least in a greater volume. But here too exact definitions are needed. What does “the ability to immerse oneself in oneself” mean? Here a wide diapason of explications is possible, from states of pensiveness and light melancholy, when the external world is to some degree pushed into the background, states of self-analysis, self-searching and even auto-suggestion with relaxation and a sensation of warmth and pleasant heaviness throughout the body, to deep trances which are accessible to some people from birth independently of type, and to some are given only after a complex and strenuous spiritual practice. And how, in this sense, are we to evaluate fits, autism, a coma? And what about sleep? Should it be understood as an immersion in oneself? And why not, since in socionics the discussion is of a high degree of conceptual generalization? But an average Don Quixote can hardly be supposed to have typological problems with sleep. And Don Quixotes, as intuitive logical types, more often than others possess self-reflection from birth or master it relatively easily thanks to life experience and training. Whereas, according to Model “A,” introverted intuition in the position of the imperative function is interpreted by Aushra Augustinavichute as an immersion in the flow of time, and not, for example, in a flow of emotions, of relations or of sensory states. Aushra Augustinavichute describes this as “subordination to the rhythm (regime) of the time of the socion” [34].

It is interesting how G. R. Reinin describes the creative function of Model “K” in Don Quixote, where the IA of introverted logic is located. He identifies this aspect with “explanation, understanding” [34, 28], which only partly reflects the semantics of this function. Further he writes [ibid.]: “A person gives out as his production, as his self-realization, his own understanding. In Don Quixote this looks like this: anything at all can be explained, and moreover in a multitude of ways. The ease with which Don Quixote can explain everything simply astounds representatives of other types.” I shall not even speak of the fact that in Don Quixote’s Model “A” this aspect is interpreted somewhat differently, but I wish to draw attention to the fact that it is precisely this ability to explain anything easily that characterizes G. R. Reinin himself — a talented Don Quixote or Balzac, and there is nothing more to be said. Therefore in his work one may encounter, alongside deep and grounded explanations, explanations that are highly superficial and contestable.

So the divergence of descriptions of one and the same aspect relying on different models is obvious.

Despite the serious methodological divergences in the description of types between Aushra Augustinavichute and G. R. Reinin, his book seems a remarkable event not only in socionics but in psychology as well. His theoretical analysis of typological descriptions of the personality in psychology [34, ch. 2] represents a splendid model of the work of an intuitive logical type and will forever enter the treasury of psychological thought. One of G. R. Reinin’s best achievements, alongside the discovery of the set of “non-Jungian” differentiating traits, is the foundations of the theory of small groups — this is one of the promising directions in socionics, a vast field for the possible application of the efforts of contemporary and future generations of scholars.

Bukalov Grigory Konstantinovich

Another remarkable socionist, Bukalov Grigory Konstantinovich, brought into socionics his experience as a design engineer with a subtle understanding of the “soul” of a technical object, thanks to which he naturally and independently of my ideas concerning the universality of the TIM developed the idea of the TIM of a technical object; however, later, under the influence of V. D. Ermak, he began to limit the concept of the TIM only to “man–machine” systems, which in my view is indeed a limitation, since the world reason is present in all things and phenomena, and it is precisely this, in my opinion, that determines informational, or, in a more general sense, material-energy-informational metabolism in our world. G. K. Bukalov’s works are well known among socionists.

A. M. Elyashevich

A. M. Elyashevich is not only a remarkable scholar but simply a remarkable person. Characteristic of him is a cognitive-pragmatic enthusiasm, a reliance on a fundamental scientific methodology of a positivist cast with elements of behaviourism — though it is not excluded that he calls this (or does not call it) something entirely different. A. M. Elyashevich is distinguished above all by a cognitive motivation very characteristic of his TIM (ILE), and he, having already achieved results in one scientific field, boldly sets out to swim within the bounds of an entirely different discipline, obtaining valuable and useful results and also introducing elements of socionics into the educational process connected with management.

But I should like to give a little grounding for my designation of his methodological complex as close to positivism and behaviourism. Let me note at once that I put no label-like or abusive sense into these terms, but only try to designate, perhaps not always felicitously, the methodological complex of a scholar as I understand it, and also indicate with their help the limits of the method. Beyond these limits it is useless to criticize a researcher’s scientific behaviour. These same limits indicate the limitations on mutual understanding.

And so, when I put to A. M. Elyashevich the question of what the psyche is and what exactly it is that we model with the help of the socionic model, he answered to the effect that this question does not interest him (in the plane of scientific research). He simply deals with an array of data (for example, of answers to testing questions) obtained with the help of tests and processes them with the help of various methods, for example with the help of data mining, cluster analysis and so on. As a result certain stable magnitudes, invariants, are discovered, which can then be factorized and formulated with the help of terms, concepts and categories. In its extreme variant the behaviourist approach accepts as the only reliable reality the lists of stimuli with whose help influence was exerted upon the “black box,” and of the reactions obtained from the side of this “box.” Reasoning as to what is inside the box — for example, the psyche — is considered metaphysical, and this is perceived as a synonym of unscientificness, incorrectness and illegitimacy, and also as a sign of bad taste. Here the dependence of scholars on philosophical fashion is clearly visible.

Close to this is the positivist programme in science as well: to study only the “positive” object and to describe its real parameters, without imposing on the object any prejudiced philosophical, religious or even simply speculative constructs. Both scientific programmes mentioned — the behaviourist and the positivist — being relatively invulnerable, have since the time of A. Comte received wide dissemination in science, since they help to gather a large quantity of factual material without entering into unpromising discussions about transcendent essences. And yet the aggregate human experience possesses data and concepts (for example, spirit and soul) which sooner or later science will simply have to integrate; otherwise its very existence will become hostile to humanity. And many of the negative costs of science humanity has long been experiencing upon itself.

V. Pavlov

V. Pavlov is a remarkable organizer and theorist of socionics from Dnepropetrovsk. An exceptionally intelligent and inventive man and undoubtedly a creative nature — I personally consider that his IQ is not less than 150. I personally saw how in the course of forty seconds he solved a creative problem on the switching of light sources and switches proposed to him by A. M. Elyashevich. This problem requires overcoming inertia of thought and going out from the combinatorial plane into the physical one, which he performed, as they say, before the eyes of the public. I personally have no doubt that the result was not known to him beforehand — it is precisely this that is testified to by the single question he asked concerning the problem, namely: “Do the lamps hang not too high under the ceiling?” This may be understood to mean that he had already obtained the answer and was only clarifying the circumstances. Well, what is there to say — all who know him sufficiently closely can hardly doubt his remarkable qualities.

In evaluating his methodological complex, I would point above all to a high level of pragmatism, or rather of pragmatic constructivism. In a private conversation Volodya said that for him the proof of a theory can be only something like welded water pipes (possibly he spoke of other pipes, but for characterizing his approach to the results of science this is inessential). In second place in the evaluation of his methodological complex I would put a sober negativism which does not take on faith what has not passed a real testing by life. Such a position can hardly deserve any attitude other than respect. But V. Pavlov is also a lover of “pranks,” including subtle theoretical provocations — “healthy prank-ism” is his term. He himself described one of his experiments-provocations, in which different people were given, under the socionic types they had chosen, one and the same weakly differentiated, average (at the level of the Milton model) description of a personality on the supposition that the person would recognize himself in it — which was confirmed. And this was supposed to testify that the descriptions of socionic types available in the literature are at any rate good for nothing. Q.E.D. Of course, this is a quite normal variant of a scientific experiment, and its result requires that those who describe socionic (but of course not only socionic) types should check these descriptions for validity, reliability and stability, as is required, for example, in the development of tests; but whether this experiment was one hundred per cent correct is unknown to me. I fear that a pre-setting toward obtaining a negative result may have taken place, as a result of which it was obtained. Because of the negative pre-setting the positive moments which, it would seem, ought all the same to be contained in the available descriptions may have been underestimated, so that everything may have gone according to the scheme — the baby thrown out with the bathwater. This same scheme of methodological provocation was laid also into the International Socionic Conference in Dnepropetrovsk on the evaluation of socionic testing organized by Volodya — Volodya spoke of this himself, and this is on the whole known to all the participants of the conference. Moreover, in summing up the results of the conference its “positive” results looked so lamentable that even the “unbending” Pavlov wavered (this was clearly noticeable from the expression of his face) and began to seek an acceptable compromise — and of course he found one. Together with A. M. Elyashevich they found invariants in the array of data obtained as a result of comparing the testing results (CTR), and the results acquired a far more objective and acceptable appearance. The same approach, it seems to me, ought to have been applied to the experiment discrediting the descriptions of the types as well.

On the basis of the above I would designate V. Pavlov’s methodological complex as constructive negativism + “healthy prank-ism.”

Volodya also made claims to the development of a metasocionics, but here I would offer a couple of critical remarks. Well, first, this programme was in its time announced by E. Shepetko, and there is no special novelty here. But the matter stands considerably more subtly, and I think that Volodya, with his remarkable intellect, is capable of understanding this subtlety. Before building a meta-discipline, the discipline itself must exist. Metamathematics is possible precisely because mathematics exists; and metamathematics is not mathematics at all — it is a discipline which studies the structure and ideology of mathematics and is used for the analysis, criticism and perfection of mathematics.

Socionics has not yet attained the perfection which characterizes mathematics or logic, and it would be premature to consider that the printed materials available on socionics have completely exhausted its subject. Far from complete (and perhaps this is in principle impossible) are the internal theoretical developments — among which Volodya’s works belong — capable of outlining the contours of socionics. And it is intuitively clear that not one type of model like Model “A” is possible but at least several — well, at least those which have already been described and reported at socionic conferences. In my article [19] I showed the possibilities of generalizing the socionic model, and here on the whole everything is clear — the functions in a model may be of any number, including a variable one. And their introduction may be formalized axiomatically, empirically, or metaphysically. But the point is not only the number of functions, but also the rules of their interaction, their semantics, their internal structure, the structure of the whole model, and also the essence of the whole totality of concepts oriented toward the modelling of the psyche. It is here, in my view, that metasocionics begins — when not merely the form of the model is generalized (that is a purely mathematical operation), but when a theory is developed of the whole totality of the specific concepts of the discipline, and not of its subject. But then metasocionics, or rather one of its branches, will represent merely one of the directions of mathematics. Its second branch, however, will be nothing other than metapsychology, because one must still ground the legitimacy, the limitations and the prospects of modelling the psyche. But the mathematical part of metasocionics has no need of such a pretentious name, because it has no relation either to the psyche or to sociology, but occupies itself with the investigation of abstract structures of the type of algebraic categories [8] and also of their totalities. The point is not in the possibilities of the formal apparatus but in the real interpretations of this apparatus. Therefore one may say that the presumed metasocionics represents the general theoretical part of socionics, which at present is still far from completion and perfection.

It is also interesting to note that Volodya’s immediate circle and he himself considered him (at least until 2000) a Don Quixote. Part of the Kiev socionists categorically disagreed with this and were convinced that he was a Hamlet. I, however, fairly quickly came to the conclusion that he is no Don Quixote and no Hamlet, but a genuine Jack — enterprising, active, intelligent, businesslike. But I never said this to him, and supported his version so as not to upset the man and not to enter into poorly prepared discussions. There is an example for you of disagreements in the determination of the socionic type.

In V. Pavlov’s circle there are many intelligent lads (perhaps even all of them), but I should like to single out especially V. Stoyakin, of whose type I have no doubt — he is an ILI (and of course it is my personal affair that I think precisely so, but I could also argue for it). This is a very intelligent, erudite, steadfast and hard-working man, ready and able to defend his point of view professionally. But is he equally ready to make sense of how far the points of view of other people and types correspond to the truth? I liked his article [18] “On the types of Athens, Socrates and … the Venus de Milo” exceptionally — in it, besides a real sensation of “density of thought per square centimetre of text,” one senses both erudition and the logical coherence of the argumentation. And there is nothing surprising in the fact that an ILI, that is, a Balzac, criticizes rather caustically a point of view he has not fully accepted, namely that TIMs exist not only in people but in other objects too — for example, countries, cities, ethnoi.

It is interesting how he begins the article (let us consider it as a test performed by the author himself). “Historical socionics is undoubtedly one of the interesting directions which will find its place in the future.” Consciously or unconsciously, the author uses in a small sentence three lexical units belonging to the category of time — “historical,” “will find,” “in the future.” He descried precisely this in socionics, this in the first place, this touched him most of all. Time — past and future — constitutes the content of the first function of the ILI. Besides, this first phrase represents a forecast. The author somehow (intuitively!) knows the future of historical socionics. But already in his second phrase there is an element of criticism. “Although the idea of determining the types of long-dead people and civilizations calls forth a certain professional mistrust (how is one to check?)…” The combination of words “a certain professional mistrust” is significant. I interpret it as 1) an indication of the author’s profession; 2) an indication of a critical attitude to the object of interest (“mistrust”); 3) as a balanced, non-rigid (= introverted) position of the author (“a certain”). But in the phrase the root (and projection of the archetype of intuition) ver- [Russian nedoverie “mistrust,” proverit’ “to check”] is repeated twice, and moreover once in parentheses — an introverted position. The analysis could be continued, but that would take up too much space in an already long chapter, and therefore I shall confine myself to individual remarks; and in doing so I have no doubt whatever that the author will hardly agree with me — for an intelligent sceptic there is too little probative force here. But I, for example, would not have used with respect to Ancient Greece the combination of words “a perished civilization” — I would have said “a vanished one.” Seemingly a small difference, but the author’s epithet is more dramatic and gloomier, since the word “perished” calls up in the imagination death, sufferings, dying — which of course were there, but the essence of a civilization does not reduce to them.

The article is permeated with scepticism and doubts not only about the possibility of determining the TIM of an ancient culture and of its individual representatives, but also about the very legitimacy of such a determination: “…if we were to meet now with an ancient Greek, would we be able to determine his type? I shall take upon myself the boldness to answer: no! The psyche of man has not changed, but his psychology has — very substantially” (ibid.). I should not wish here either to refute or to prove anything; I am a different type. I wish only to draw attention to what seems to me a contradiction in the author’s reasoning — if an ancient Greek had a TIM, then in principle it can also be determined. It is another matter whether we at present have sufficient means for this. But means are a matter of acquisition. Pointing out a contradiction is an ordinary polemical device — well, two intuitive logical types are discussing something. But an ingenious refutation will immediately follow, and this may continue quite a long time. But will it prove possible to find a common language and to arrive at a reliable conclusion? Concerning V. A. Stoyakin’s methodological complex I have no doubts — he named it himself (an intelligent man — homo sapiens!): a “dyed-in-the-wool” positivist (self-definition), and there is nothing to add here; but I shall nevertheless add that the time of positivism too is drawing to a close, and “normal” science must be ready for a change of paradigm.

Having been at the VI Moscow socionic conference (6–7 April 2002), I note with great satisfaction and hope its high level. Here I saw both familiar and, for me, new speakers with their inimitable methodological complexes. The time of communication was not great, and it is hard for me to vouch that my observations are one hundred per cent the truth; nevertheless, as a first approximation they will quite do.

Prokofieva T. N.

Prokofieva T. N. (ILE) is a remarkable organizer of science and propagandist of socionics, distinguished by a high level of socionic optimism. In her socionic work she enjoys the support of her whole family against the background of socionic dualization, and therefore one need not be surprised at the effectiveness of her work. A mathematician by first education, she retrained in psychology, but her mathematical base secures for her a high theoretical and methodological level in combination with a well-grounded reliance on the practical use of socionics. She has developed her own original algorithm of the diagnostic interview and uses it successfully in determining the TIM.

Chaur N. A.

Chaur N. A. (LII) began his report at the 6th Moscow conference with the words: “For me socionics is one continuous supposition.” What a deep sense in one small phrase! This is testimony that there still does not exist an unambiguously probative exposition of socionics. The paradox consisting in the contradiction between the effective practical use of socionics and the absence of its official recognition still awaits its resolution. But why, all the same, does socionics to this day still remain a hypothetical construction? Who ought to put an end to the indeterminacy of the scientific position of socionics? What is the cause of the discriminatory attitude to socionics on the part of the academies of sciences and the higher attestation commissions? And at the same time N. A. Chaur’s appearances are permeated with socionic optimism and enthusiasm. And, as I understood, he is convinced that sooner or later all the necessary groundings will be found and all the dots will be put over the “i”s in the official status of socionics.

It was precisely with this aim that I undertook to write this book, but evidently the ideal still remains beyond the bounds of reach.

Kochubeeva L.

The development of Kochubeeva L. (SEE) is a remarkable example of how a conscientious and prolonged psychological investigation brought its socionic fruits in the form of a productive adaptation of the test “Non-existent Animal” to socionic diagnostics. And yet before her this was worked on both by S. Malashok and by S. Churyumov and others, but they confined themselves only to a practical confirmation of the effectiveness of using this test for identifying the axial traits of the TIM of the person under investigation, without bringing their research to the level of a method.

S. Shteinikov

A few words about S. Shteinikov — he proposed a socionic model deserving attention which was completely rejected by V. D. Ermak. Why? Perhaps V. D. Ermak did not understand it? Or perhaps because he is a dogmatist? And yet S. Shteinikov’s model is not at all bad — behind it stands an intuitive-naturalistic vision of nature, in which a generalization is made of the form of natural processes and the generalized form is transferred into new spheres. Seryozha generalized such natural processes as the sexual act, a volcanic eruption, defecation and much else, discovered in them a four-beat structure, and connected it with his model of the socionic type, which is a natural development of Model “A.” But one would like him to describe his research in more detail himself.

T. Yakubovskaya

In her research T. Yakubovskaya consistently relies on the method of analogies [25]. She discovers analogies between well-known ancient constructs — the I Ching, Tarot, astrology, the Pythagorean square and others — on the one hand, and socionics and even the structure of DNA on the other. Her credo she expresses in these words: “I understand that my reasoning is somewhat shaky, but I proceeded from an inner conviction that analogous things are analogous precisely because their roots go into some universal cosmic analogue. In other words, at the base of analogous things lies a common principle” [28]. A very characteristic expression for an intuitive logical type. An inner conviction about the sense of things is precisely a manifestation of intuition. Unfortunately, intuition makes it possible only to formulate a hypothesis, but does not give probative knowledge. As for the method of analogies, the limitations extending to it are well known — an analogy must be essential and not formally superficial. For example, it is hard to believe that there is some essential connection between the four wheels of an automobile and the four elements. Nevertheless, T. Yakubovskaya succeeds in finding convincing arguments which prove the existence of a substantive connection between such ancient teachings (or, possibly, their relict remnants) as the I Ching, Tarot, the visions of Ezekiel and so on. And indeed, if the ancient teachings correctly reflected essential peculiarities of our world, then, independently of the symbolic codes they used for fixing their knowledge, invariant structures must be present there. And T. Yakubovskaya succeeds in showing convincingly that such structures do indeed exist and, in particular, that they are built up over the archetypes of the elements. Knowledge of the archetypes standing behind the concepts of the elements is perhaps one of the most fundamental achievements of antiquity.

Unfortunately, contemporary science does not include in its methodological instruments the description of scientific concepts in terms of the elements, and therefore the establishment of analogies between ancient and modern constructs makes sense only within the framework of comparative science studies. Of course, if the talk were of a real rediscovery of what stands behind the ancient teachings — for example, of sources of energy unknown to science — and of the development on this basis of effective technologies, then that would be another matter.

Therefore, when T. Yakubovskaya finds a way of establishing her own correspondence between the elements and the socionic functions, then although this is curious, it is unclear what is to be done with it in socionics. Such correspondences prove nothing except the existence of an analogy. Nevertheless, if in the structure of the elements, the Tarot cards or the hexagrams some special connections were discovered which could be transferred into socionics and given substantive interpretations allowing one to learn something new about the socionic types, then of course this could only be welcomed. An analysis of attempts to correlate the elements and the socionic functions is given in the chapter on the semantics of the IAs.

The same may be said of the analogy between the elements and the four bases — adenine, thymine, guanine and cytosine — which enter into the composition of DNA. Let us suppose that these bases substantively correspond to the elements of fire, earth, air and water. Is this to be understood in the sense that adenine has the properties of fire, thymine the properties of earth, and so on? Even if in some more or less figurative sense? One may agree even to this. But in what does this manifest itself in real chemical bonds? Is it essential for understanding chemical processes? Yet it is precisely such questions that must be answered for the analogy to become substantive. Otherwise it is no more than a game of the theoretical imagination.

As an example of how an intuitive logical type may reason, I shall give an example from Yakubovskaya’s book [25]. “Let us return to the genetic code and see which nitrogenous base stands out in any way. What strikes the eye is the fact that in molecules of RNA, unlike molecules of DNA, thymine (T) is not present. Instead of thymine in these molecules stands uracil (U), which, like thymine, is a pyrimidine base. The three other bases are present both in molecules of DNA and in molecules of RNA. It turns out that the marked base is thymine. That means that thymine corresponds to the dyad which designates earth. Let us recall that the bases are divided into purine and pyrimidine, and the elements into feminine and masculine. If one base corresponds to a feminine element, then the second must correspond to a feminine one as well. If thymine is earth, then cytosine is water. In the double helix of DNA thymine (T) is mirror-symmetrical to adenine (A), and cytosine (C) to guanine (G). That means that adenine corresponds to fire and guanine to air.” One sees the erudition; one sees that the researcher’s intuition is catching something and trying somehow to structure the intuitive flow; there is a certain heuristic here too, but it is hard to imagine that this could be convincing for a specialist. But if specialists were to discover in this material hints useful for their science and were able to unfold them, to realize them in the form of a new theory or at least of a new theoretical approach, then that would be a very valuable result. In the end, one person cannot do everything. T. Yakubovskaya has performed very laborious and interesting work, quite characteristic of an intuitive logical type; but now the efforts of ethical intuitive types and logical sensory types are needed to prepare this work for transformation into a methodological instrument or some technology, for example an informational one. One would like to believe that new generations of socionists, sociologists and geneticists will read T. Yakubovskaya’s books with profit for themselves and their science and will find in them keys to the further development of their directions.

T. Yakubovskaya’s book The Genetic Code of the Universe is not merely not bad, it is talented. In it a splendid analysis is carried out of the formal structure of the most ancient concepts and interesting analogies are established. Very good is the very idea of a genetic code of the Universe, that is, as I understand it, of the existence of universal proto-structures in accordance with which all the objects of Nature are formed and function. This is a serious contribution to the understanding of the world in which we live. It is a contribution both scientific and philosophical. However, for the present it remains unclear how all this can be applied to socionics and in other scientific spheres.

Sergey Savchenko

Sergey Savchenko is one of the most talented scholars in socionics. I should not like to be categorical, but from my point of view he is an intuitive-logical extravert who quite reasonably considers himself a sensory-logical extravert. His developments in the sphere of symbolic socionics appeared very much to the point. He did not merely establish an analogy between socionic concepts and the system of the court cards of the Tarot; he managed to show the inner identity of these concepts. One may say that he thereby as it were rehabilitated ancient knowledge in the field of psychology and sociology from the positions of modern science. From the point of view of socionics, however, he opened an informational channel that could help to transfer the achievements of the ancients adequately into our time. Properly speaking, this is precisely what he is engaged in.

But, still more concretely, one may say that S. Savchenko has deeply worked through one of the thirty-five socionic groups indicated by G. Reinin [12] — namely, as it may now be called, the court group.

Igor Litvinenko

I should like also to note the talented works of Igor Litvinenko. Here a good methodological preparation is combined with a professional preparation in the field of psychology. His works are distinguished by thoroughness of elaboration, precision of definitions and professionalism. However, it seems that at the faculty where he studied, philosophy and methodology were taught by lecturers who stood firmly on the positions of dialectical materialism, and this is felt in his works. Dialectical materialism, if cleansed of ideological complications, may serve as a quite sound basis for scientific research. In the end, even crippled Soviet science justly occupied first places on the advanced front of the cognition of nature. True, it gradually began to lose to Western science. And one of the most serious losses was the surrender of positions in computer technologies. Here there is no fault of the scholars — this is the loss of untalented politicians. In the Soviet Union there were talented scholars who could have secured modern computer technologies, and we would have had a significant share of the computer market; but alas, too little then depended on the scholars and too much on the party bureaucrats. And one of the roots of this tragedy — I am not afraid of the word — was dialectical materialism, on the whole greatly simplified, for it too ceased to develop with the communists’ coming to power. Therefore in our time it is not very reasonable to rely on a methodology that, though sound, is somewhat outdated. It is necessary to discover for oneself new approaches in this sphere, in which world philosophy is so rich. Incidentally, these approaches by no means contradict materialism, but only broaden its boundaries.

Afanasyev A.

Afanasyev’s book The Syntax of Love is talently written and deservedly enjoys success with readers. To all who have not read this piece I recommend doing so, and you will, given compatibility with the text, derive great pleasure, and may even become a supporter of this beautiful theory. He created his own typology. In his work he undoubtedly started out from Aushra Augustinavichute, and the necessary reference is present in his book. But this is an example of a “home-made” typology, of a peculiar typological heresy. Let us try to show its principled difference from socionics and its theoretical incorrectness.

Afanasyev says that there “gradually took shape a conception of the internal architecture of man, consisting of four psychic modules, or functions: EMOTION (‘soul’), LOGIC (‘mind’), PHYSICS (‘body’) and WILL (‘spirit’)” [3]. Note that here the author calls functions certain primary psychic capacities not dependent on their position in the psyche. Not a bad set of empirically chosen categories. However, there are no sufficient grounds here for considering such a set complete. He might have singled out not four but, for example, five, six, seven or more psychic modules, or functions, as he calls them. One might also have confined oneself to three functions: BODY, SOUL, SPIRIT, which are met with in religious teachings. Or one might have added INTUITION, IMAGINATION, SENSATIONS, CONSCIENCE — well, there is no telling what else might come into a talented person’s head. Of course one may, if one wishes, assign INTUITION to MIND or to EMOTIONS, but one may also not assign it. The sole criterion here is intuitive satisfaction with the resulting set of categories, whereas what is needed is exact, theoretically grounded definitions.

Further Afanasyev, somewhere between Jung and Aushra Augustinavichute, accepts that the functions he has chosen — on the whole very likeable ones — are arranged in the psyche in a hierarchical, four-step order, on which the manifestation of each of them depends. Here one senses the semantics of order, but it is different from that of Jung or of Aushra Augustinavichute, somehow his own. Further, in this order a TOP and a BOTTOM are singled out. The TOP is strong, the BOTTOM weak, at least relatively. And one further distinction. The extreme functions are resultative, and the middle ones processional. For the resultative ones the result is more important than the process; for the processional ones, on the contrary, the process is more important than the result. Further the semantics of the places in which the functions may stand is deciphered in more detail. A function standing in first place gravitates toward EXCESS; it is distinguished by the greatest strength, as a result of which all people may be divided into sensualists (1st Physics), voluntarists (1st Will), mystics (1st Emotion), rationalists (1st Logic). Already here one may ask why emotionality is correlated with mysticism. Against the background of the three other categories, more or less comprehensible by general scientific standards as correlated with first functions, this correlation looks at least dubious. Further the author accepts that what a person cognizes along the first function is distinguished for him by the greatest reliability. The first function secures a person’s maximal contact with the external world, and the author compares it with a hammer.

The second function is NORMATIVE. It is hard to describe, and the author compares it with a river. It too is strong, but in comparison with the first it is distinguished by breadth, richness, naturalness and flexibility, which somehow goes beyond the bounds of the semantic field of normativity. The second function acts impeccably adequately to the situation. In this Afanasyev sees a standard-setting quality. The processionality of the second function is manifested in the fact that for its full-blooded realization a partner is necessary, in whose capacity an audience may also appear. The second function is fearless and readily takes risks, does not fear blows and even utilizes them for its own perfection.

Comparing the first and second functions, the author uses one more beautiful metaphor: if the first function is a gift to oneself, then the second is a gift to others.

The third function is the weak, sore spot of the human psyche, an ulcer, a “dynamic trauma,” a source of shock, of upheaval, of awkwardness, of incompatibility, of a conflictual perception of the world. This function is vulnerable, defective, underdeveloped, in need of constant strengthening, self-development and defence. With it is connected a sensation of great but unrealized potential. A most beautiful comparison of the third function with the chained Prometheus, but so intimidated that in every passing crow he sees the eagle of Zeus flying to peck at his wounded liver. Vulnerability, sharpened sensitivity. Blows to the third function are experienced extremely painfully, and the scars from them remain for life. It is especially hard for this function in childhood. Here there is a sharpened sense of danger, it is hard to catch it unawares, there is an inclination toward hyperbolization and it greatly exaggerates the real danger. The expectation of a blow to the third function is the chief nightmare of a person. The 3rd Logic fears an accusation of incompetence, the 3rd Will fears humiliation, the 3rd Physics fears beatings, the 3rd Emotion fears hysterics. There is a “fig-leaf” reaction on meeting the same but stronger function: irony for the 3rd Emotion, scepticism for the 3rd Logic, hypocrisy for the 3rd Physics, buffoonery and dissembling for the 3rd Will. This is also the chief generator of love. Alcohol removes the block from the third function, so that restraint along the 3rd Emotion turns into heightened sensitivity, silent withdrawnness along the 3rd Logic turns into talkativeness, misogyny along the 3rd Physics turns into importunate pestering of women, modesty along the 3rd Will turns into conceit.

This function is to the greatest degree capable of sympathy and empathy, but it is inclined to envy, which impels it to strive to reach the level of the object of its interest, since it feels itself infringed upon, but at the same time, as Afanasyev considers, it wishes to humiliate that object. Along the third function a person is inclined to subject himself to trials which he sets himself. The cause of this is a person’s striving to learn his limits along the 3rd function. Praise and rewards along the 3rd function are valued as none other. Flattery here may be served up in any quantities.

To the fourth function a person attaches little significance, although it may be quite strong and productive. The 4th Emotion is not necessarily unfeeling, the 4th Logic is not necessarily stupid, the 4th Will is not necessarily weak-charactered, the 4th Physics is not necessarily weak. There is located what a person himself places on the last step. Along this function a person behaves unconstrainedly and feels himself free. Activity along the 4th function is not an independent value; it is not an end but a means of existence. Impressions arriving along the 4th function are perceived by a person as the least reliable. Along the 4th function a person easily becomes led, easily entrusts the problems that arise to other functions. The 4th Physics easily becomes a kept woman, the 4th Emotion is easily infected by another’s mood, the 4th Logic easily agrees with another’s opinion, the 4th Will easily agrees with decisions taken for it. And again a remarkable metaphor: the fourth function is “a slave without guile, a chameleon and a dependant with a great but dormant potential.”

Well then, a simple and clear scheme for evaluating a person. And moreover a talented “right-hemisphere” exposition. A large and valuable factual material has been gathered. All the necessary conditions for turning the book into a brand and a bestseller are present. And so it turned out.

However, from the point of view of socionics, this is just such a truncated and slightly skewed typology as the Jungian typology in America, though somewhat better than the MMPI, Leonhard’s accentuations and Dellinger’s psychogeometry. In the hands of a master it may work no worse than the Tarot cards, the I Ching or the Runes. However, for the contemporary person it possesses an additional attractiveness on account of its “almost-scientificness” — there is a structure, there are definitions, there are classifications. And a very high-quality “right-hemisphere” exposition of the material. It is like a strongly distorted but very inventive and talented retelling of socionics. Therefore it will be useful for socionics to take Afanasyev’s findings into its armoury, having rethought them in its own terms.

Unlike socionics, Afanasyev’s typology (TAF) places the functional and aspectual accents differently. In socionics a function is above all a position, by which the semantics of the function is determined, while its filling is an informational aspect. In Afanasyev a function is above all a primary psychic capacity. It may be located in one of four places, but the places in themselves are not functions for Afanasyev. The functional character of the position he almost fails to distinguish — well, somewhere on the border. At least, he does not speak of this directly. The position does have its own semantics, but the author, unlike socionics, does not single out or does not realize the functional character of the position.

In Afanasyev’s typology (TAF) a slightly distorted Model “AYu” is quite discernible. The first function is the zone of maximal self-realization, the second function is creative, the third function is the zone of painful sensitivity, and the fourth function is suggestive. Thus the semantics of the functional positions in Afanasyev coincides with the semantics of the functions of Model “AYu” up to synonymic substitutions.

As for the difference between Afanasyev’s four and socionics’ eight functions, it is not hard to show that Afanasyev’s functions either partly coincide with the socionic ones or are a semantic combination of the latter. For clarity let us introduce the designations E(a), L(a), Ph(a), W(a) for Afanasyev’s functions, and I(s), S(s), E(s), L(s), i(s), s(s), e(s), l(s) for the socionic functions, where capital letters indicate extraverted and lower-case letters introverted aspects. The letter in parentheses correlates the aspect with Afanasyev’s typology or with socionics. The result of the comparison is presented in Table 19.05 [sic — the table is renumbered in the original]. The sign % in the table denotes a partial coincidence with the corresponding positions of the function indicated in parentheses.

Table 19.05

Afanasyev	Socionics	Comment
E(a)	E(s)	coincide by definition, but positionally 1E(a) = %(2E(s) + 5E(s))
L(a)	l(s)	close by definition, but positionally 1L(a) = %(1l(s) + 2l(s) + 3l(s))
Ph(a)	L(s)	close by definition, but positionally 1Ph(a) = %(2L(s) + 5L(s))
W(a)	S(s)	coincide by definition, but positionally 1W(a) = %(1S(s) + 5S(s) + 3S(s))

This is the result of a first-approximation analysis. Possibly one will have to work on it thoroughly, but the tendency is clear. In any case, one cannot possibly say that Afanasyev’s primary functions in principle do not coincide with the socionic ones or that they must be understood in some special way. It is another matter that a comparison even of these two typologies leads to the melancholy thought that in psychology to this day there is no deeply grounded theoretical solution of the problem of the primary functions. Of course, psychologists may object that everything is in order with them, but here come all sorts of people who start muddying the water. Yet socionics has managed to offer a theoretical base for posing the problem of an exact and objective explication of such important concepts as the primary psychic functions.

However, the chief difference of TAF from Model “AYu” consists in the absence of restrictions on the joint arrangement of rational and irrational functions, and this very concept is precisely what is absent there. Therefore in his typology all permutations of the four primary functions are possible. As a result one obtains not sixteen types but twenty-four. But this is an important and well theoretically grounded moment in socionics. This gives preliminary grounds for considering that there is a substantial miscalculation in Afanasyev’s model. So socionists will have a pretext for theoretical research in this field.

And yet Afanasyev was unable to avoid a structure with sixteen types: this set is made up by his primary types, obtained as the semantic product of the semantics of the primary function and the semantics of the place in which this function stands. All his sixteen types are presented in Table 19.06.

Table 19.06. Afanasyev’s primary types

	Emotion	Logic	Physics	Will
First	Romantics	Dogmatists	Proprietors	Tsars
Second	Actors	Rhetoricians	Toilers	Nobles
Third	Dry sticks	Sceptics	Touch-me-nots	Philistines
Fourth	Gapers	Schoolboys	Idlers	Slaves

By the structure of TAF it is presupposed that the final type is obtained as a totality of four primary types from this table, but on the condition (there it is, the restriction on the combinatorics!) that in one final type there may be combined only such primary types as are not simultaneously in one row and in one column. However, such a restriction has no sufficient theoretical grounding. In any case it has not been investigated. Yet it is not at all difficult to imagine a person, a bearer of primary types from one row — for example, gaper-schoolboy-idler-slave, well, such a completely worthless person. But what, can one not imagine a tsar-proprietor or a tsar-dogmatist? As many as you like! Experiment with the “forbidden” combinations and you will sense the ambiguity of a typology arranged in this way. But all the same a very beautiful one!

One may also recombine the categories standing in the Will column, and then we shall obtain “subtle” shades of these categories. Tsar-Tsar — something like Leonov’s hero from An Ordinary Miracle; Tsar-Tyrant, wholly corrupted by absolute power. Tsar-Noble — not devoid of nobility and breadth of views. Tsar-Philistine — narrowness of interests, limitation of perspective, primitive satisfaction of the simplest needs. Tsar-Slave — a marionette of his entourage, without understanding this and without attempts to change the situation. But one may obtain more complex combinations too, for example Tsar-Romantic-Actor-Philistine. Nero, perhaps, with his romantic folly and vulgar play-acting, would fit quite well into this category.

One may also, if one wishes, single out an enormous quantity of varieties of slaves. Slave-Tsar — while in a dependent position, exerts a decisive influence on the situation. Slave-Noble — while in a dependent position, preserves noble attitudes. Slave-Philistine — a slave by position and a philistine by conviction. Slave-Slave — a dependent and dull creature. And so on.

If to TAF one applies the same approach which Afanasyev, perhaps unconsciously, “applied” to socionics — namely the free permutation and combination of the elements composing it — then one may obtain not 24 types but 16! = 20,922,789,888,000 — a figure plainly beyond the powers even of a very large scientific research institute; the number of types exceeds by billions of times the number of people who have ever lived on Earth. And if one further introduces not four positions but sixteen… For example, Romanticism1, Romanticism2, Romanticism3, right up to Romanticism16, and so on. But in such a typology it will be possible to express the subtlest shades of the human soul. In it the combination Romantic1-Dogmatist1 will differ from the combination Dogmatist1-Romantic1. The first, in the design of dogmatic texts, uses ornaments of wild flowers, while the second dogmatically insists that romanticism is the only mode of existence worthy of man. Selecting biographies would be no problem, but presumably in the whole history of humanity there has not existed such a quantity of people that one type from such a typology should fall to each. Well then, one may speak of the enormous potential of such a classification, which finds a place even for what does not exist and, possibly, never will exist! The inexhaustibility of TAF is one of its astonishing merits.

In connection with TAF I recall a psychological impromptu of my elder brother when he was about 25. An ethical-intuitive extravert, he easily made psychological generalizations. And once he proposed a division of all people into four groups: heroic warriors, magicians, judges and contemporaries — do you recognize WILL, INTUITION, LOGIC and PHYSICS? Well, let it not be quite exact, but no one supposes that it is! But another time, evidently in another mood, another division occurred to him, but likewise into four groups: brigands, swindlers, executioners and philistines. However, soon, obviously because of the antisymmetrical similarity of the two rows mentioned, they combined into a simple but quite socially accusatory quatrain. [The quatrain pairs each member of the first list with its counterpart in the second: magicians are swindlers; heroic warriors are brigands; philistines are our contemporaries; and as for judges — they are executioners.]

How prophetically these lines sound in our troubled time, when the masks have been thrown off the sanctimonious faces of encyclopaedic and self-appointed idols!

To this improvisation by a young but talented non-professional one can hardly bring the requirement of completeness of classification. Probably one may find gaps in it. For example, what about scholars and artists? But possibly this improvisation is about something else, and these two remarkable categories of people are generalized in the types singled out.

Afanasyev’s typology is the work of a professional, and it lays claim to universality. Therefore the demands on it are different — here neither explicit nor concealed contradictions are admissible. If, however, one tries to remove these contradictions, then, I think, in the end we shall arrive at socionics. However, this is hardly what the author needs.

If in his evaluation of astrology one substitutes TAF for astrology, and for the names of the Roman gods the primary types he proposes, then we obtain the quintessence of the theoretical position of the author of “psyche-yoga”: “Although attempts have been and are being made at a scientific formalization of astrology, it plainly stands in no need of it and in no way relies upon it. And it is clear why — its strength is not here. The strength of astrology is in its own artistic structure, where the names of the Latin gods assigned to the planets of the Solar system, in combination with the mysterious images of the signs of the zodiac, build the gigantic scaffolding of an inexhaustible and vivid cosmic theatre. The trains of meanings behind each of the Roman gods and behind each of their combinations, multiplied by the trains of meanings and interpretations of the zodiacal signs, create a kaleidoscope which one may turn to infinity without the risk of repetition and without fear of the audience’s boredom (emphasis mine — S. Ch.).” Exactly so, TAF stands in no need of a scientific grounding — its strength is not there, it is in its own artistic structure. The trains of meanings behind each primary type and behind each of their combinations, multiplied by the trains of meanings and interpretations of the positions in which they may stand, create a kaleidoscope which may be turned to infinity without the risk of repetition and without fear that the audience will begin to be bored.

Afanasyev’s book is undoubtedly talented, written in a vivid, figurative language, and moreover well produced. And yet somewhere his artistic taste failed Afanasyev when he decided to declare his typology, already sufficiently picturesque, as psyche-yoga. No more, no less. It is all the same as pasting onto a beautiful painting, right onto the face of its chief personage, a receipt with the sale price. As a promotional move it is easy to understand — it is enticing, but it smacks of lowered demands on oneself. Yoga is from a different culture. We have heard of it. There are many yogas, and among them the one responsible for psychic development is called raja yoga. But that is about something quite different and in quite a different way.

The psychology of personality from Oleg Maslyaev

You take in your hands a well-produced book, published in 1997, with the title The Psychology of Personality, written by O. I. Maslyaev. Splendid design, good literary language, a confident use of psychological terminology, a mass of subtle and highly plausible psychological observations which undoubtedly shed light on people’s behaviour and will be useful to the most varied categories of reader.

However, let us look more closely. The first chapter is called “What type are you?” Aha, a typology. And here is the key phrase: “In a hundred years a multitude of typologies have been created — each better than the last, and more are being created.” It seems the author is going to offer us a typology created by him, but will it be better than the others? Here is the subsection “Psychological types,” and it begins with the words: “In this book we have divided all people into sixteen types, described each type, noted its strong and weak sides, offered certain, in our opinion, useful pieces of advice…” Let us look at the end of the book at the list of literature used. Aushra Augustinavichute, Medvedev, Slinko, Tieger, Jung. Yes, the author stands on the shoulders of titans, as he warned the reader at the very beginning of the book, so that the high quality of the new typology is almost guaranteed. Well, perhaps the typology is not entirely new, but presumably there is a substantial element of novelty in it, and the author can with a clear conscience offer it under his own name to a broad readership.

Let us look further. Here is the list of proper names — the names of the types (in alphabetical order): “Akhmatova,” “Bulgakov,” “Hitler,” “Gogol,” “Gorbachev,” “Doctor Watson,” “Dostoevsky,” “Yesenin,” “Lenin,” “Mayakovsky,” “Napoleon,” “Stalin,” “Tolstoy,” “Tsvetaeva,” “Sherlock Holmes,” “Stirlitz.” Simple, but with taste. Not a whit worse than in socionics, and in something even better.

Immediately after this list there is an encouraging warning: “And one of them is you!” Yes, an element of novelty is evident. A considerably more refined set of personalia than in Aushra Augustinavichute and even than in Slinko, so that the reader will not be bored.

Now let us see what the basic principle of the new typology consists in. It turns out the principle is not so very new — four dichotomies. And here is the test table of these dichotomies. E or I — this is of course extraversion and introversion. S or N — sensorics and intuition. R or C — rationality and irrationality. And here is one more element of novelty. T or D — this is statics and dynamics. In Myers-Briggs this was not there. True, it was in Aushra Augustinavichute, but not in the basic set after all, and that is an element of novelty.

Now let us see how O. Maslyaev divided his types by at least extraversion–introversion. Here you are. Extraverts: “Bulgakov,” “Gorbachev,” “Doctor Watson,” “Yesenin,” “Lenin,” “Napoleon,” “Tsvetaeva,” “Stirlitz.” Introverts: “Akhmatova,” “Hitler,” “Gogol,” “Dostoevsky,” “Mayakovsky,” “Stalin,” “Tolstoy,” “Sherlock Holmes.” A reader acquainted with socionics may already say here: “Everything is clear! Another typological profanation!” But let us look a little further.

Let us abstract from the author’s list of personalia and try the dichotomies chosen against the socionic types. Let us consider only one case. Let us take from Maslyaev’s typology only one combination of the dichotomies he chose, for example ENCT, that is, an irrational-intuitive extravert static. Anyone who knows socionics will say at once that there are two such — ILE and IEE (Don Quixote and Huxley). This means that Maslyaev’s fourth dichotomy proved not to be orthogonal to the totality of the first three. First, it is obvious that the author simply did not take such a possibility into account; and secondly, he confused statics and dynamics with the fourth dichotomy of the American typology: decisive–judicious. So that the dichotomy chosen by the author as statics/dynamics proved unsuccessful, while as judiciousness/decisiveness it proved unoriginal. All the same, I am not certain that this book can be characterized as a variety of plagiarism on the ground of psychological graphomania. In the end, the author gave references to everyone. The text he quite plausibly wrote himself, and I think that this book is most correctly evaluated as a hoax, even if the author had something else in mind. Therefore, when the author writes, in the section entitled “Now let us formulate the most important thoughts of this book, which it is simply necessary to understand”: “This theory helps us to understand what moves each individual, what motives lie at the base of his behaviour,” it becomes clear that he has created a botched typology, and that everything he will say about people’s behaviour does not deserve confidence. But as a “prank” it is not at all bad. Here one might object: “Can it really be that in such a beautiful little book absolutely everything is wrong?” To this I shall reply that one may compose from very correct expressions taken separately a text which will mislead the reader. It is precisely on this that manipulations with people’s consciousness are built.

Here, look at what the author writes in the section “The strong and weak sides of the Hitler type.”

Strong sides:

• People of the Hitler type prefer to work for the sake of ideas and goals in which they sincerely believe.
• They work productively alone, from time to time communicating with those whose opinion they value.
• They always try to fulfil their obligations.
• They work with inspiration if they believe in what they are doing.
• They understand people well and find contact with them.

As they say, comments are superfluous. Of course, it remains unclear how the author filled in the test on Hitler’s behalf, but that, properly speaking, is no longer important. And the main thing — what political correctness!

Let us also note that the author considers this type an introvert, intuitive, irrational and a dynamic, to which, by socionic notions, two types correspond: Yesenin and Balzac. At the level of a “prank,” not bad.

Nevertheless, there are interesting thoughts in the book. For example, the author proposes an original test of his own construction, when he unambiguously assigns a person to a definite type on the basis of which vase, out of sixteen proposed, the person tested chooses. Probably this is not a bad idea; but since the author adduces no grounding of it whatever, and taking into account the unseriousness with which the author approached the construction of his test, one has to treat the idea of testing type by the choice of a vase with mistrust.

Having read the book, you will incidentally receive a simple recipe for creating new typologies. You take some four dichotomies — better if they do not fully coincide with the Jungian ones. You work out what behaviour might correspond to each of the sixteen combinations of the dichotomies you have chosen. You select for them sixteen well-known people (better from different spheres of activity), and, properly speaking, the typology is ready. It remains to expound it beautifully, to supply it with memorable pictures and to publish it in a beautiful binding. A bestseller is guaranteed you — that is, the book will sell well.

E. Lomonosova and O. Zagorskaya

On the basis of socionics the psychologists E. Lomonosova and O. Zagorskaya developed a fundamentally new method of working with subconscious complexes, which they called the Unarchiving of Psycho-Energetic Memory (UPEM) [35]. Conducting research work on the diagnostics of the TIM with the use of the form of the fairy tale, they drew attention to the appearance in their respondents’ projective material of semantic elements of S. Grof’s basic perinatal matrices (BPM), which somewhat earlier had been investigated and grounded by A. V. Bukalov. However, the authors, having realized the psychotherapeutic possibilities of the connection of TIM with BPM, went further and created their own method of deactivating subconscious fixations reflecting the peculiarities of a person’s perinatal experience. This method is considerably more economical in time than, for example, psychoanalysis. Knowledge of the TIM in this method makes it possible, at the psychosemantic level, to determine a person’s BPM, that is, to make him a “perinatal” diagnosis, and then to carry out the necessary psychotherapeutic work.

This is a very good result, worthy of entering the arsenal of psychological classics, and a good example of a professional approach to the solution of psychological tasks.

Ya. Bondarenko

Entirely unexpected for me was the original, beautiful and very enticing idea of the Donetsk psychologist Ya. Bondarenko [36]. This is the idea of vibrational influences of the cosmos on the formation of the TIM already at the moment of conception of the future person. At the base of this idea lie the concepts of a form-generating factor and of psychogeometrical parallelism. With the theme of psychogeometrical parallelism we meet, for example, in S. Dellinger’s psychogeometry, though on an entirely different methodological basis. I should like with admiration to note the very moment of Bondarenko’s intuitive insight with respect to the idea under consideration — a moment of Truth, when, properly speaking, the discovery took place.

Once, examining a micro-photograph of a section of Cretaceous limestone (Fig. 19.10), on which simple geometrical forms were distinctly visible, Ya. Bondarenko suddenly (!) — there it is, the insight! — realized that he was seeing distinct imprints of a Global Resonance, which is precisely the form-generating factor or at least one of its links, to which the formation of primary forms is subordinate. This realization took a concrete shape in the form of a formulation of, I am not afraid of the word, a hypothesis of genius: AT EVERY INSTANT THERE ARE BORN FORMS OF ONLY ONE TYPE! It is precisely by this that one can most simply explain the exact geometrical forms of the particles of limestone and their geometrical differences. And if the embryo of a living creature experiences upon itself the morphogenetic influence of cosmic resonance, then it is not hard to understand the arising in each embryo of a semantic component at whose base lies a geometrical form. And now, already on the basis of psychogeometrical parallelism, one may postulate quite definite basic psychic differences which, in the end, are manifested as typological differences. Thus Ya. Bondarenko’s hypothesis directly indicates a physical factor which may lie at the base of at least some psychic and psychological differences. However fantastic this idea may seem, it is apparently even more accessible to verification than many other ideas current in socionics; and in the event of confirmation of its correspondence to reality, we should obtain a physical law explaining the connection of the physical and the psychic!

Fig. 19.10. Micro-photograph of a section of limestone.

A. P. Tikhonov

I very much like the research work of Tikhonov A. P. Exact, verified, without unnecessary fuss. Working carefully with primary sources, he achieves the maximum possible reliability. His texts are pleasant to read and one always learns much new from them. This is the work of a genuine professional. The test developed by him in co-authorship with Bezguba N. V. and Lapina I. V. in 1998 represents one of the best achievements in socionics [30]. They successfully used in their test the idea, proposed in its time by G. A. Shulman, of temporal variations of the type “happens more often now,” “used to happen earlier” and “I should like it to be,” which significantly improves the conditions for the subject’s orientation in the test and at the same time raises the reliability of the information obtained.

The Lytovs

D. A. Lytov has long and thoroughly worked in socionics, although personally I have never liked either his style or his position; but this belongs rather to the sphere of socionic incompatibility. All the same, the recognition of scientific truth must not depend on the fact that between scholars there obtains a relation of conflict — socionic, it goes without saying — or of socionic supervision, and cannot be a matter of aesthetic taste. Therefore I accept with respect and even with admiration the excellent work carried out by the Lytovs on the creation of a socionic test, which I discussed in more or less detail in the chapter devoted to socionic diagnostics. Here I wish to dwell a little on their joint methodological complex. Of course, to the extent that I understand it.

The article [38], written by D. A. Lytov together with M. F. Lytova, bears a sharply polemical character. And I shall say at once that one can only welcome the fact that critical articles are appearing with an emphasis on methodology. However, the ironic tonality chosen by the authors lowers the enlightening pathos of their intentions. In science hardly anyone can adopt the position of an absolute judge. All that a scholar can do is to set forth his position and note in what and why he disagrees with his opponent. Within the framework of ethical benevolence, ridiculing one’s partner is inadmissible — if, of course, the talk is of logical argumentation and not of a regime of mutual annihilation in which science becomes merely a pretext for mutual insults. On the contrary, from the point of view of the search for scientific truth, the opinion of one’s partner always represents an exceptional interest. For if a partner, not being a fool, thinks incorrectly from our point of view, then behind this there must stand some quite weighty cause, which it would be good to discover. And the presumption of innocence must be taken into account too. I think that an ethical position in science has a lower boundary in the form of logical argumentation and does not admit ridicule. It is not cultured and not worthy of an intelligent person.

In reading [38] one gets the impression that the authors have taken up a serious study of scientific methodology, and the first signs of its application may be seen precisely in the thoroughness with which they approached the development of their test. But when they begin the rout of those whose works they do not like, and in doing so use several strong phrases with the use of methodological terminology, then this cannot but be alarming.

And therefore, when they write that “…looking at socionics from outside without prejudice, it is easy to notice the whole shakiness (in fact the absence) of its foundation: it consists not of facts at all but of hypotheses” [38], then one may of course agree with them, but one must after all ask what they understand by a foundation. One may at once ask what sense they put into the expression “to look at socionics from outside without prejudice”? By what do they guarantee their lack of prejudice? And can people working for many years in socionics really look at it from outside?

I fully agree with the methodological pathos of the article. Yes, it is high time to unfold an experimental verification of socionic concepts. However, I do not agree with its prohibitive-ironic side. Let us take, for example, the following phrase of the authors: “…it is incomprehensible why V. V. Gulenko uses in a humanitarian science physical terms (field, lines of force) whose sense, as is obvious from the context, is unclear to him. Alas, the tradition of using natural-scientific analogies out of place goes back to A. Augustinavichute…”

The authors are plainly “working” on the edge of intolerance. If the authors did not understand Aushra Augustinavichute’s “natural-scientific analogies,” then this by no means signifies that these analogies are meaningless. On the contrary, in Aushra’s insights one may see a bridge between the natural and the humanitarian disciplines. If the psyche obeys the laws of thermodynamics — and it seems that it does — then the natural-scientific analogies so disliked by the authors need to be deepened and their experimental confirmation sought, and not discarded merely out of considerations of terminological taste. In exactly the same way, if the authors do not understand V. V. Gulenko’s vision of socionic processes in terms of fields and lines of force, then this of course does not mean that nothing corresponds to these concepts. At the very least, what V. V. Gulenko understands by socionic fields and lines of force must be asked of him. Perhaps the authors have forgotten, for example, about Kurt Lewin, who in his time found it possible to introduce into psychology the concept of a field and of lines of force. Moreover, for many people with a corresponding information metabolism, fields of psychological inhomogeneities and tensions together with the lines of force present in them are an obvious thing. And those who do not perceive these entities might precisely take care of their experimental verification. No one forbids the authors to see socionic problems in their own terminological and conceptual formulation; but when, instead of substantive criticism, they appeal to their own methodological taste, then this is perceived as something unacceptable. One may preach one’s point of view as much as one likes, but why deny wholesale the possibility of a different vision of scientific problems?

Now to the substance of the methodological problems advanced by the authors.

In my view the authors of MT justifiably set the task of verifying what they call the Basic Problem of Socionics (BPS). Of course, as to what is to be considered the BPS, various opinions may exist, and they do exist. But this is a question for a separate discussion. However, when they say that carrying out “a verification of the first part of the problem (that is, that there exist 16 types) is relatively simple — here what is needed are methods of dispassionate analysis of the characteristics of the subjects, for example tests” [38], then one at once gets the impression of the hastiness and superficiality of such a conviction. Presumably they were not the first to guess that socionics needs methods of “dispassionate analysis of the characteristics of the subjects.” But, alas, for almost 30 years now socionists have not only dreamed of this but have also undertaken purposeful efforts in this direction. And some results, even if negative, have all the same been obtained. And this is because the majority of socionists are not such stupid people as it may seem after reading “The Prospects of Socionics.” And the fact that the chief result — an effective socionic test — still remains a dream is because this is indeed a difficult task. Well, and of course the experience of psychology shows that creating a high-quality psychological test is not at all simple. Therefore one can only wish the authors of MT success, and let us hope that they will bring their test to the highest perfection.

As for the existence of 16 types — this is how the authors formulate the BPS — then in order to pose and solve this problem one must immerse oneself in the philosophical subject matter of existence.

There exists at least one more problem where D. A. Lytov has made a serious claim. This is the problem of Reinin’s traits. All the same I, paying tribute to the actual state of affairs and to historical justice, consider that these traits ought to be called the Augustinavichute–Reinin traits (ART), since, although Reinin mathematically discovered their existence, it was only thanks to Aushra that they were filled with socionic content. In article [39] the authors Stovpyuk M. F. and Lytov D. A. sharply and in many respects correctly pose the question of the theoretical and substantive status of the ART.

Incidentally, about the casuistic example adduced by the authors in which men, women and the Rhesus factor figure. The fact that the authors obtained a classificatory group whose sense they find it difficult to interpret by no means signifies that such a sense does not exist or cannot exist. The subtlety here consists in understanding the difference between sense and meaning. By definition, meaning is the object standing behind a term (the denotatum), while sense is how the object will be used by the subject. That a subject cannot, or does not know how to, use a certain object means precisely that this object has no sense for him; but independently of this the term used has a meaning. Mathematics works with meanings and not with senses, and therefore to accuse mathematical results of senselessness makes no sense. To find sense is the affair of the subject, not of mathematics. All the same, a physiologist could find a sense in the “senseless” groups of men and women with different Rhesus factors obtained by the authors — well, at least in that this theme may become an object of genetic counselling, since a difference in Rhesus factors may turn into complications during childbirth and be reflected in the offspring. Nevertheless, the point is not to make sense of the results of mathematical calculations — that is possible even in cases far more absurd from the point of view of common sense — but to identify the real sense of the ART. Reasoning on this theme is partly presented in the chapter on the problems of socionic diagnostics, and it must be said that in the criticism of Aushra Augustinavichute’s preliminary attempts to make sense of the ART I am almost entirely in solidarity with the authors of the article under consideration, and I wrote the corresponding parts of my texts in almost the same words and with the same references and quotations. But there is at least one moment where our opinions with respect to the ART diverge. That there are distortions and misinterpretations in the understanding of the ART is not the main thing. This must be criticized and worked with; but the main thing is all the same to find the primary sense of these enigmatic categories. I think that behind these categories stand archetypal entities whose verbalization is extremely difficult. And nevertheless there is no need to doubt that the key to their understanding is Model “A.” It is another matter that the understanding of it by the majority of socionists is far from perfect. And there is no sense in accusing Aushra Augustinavichute of an incorrect understanding of these entities. She not only did what she could, she also showed the path along which one must seek the typological comprehension of the ART — this is a correct, that is, based on clear rules, interpretation of the placement of one or another IA in Model “A.”

But the saddest thing for me in D. A. Lytov’s methodological complex is his evident fear of abstractions of a high level. Of course this is my personal affair, but I am speaking of my impressions. Probably there are socionists who can do without such abstractions, but can socionics do without them? For me personally its high-theoretical status is obvious, and it will be a matter for regret if its potential is understated in favour of a “creeping empiricism” (Hegel’s famous term of abuse) or of an inability to sustain a high level of abstraction. Of course it is easy to reproach “poor” intuitive types with an incontinence of empirically unsupportable insights and with “waiting for Negroes” [38] who will do for them the black work of empirically verifying the far from obvious constructs they have invented; but socionics is precisely about this — the informational specialization of people in accordance with their TIMs. Therefore Lytov’s indignation will hardly change anything in human nature.

D. A. Lytov considers that “As a theory, socionics is very simple, including (frightful to say!) in its ‘holographic’ (V. V. Gulenko) variant. This theory can be explained to a senior schoolboy (one who has not managed to smoke/drink away his brains)” [38]. About the brains I like very much — I use such expressions myself in working with students; but about the simplicity of socionics I do not agree. For one could say this unsupported even about mathematics — there too the simple arithmetical operations, geometrical figures and graphs can be explained to a schoolboy with unsmoked brains, but mathematics is not exhausted by this. And in socionics we have for a quarter of a century now been unable to sort out the ART.

Yes, I well remember the whole path of Kiev socionics. When in 1986 we first listened to Aushra Augustinavichute’s lectures, everything seemed as simple and clear as is written in some little books on socionics even now. And only many years later, after many conferences and gatherings, did we begin to understand that everything is not at all so simple, and each, in accordance with his own understanding, began to construct his own image of socionics. And this is probably not because we are all to a man fools, morons or clinical idiots, but because the subject proved not at all so simple as it might have seemed at first. And the present socionic discord is a reflection of the complexity of socionics as a theory. No, as a typology it is presumably indeed not very complex — sixteen types and sixteen relations, well, and there are also the IAs, the ART, Ego, Superego and other trifles. But there is in it something so fundamental, inspiring, bewitching and provoking that it induces intuitive types again and again to peer into its magic crystal and to extract from the socionic looking-glass ever new constructs which throw some into indescribable rapture and arouse in others a theoretical revulsion.

Yes, at last — not twenty years have passed — and Stovpyuk and Lytov too have got as far as the ART, have discovered defects in their description in Aushra Augustinavichute and have begun to criticize her. They obtained a negative result, and this is good. But where is the positive result? Here one may say that one should not demand too much of the authors. And this is true. Incidentally, in exactly the same way one might criticize Jung too — for not having discovered socionics, for not having thought his way to the ART, and, having written a fat book on psychological types, for having stopped at a mere eight. Even for very talented people not everything works out at once, gentlemen.

I think that criticizing is probably both necessary and possible, but it must be constructive criticism advancing socionics to the next, higher level. And as for Aushra, she did her part of the work, leaving us a vast field of work to which as yet no end is in sight. Aushra created the main thing — the theoretical contours of socionics, and I think that several generations[^3] of socionists will gradually be able to disclose its as yet not fully comprehensible depths.

And, on the whole, one wishes to thank the authors for a sharp and intelligent article on the ART. It is, in essence, correct. They managed to achieve at least two results. First, they showed the imperfection of socionists’ conceptions of the ART; and secondly, they exposed the exceptional frivolity of many, if not most, socionists, who proved incapable of discerning plain psychological absurdities. The authors demonstrated a high critical potential, and possibly this problem will some day be solved. In the end, its complexity is obvious, which refutes Lytov’s incautious assertion about the simplicity of socionic theory.

A. Shiyan

I should also like to characterise, at least in a few words, the methodological complex of A. Shiyan, who was present at the Great Socionics Experiment in Dnepropetrovsk and who is well known to a good many Ukrainian socionists. Type — ILI (a hypothesis), and, as we now understand, that says a great deal. An intuitive-logical cast of mind allows him not only to grasp scientific problems subtly and deeply, but also to handle methodological concepts with considerable freedom. Given his TIM, his critical bent is entirely understandable, and it is displayed plainly in his survey of the scientific level of currently available papers on socionics [24], and also in the book Foundations of Informational-Psychological Security for the Manager. These texts are written wittily and venomously. One senses that the author understands socionic problems and that he is by no means a stupid man; but it is equally obvious that he lacks breadth of generalisation and confines his socionic horizon within the bounds of his own understanding. In trying to debunk particular hypotheses of socionic researchers, he substitutes for scientific analysis the polemical devices of ridicule and unfavourable comparison — or, for instance, offers as one of his arguments against the law of quadra succession the point that G. A. Shulman was unable to supply a reference showing where that law had been formulated, described or published.

Already from the opening lines of his text one suspects that he is not indifferent to socionics — he puts the term in quotation marks throughout, apparently thereby underscoring his doubt as to its (the term’s) and her (socionics’) right to exist. He insistently presses the thought that his own works are better and, in that sense, not to be compared with what the socionists he evidently despises are doing. He writes: “It seems highly interesting that the first FUNCTIONAL portraits of CONCRETE people were published by us” — that is, by A. Shiyan. And onward in the same vein of hints at his own superiority, infallibility and primogeniture, he continually seeks to belittle socionics, to stress his priority, to exalt himself and to advertise himself. But in what? Not in socionics, surely — since he apparently does not regard it as a science. Possibly he means that he has created a scientific direction alternative to socionics, one having nothing to do with it, yet substantially surpassing it in its capacity to model the human psyche. And here, to my mind, lies the fundamental contradiction of A. Shiyan’s position: relying on the ideas of socionics and using them in his own work, he tries to distort them and to ascribe to himself personally the discovery of the very methods socionics uses, only under some other name. A curious attempt at militant plagiarism with breaking and entering. He even tries to humiliate A. Augustinavichute, reproaching her with an inability to answer his questions: “It is interesting that we met with A. Augustinavichute twice already — and she likewise gave no answer to our analysis!” (Shiyan’s exclamation mark, by which he apparently means to underline the extreme obtuseness of the discoverer of socionics.) Reading further in Shiyan’s work, one becomes ever more convinced that this is no more than an anti-advertising campaign against actual and potential competitors in socionic consulting; and at that point it becomes clear that no scientific analysis is in question at all, but rather a readiness to use any device whatever, including those of “black PR”, so long as not one stone is left standing upon another of one’s rival. It is therefore no surprise that the “demolition” part of his text ends with the words: “Do you wish to entrust the success of your business (and indeed your fate) to such ‘experts’?” — which is to be understood as “do not turn to bad socionists, turn to the good Shiyan.” The whole pathos of Shiyan’s struggle with socionics now becomes clear. Incidentally, Shiyan is not telling the truth when he asserts that no one ever answered his claims. A detailed reply to his attempts at a mathematical interpretation of those same socionic ideas which he so strives to demolish, while at the same time trying to disguise them as his own discovery, was given in its time by the director of the International Institute of Socionics, A. V. Bukalov. It is not out of the question that Shiyan’s theoretical work along socionic lines, but with a denial of their primacy (which, borrowing his own venomous style, one might designate “Shiyanics” — though I have no need of that), may prove entirely effective; of course an intelligent man can create something valuable. But it is regrettable that intelligence, even in science, can be used to blacken one’s colleagues.

Of course socionics has its problems and its growing pains. It is not excluded, and is entirely natural, that its results should be seized upon by people who are in science by accident, by the incompetent, and by plain charlatans; but this can in no way be applied to the main body of scholars developing this direction. Far from all socionists who have made a scientific contribution to socionics agree among themselves; not all of its ideas have been brought to perfection; and the rapid, reliable determination of TIM remains a problem. But all this is the normal process of a science developing, and all these problems will be worked on and will be solved with time. Even the para-scientific conduct that Shiyan demonstrates (“Shiyanism”) is a perfectly comprehensible side-effect of the development of a science. Certainly, if Shiyan makes a real contribution to socionics, that can only be welcomed; but so far his activity is destructive in character.

In any case the conception of the socion continues to remain a highly plausible working hypothesis, and until it receives broad practical corroboration, none of its consequences can be considered obligatory. If, however, modern science assimilates the concept of the socion as a full-fledged scientific category, then the — for the present hypothetical — law of quadra succession (already, incidentally, quite well founded, which Shiyan fails to notice by virtue of his ambitious methodological position) will acquire the character of the same sort of working instrument as many other social laws reflecting the rhythmics of social development. Among such laws belongs, in particular, the law of the succession of social formations, formulated by K. Marx and F. Engels, which some philosophers and politicians regarded as reflecting the actual state of affairs well, while others subjected it to annihilating criticism. Another stumbling-block for A. Shiyan proved to be the hypothesis of the universality of the TIM. Of course, the comparison of a human being with animals, mechanisms, candelabra and other furniture may be received with offence by individual representatives of humanity, since it is often used as an insult; but we are not dealing with a kitchen squabble, we are dealing with science. If, for example, a mathematician for some reason needs to represent humanity as a geometrical set of points, and individual people as points in that set, then only very tendentious or accentuated personalities will take this for an insult. In socionics we are speaking of informational metabolism, and it is not at all hard to understand that information is transformed not only by human beings but by all the elements of the surrounding environment; otherwise a person simply could not receive information from the environment, or it would present itself to him as a single undifferentiated mass. And there is nothing at all strange in speaking of the interior of some room, of the furniture in it, and in particular of the chairs — of how far they correspond to the people using that room; and here, of course, the appropriate socionic categories may be used. And it is unlikely that anyone will remain indifferent to what the interior, or the chair, will be — dual, and hence complementary, convenient, comfortable, or on the contrary conflicting, and therefore uncomfortable and productive of tension. Of course the use of specialised terms may look unaccustomed, but we are dealing with a science, and terms are the ordinary business here. Moreover, if previously, before socionics, we could speak in aesthetics and design only of the beautiful or the ugly, the pleasant or the unpleasant, the convenient or the inconvenient, socionics introduces a considerably finer spectrum of assessments, and one may now speak of “identical”, of “activating”, of “supervisory” and of other types of interior. So the demolition-critical style chosen by A. Shiyan characterises the author himself very fully, and may serve not only as a peculiar test for determining his socionic TIM but also as a basis for describing him as a person and his position as a scientist. Malicious denial in science has as a rule never corresponded to its further progress, and there has long been an observation to the effect that if some scholar displays a sceptical attitude to new ideas or directions in science, then either he holds conservative views and appears as a reactionary and a dogmatist, or he is personally interested in restricting his competitors. So it was in genetics, and in cybernetics — only we have had to pay for it with the heavy price of a technical backwardness from which we have not emerged to this day. It would likewise be regrettable if scholars were to write their papers in the spirit of political denunciations rather than of sober scientific analysis, and if instead of arguments and facts there were to be used anti-advertising devices such as flashy quotations from the classics comparing the human “I” to a mad piano — calculated to shock the reading public and the authorities.

In any case there is no sense in reproaching intuitive logicians for writing many of their papers in the style of “revelation” — according to socionic conceptions this is entirely natural for people of that type, all the more so at the early stages of a science’s development; whereas the criticism, the selection, and the logical and mathematical elaboration of their ideas can and should of course be carried out by representatives of other types as well: to demand everything at once from a single person is not socionic.

From the survey made by A. A. Shiyan it is evident that he has deeply grasped the value and the prospects of socionics’ development (“…since the conclusions based upon it require a cardinal revision of the very foundations of practical activity in a whole series of fields…”), but the dramatic situation of official non-recognition (entirely comprehensible, incidentally, for a young scientific direction) he construes as an orientation toward “hermetic” closedness, while he attempts to present many socionists as, at best, short-sighted and frivolous dreamers.

There can of course be no question of socionics being a chance discharge of human fantasy. At the early stages of its development any phenomenon — a scientific direction, an invention — usually passes through an “ugly duckling” phase, when it is easy to disregard its potential and, should the occasion arise, to abuse it or give it a kick for one’s own self-affirmation; no great intelligence is required for that. Considerably more intelligence is required to see the valuable and important thing this new phenomenon brings with it, and to help it develop and bring its fruits to society. Socionics must turn into a full-fledged scientific direction, and at present the intuitive level of papers is increasingly giving way to precise logical and mathematical elaboration (G. Reinin, M. Gut, Ya. Dubrov, E. Shepetko, V. Pavlov and many others). Socionics, in the person of a number of its representatives, is also trying to make sense of its own methodological foundations, and this marks an important step in its development as a science. The point now, therefore, is not to abuse individual socionists but to extract without prejudice everything valuable and promising from their work, as the Americans know how to do. Besides, one must not forget that a science cannot develop by the efforts of idea-generators alone (chiefly ILE and ILI) — there is need also of selectors, able professionally to pick out from those ideas what represents real value for the science; and of developers, capable of bringing the selected ideas up to the level of a technology (for example LII, LSI); and of “implementers”, who could find practical application for socionic technologies and give that application wide scope (LIE, LSE, SLE and others) — but neither can one do without the remaining socionic types, since only all of them together are capable of creating a socion, a full-fledged environment for the development of society and of science within it.

There is no doubt that the general-scientific part of A. A. Shiyan’s methodological complex is well developed, and at that level one could find a common language with him; however, he has his individual peculiarities too. To characterise that part of his methodological complex I would use the maximally neutral term abstract-analytical globalism. He sees well what is common to different authors — C. G. Jung, Aušra Augustinavichute, A. V. Bukalov, V. V. Gulenko, G. A. Shulman and others — but does not always distinguish their individual contributions. That, evidently, is why he considers that everything Aušra Augustinavichute speaks of is already present in Jung and Myers-Briggs; and besides, he considers (and here a personal interest in diminishing the merits of other scholars can be felt) that the mathematical model he has built entirely subsumes everything the other socionists have done — and it is unlikely that anyone will succeed in dissuading him.

V. Shirochin

When the text of this book was ready, I found on the internet — on a professional psychologist’s recommendation — V. Shirochin’s site, with his book A Word on Intellect posted there. Once I had acquainted myself with the contents of this book, I understood that a reference to Shirochin could not be avoided, all the more so since the psychologist I knew who had given me the address spoke of his book with something close to mystical reverence, as the last word of the systems approach in psychology.

Unfortunately I was unable to obtain Shirochin’s biographical details, and I did not even find the date of publication of his book (not earlier than 1994, I think); but in the end what interests us is Shirochin’s approach to solving psychological problems, not his individual peculiarities. True, from the text of the book one can gather that its author is not only a specialist in cybernetics but also a gifted poet, since his book is richly illustrated with stanzas from his own collection of verse (ZodiaC+, On Faith, Suffering and Love (verse), Kiev, Diasoft, 1993, 64 pp.).

[A four-line stanza from Shirochin’s poetry collection is quoted here in the original — on the mind, working overnight, comparing visions and delivering the solution to a problem at sunrise. Not reproduced.]

However, as one can gather from the text of the book, psychology is not the author’s strong side; but of course, as a cultured man and a scholar, he has his own conceptions of the structure and working of the brain. The book contains a large number of block-and-arrow diagrams, which are of interest in many respects, and all interested parties may acquaint themselves with them on the site. I shall therefore not describe or analyse them. From these diagrams, however, one can gather that Shirochin accepts the idea of the unconscious deriving from Freud, and the corresponding reference is present in the bibliography. He also accepts the idea of prana, and allots it a fitting place in his diagrams. And in the bibliography there is a reference to H. P. Blavatsky. And since he uses the most advanced systems-cybernetic ideology, his diagrams not only synthesise everything available to a scholar from anatomy, physiology and psychology, but also give some notion of how cyberneticists might dispose of such knowledge. Very meticulous, very logical, very technological, but at the same time very mechanistic. Mechanistic does not mean bad; it means that what is there in a living human being is not there. Although Shirochin’s diagrams provide a place even for fear, duty, the passions and sex, the most important thing lacking in them is, strange as it may seem, precisely systemic quality — which, after all, does not reduce to rectangles and arrows.

Nevertheless Shirochin has acted honestly: he has presented all his knowledge about the human being in the form of visual representations, where it is immediately clear what is located where, what is connected with what, and what goes where. In a certain sense this is a definite maximum accessible to a professional in cybernetics when he undertakes to solve psychological problems in which he is not a specialist.

True, there is one “slip” in Shirochin’s book. It is in the section where he attempts to develop the theme of the “atom-types of intellect”. A socionist reading this section cannot rid himself of the thought of a clumsy use of concepts well worked out in socionics. It turns out that the “atom-types of intellect” are those same sixteen Jungian types, but now without references to Jung or to socionics. The main thing, however, is not that, but the distortion of the corresponding concepts. “The intuitive-logical extravert is the most energetic and erudite atom-type of intellect, capable of foreseeing far in advance the constructive and organisational possibilities of realising a Project, of calculating and grounding its conception and of defending the idea of the Project. This is the rare, outstanding atom-type of the Intellect of the General Designer.” Almost all correct, apart from a trifle: intuitive-logical extraverts almost never turn out to be General Designers. In that post one most often finds sensory-logical and logical-sensory extraverts. Of course this may be considered a trifle, but in the book it is all served up as the last word of psychological thought. The idea of socionic relations is reworked by the author into a conception of productive molecule-pairs (that is what scientific-poetic thinking does!), and the best of such molecules the author considers to be what in socionics is designated the mirror relation. Of course an author may hold any opinion on any subject, especially where poetry is concerned; but from the standpoint of scientific methodology one is simply amazed at the absence of any full-fledged specification of the concepts used. Everything is so light and simple, at the level of a blurred everyday use of words, but bright and beautiful.

An important merit of the book is five commendatory reviews from five of the largest Ukrainian scholars. For instance, Academician B. E. Paton writes: “…It is no accident that yet another attempt at working out a conception for creating ‘emotionally- and morally-oriented’ robots and corresponding computer systems for work on, say, other planets has been undertaken by a specialist in the technical sciences, having experience in designing systems of program control for complex technological installations…” Yes, “emotionally- and morally-oriented” robots — that is splendid. Of course they are needed. And as a statement of a problem Shirochin’s work is entirely apposite. But what about scientific methodology?

Academician of the APS of Ukraine, Doctor of Pedagogical Sciences, Professor M. I. Zhaldak writes: “…The work … stands out by a certain boldness of judgement and novelty of approach to the interpretation and modelling of the human brain as a multifunctional and multiprocessor system of situational control and decision-making…” Yes — the subconscious, prana — that is bold, and there has been nothing like it in cybernetics; nevertheless, when introducing new concepts one cannot use them by default, and at least working definitions are required.

“…Of particular interest for pedagogical workers are the grounding and identification of types of human intellect according to the capacity for perceiving various kinds of humanitarian or technical knowledge, and also the proposals for creating tests to determine types of intellect and for forming well-matched collectives…” This is the review of Professor, Doctor of Technical Sciences, Vice-President of the Ukrainian Academy of Informatics, G. M. Lutsky. Of course a Doctor of Technical Sciences is not obliged to know the achievements of psychology in connection with determining types of intellect and forming well-matched collectives; and in the end Shirochin might have thought all this up himself. In principle that is possible. Only the terminology is taken from Jung and Aušra, without references. And pedagogical workers have long been using socionic developments for the purposes named, without the knowledge of their superiors.

And here is what Professor, Doctor of Philosophical Sciences, Dean of the Faculty of Sociology of NTUU “KPI”, B. V. Novikov writes: “…An original approach to the topical questions of the correlation of the subconscious, the spiritual and the rational in human activity, in man’s adaptation to the surrounding environment, gives the author grounds for insisting on the creation of a scientific direction and a corresponding subject: systems psychology, which sets out the foundations of a ‘structural-logical’ solution to the problem of creating ‘human-like’ systems…” As though there had never been either Freud or Jung or all the other participants in almost a century of the development of analytical psychology, which investigated “the correlation of the subconscious, the spiritual and the rational in human activity” — whereas Shirochin, having “compared the visions overnight, will suddenly deliver us the solution to our problems!”, and turns out, no more and no less, to be the founder of systems psychology.

And one more review: “…An original and genuinely new attempt at representing the human brain in the form of a hypercomplex and strongly connected specialised computer system of functionally-oriented processors and co-processors deserves, from our point of view, every approval and support…” Beneath this stands the signature of Professor, Doctor of Technical Sciences, Academician of the AES of Ukraine, V. P. Tarasenko. Of course this does not necessarily mean that the academician thinks so, for a ready-made review may have been laid on his desk and he merely signed it. Besides, Shirochin’s work is of course original. Doubtless novelty can be found in it too. Moreover, as a preliminary discussion, as a serviceable answer by cyberneticists to the demands of psychology, this work does make sense; but one ought all the same to read the primary literary sources and to cite them. That is a general scientific norm.

In connection with Shirochin’s work one gets the impression that the luminaries of Ukrainian science are capable of discovering a profound meaning in the very superficial constructions of a far from bad scholar and poet, while the genuinely fundamental character — perhaps not very intelligibly set out — of the foundations of a fundamentally new direction in psychology, which Aušra Augustinavichute named socionics, escapes them entirely.

X.X.X.

About X.X.X. I should prefer not to write at all, since he has crossed the line into dirty technologies. No constructive criticism whatever, but only hysterical howls, incantations and curses in the direction of the “bad” Kiev socionists. Bad or good, these Kiev socionists have created their own “scene” and are working as best they can. And certainly with enthusiasm. Do your own work, and we shall see whether it withstands logical scrutiny or not.

With such people scientific communication is impossible, they do not take in logical argumentation, and it is pointless to look for a common language with them.

That is precisely what the symbolic equation speaks of:

D = ∆ [A, C, M, O]

The author’s own complex, and a closing word

And for the sake of fairness, a very little about myself. My methodological complex is methodological reflection. I study any methodological approaches attentively and try to identify the invariants inherent in them. I have become convinced that any scholar subconsciously considers himself a professional in the field of methodology and is ready to prove that his methodology is the best in the world. Nothing can be done here — such is human nature. Since the value-laden part of the methodological complex is apparently connected with the first socionic function, with which a person maximally identifies his ego, he is simply not in a position to act otherwise. In renouncing the complex he would have to renounce what he considers to be himself. I even think that these statements of mine will be refuted for these very same reasons. The theme of methodology interests me professionally, and I am ready to look for a common basis for all approaches and searches in socionics. Although it is not excluded that the attempt to find a solution acceptable to everyone, or at least to the majority, is yet another utopia entirely characteristic of Don Quixotes, and that everything will proceed as always by the laws of the development of chaos.

If one now looks back at the path traversed by socionics — by 2005 something like thirty years, very little for a new science — then this stage of its development may be designated as intuitive, rich in vivid insights which could become full-fledged theoretical constructs; but for that, scrupulous methodological, theoretical and experimental work is needed. I think socionics has fully matured for the transition to the next stage of its development: methodological self-grounding.

In this chapter I have mentioned only a few socionists, and, as it turned out, without any system, simply under the influence of an intuitive and theoretical impulse — those whom I knew, whom I heard at conferences, whose books I read. Perhaps some day it will prove possible to investigate the methodological complexes of socionic scholars more fully and more reliably, and to include new material in this chapter. I am always ready to take part in a discussion of the theoretical aspects connected with the methodological complexes of scholars, and of course not only of socionists. The work of some socionists I have discussed in the appropriate chapters.

Gentlemen socionic theoreticians and socionic practitioners: on setting about reasoning in the field of socionics, re-read some textbook of the methodology of science, and do not commit at least the elementary errors connected with the qualification of your assertions. Do not write hack-work on socionics, in which you will be able to display only a simplified — and often simply vulgar — level of understanding of psychological reality and of socionics as a new scientific direction in psychology. A home-grown and vulgar presentation of socionics debases this remarkable teaching of the remarkable daughter of the Lithuanian people, Aušra Augustinavichute. Alongside very good, full-fledged books popularising socionics, there appear books apparently founded on the elementary desire of the author to write at least something. Of course these hasty, raw and superficial books must be assigned to the category of socionic graphomania. Unfortunately, even some talented theoreticians of socionics not infrequently publish in their books intermediate and unreliable results, apparently considering them the truth in the last instance.

In any case, I offer my apologies to all whose feelings I may have touched, and still more, without wishing to, offended; but all the same, let us seek the truth together, relying on scientific methodology and within the framework of the academic style.

Observation of the methodological conduct of socionic scholars has led me to the thought that methodological problems cannot be circumvented, and that it would not be a bad thing to include this problematic in all socionic conferences. It is therefore not hard to understand why I have called this chapter “The Inevitability of Methodology”.

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Conclusions to Chapter Nineteen

1. Socionics has gathered around itself a large number of enthusiasts, many of whom have made their contribution to the development of the new science. Their work contains a great many original observations and unique developments which, however, by definition require methodological expert examination and experimental verification. Without this they will remain no more than vivid science-fiction plots, works of art on para-scientific themes, or even splendid variety turns affording their authors the chance to affirm themselves in their own eyes and in the eyes of those close to them.

2. Even the errors, blunders and artefacts appearing in socionists’ works will bring benefit and yield a valuable contribution to the new science, if their authors find in themselves the courage to look at them critically and with humour once the fog of the illusions of intuitive insight has dispersed.

3. Socionics continues its development according to the scenario of chaos. A period of the primary accumulation of scientific potential is under way.

4. At present there exist several sufficiently different approaches to the understanding of the basic categories of socionics, and for the time being it is not apparent how mutual understanding might be achieved. But time puts everything in its place.

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References

(Journal abbreviation: SMPL = “Socionics, Mentology and Personality Psychology”.)

1. Augustinavichute A., The semantic content of the symbols used in socionics. “Sixteen”, No. 3, 1990.
2. Aušra Augustinavichute, A commentary on Jung’s typology and an introduction to informational metabolism, manuscript, 1982.
3. Afanasyev A., The Syntax of Love, Moscow, 2000.
4. Bukalov A. V., A new model of the ethnos and the state; the psychoinformational space of the ethnos, SMPL 5, 1999.
5. Gulenko V. V., Two views on extraversion and introversion, “16”, March 1991.
6. Gulenko V. V., Structural-Functional Socionics, Kiev, 1999.
7. Gulenko V. V., Molodtsov A. V., Foundations of Socioanalysis 2, Kiev, 1991.
8. Dubrov Ya. A., Conceptual and mathematical modelling in socionics, SMPL 5, 1999.
9. Ermak V. D., How to Learn to Understand People. Socionics — a new method of knowing the human being, Moscow, 2003.
10. Pereverzev A., On the meaning of the PSS, paper at the XX socionics conference, 2004.
11. Prudnikova L. Yu., The socion as a mode of the asynchronous evolution of man, SMPL No. 6, 2003.
12. Reinin G. R., Morphology of small groups, SMPL 3, 1996.
13. Reinin G. R., On mixed and pure types, SMPL 3, 2001.
14. Reinin G. R., A theoretical analysis of typological descriptions of personality in psychology, SMPL 4–6, 1999.
15. Ritchik D. Yu., Filimonov S. V., Shepetko E. V., Socionics and Mentology, Sverdlovsk, 1991.
16. Stoyakin V. A., On the types of Athens, Socrates and … the Venus de Milo, Socion No. 1, 1998.
17. Churyumov S. I., Generalisation of the socionic model, SMPL 5, 1996.
18. Churyumov S. I., The problem of differentiating traits in psychology and socionics, SMPL No. 6, 2002.
19. Churyumov S. I., Socionics as methodology, SMPL 1, 1996.
20. Churyumov S. I., Type and character, SMPL No. 1, 2000.
21. Shepetko E. V., Analysis and classification of intertype relations, manuscript, Vilnius, 1990.
22. Shiyan A. A., The state, tendencies and prospects of the development of socionics, manuscript, 1996.
23. Shulman G. A., A picture of intertype relations, SMPL No. 1, 1998.
24. Shulman G. A., A model of the socion, SMPL 3, 1995.
25. Yakubovskaya T. S., The Genetic Code of the Universe, Lviv, 1997.
26. Lis, Myths of the Reinin traits, www.socionika.net, 2005.
27. Tikhonov A. P., The dichotomous approach in determining TIM: a pilot empirical study of certain test methodologies, SMPL 1, 2001.
28. Meged V. and Ovcharov A., Characters and Relations, Moscow, 2002.
29. Kalinauskas I. N., Alone with the World, St Petersburg, 2002.
30. Reinin G. R., Socionics, St Petersburg, 2005.
31. Augustinavichute Aušra, Characterisation of the intuitive-logical extratim, manuscript, Vilnius, 1983.
32. Lomonosova E., The influence of the process of human birth (S. Grof’s BPM) on the type of informational metabolism, SMPL 3, 2003.
33. Bondarenko Ya. A., Form-Colour Socionics, Donetsk–Kiev, 2002.
34. Maslyaev O. I., Psychology of Personality, Donetsk, Stalker, 1997.
35. Lytova M. F., Lytov D. A., On the prospects of socionics as a science, 2–13 April 2005.
36. Stovpyuk M. F., Lytov D. A., On the semantic content of the Reinin traits, SMPL No. 6, 2003.
37. Tsypin P. E., Encyclopedia of Relations, Moscow: Dobroye Slovo / Chornaya Belka, 2005, 208 pp.
38. Shirochin V., A Word on Intellect, Kiev, not earlier than 1994, internet site.
39. Gulenko V. V., The theory of subtypes: the DNCH system, paper at the XXII International Socionics Conference, Kiev, 2006.

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Notes

1. Incidentally, this is done by him very wittily and inventively — unquestionably he is a talented scholar.
2. For example, she used Kretschmer’s terms “schizothyme” and “cyclothyme”, regarding irrationals as cyclothymes and rationals as schizothymes. As a result it turned out for her that, for instance, Don Quixotes, being schizothymes by their typological description, fell among the cyclothymes.
3. The English have an observation that only the fifth generation can become genuinely intellectual.