Chapter 4

The Problem of Modeling the Psyche

This is the house that Jack built… — English nursery rhyme

In this chapter, reasonings will partially be used that are close to those encountered in the preceding chapter. This is connected with the fact that the themes of the two chapters are closely bound up with each other. Nevertheless, these are fully independent chapters, in which a thematics close in meaning is considered from different angles of view. In this chapter, out of stylistic considerations, the symbolics of Aušra Augustinavičiūtė is partially used. This is done, above all, because such symbolics points more directly to the archetypes standing behind the symbols, and in the consideration of certain hypothetically initial situations such a peculiarity seems preferable.

By the present time, more than a dozen and a half models of the psyche have been proposed in socionics, which by part of the socionists is perceived with irony, irritation, or bewilderment. However, if one acknowledges the right of scientists to make sense of the socionic notions about the functioning of the psyche, then such “model-creation” will look entirely acceptable. Probably, practitioners have the right to expect stability from theory, but, alas, this stability can be ensured only by theoreticians. All the proposed models take Model “A” as their point of departure: someone simply transforms it, someone explains it in his own way, someone proposes a more complex structure, but this is always an attempt to comprehend, to understand, to make sense of things. Let us too try to make sense of the proposed models. But let us consider everything in order.

Since socionics has not yet sufficiently fully settled its methodological space, it makes sense, when occasion arises, to stipulate and refine the methodological categories that are introduced and used. One of such categories is the concept of model and modeling. These concepts have long since become general-scientific, but, nevertheless, it would do no harm to refine them anew in each subject domain, and, in particular, in socionics — all the more since not all socionists perceive these concepts identically.

The problem of modeling the psyche is by no means an invention or a priority of socionics. As soon as the ideas of cybernetics penetrated into psychology, psychologists began to use cybernetic methodology for the solution of psychological problems. And, of course, soon there appeared the idea of modeling the psyche, and even consciousness. The well-known Ukrainian scientist and remarkable surgeon N. M. Amosov, one of the first in the Soviet Union to take up the ideas of cybernetics, as early as 1968, in the work Modeling of Complex Systems [3], sketched, in the form of “block-and-arrow” schemes, a multitude of models of complex systems, to whose number, among others, belong animals and human beings. In fig. 4.01 is presented the scheme of how this remarkable scientist represents to himself the model of a “very complex system”:

Fig. 4.01. General scheme of a complex system with its basic subsystems (after Amosov). A — models of the external world (Cognition); B — models of actions directed outward (Actions); C — models of the internal environment, expressed in “feelings” (Feelings).

Already in this scheme we see blocks that can, of course, be understood as generalized functions necessary to a “complex system”¹ in order that it be able to exist effectively in the surrounding environment. Block A perceives the influence of the environment, and, of course, this process can be connected with cognition, or the formation of models of the external world; but, as we now know thanks to socionics, this block has its own internal structure, formed by several generalized functions, and this structure bears a principled character. This means that such a multitude of functions must be necessary and sufficient. Analogous reasonings are applicable to block B as well.

The introduction of block C,² however, is not necessary, since, as will be shown below, it enters into the composition of one of the extreme blocks. On the other hand, with a suitable choice of the element base, one can introduce a multitude of other intermediate blocks; but although their introduction would answer the requirement of sufficiency, it would not answer the requirement of necessity for the level of generalization with which socionics works. This occurs because the methodological requirement of the unity of criterion in the choice of the level of generalization is violated.

If the structure of a block answers the requirement of necessity, then such a structure can be called the principled scheme of the block. It is another matter that the functions entering into the input or output block can be combined in various ways or split into functions of a lower level, obtaining various modifications of the principled scheme. Such modifications may be presented as specific discoveries in the field of psychology and become the basis for the formation of new psychological schools. It is precisely this that occurred in contemporary psychology, when, as the result of the processing of similar empirical material, at least three different sets of traits describing the human psyche were obtained. What is at issue is the MMPI, Leonhard’s accentuations, and the scales of Lichko’s laboratory, but this question is considered in more detail in another place in this book. Here let us only note that similar results may lead to relativistic ideas to the effect that one and the same object can be described in different ways and all such descriptions will be equivalent, while a single, “true” description, to which all the others would be reduced, does not in principle exist.

One of the merits of socionics consists precisely in the fact that it points to the possibility of describing the human psyche with the help of a necessary and sufficient set of generalized functions. And although such a description by no means excludes other alternatives, it gives the key to establishing a law-governed connection among the various descriptions of the structure of the psyche that one can encounter in different authors.

Another principled attempt to build a model of the human psyche on an empirical basis is presented in the book of V. M. Melnikov and P. T. Yampolsky, Introduction to the Experimental Psychology of the Personality [14]. However, before proposing their own approach to the construction of a model of the personality, these authors mention several approaches to this problem by other researchers, which, without doubt, is of interest for socionists as well.

To K. K. Platonov belongs the idea of a hierarchical, as he understands it, construction of the structure of the personality, resting on the fact that the traits of the personality are regarded “…as steps of a hierarchical ladder, in which the lower steps are subordinated to and controlled (subordinated) by the higher, while the higher, including the lower within themselves and leaning upon them, are not reduced to their sum, since the transitions from step to step are accomplished as leaps on the basis of the appearance of systemic qualities” [16].

K. K. Platonov singles out four basic, in his opinion, substructures of the personality: 1) the socially determined substructure (directedness, moral-ethical qualities); 2) experience (knowledge, skills, abilities, habits); 3) the individual peculiarities of various psychic processes; 4) the biologically determined substructure (constitutional peculiarities and temperament).

V. S. Merlin does not agree with K. K. Platonov. He writes that “…the structure of the personality cannot be characterized as a system composed of several different groups of psychic properties: temperament, character, abilities, and directedness. Some of them (the properties of temperament) are not properties of the personality at all; the others (character, abilities, and directedness) represent not different ‘subsystems’ but different functions of one and the same properties of the personality” [15].

V. S. Merlin holds that as the primary elements of the structure of the personality its properties must be used. “Each property of the personality is simultaneously an expression of directedness, of character, and of abilities. It is formed in activity and, together with this, to one or another degree depends on heredity, on innate endowments. Therefore by the structure of the personality one should understand the connection, the organization, of the properties of the personality” [15].

The structural models of the personality in the works of B. G. Ananyev and A. G. Kovalev are similar to the two models considered. In them too is used the principle of the hierarchical ordering of levels by the degree of representation in them of the biological and social sides of the personality.

O. P. Yeliseyev, highly valuing the ideas of B. G. Ananyev, writes: “The fullest such description was given by B. G. Ananyev on the basis of the singling-out of four basic macrocharacteristics (personality, subject, individuality, individual) in the general structure of the notion of the human being and the interconnection of the development of his properties. The concept of the personality, thus, is one of the four basic subsystems in the integral system of the Human Being” [9].

The basic task of further investigations of the structure of the personality in the eighties of the twentieth century, in the opinion of E. V. Shorokhova, was the singling-out of a finite list of the properties of the personality and the establishment of “the character of the connections and interdependencies among them.” And further: “At the present time it is difficult to give preference to any one of the proposed conceptions, but the fruitfulness of the structuring of the properties, qualities, and peculiarities of the personality does not evoke doubt” [25].

The references adduced show how, approximately twenty years before the twenty-first century, in Russian psychology there arose the ideas of a structural model of the personality; that these ideas, stimulated by the development of cybernetics and systems theory, were in the air and awaited a suitable embodiment. At the same time we see that the researchers had no unified opinion concerning the “element base” of such a model. They had only a methodological image of such a model, and even that, apparently, in a very approximate and formal form, as “…the grounding and realization in concrete investigations of the systemic-structural approach.” “Its essence is that the personality is understood not as an aggregate of separate psychic processes, but as an integral formation, including within itself a multitude of interconnected characteristics and elements” [12]. Of course, it is necessary to understand that for many years the development of psychology in the Soviet Union went on in deep isolation from the development of psychology in the rest of the world, and therefore we do not even see a mention of the fact that the concept of the structure of the personality already existed, and that it, at the least, ought to have been reckoned with.

Further, V. M. Melnikov and P. T. Yampolsky [14] correctly write that “The importance of the realization of the structural approach in the theory of the personality consists in the fact that it destroys the popular notion of the personality as a ‘collection’ of independent, coordinate properties. The understanding of the personality as an aggregate of independent traits unjustifiedly disunites the object of investigation, deprives the concept of the personality of its categorial content…” With this one can fully agree, since the point of this assertion is directly aimed against “creeping empiricism,” which wishes to remain within the narrow framework of experimental reliability, reducing in the final analysis to direct observation, to the visualization of the characteristics of the object under investigation. The authors also hold that “…the application of the structural principle in the description of the personality strikes a blow³ also at the adherents of the so-called integral (holistic) approach.” Since the holists proceed from the proposition of the integrality, the non-dismemberability, of the personality, from this ought to follow the impossibility of its analytical study. In that case the only admissible mode of cognition remains phenomenological descriptions of the distinctiveness of the personality of outstanding people. With such an opposition of psychological modeling to holism one can by no means agree — after all, the holistic approach by no means contradicts the acknowledgment of the existence of structures. It only emphasizes the inferiority of the reduction of an integral object to the sum of its parts, in whatever way they may be structured. Of course, in the holistic approach extreme positions too are possible, categorically denying any possibility whatsoever of an analysis that dismembers integrality. However, the categorical opposition of polar positions in science has long been an anachronism, although from time to time one can encounter it in various forms. At the present time such an opposition appears to be no more than a misunderstanding, since advanced scientific thought is connected with the simultaneous acknowledgment of the necessity of describing an object at all its essential levels — the elemental, evolutionary, causal, structural, systemic, pragmatic, and, of course, the integral. In many cases scientists quite manage this.

The summing-up of these reasonings is provided by a remarkable quotation from the textbook of S. L. Rubinstein, written as early as 1946: “…equally incorrect are both the point of view for which the unity of the personality is expressed in an amorphous integrality, transforming its psychic countenance into a formless nebula, and the other, opposed to it, which sees in the personality only separate traits and, losing every genuine, internal unity of the psychological countenance of the personality, vainly then seeks correlations among the external manifestations of these traits” [18]. As we see, here is very clearly expressed the point of view of the dialectical unity of the integral and the structural approach. However, to realize in practice this remarkable methodological principle in Soviet psychology never succeeded.

“With the structural approach the personality is represented as consisting not only of elements (properties, states, processes, and the like), but also of relations among them. These relations bind the elements into a single whole, determine the structure of the personality and the laws of its functioning. The integrality arising in the presence of a structure differs from the ‘amorphous,’ non-dismemberable integrality of holism; it admits division into elements, various combinations of which permit the obtaining of new qualities or properties of the personality, not fully derivable from the properties of the elements.” It is precisely this result that has been obtained in socionics, when the model of the personality is presented by a concrete structure of functions, from which one can obtain non-trivial information both about the specific work of each function, and about the various blockings of these functions, and about the joint work of all the functions as a single whole. The last possibility, in particular, manifests itself also in the fact that, alongside the multitude of concrete peculiarities of each type of information metabolism (TIM) — psychological traits — from the model is derived also the integral image of the type. At the same time, the theoretically declared character of a model of the personality had not, before the appearance of socionics, been attained in psychology.

Judge for yourselves. Setting about the construction of their structural-hierarchical model of the personality, the authors [14] find nothing better than to use the scales of the MMPI and the 16PF. And, of course, for a start this is not at all bad, since at least some generalization of the empirical material appears; but further, after all, one needs to come out onto symmetries, invariants, and regularities — and it is precisely this that they then did not manage to do. Using the results of the factor analysis of the MMPI and 16PF at the level of the questions, and having singled out factors of the second and third order, the authors propose the final variant of the structural-hierarchical model of the personality in the form of a graph, presented in fig. 4.02.

Fig. 4.02. The structural-hierarchical model of the personality of Melnikov–Yampolsky. Level I: answers to 753 questions. Level II: 11 factors. Level III: 10 factors. Level IV: 4 factors.

The authors themselves [14] describe their model thus.

“At each level is located a definite number of vertices. The vertices correspond to personality traits, measured with the help of questions, or to factors generalizing these traits. The higher the level, the higher the degree of generality. Each vertex of a lower level is connected with only one vertex of a higher level. The vertical connections between traits and factors are indicated by lines. Horizontal connections between them exist if they are generated by a common vertex” [14].

“The first level corresponds to the 753 questions of the MMPI and 16PF tests. The answers to these questions are the initial information about the individual-psychological peculiarities of the personality. All the factors of the higher levels act as generalizations of various levels with respect to this information” [14].

Further they describe the second level, representing an aggregate of 11 factors extracted from the question base by the means of factor analysis. Into the number of these factors, measuring the psychic stability of the personality, enter: “irritable weakness,” “anxiety,” “hypochondria,” “phobias,” “suspiciousness,” “paranoidness,” “schizoidness,” “intrapsychic disorderedness,” “hypothymia,” “conflicts of the narrow circle,” “conformity.”

Then follows the third level, represented by ten factors. “Of them, 3 factors generalize the information from the 11 factors of the first level — that is, they too characterize psychic stability, while 7 factors measure other individual-psychological peculiarities of the personality” [14]. To the number of these factors belong: “neuroticism,” “psychoticism,” “depression,” “conscientiousness,” “disinhibition,” “general activity,” “timidity,” “sociability,” “aesthetic impressionability,” “femininity.”

And, finally, at the fourth level are located “4 independent factors, generalizing the information of the factors of the third level.” These are “psychic unbalancedness,” “asociality,” “extraversion,” “sensitivity.”

Further, the authors compare their model with the root system of a plant. Despite the seemingly purely external analogy, there is a definite meaning in such a comparison. Whether the authors want it or not, in this comparison is reflected a definite methodological set, which can be expressed by the assertion “all the psychological peculiarities of the personality have a common soil and originate from one root.” At the same time, looking at the drawing of the model, we see that the soil is located at the top, and the root too goes from there, which stands in a certain contradiction with the empirical set of the authors. The empirics here is fixed in the 753 questions — this is the level of factors of zero order, that is, of that which can be directly observed in experiment and at the level of everyday empirics. Evaluating this model, one can say that, first, the authors did all they could, but positivist methodology played its role, and further than minimal generalizations of the empirical material they did not manage to advance.

I have deliberately given a sufficiently detailed description of the searches for and construction of the “structural-hierarchical” model, so that the reader might receive a more or less clear notion of the direction of the searches, their methods, and their “element base.”

Thus, the authors include in the structure of the personality even the answers to the questions of the test, considering this level primary and somehow not taking into account that all these questions can in no way be assigned to the category of invariants. At the second level are located the semi-clinical (that is, although oriented toward the clinic, used also for work with healthy people) scales of the MMPI, determined by the answers to the questions of the test. At the third level are located the factors of the second order — the results of the factor analysis of the clinical scales; and at the fourth (last) level are located the factors of the third order — the results of the factor analysis of the factors of the second order. In examining this model the impression is created that the authors found a packaging, acceptable to them, of the hierarchical processing of the primary data contained in the questions of the test, and the whole model is no more than a form of protocol of testing simultaneously by two popular methodologies. The question is only how adequately the questions of the tests reflect the structure of the personality.

It is curious that in the latest, most “advanced,” textbooks and monographs on the theory of the personality [13, 20, 21] the question of the integral modeling of the personality is not posed at all, the cause of which, apparently, is the methodological prejudice rooted in Western psychology, forbidding the practical psychologist-experimenter to turn to “metaphysical” instrumentation. Such a prohibition is not only erroneous but also harmful. It is erroneous simply because “metaphysical” construction is initially inherent in intellectual work and, one way or another, at one level or another — and, above all, at the level of any generalizations and the formation of categories describing experimental results — will obligatorily appear. It is another matter that this instrument must be used skillfully. And this prohibition is harmful because it cuts off a wide zone of scientific creativity, creating the illusion of the absolute reliability of experimental methodology.

As a heuristic argument confirming the impossibility of building a model that is simultaneously full-fledged, integral, and reflective of the contemporary level of scientific methodology, one can refer to the following statement of an authoritative neurophysiologist⁴: “Arithmetical ‘rigidity’ is not suitable for the brain, and the searches for a determinate code based on arithmetical exactness will undoubtedly lead to disappointment.”

It is also interesting to note that in the remarkable monograph of V. N. Druzhinin, Experimental Psychology (a textbook of the new century, as he calls it!) [8], the impossibility of building integral models at the contemporary level of knowledge in psychology is directly indicated. First he says that “There are very many possible variants of the structural-functional organization of the system of the psyche,” and then, as an example, he adduces the model of the basic structure of the psyche proposed by A. M. Volkov in 1990 and presented in table 4.01.

Table 4.01 (after Volkov)

Level	Function	Image	External regulation	Experience
1. Sensory	Solution of a task	Feature	Tactics	Skill
2. Perceptual	Attainment of a goal	Object	Strategy	Ability
3. Mental	Realization of a motive	Concept	Plan	Knowledge

In this model the author singles out the sensory, perceptual, and mental levels with various manifestations of their functioning. And V. N. Druzhinin correctly remarks that “It is unclear, however, why one of the kinds of images is the feature; where the level of the attainment of the goal is located; why sensory experience is reduced to skill and does not include sensory knowledge (sensory standards, etc.), and so on” [16]. And further V. N. Druzhinin says: “The above example is taken rather at random, not so much for criticism as by way of demonstration. Probably, at the contemporary level of psychological knowledge, the construction of such integral models of the psyche, laying claim to universality and completeness, is a hopeless and thankless affair (emphasis mine — S.Ch.).”

Nevertheless, on the example of this random model one can see to what degree certain important theoretical concepts are unelaborated in psychology. What, then, does V. N. Druzhinin himself do in this direction?

He says that, since “…methodological and methodical problems must be solved (even if only in a first approximation), therefore every researcher, including the author of this book, has to create, as means of solving these problems, certain constructions having the status of metaphors, and not of final products of research activity. And, naturally, there are far more theoretical claims against the content of these constructions than benefit from their application (emphasis mine — S.Ch.)” [8]. From this phrase it is evident that psychologists continue the search for a fundamental model of the personality, but too many methodological and methodical problems in psychology remain unsolved, while the simple idea of the positioning of the psychological functions, found by C. G. Jung and taken up by socionics, remains uncomprehended by psychologists.

V. N. Druzhinin, as a working scheme, proposes the following hierarchy of levels of psychic systems (quoted from [8]):

“The ‘zero’ level is the pre-psychic level, ensuring the vital activity of the human organism and its influence on psychic activity — it is determined by the next, psychophysiological, level.

“The ‘psychophysiological’ level. The name is extremely conditional. What is at issue is the level of psychic processes in whose investigation the psychological and the physiological methods are equally successful. This level answers for the simplest kinds of psychic subconscious regulation (the realization of automatized actions — operations, skills).

“The ‘mesopsychic’ level — the level of the regulation of actions. The basic logic of this level: the relation of voluntary and involuntary processes. This is the ‘properly psychological’ level — the level of the interaction of consciousness and the unconscious, although they, as structures, are represented at another level of interpretation.

“The ‘macropsychological’ level. At this level is carried out the regulation of activity by psychic functional systems answering for the integrality of the psyche. Here the ‘I’ interacts with social norms (the normatively approved mode of activity is correlated with the individual).

“The ‘level of uniqueness’ is the integral individuality, the subject of vital activity (creativity), building its own unrepeatable life path” [8].

One can fully agree with such a division of psychic and psychological phenomenology into levels of generality, and one can suppose that for each of these levels, with the exception, perhaps, of the last, an adequate model can be built. In doing so, possibly, it is not at all obligatory to strive to build a model that would encompass all the levels. An aggregate of models of the various levels could quite well serve as a reliable theoretical basis for further experimental investigations and practical work.

It appears that the socionic model corresponds to the macropsychological level. Let us try to show how, using the evolutionary-semantic approach, one can build and ground a model of the psyche corresponding to this level [8].

However, let us begin with one more quotation, giving a notion of what psychologists think about the modeling of the personality: “The psychological study of the human being requires the conscious constructive activity of the practical psychologist, directed at the construction of a model of the structure of the personality according to the principle of the mutual coordination and compatibility of all the properties of this personality. The model of the personality must serve the self-cognition of the human being, explaining the personal meaning of constructive activity and in general form determining individually distinctive abilities” [9]. Here one can agree with everything that characterizes the model of the personality, but the thought that the construction of the model of the personality must be occupied with by practical psychologists puts one on one’s guard. Probably, practical psychologists can make their contribution to the construction of a model of the personality, but, of course, here, above all, effective theoretical solutions must be found.

In the given text, by a model we shall understand a homeomorphic mapping of an object by the means of an arbitrary sign system. The concept of homeomorphism is a generalization of the concept of isomorphism, behind which stands the notion of a one-to-one correspondence of the structures of two objects, each of which may have an arbitrary nature, including a symbolic one. Homeomorphism does not presuppose an unambiguous correspondence — it is sufficient that there be at least some. The higher the degree of correspondence, the more precisely the model reproduces the properties of the object.

By a sign we shall understand an object of arbitrary nature, pointing to another object, also of arbitrary nature, so long as this connection has at least some degree of definiteness. The nature of this connection may be arbitrary — natural, artificial, symbolic, pragmatic, and so on. Thus, for example, a footprint in the sand is a natural sign pointing to the person who has walked along the sand. Cracks in a cliff are a natural sign pointing to an earthquake or other physical processes. Words, sentences, and texts are artificial signs pointing to some real or invented objects.

If an aggregate of signs represents a system, then one can speak of a language. In another way this can be formulated thus: a language is a sign system by whose means one can model the objects and processes of surrounding reality, both separately and in various aggregates.

The concept of system in the scientific literature has a multitude of definitions, but in the given text we shall proceed from the premise that a system represents “a multitude of material, energetic, and informational flows, united among themselves by feedback connections” [5]. Of course, these feedback connections too are part of the informational flow. Feedback connections are the real mechanism providing the system with such a characteristic as integrality. This can be understood in the sense that the system acts as a single object, all of whose parts withstand the influence of the external environment as one whole. In reality, however, the matter may stand thus, that the connection among the parts bears not an absolute but a relative character. So that one can speak of the degree of integrality determined by the system. But, in any case, a system without minimal integrality cannot exist (by definition), and thus the concepts of system and integrality are equivalent to each other. However, let us note that the definition of a system as an integrality permits one to speak of the degree of systemness, and this introduces into the definition of a system an additional shade.

A language can be evaluated by its power, which is defined as the degree to which it is capable of reflecting the objects of the external world and, in the end, the world itself as well. Human languages possess a very high power and are capable of modeling the subtlest shades of human relations — the whole massif of artistic literature testifies to this. However, languages have other parameters as well — for example, adequacy, which shows how precisely the linguistic, that is, sign, models reflect the internal nature of the object. It is precisely to this that human languages are not adapted — they were formed under the conditions of the observation and reflection of the external peculiarities of objects. It is precisely, as the author understands it, in connection with the requirement to raise the adequacy of the sign modeling of the objects of the world that science arose. It began to create more adequate models within the framework of specially created sign systems, representing specific languages adapted to the reflection of the peculiarities of a concrete subject domain with its particular objects.

At the present time socionics is in the process of perfecting the primary socionic sign system built by Aušra Augustinavičiūtė, and this sign system is still in the process of becoming and has not attained an optimal level, while the socionic language is already breaking up into several dialects, and mutual understanding among them is becoming difficult. One of the objects of divergence in understanding is the basic instrument of socionics — the model of the psyche.

A model, just like a text, represents a sign — a complex, structured sign, in which conventional and iconic features are joined. Conventional in the socionic model are the designations of the IA and the numbering of the functions.⁵ The geometric form of the model bears a generally iconic character, since, presumably, in some approximation, it maps the topology of the psyche. But the semantic filling of the model depends on the theoretical understanding of what, and precisely how, the model conveys in the work of the psyche. It is precisely here that the divergences in the understanding of the model begin.

Socionics is occupied with the modeling of the human psyche. From this it follows that one who uses the model or proposes its interpretation knows how the psyche works, or proposes his own hypothesis about this work. From the general-scientific point of view, it is desirable that such hypotheses pass further scientific expert examination or be subjected to experimental verification — but, of course, not in the sense of formal-bureaucratic control with the possibility of receiving bribes and the development of systemic corruption, but with the aim of the mutual coordination of methodological semantics.

The simplest model in the given case, as in all the others, may be the designation of the psyche by one arbitrary symbol — for example, by the Greek letter psi, or by a point, or by a small square, or by the symbol of a black box. What, then, does such a model model? It would seem, exactly nothing. However, this is completely incorrect — such a model, above all, models the existence⁶ of the object, and this is the most fundamental characteristic of an object: before possessing properties, one must exist.

Let us, in the given case too, designate the psyche by a rectangle with the letter psi inscribed in it, which can be understood as a pointer to a certain hypothesis about the existence of something that in psychology is understood as the psyche (fig. 4.03).

Fig. 4.03. A model of the psyche in the form of an absolutely black box, into which nothing enters and from which nothing exits.

Here it is quite appropriate to specify what the psyche represents. Here is the definition of the psyche given by a psychological dictionary [17]: “PSYCHE (from the Greek psychikos — of the soul) — a systemic property of highly organized matter, consisting in the active reflection by the subject of the objective world, in the construction by the subject of a picture of this world inalienable from him, and in the self-regulation on this basis of his behavior and activity.”

Even the fact that, instead of the etymological basis of the Russian term, the form of the adjective psychikos — “of the soul” — is used, and not the noun psyche — “soul” — can be understood in the sense that the author of the definition strives to veil the problem: when one need not refer to something laying claim to being an object, one can refer instead to the perfectly understandable situation when an object, in the given case a human being, possesses certain properties. After this it is said that the psyche is a systemic property. One need not continue further, because the most important object of reality — the soul, presumably identical with subjectivity — is reduced to a property of a system, to something like color, form, or size. However, if one continues the analysis of the definition adduced, one should note its logical defectiveness, manifesting itself in the fact that one unknown (the psyche) is defined through several others, among which the most important in the given context is the concept of the subject. This term is used in the definition in passing, as if it were understandable to everyone what this — possibly the most inmost — entity present in our world represents.

No better is the definition of the psyche from the philosophical encyclopedic dictionary [19]: “PSYCHE (from the Greek ψυχικός — of the soul), a property of highly organized matter, being a special form of the reflection by the subject of objective reality; being a product of the vital activity of the subject, the psyche, mediating it, performs the function of orientation, of control of it.”

Here the essence of the matter is masked by the image of “highly organized matter” (apparently it is presupposed that this, at least, is well known to everyone) and by the fact that the psyche is a “special form of reflection” (well, something like a mirror, but a special one — possibly on an air cushion). And if one speaks seriously, then in both definitions the psyche is reduced to the concept of the “reflection by the subject” of objective reality, where reflection, in contemporary terminology, can be understood as modeling; but the subject, from the psychological point of view, all the same remains an elusive entity. Little is given here by the purely phenomenological definition of the subject as the source of activity, because it remains unknown what or who precisely manifests this activity. Therefore it is simplest here to renounce attempts at a scientific definition, because science at the present time does not yet possess the possibility of the experimental measurement and observation of the hypothetical energetic fields that are the substrate of the psyche. Therefore let us simply accept as a working hypothesis that living creatures possess an integral system of the perception of the external environment acting upon them; that they react in one way or another to this influence; that they have internal possibilities of modeling this environment; and, finally, that they are capable of forming behavior giving the possibility of surviving in this environment. Such a set of suppositions is necessary in order to reflect the data available in psychology about the functioning of the psyche and to formulate a hypothesis about the formation of the structure of the psyche in the process of the adaptation of the living to the habitat.

The model presented in fig. 4.03 corresponds to the very cautious position of a researcher who only detects the signs of the existence of “something,” but, for various reasons, avoids drawing any hasty conclusions from his discovery.

The next naturalistic supposition that we make with respect to the psyche is that it exists in a certain environment, with which it somehow interacts. If to the preceding model we add arrows designating the influence of the environment on the object and the reactions of the object to this influence, we obtain the standard behaviorist model of the “black box,” a model with an input and an output (fig. 4.04).

Fig. 4.04. A model of the psyche in the form of an absolutely black box with an indication of the input influence and the reaction to it.

Let us note that when we singled out in the world that which we called the psyche, two parts of this world appeared: the object possessing the psyche, and the environment of its habitation. When we added the influence of the world and the reaction to it, four parts appeared: the psyche, the environment of its habitation, the influence of the environment on the psyche, and its reaction to this influence.

In the process presented one can observe the transition from something one-and-single to the polar opposition of two, and to a four-part structure, which in various forms appears in various philosophical and scientific constructions. The assumptions that were made in the attempt to describe the psyche bear an intuitively plausible character.

Preserving intuitive plausibility, let us pass to a “semi-transparent” box, having made a supposition about what, inside the box, adjoins the input and output parts. In reality the influence of the environment is perceived by the sensory system of the psyche — this hypothesis is sufficiently grounded in psychology. And when the input influence has been processed, transformed, turned into a reaction, it acquires the character either of purposeful physical work (the extraverted form of activity) or of orientational behavior (the introverted form of activity). The latter can be defined as the evaluation of the state of the environment in accordance with the experience one has. In the most general form, orientational behavior looks like a relatively cautious probing of the environment with the help of actions that can be called signal actions, since they are directed not at obtaining a materialized product but at obtaining information. The meaning of the last suppositions in socionics is connected with the aspects of logic: extraverted (technology, production, physical labor, manufacture) and introverted (the putting-out, collection, processing, quantitative and structural evaluation of information). The suppositions made will lead us to a two-part structure of the initially “black box,” since inside the box two parts are formed, adjoining the “environment” at the place of the input and the output. The input, receiving part, in accordance with what has been said above, we shall designate with the “sensing” symbols (S/s), pointing to the sensory system of the psyche, which is formed under the influence of the external environment and (therefore) has the possibility of receiving the external influence; and the output part we shall designate with the “logical” symbols (L/l), pointing to the executive structure, formed with the aim of pragmatic influence on the environment. As a result we obtain the model depicted in fig. 4.05.

Fig. 4.05. A model of the psyche in the form of a semi-transparent box with an indication of the input influence, the reaction, and the parts adjoining them.

Empirical knowledge of the conditions of the functioning of the psyche gives grounds to assert, or at least to suppose, that the sensorily fixed influence on the subject, at least in the case of a developed psyche, is accompanied by an evaluative emotional-relational reaction. Thus the input part of the semi-transparent box can now be divided in half, adding the ethical function (E/e).

Now we shall make one more supposition (which, incidentally, is intuitively understandable): that the output reaction of the subject of the psyche must be preceded by the construction of an internal model of the external environment, which includes within itself the formation of programs of possible, admissible, and presumably effective behavior. For this, on the basis of the sensorily perceived influence of the environment and the emotional-relational evaluation of this influence, one must perform intuitive work and understand⁷ the potential possibilities of the environment. This part of the work of the psyche we shall designate by the archetypal symbol most closely interpreted as intuition. Socionics distinguishes two aspects of intuition. Extraverted intuition is penetration into the potential possibilities of an object. Introverted intuition is penetration into the peculiarities of the flow of processes in the environment in connection with time. Aušra Augustinavičiūtė proposed a symbol for the designation of this archetype. Out of typographical considerations, it is convenient to use the letter designation I/i. The corresponding four-part model has the form presented in fig. 4.06.

Fig. 4.06. A model of the psyche in the form of a transparent box with a depiction of the internal structure.

If one now separates the aspects combined in the preceding model, one obtains a model with eight functions (fig. 4.07).

Fig. 4.07. A model of the psyche in the form of a transparent box with eight functions. The upper row of functions is formed as the result of the loading, and the lower as the result of the resource, influence of the environment.

In order for the model to acquire precisely such a form, additional suppositions are necessary, which in what follows must be grounded.

1. The influence of the environment can be divided into the forceful — or, what is the same, the loading — and the resource, or providing. To the first relate extreme conditions, the struggle for existence, survival. To the second relates everything that contributes to survival. The environment not only loads us, subjects us to trials and dangers (including deadly ones), but also warms us, feeds us, and so on — that is, it provides, and presupposes some more or less comfortable conditions.
2. To a comfortable influence the psyche reacts with positive emotions — how good! I want more! To a loading one — with a “critical” relation — how bad! better that this not be, I don’t want it! The semantics of the loading influence induces the semantics of a negative reaction and a critical relation, while the semantics of the resource influence induces the semantics of a positive emotional reaction.
3. A negative relation compels one to distance oneself from the source of the negative influence, for which one must know it. For this an internal model of the environment is formed, in which its potential possibilities are reflected; while a positive emotional reaction impels the psyche (the subject of reaction) to the repetition of the contact, to spending time on the additional obtaining of the resource.
4. And, finally, the internal model describing the potential possibilities of the environment is projected outward in the form of a sign description of this very environment in the codes of the subject of the psyche, while the structuring of time by the subject is expressed in productive activity, or, what is the same, useful and productive work.

In the formal-mathematical sense, the model turns out to consist of alternating extraverted and introverted elements, which, of course, is beautiful, but does not seem necessary — and to this moment we shall yet return; while the reasoning adduced above, at first presentation, seems somewhat artificial, though plausible. It appears that this is connected with the imperfection of the language with which we try to describe the functioning of the model.

Thus, the model built reflects the hypothesis that, first, the psyche exists, and, second, that it is structured in a definite way. The latter means that the psyche has the possibility of perceiving the loading and resource influence of the environment,⁸ is capable of performing a primary evaluation of the influence produced upon it,⁹ is capable, on the basis of the first two steps, of building a model of the environment and working out a program of adaptation to it,¹⁰ and, finally, of representing the environment in a certain sign code and of producing in it a certain, presumably useful, work.¹¹

Despite the fact that Aušra quite clearly described her view of the work of Model “A,” her followers discovered possibilities — and this is entirely natural — of developing this theme. The most interesting elaborations in this direction, reported at conferences and published in print, are the investigations of A. Bukalov, V. Gulenko, V. Ermak, S. Shteinikov, S. Filimonov, I. Kalinauskas, V. Alekseev, and others. Undoubtedly, these works enriched the theory of Model “A,” but, just as undoubtedly, did not exhaust it. After the group-theoretic and categorial-algebraic analysis of the socion performed by A. Reinin, Ya. Dubrov, M. Gut, and others, no doubts remain that this model represents a very high level of abstraction, not merely comparable with the mathematical, but exactly corresponding to it. It is precisely by virtue of the high level of abstraction of Model “A” that one can assert that the model admits, if not an infinite multitude of fillings and interpretations, as is the case with mathematical formulas, then, at the least, several.

The subtle differences in the understanding of the work of Model “A” can be illustrated by the following example. V. V. Gulenko, in his article devoted to the understanding of Model “A,” writes: “The socionic model describes the functioning of the human psyche as a twofold process. One contour of the processing of information is fully conscious — that is, it is wholly subordinated to the purposeful control of consciousness. This is the mental ring of functions.

“The second contour of the processing of information yields far less to conscious control, is connected with the everyday physiological needs of the individual and his organism, functions almost mechanically, without deliberation. This is the ring of the vital functions” [6].

The reasoning adduced can be regarded as a hypothesis advanced by the author on the basis of personal observations of the functioning of the human psyche from the point of view of socionics. And of course, the hypothetical character of such reasonings must be specially stipulated, so that specialists from other fields of science know exactly that they are dealing with a supposition, and not with the truth in the last instance. However, such a hypothesis undoubtedly stands in need of experimental verification. This is needed, if only in order to refine and establish the reliability of such quantitative assertions as “One contour of the processing of information is fully conscious” and “The second contour of the processing of information yields far less (emphasis mine — S.Ch.) to conscious control.” Of course, in doing so, in the experiment it is necessary to detect the existence of the contours themselves as well. But such a hypothesis, at the least, sets the parameters of the supposed experiment.

The notions of V. V. Gulenko about Model “A” are sufficiently distinctive for his interpretation of Model “A” to be considered his own model — model “G.” Above all, V. V. Gulenko does not acknowledge the grounding of the model that Aušra proposed. “Unfortunately, Aušra derived her scheme rather metaphysically — by way of speculative reasonings on the theme of the physical picture of the world, using natural-scientific (kinetic and potential energy) and even mechanical (the four-stroke engine) analogies” [6]. And further: “In any case, in investigating the psyche, one can dispense with natural-scientific rhetoric about space, time, substance, and energy.”

V. V. Gulenko is a many-sided thinker, and in his various works he proposes several different approaches to the grounding of Model “A,” but, in fact, this is always an attempt to replace it with model “G.” In one of his articles [6] he tries to lean on the ideas of the American sociologist T. Parsons. Properly speaking, he takes from him the so-called “system prerequisites,” representing empirical generalizations of the functional side of communicative systems and reducing to four functions: adaptation, integration, goal-attainment, and self-preservation. The set of these categories, despite the authority of T. Parsons, cannot be evaluated otherwise than as more or less random, since there are no proofs whatsoever that this set is necessary, sufficient, complete, and non-contradictory. Therefore the assertion that these categories represent functionally necessary conditions has no sufficient grounds under it, although it does present a definite historical interest. In addition, investigations of the independence of the empirically found categories are absent. Moreover, it is not difficult to show that these categories are not ultimate in their subject domain and can be decomposed and transformed into a more regular set. Thus, the function of adaptation can be presented as a complex, multi-step process, including within itself the stage of the perception of the environment, of the reaction to its influence, of the formation of an internal model of the environment, and of effective functioning in this environment ensuring feedback. The function of integration is, properly speaking, one of the sides of systemness, and therefore there is no sense in tearing it away from the other system-forming factors. The function of goal-attainment is a derivative of survival, as a more fundamental function. The function of self-preservation is also only an aspect of the function of survival. Therefore there is no sense in substituting, for the attempt at a fundamental thermodynamic grounding of the model by Aušra Augustinavičiūtė, a reliance on a more or less subjective set of concepts.

As for V. V. Gulenko’s understanding of the semantics of the rings and blocks and of the character of the movement of information, then, as far as I understand it, of Aušra there remain here only the eight positions arranged in the form of a 2×4 matrix. Let us consider the following statement of V. V. Gulenko: “If one uses Aušra’s definitions, then the first position of the model contains the potential energy of the type, the second carries out the transformation of potential energy into kinetic, the third position is nothing other than the carrier of the momentarily consumed kinetic energy, and the fourth performs the function of the transformation of kinetic energy into potential — as it were, it pumps up the first position, closing the ring” [6]. The point is that Aušra counts from an entirely different function than V. V. Gulenko does, and therefore the reference adduced is no more than an attempt to “use Aušra’s definitions.”

Fig. 4.00a. Model “A” with attachment to the environment. 1986 redaction.

I (3/1)	l (4/1)
e (2/1)	S (1/1)
E (2/2)	s (1/2)
i (3/2)	L (4/2)

(with the environment [Среда] closing the contour)

Fig. 4.00b. Model “A” in the 1986 redaction — the same arrangement without the environment shown.

The mental ring in model “G” is called the ring of stabilization, and the vital the ring of development. Aušra does not have this. V. V. Gulenko argues these names with references to Parsons and Merton, but what he obtains as a result differs strongly from what Aušra Augustinavičiūtė speaks of. Probably, V. V. Gulenko has the right to call everything as he pleases, but what does Model “A” have to do with it?

The reasonings of V. V. Gulenko permit one to understand why in his model a definite numbering of the functions is adopted. It appears that in some way this numbering presupposes a linear transmission of information from the first (according to Gulenko) function to the eighth. In doing so, the strangest-looking is the transition from the fourth (according to Gulenko) function to the fifth — that is, from the function of least resistance to the function of expectation. In any case, the interpretation of Model “A” by V. V. Gulenko does not take into account the principled supposition of Aušra Augustinavičiūtė that “the homogeneous parallel elements located in the active and passive ring — S and s, L and l, and so on — function simultaneously” [2], and not sequentially.

The hypothesis of Aušra Augustinavičiūtė looks somewhat different. Aušra begins with model “J,” as maximally approximated to the notions of C. G. Jung about the structure and functioning of the human psyche. Jung’s ideas were based on enormous clinical experience and, thus, leaned on empirical data, and were by no means the product of arbitrary metaphysical creativity, as the positivists wish to present it.

Aušra Augustinavičiūtė somewhat transformed Jung’s model. Above all, in model “J” she refined the semantics of the two functions that Jung had designated simply as auxiliary. And, in addition, to the model itself she matched the second-signal processing of information — that is, operations on informational flows presented in linguistic form. It is precisely in this sense that one can speak of the consciousness of this process, since words can be fully fixed and reproduced, and on their syntactically and semantically correct aggregates one can perform linguistic and logical transformations, which, presumably, is precisely what occurs in the conscious process of thinking.

Having folded the resulting group of functions into a ring and having changed the vertedness¹² of the third function, Aušra closed the ring onto the external environment, having built a contour with feedback (fig. 4.00a). In this case the information arriving from outside is “mentalized” — transformed into a thought, into a mental model — and is verbalized, that is, expressed in words in the form of a linguistic model. For this the input information passes sequential processing by the four functions of this ring and, in processed form, is put out into the external environment. The generalized reaction of the external environment to the mental product of the psyche can be regarded as one of the links of the feedback establishing itself between the psyche and the habitat. A simplified depiction of this model is presented in fig. 4.00b.

Here it is important to take into account that for the human being the habitat has a principally twofold character: first, it is the natural environment, representing a definite geographical and climatic zone; and, second, it is the social environment with its hierarchy, morality, means of encouragement and compulsion. However, the generalized description of the environment in which the subject of the psyche dwells has a synthetic character. In this case, the environment represents not a heap of inert material objects, but is perceived as flexible, mobile, and even animated. Therefore the verbal projection of the internal model of the potential possibilities of the environment can be regarded in two ways. First, as the concluding moment of the feedback cycle, representing a rationalization — that is, a grounded comprehension of the irrational¹³ situation of the subject of the psyche. Second, as a communicative act directed at the communication, the transmission, of the obtained mental product to the subjective component of the environment or, in the simplest case, to other people. But this same process, the return of the reaction into the habitat, can also be understood as orientational activity, having no materialized¹⁴ product but concluding with the refinement of the subjective model of the environment — an introverted product. In this case the communicative process in the form of verbal communication with other people can also be understood¹⁵ as the refinement of the model of the world, but here the subject turns out to be no longer the individual person, but a group of people or even the whole of humanity as a whole.

However, one of the sides of the brilliant intuition of Aušra Augustinavičiūtė consists in the fact that she managed to put into correspondence with the first-signal influence of the external environment a second-signal processing of this influence, isomorphic to it, in the mental ring, and a first-signal processing, parallel to it, in the vital ring. This parallel work is performed by functions of the same name as the functions of the mental ring, but with the opposite vertedness. In this process the informational flow beginning in the external environment is given form by sensations, emotions, needs, the physical tension of the musculature, and real actions. According to the thought of Aušra Augustinavičiūtė, these two flows work in parallel, and not sequentially, as some socionists represent it. Closing onto the external environment, these two flows form two rings with feedback between the psyche and the external environment [1].

Above all, let us say something about the external form of Model “A.” The way Aušra depicted it represents only one of the possible two-dimensional projections of the corresponding structure. But there exists also a three-dimensional projection of it, exactly corresponding to what Aušra called the “half-stroke cube” (fig. 4.08), presented by her in The Theory of Reinin’s Traits.

Fig. 4.08. The half-stroke cube, representing a three-dimensional projection of the model of the psyche.

In contradistinction to the flat model, the half-stroke cube (HC) far more vividly presents the mathematical structure of the object hidden behind it — it alone can replace all sixteen models of the TIMs, and it does not mask the presence of the vertical connections existing between the functions of the mental and vital ring. Let us note also that these connections unite the functions with extraverted aspects and the corresponding introverted ones into distinctive dipoles. This returns us to Aušra’s idea that the functions of the mental and vital ring work in parallel. They merely give form, in different “vertedness,” to one and the same informational-psychic flows and complexes. It is understandable that although the flat model of a TIM is convenient for depicting it on a sheet of paper, all the same it introduces the inevitable distortions characteristic of the transition from three-dimensional projections, and projections of still greater dimensionality, to two-dimensional ones — which may be one of the sources of its incorrect interpretation.

Regarding the HC as the model of the ILE (Il), we must identify the vertex I with the program-potential function (PPF), the vertex l with the communicative-probing function, and so on. Then the upper face of the HC — IlSe — will represent the mental ring, and the lower — iLsE — the vital.

Placing the PPF on the vertex l and going around the upper face clockwise, we shall have the projection of the model of the LSI, or, in archetypal designations, lS. Continuing to shift the numbering of the vertices of the upper base clockwise, we obtain the models of the SEE (Se), and then of the EII (eI). If, however, one changes the direction of the circuit of the vertices to the opposite, one can obtain the projections of the models of the IEE (Ie), ESI (Es), SLE (Sl), and LII (lI). In an analogous way one can obtain the projections of the models of all the remaining TIMs, but for this one must turn the HC over so as to make the lower base the upper one, and correspondingly change the attachment of the PPF.

Such a representation of the socionic model of the psyche gives the possibility of looking in a completely new way at the connection among the models of the individual TIMs and of seeing that they represent something single and whole, and differ only by the displacement of functional accents. Moreover, the HC can be regarded as a maximally folded model of the socion, which, when necessary, can be unfolded and presented in more detail, as is done, for example, in the Square of Churyumov, the Cube of Shulman, the Polyhedra of Litrovnik, and others.

To emphasize the parallelism of the work of the complementary functions of the model,¹⁶ it is convenient to use a flat projection of the model in which the mental and vital rings are unfolded into two vertical parallel strips, as shown below on the example of the model of the ILE (Il) (fig. 4.09).

Fig. 4.09. A socionic model of aligned rings.

Mental	Vital
I (1f)	i (7f)
l (2f)	L (8f)
S (3f)	s (5f)
e (4f)	E (6f)

Here the unnaturalness of the numbering of the functions immediately draws attention to itself (this numbering was proposed by V. V. Gulenko), and there arises the idea of the relativity of any numbering in general, since the functions in themselves have no numbers and can only be ordered depending on the task the researcher sets himself. For the proposed representation of the model, a more natural look would be had by the numbering introduced in the model presented below. In such a case the numbering reflects the supposition that the extraverted and introverted variants of one and the same IA work in parallel, representing two hypostases, two components, of one and the same action — the mental and the vital — which can be understood as the actual necessity and the potential possibility of the transformation of a mental act into an action. Here it is appropriate to recall Sechenov’s thought that any mental act concludes with muscular tension and action. Of course, thought and action can not only be separated in time and space, but many thoughts may never be realized at all; however, their bodily mapping all the same takes place, if only in the form of micromotor tensions of the musculature.

Proceeding from what has been said, in the model of aligned rings one can propose another, alternative numbering, reflecting the “parasynchronicity” of the work of the corresponding functions of the mental and vital rings (see fig. 4.10).

Fig. 4.10. A socionic model of aligned rings with changed numbering.

Mental	Vital
I (1f)	i (2f)
l (3f)	L (4f)
S (5f)	s (6f)
e (7f)	E (8f)

In such a representation of Model “A” — if one holds that the model begins to function with the unfolding, demonstration, or actualization of the programs that are the product of the PPF — the seventh function (in the designations adopted in the Kyiv school), parallel to the first, can be interpreted as the imperative structuring of time, or the imperative expenditures of time necessary for the introduction of the programs into life and their further realization. This can be commented on as follows: since the life programs have been worked out, they will be introduced into life; and since time is necessary for this, this time will be found and will be expended.

The second (“Kyiv-style”) function, designated here as 3f, in this case can be understood as the communicative presentation of the programs that are the prerogative of the first function. This presentation is complementary to the formation of the technological sequence of actions¹⁷ with the corresponding product, determined by the semantics and informational filling of the eighth (“Kyiv-style”) function, which in the representation of the model under consideration is located parallel to the second and is designated as 4f.

However, the realization of the base programs of the individual requires their sensory-forceful support, while their technological materialization is impossible without provisioning with energetic and material resources, which corresponds to the parallel work of the third and fifth functions in the designations of the Kyiv school, or of the fifth and sixth in the designations of the “aligned” model.

The closing link, with such an understanding of the work of the model, will be, in the mental ring, the fourth (“Kyiv-style”) function and, parallel to it, the sixth (“Kyiv-style”) function, designated in this model as 7f and 8f. Here the fourth (“Kyiv-style”) function expresses the subject’s evaluation of the result of his activity. The sixth (“Kyiv-style”) function parallel to it, connected with the emotional reaction, expresses the emotional satisfaction or dissatisfaction of the subject. The sixth function in this case can also be understood as the level of the emotional-energetic filledness of the subject in the case of successful functioning and the attainment of goals, or, correspondingly, of emotional-energetic deficit in the case of failure. It is not excluded that, by virtue of the high level of abstraction of the model, other variants of the interpretation of the processes that occur in the psyche may also exist.

Let us note also that the interpretation of the work of the model adduced above relates to all TIMs, but in each individual case is given form in accordance with the character of the IA standing in the places of the concrete functions. This assertion leans on the hypothesis [23] of the coincidence of the semantics of the functions of Model “A” with the semantics of the symbols of the IA attached to the functions of the model of the ILE (Il).

Still, the description of the work of the model adduced above, while quite plausible, may seem artificial — which, incidentally, may be explained by an imprecise or inadequate interpretation of the socionic symbolics.

If in the model “of aligned rings” one changes the order of succession of the functions, as shown in fig. 4.11, then the description of the work of the model turns out to be significantly more natural — which, incidentally, does not necessarily guarantee its uniqueness. A description of Model “A” close to this was given by Aušra Augustinavičiūtė [1].

Fig. 4.11. The model of aligned rings with a changed order of the functions.

Mental	Vital
S (3f)	s (5f)
e (4f)	E (6f)
I (1f)	i (7f)
l (2f)	L (8f)

In this model the input functions are 3f and 5f (in the “Kyiv” designations) — the sensory input of the system, through which the environment exerts influence on the psyche, on the internal world of the subject. This influence is processed by functions 4 and 6, forming the mental (critical, “relational”) and vital (emotional) reactions of the psyche. Under the influence of these reactions, on 1f are worked out programs of possible behavior taking into account the peculiarities of the surrounding environment, while on 7f, simultaneously, a set toward the character of the structuring of time is formed. By virtue of the repressed (vital) character of this function, the formed set acquires imperative properties, which unambiguously determines where and on what the individual will spend his time.

The last stroke in this cycle is the output, the influence on the environment through 2f and 8f. The second function “presents,” represents the programs formed on the first function, and thereby subjects them to checking and refinement; while the eighth function puts out into the environment a real product corresponding to its informational filling, and thereby closes the vital ring of feedback and creates the conditions for the next stroke of the influence of the environment on the fifth function, which awaits from the environment resource reinforcement.

Approximately thus did Aušra describe her model in its canonical variant. In accordance with such a description she also assigned the numbers to the functions. If the proposed model is corrected by restoring Aušra’s numbering, one obtains the form presented in fig. 4.12.

Fig. 4.12. The model of aligned rings with the natural order of the functions according to Aušra.

Mental	Vital
S (1.1f)	s (1.2f)
e (2.1f)	E (2.2f)
I (3.1f)	i (3.2f)
l (4.1f)	L (4.2f)

In this model the dominant of the TIM — its program function — turns out to be not in the first but in the third place, which appears to be a certain contradiction, though one that nonetheless bears a formal character. However, if one understands the dominant of the TIM as the functional extremum of subjectivity, then it is quite natural that it attains its maximum only after some preliminary work has been done.

Let us recall that an arrangement of the functions in the model close to this was used by certain socionists to illustrate their own view of the work of the psyche. Thus the Moscow socionist V. Alekseev proposed his own variant of the model, where the horizontal blocks were filled with IA of one name but different vertedness. For example, the model of the SLE (Sl) looked as presented in fig. 4.13.

Fig. 4.13. Alekseev’s model for Zhukov (Sl).

S (+1f)	s (−1f)
l (+2f)	L (−2f)
E (+3f)	e (−3f)
i (+4f)	I (−4f)

It appears that Alekseev proceeded from the proposition worked out in psychoanalysis that to a conscious function corresponds the unconscious one repressed by it. The first function he called specialized, defining it as the most developed function of reaction to input and output along the corresponding IA. He said — if I have understood him correctly — that if a specialized function is singled out, then the one opposed to it is naturally repressed into the subconscious. Such a repressed function in the SLE (Sl), as far as I understood, he considered to be intuition. Here is what the semantics of the functions looks like according to Alekseev.

The first function (+1) answers for perception. Conjugate with the first function in this model is operative memory (−1), which can be understood in the sense that for the work of the specialized function an intensive exchange with operative memory is necessary.

The second (+2) function here is auxiliary-adaptational and serves for the formation of hypotheses. Conjugate with it is the standard (−2) function, serving as the base for the comparison of newly arising situations with what has already been accumulated thanks to experience.

The third function (+3) is the function of standards, and conjugate with it is the heuristic one (−3), which switches on when experience turns out to be insufficient and a discovery is necessary.

The fourth (+4) function is the function of pleasure, and with it is conjugate the stress function (−4), processing information that evokes displeasure, irritates, oppresses, leads to a breakdown of mood.

According to this model, the process of the work of a definite cycle in the psyche begins with the perception of information along +1f, which is then accumulated in operative memory (−1). This process bears a reflexive character. If in the developing situation this is insufficient, the adaptational +2f switches on, as the result of which hypotheses are created, based on the material supplied by the standard −2f. If, however, the available standards turn out to be insufficient, which is checked by the standards function (+3), then the heuristic −3f switches on, as the result of which a way out of the difficult position may be found, and this will be fixed by the function of pleasure (+4). If, however, a way out is not found, then the stress function (−4) will switch on, which either will begin to destroy the whole system or will entail the mobilization of all possibilities in order to overcome the arisen difficulties. The scheme proposed by V. Alekseev does not contradict contemporary notions about the work of cybernetic devices of the self-organizing-systems type, to which, apparently, living creatures also belong. However, this scheme corresponds to the engineering level of generalization, where, for example, it is important to single out the area of operative memory, to provide for the existence of standards and the presence of a heuristic function, which must ensure behavior in non-standard conditions. Of course, all this can be transferred onto living creatures too, in order to understand them at least somehow; but everything is exactly the other way around — it is the example of living creatures that compels engineers to seek technical solutions capable of at least somehow imitating the behavior of the living. In Alekseev’s model, I personally do not understand how the semantics of the functions is connected with the archetypes to which the symbols of the designations point.

If, all the same, one proceeds from the formedness of the subject and his activity in influencing the environment (which is by no means obligatory), then as the first function one must take his program function; and in this case one can build a linear process of transition from function to function, and then one can unfold the whole model into a single chain — a column or a row, as shown in figs. 4.14 and 4.15.

Fig. 4.14. A linear model of the TIM (column): I (1f), l (2f), S (3f), e (4f), s (5f), E (6f), i (7f), L (8f).

Such a model, it seems, is significantly more difficult to describe in objective terms; but since in it the activity of the subject, his readiness to enter into contact with the environment, is put in first place, the accent too must be made on subjectivity.

1f — the programs present and formed, the internal sets, goals, intentions; that which determines the life position of the subject, his leading typological peculiarities and potential possibilities.

2f — the subject represents his programs, his goals and intentions, demonstrates his potential possibilities, awaits their evaluation on the part of the environment.

3f — sensory-volitional mobilization, the attraction of the maximally effective means existing and admissible in the given environment for use by the concrete TIM.

4f — the detection of the problem zone, the elimination of limitations and barriers, or else the evaluation of one’s own behavior from the point of view of moral-ethical norms.

5f — the designation of the resource and the need for the resource necessary for the full-fledged functioning of the TIM.

6f — the need for emotional-energetic support; the designation and choice of a real or idealized customer (for whom it will be done — this is a symbolic expression of socialization).

7f — the structuring of time, the setting of deadlines, concentratedness on the fulfillment of the task, the solution of the problem.

8f — the direct, physical embodiment, the realization of plans and the obtaining of the final product.

Another linear scheme of the functioning of the model was also proposed (model “V” — Vaisband).

Fig. 4.15. A linear model of the TIM (row): s (1f) – E (2f) – l (3f) – I (4f) – e (5f) – S (6f) – i (7f) – L (8f).

• s — the wolf sees the hare, the goat sees the cabbage — the sensory phase.
• E — its emotional-energetic system becomes excited.
• l — the centers answering for the processing of objective information evaluate the distance and the other spatial parameters necessary for the seizure of the target.
• I — the centers answering for the formation of the model of the environment refine the strategy of attaining the goal and work out concrete programs for taking possession of the observed object.
• e — the situation is evaluated from the point of view of possible consequences — that is, above all, whether this is good for survival.
• S — in accordance with the preceding step, volitional resolve is formed.
• i — time is allotted for the fulfillment of the formed programs.
• L — the technological chain is launched, directed at taking possession of the object and its utilization.

Well, a quite plausible scheme, but, of course, anyone who wishes can find in it a mass of shortcomings and propose his own. I shall not go into a detailed evaluation of this scheme, but shall make only one, and at that a purely formal, remark. In this model the alternation of the rational and irrational links of the psychological process has the form: ir, ra, ra, ir, ra, ir, ir, ra. Probably such a functional pattern is possible, but it requires its own theoretical grounding.

Special mention must be made of the sixteen-component model of A. Bukalov (model “B”). As far as I understand, it is a reaction to V. V. Gulenko’s introduction of signs of the functions. Possibly, sensing the unbalancedness of model “G” with signs, A. V. Bukalov supplemented it with a parallel structure, so that each function would be present in the model with both signs. And this, at least theoretically, is plausible. With the help of this model A. V. Bukalov proposed interesting explanations of the mechanisms of extraversion and introversion. In flat projection this model is presented in figure 4.16.

Fig. 4.16. The four-dimensional half-stroke cube of Bukalov, representing model “B” — each of the eight functions doubled with the ”+” and ”−” sign.

I consider that no signs whatsoever should be ascribed to the functions, but if one is to ascribe them, then in the way A. V. Bukalov does it. In his model all the functions are equally endowed with positive and negative signs.

An interesting improvisation in connection with Model “A” is given by A. Zaitsev [4]. However, since he came out with a venomous and, it appears, malicious criticism of my attempts to make sense of his constructions, I shall not analyze his work, and refer those who wish to acquaint themselves with his article to the journal SMiPL No. 3 for 1999.

An original model of the TIM was proposed by I. Kalinauskas, a talented and deep psychologist who has done much for the popularization of socionics. However, for various reasons, a brief analysis of this model I place not here, but in the chapter “The Inevitability of Methodology.”

Let us also turn our attention to the deep ideas of S. Shteinikov, which he repeatedly expressed at socionic seminars and conferences. He elaborated an original configuration of the model, at whose foundation is placed the notion of a four-phase natural cycle, realized, according to the author’s thought, in many (if not all) natural phenomena, beginning with the sexual act and ending with the eruption of a volcano. In free exposition this cycle can be presented in the form of four stages, as beginning with the potential possibility of the development of some phenomenon, event, or object.

Further, this possibility passes into the stage of unfolding and realization, naturally concluding with a certain result. The last, fourth stage, or phase, of this cycle is a certain transitional process of the after-effect of the accomplished result, a certain informational halo arising around the event that has taken place. For example, as the author says of this, in human practice to this phase may correspond the experience acquired as the result of passing through the first three phases. It is precisely this notion of the natural four-phase cycle that the author consistently carries through in the description of the work of his model of the psyche.

This model [5], just like Model “A,” consists of a mental and a vital ring (see fig. 4.17), but in contradistinction to Model “A,” each of these rings contains eight functions, grouped into blocks of two. In the mental ring are located the blocks Ego, AntiEgo, SuperEgo, and ControlEgo (the terms are given in the author’s spelling), and in the vital, correspondingly — SuperVit, StartVit, StimulVit, AutoVit.

Fig. 4.17. Shteinikov’s model for the ESI — a mental ring of blocks (Ego, ControlEgo, AntiEgo, SuperEgo) and a vital ring of blocks (SuperVit, StartVit, StimulVit, AutoVit), each of two functions.

In Shteinikov’s model (henceforth “Sh”) the input function is the fifth, which is not difficult to understand, since it is the suggestive one. However, the further movement of information in the model — 7→6→8→1→3→4 — undoubtedly stands in need of special grounding.

However, despite the heuristically rich initial thought placed at the foundation of model “Sh,” its terminological formulation seems overcomplicated. Still, let us hope to read a more detailed description of this model in the execution of the author himself.

The survey of the various approaches to the understanding of Model “A” and of the numerous attempts at its further development shows that the process of the formation of the conception of Model “A” continues; that scientists, proceeding from their practical experience of work with people and their methodological baggage, discover new possibilities of the representation of the human psyche in the form of a model. One can also propose not only other configurations of the model, but also notions, differing somewhat from those existing at the present time, about the character of the work of the functions of the model.

As early as the conference in Vilnius in 1991, I drew the attention of socionists to the fact that in Model “A” its four horizontal blocks represent the socionic radicals of four TIMs: the EGO block corresponds to the identity relation (Id), the SUPEREGO block corresponds to the superego relation (Se), the SUPERID block corresponds to the dual relation (Du) — this was always a most important moment in the descriptions of the work of the model that Aušra Augustinavičiūtė gave [1] — and the ID block corresponds to the relation of full opposition (Op). At that same time I posed the question of the representation in the model of all the other relations, and proposed a corresponding model in which the radicals of all TIMs and all relations were represented (model “Ch”). But this model was received without particular enthusiasm — apparently, above all, because of its relatively large size, since all sixteen radicals entered into it. Subsequently this model was worked through and presented in a more developed form at the XI socionic conference. However, already at the conference in Vilnius I drew attention to the fact that Model “A” can be construed not only as a mapping of the sequential and parallel processing of the informational flow by functions and rings, but also as a mapping of the contact of the psychic structure of the personality bearing a definite TIM with the corresponding structures of the psyche of the bearers of other TIMs. Aušra Augustinavičiūtė showed this side of the work of Model “A” splendidly on the example of dualization, but she also said that she directly feels the connecting-up to herself — in the form of a light physical touch on a definite section of the surface of the body — of the bearer of any other TIM.

All this led me to the thought that the model can also be understood as a mapping of the structure of the readiness of the psyche to enter into contact not only with a concrete bearer of another TIM, but in general to react to one or another variety of informational flow. Thus, as yet another alternative understanding of the work of the model, there is the notion of the blocks as structural units of the psyche tuned to the direct (and not mediated — that is, through other functions and blocks) processing of information going not only from another person, the bearer of a definite TIM, but connected with any situation that may arise in the environment surrounding a person. In accordance with such a notion, in Model “A” one can single out not four but sixteen blocks, as was done in model “Ch” in unfolded form. However, Model “A” in compact form represents all sixteen blocks, which are easily detected by uniting the functions in twos in a sequential circuit of each of the rings clockwise and counterclockwise (fig. 4.18).

Fig. 4.18. The representation of Model “A” as an aggregate of sixteen radicals expressing the relations of the given TIM. (Marker key: Id — identity; Mr — mirror; Du — dual; Ac — activation; Kn — kindred; Bu — business; Sd — semi-dual; Mg — mirage; Qi — quasi-identity; Cf — conflict; Se — superego; Op — full opposition; Or — order given; Ro — order received; Cn — control given; Rc — control received.)

Such a representation can be understood thus: through the EGO block the given TIM interacts with the identical (Id) — or with a situation corresponding to its EGO block. But through this same block, activated counter clockwise, this same TIM interacts with the mirror TIM, or with a situation whose semantics is “mirror” with respect to the semantics of the ego block. All the remaining elements of the proposed representation of Model “A” are read analogously.

Let us now consider the model that I proposed in 1990 at the conference in Vilnius and which I called the full model of the TIM. It can also be called the unfolded model of the TIM, since in folded form it is fully contained, as I showed above, in Model “A.” This model is easy to obtain if the blocks marked in fig. 4.18 are arranged one under another in the order corresponding to the arrangement of the TIMs in the socion, as shown in table 4.02. Thus the model consists of four rings of four blocks each.

Table 4.02. Specification of the unfolded Model “A”

Ring of the ego, or the exposition of the TIM

(Id)	Block of identification — is actualized on contact with the identical or with an “identical” situation.
(Du)	Block of dualization — is actualized on contact with the dual or with a “dual” situation.
(Ac)	Block of activation — is actualized on contact with the activator or with an “activating” situation.
(Mr)	Block of mirror reflection — is actualized on contact with the mirror partner or with a “mirror” situation.

Ring of the superid, or the mobilization of the TIM

(Or)	Block of the order-recipient relation — is actualized on contact with the customer (order-giver) or with an “ordering” situation.
(Cn)	Block of the controlled relation — is actualized on contact with the controller or with a “controlling” situation.
(Bu)	Block of the business relation — is actualized on contact with the business partner or with a “business” situation.
(Mg)	Block of the mirage relation — is actualized on contact with the mirage partner or with a “mirage” situation.

Ring of the id, or the goal-setting of the TIM

(Qi)	Block of the quasi-identical relation — is actualized on contact with the quasi-identical or with a “quasi-identical” situation.
(Cf)	Block of the conflict relation — is actualized on contact with the conflictor or with a “conflict” situation.
(Se)	Block of the superego relation — is actualized on contact with the superego partner or with a “superego” situation.
(Op)	Block of the relation of full opposition — is actualized on contact with the partner of full opposition or with a situation of “full opposition.”

Ring of the superego, or the realization of the TIM

(Kn)	Block of the kindred relation — is actualized on contact with the kindred partner or with a “kindred” situation.
(Sd)	Block of the semi-dual relation — is actualized on contact with the semi-dual or with a “semi-dual” situation.
(Ro)	Block of the order relation — is actualized on contact with the order-recipient partner or with a situation of “order-reception.”
(Rc)	Block of the control relation — is actualized on contact with the controlled partner or with a “controlled” situation.

The ring of the EGO can be understood as an aggregate of functions whose common function is self-identification. Through the block of self-identification (Id) the TIM declares its existence and its distinctiveness. Through the block of dualization (Du) the TIM supplements the whole existing world, as if declaring by its presence that it has come into this world in order to make it fuller. Through the block of activation (Ac) the TIM actively includes itself in the being of the world, doing so itself and impelling others to do so. Through the block of mirrorness (Mr) the TIM in a specific way maps the environment of its existence, builds its internal model, and is opposed to it as subject to object. This ring can also be called the ring of the exposition of the TIM, since within its framework the bearer of the TIM in full measure presents to the world and gives form to his programs. In one’s own quadra the process of self-identification is accomplished.

The ring of the SUPERID can be understood as the aggregate of the requirements that the TIM presents to the surrounding world. Through the block of the order (Or) the TIM transmits into the environment of its existence information about what it needs. Through the block of control (Cn) the TIM declares what does not suit it in this world. Through the block of business relations (Bu) the TIM demands the possibility of collaborating on equal terms with the agents of this world. Through the block of mirageness (Mg) the TIM demands the granting to it of the necessary freedom. This ring can also be called the ring of the mobilization of the TIM, since within its framework the bearer of the TIM passes from the potential form of the representation of his programs into the active form, bringing his resources into working readiness.

The ring of the ID can be understood as that which fully opposes the TIM and as that in which the TIM must realize itself. Through the block of quasi-identity (Qi) the TIM strives to take into account that which, in accordance with its metaprograms, it lacks. Through the block of conflict (Cf) the TIM enters into open confrontation with the environment, trying to affirm itself, but at the same time discovers that it is not alone in the world, and that, if its goal is harmony, then it must learn to find a positive way out of conflict situations. Through the block of the SUPEREGO (Se) the TIM points out to the world its shortcomings and simultaneously receives information about its own shortcomings, and moreover in a very acute form, as a reproach from the position of its own conscience. Through the block of full opposition (Op) the TIM learns of the existence of still greater differences from itself than in all the preceding cases. To change oneself fully, to go to the very end, to pass through everything — is this not the ideal of self-perfection? This ring can also be called the ring of the goal-setting of the TIM, since within its framework the bearer of the TIM unfolds and determines his nearest goals as the radical transformation of himself and of his immediate surroundings.

The ring of the SUPEREGO can be understood as the aggregate of functions with whose help the bearer of the TIM learns of the requirements that the surrounding world, and above all the environment of his habitation, presents to him. Through the block of kindred relations (perhaps these relations would better be called semi-identical) the TIM learns that its first function can be used in a principally different way. Through the block of semi-duality (Sd) the TIM is provided with the resource it needs, but at the same time certain requirements are presented to it. Through the block of order-reception, the surrounding environment expresses its wishes with respect to the TIM. Through the block of controlledness (Rc) the TIM learns of the requirements that the world, and above all the surrounding environment, presents to it. This ring can also be called the ring of the realization of the TIM, since within its framework the bearer of the TIM, having taken into account the requirements of the environment, completes the working cycle, having restored equilibrium with the environment.

Table 4.03

Ring of the EGO: Il — block of identification; sE — block of dualization; Es — block of activation; lI — block of the mirror relation.

Ring of the SUPERID: Ei — block of the transmission of the order; lS — block of the transmission of control; Sl — block of business relations; iE — block of mirage relations.

Ring of the ID: Li — block of quasi-identity; eS — block of conflict relations (Cf); Se — block of the superego (Se); iL — block of full opposition (Op).

Ring of the SUPEREGO: Ie — block of semi-identification (Kn); sL — block of semi-dual relations (Sd); Ls — block of the reception of the order (Ro); eI — block of the reception of control (Rc).

The proposed interpretation of the model of the psyche can also be understood as a program of individual development, which was in no way accentuated in the reading of Model “A.” Thus one can speak of sixteen stages of the development of the personality.

• Id — the “embryo of the personality,” its potential possibilities.
• Du — dual adjustment to the environment, upbringing.
• Ac — activational adjustment to the environment.
• Mr — mirror adjustment, the construction of an image of the environment, normative learning.
• Or — the formation and awareness of positive requirements to the environment.
• Cn — the formation and awareness of negative requirements to the environment.
• Bu — collaboration with the environment on equal terms.
• Mg — the awareness of the concept of freedom and of its necessity.
• Qi — the formation of an ideal image of the I.
• Cf — the overcoming of conflict with the environment at the level of programs.
• Se — the overcoming of conflict with the environment at the level of metaprograms.
• Op — the exit onto the level of other-being.
• Kn — the change of the stereotypical repertoire, the change of image.
• Sd — the conscious harmonization of relations with the environment.
• Ro — the returning of debts to the surrounding environment.
• Rc — the exit onto the level of understanding the necessity of submitting to the laws of the environment.

Substituting for the symbols of the relations the EGO blocks of the corresponding TIMs, we obtain the representation of the unfolded model of the TIM given in table 4.03. Below is adduced a more detailed description of the functions of the blocks.

Ring of the EGO: the thematics of self-identification.

(Id) — the function of identification: the process of self-identification. Identity, the area of competence, the subsystem of the EGO. With the help of this function the socionic substructure of the psyche detects, reveals, establishes identical structures and elements in the psychic environment connected with the real bearers of other (including identical) TIMs; it helps to detect the identical partner (the effect of “a fisherman spots a fisherman from afar”). This function answers the question: “What do we have in common, in what are we similar?” One of its manifestations is the accumulation and increase of identity, which, upon the violation of balance, upon exit beyond the limits of the harmonious measure, may lead to an excessive raising of the level of entropy in the summary system or in the supersystem. A concrete manifestation of such a process may be the increase of identical elements in the habitat, the raising of the level of equality of social units, the overpopulation of the environment by representatives of one type, the lowering of the value of hierarchical structural connections, the degeneration of the habitat (the “frog-spawn” effect). To this also relates the theme of cloning and of a brigade of identicals.

On establishing contact with the surrounding environment, the system performs its scanning, in order to establish with what parameters, circumstances, “devices,” and the like it will have to deal. The block of identification begins this work.

(Du) — the function of dualization, duality, the subsystem of the superid, requirements to society, the necessity of understanding: With the help of this function the socionic substructure of the psyche realizes a soft (comfortable) adjustment not only to the representative of another TIM, above all the dual one, but also to any objects of the immediate surroundings, the microenvironment, and of distant sections of the world, the macroenvironment. This is a block of soft adaptation of the type “if the mountain will not come to Muhammad, then Muhammad goes to the mountain.” This block helps to complete, to supplement the existing system in such a way that it becomes functionally complete at the socionic level of existence.

THE CONCEPT OF FUNCTIONAL COMPLETENESS can be defined in the following way: A SYSTEM IS FUNCTIONALLY COMPLETE IF THE SET OF FUNCTIONS AT ITS DISPOSAL IS SUFFICIENT TO REACT EFFECTIVELY TO ANY INFLUENCES THAT THE ENVIRONMENT MAY EXERT ON THE SYSTEM.

The concept of functional completeness should be connected with a definite level of functioning, since at different levels of functioning there exists a different quantity of possible influences. Thus, at the very highest level of the generalization of functioning, the environment exerts on the system a single integrated influence, and the single generalized function of the system in this case is survival. Thus, at this level the system is functionally complete if it survives. Dualization helps to increase the specific effectiveness of one or another system at the expense of unloading it from the performance of its weakly specialized functions. It can help restore energetics. It forms the rear.

Dualization, like all the other relations, has its working zone, within whose limits dualization is effective, and outside of which the functioning of a system of two dualized elements becomes ineffective. The working zone of a relation can be determined by criteria of effectiveness. Thus, for example, in a dualized married couple the well-being of the spouses may be so comfortable that they will have no stimuli for personal development, career, the expansion of the zone of being — in short, their life will turn into a swamp and stagnation, though, possibly, a pleasant and comfortable one.

In a broader sense, dualization consists in the functional expansion and closure of the system. When a new system appears in the world, it expands its nomenclature, makes it fuller (in the most general sense). Such a system says, as it were, that the world without it would be incomplete, and it has come into it in order to supplement it and make it more whole. The reverse side of this situation is that any system without the rest of the world would also be incomplete, and the world supplements it to integrality.

From the point of view of the individual person, the question can also be posed in the same way: the person supplements the world, and the world supplements the person, and this process can continue one’s whole life.

(Ac) — the function of harmonious activation, joint creativity. With the help of this function the socionic substructure of the psyche comfortably mobilizes the energetics of other elements and components of the environment, activating it and directing it in a definite direction, and in doing so is itself adequately activated. An example here can be the raising of livestock or plants, where, besides the creative process of breeding new breeds and species, there is the development of definite mental abilities of the one who occupies himself with this.

I have come into this world in order to give it a new impulse. The world activates me — it all the time places me in situations from which one must seek an effective way out.

(Mr) — the function of reflection with minimal distortions, mirrorness, exactingness in friendship, objective criticism. With the help of this function the socionic substructure of the psyche builds a positive or negative interpretation of a message arriving from the partner, the surrounding environment, or arbitrary objects, with minimal distortions, thanks to which the system consisting of the transmitter and the receiver of the message can develop, perfect, restructure, or criticize the ideas contained in this message. In order to act effectively in this world, I must adequately reflect it, know it, cognize it. With the help of this function the reflection of the world is realized and its internal model is built.

Ring of the SUPERID: I present my requirements to the world; I need the world to be convenient for me.

(Or) — the function of the transmission of the order, the set to understand and accept the other. With the help of this function the socionic substructure of the psyche unilaterally, comfortably (softly) activates the energetics of other people or elements of the environment. In doing so, the source of activation itself remains to a significant degree neutral, transmitting the activating signal as if without interest, simply radiating the corresponding impulse.

(Cn) — the function of the exercise of control, responsibility, the ability to lose and to fulfill requirements, discipline, superiority and unattainability. With the help of this function the socionic substructure of the psyche unilaterally blocks, neutralizes, stops the activity of the partner or of some substructure of the environment. However, this is done unintentionally, and occurs as if of itself, by virtue of the natural informational-energetic properties of the source. This process can to a certain degree be compared with the action of nerve-paralytic substances.

(Bu) — the function of business interaction, the understanding of the conditions of joint work. With the help of this function the socionic substructure of the psyche organizes a neutral adjustment to another partner or to a definite substructure of the environment. This adjustment is distinguished by the fact that the interaction leans on external motivation, bears a chance or compulsory character, but proceeds in a calm, little-emotional atmosphere bearing to a significant degree a formal character. However, these relations, other conditions being equal, can be quite effective, if the division of labor is performed correctly and each conscientiously performs his part of the work.

(Mg) — the function of external coexistence, freedom. With the help of this function the socionic substructure of the psyche probes the external or internal environment, using neutral stimuli and signals, trying by indirect signs, as if without interest, to evaluate the characteristics of the object (the variant of the resident-spy); conversation about anything whatsoever, but not about the essential.

Ring of the ID: the thematics of opposition.

(Qi) — the function of neutral activation, impersonal criticism, an image of effectiveness differing from what is present. With the help of this function the socionic substructure of the psyche provokes reactions, answers, and behavior of the partner that help him come out of the state of relative equilibrium, causing an indefinite disquiet and as if compelling him to justify himself (catching red-handed).

(Cf) — the function of disharmonious competition, sharp confrontation. With the help of this function the socionic substructure of the psyche sharply throws the partner or elements of the environment out of equilibrium, compelling them to offer resolute resistance (“you’re the fool yourself,” “get lost”).

(Se) — the function of tense coexistence, manipulative confrontation. With the help of this function the socionic substructure of the psyche, entering into contact with the partner or elements of the environment, tensely seeks the conditions of equilibrium and harmony, and so far as possible gives this search decorous forms, only gradually, under the pressure of circumstances, replacing them with ever more tense ones.

(Op) — the function of opposition, disinterested confrontation. With the help of this function the socionic substructure of the psyche makes cautious attempts to investigate with interest the partner or elements of the environment, running up against incomprehension and bewilderment (“can it be that I have made a mistake this time too?”). This is a function of cautious evaluation and cautious experiment.

Ring of the SUPEREGO: the world presents its requirements to me; it needs me to be convenient for it.

Kn (or semi-identity) — the function of harmonious competition, the reorientation of the program function, soft competition. With the help of this function the TIM reorients its program onto the complementary thematics (ethics onto logic, sensing onto intuition, and the reverse). With the help of this function the socionic substructure of the psyche includes itself in a relatively soft competition with the partner or elements of the surrounding environment, taking into account their valuable qualities, and increasing the distance in the absence of understanding or of the expected reaction.

(Sd) — the function of partial dualization, adjustment with the presentation of requirements. With the help of this function the socionic substructure of the psyche organizes an adjustment to the partner or elements of the surrounding environment, explicitly or implicitly presenting to them definite requirements or establishing subconscious expectations, expressed in the form of ready or projected programs.

(Ro) — the function of the reception of the order, empathy. With the help of this function the socionic substructure of the psyche, or the corresponding elements of the substructure of the environment ensuring feedback with the subject of influence, unilaterally perceives the activating impulse, which serves for it as a distinctive guide to action and directs it along a definite informational-thematic channel.

(Rc) — the function of the perception of control. With the help of this function the socionic substructure of the psyche, or the corresponding elements of the substructure of the environment ensuring feedback with the subject of influence, unilaterally limits its activity, lowering its energetic level or limiting its informational range.

In each TIM, at the corresponding place stand two IA, which point to the other TIM with which the given TIM stands precisely in those relations to which the position of the other TIM corresponds.

However, one can represent a still more complex model of the psyche, which can conditionally be designated as “8×8.” It so happened that A. V. Bukalov and I almost simultaneously had the idea of building a model of this type, but they came out very different, and therefore what is at issue here is not mutual influence, but two independent expansions of Model “A.” Above all, I do not use the concept of the dimensionality of a function, since I consider it one of the formal possibilities of representing the internal structure of a function. His expansion of Model “A” A. V. Bukalov, in my view, applied very successfully to the description of the peculiarities of ethnically colored behavior and of the functioning of social infrastructures in various states. For this he represented each function of Model “A” as having a structure similar to Model “A,” which, incidentally, agrees well with the principle of fractality in socionics, whose author is likewise A. V. Bukalov. Bukalov presents his model as three-dimensional, and it can best be presented in an axonometric depiction. He proceeded from the two-dimensional Model “A” in its application to the mapping of the generalized characteristics of a socium (see fig. 4.19).

Fig. 4.19. Bukalov’s model for the integral representation of the Ukrainian ethnos.

In this model the upper layer represents the Model “A” of the EII (Dostoevsky), which by part of the socionists is matched to the Ukrainian ethnos (A. V. Bukalov, S. I. Churyumov, and others). In it the EGO block is matched to the Ukrainian mentality, the SUPEREGO block to the apparatus of administration (the government and the bureaucracy), the SUPERID block to the commercial-industrial stratum, and the ID corresponds to the generalized notion of the people’s life. According to the thought of A. V. Bukalov, each of these blocks can be unfolded into a full-fledged Model “A,” in which such a block performs the role of the ego, while the other superstructures of the socium-ethnos are represented by the other blocks, thanks to which one can describe and interpret not only the objective position of a superstructure in the ethnos, but also its subjective position in relation to all the remaining superstructures. Thus, from the position of the generalized mentality of the Ukrainian ethnos, the power structures, to which corresponds the position of the SUPEREGO, must be typologically described by the model of logical-sensory introversion, to which correspond a clear structuring of society and executive discipline.

My expansion of Model “A” arose on a completely different basis. I proceeded from the fact that the functions in Model “A” are not isolated from one another, but stand in a deep internal connection. This connection bears an informal character, and is constructively expressed in the fact that in each generalized function there are representations of all the remaining functions — and, of course, its own [V. V. Popov, Conversations, 1989]. Thus, since each function is represented in all the other functions, there turn out to be 8×8 = 64 such subfunctions in all. Each of these subfunctions can be unambiguously designated by three markers: the marker of the information aspect (MIA), the marker of the semantics of the basic function (MSF), and the marker of the connection of the given function with some other one (MCn). Each of these markers can take one of eight values, coinciding with the designations of the IA. In figs. 4.20 and 4.21 are adduced examples of the model “Ch-8×8” for two types.

Figs. 4.20 and 4.21. The “8×8 model” for Ki (Don Quixote) and Dю (Dumas) — 64-cell matrices of triples of markers. (Translator’s note: the printed matrices are heavily corrupted in the source scan; the structure is that each of the 8 functions of Model “A” contains 8 cells, each cell a triple ⟨MIA, MSF, MCn⟩, e.g. sIl.)

Fractal quantization is potentially capable of generating an infinite sequence of structurally conjugate subsystems of the psyche. The quantity of elements at each level is determined by a power of the number 8. The “8×8 model” represents the second level of the structuring of the psyche. I do not know about the interpretation of the models beginning with the third level, but A. V. Bukalov and I managed to interpret (each his own) “8×8 model.” So one can speak of the models “B-8×8” and “Ch-8×8.”

In the model “Ch-8×8” each function has three semantic fields, as shown in table 4.04.

Table 4.04

Marker	Functional semantics
1. MIA	The information aspect — corresponds to the IA of the Model “A” of the TIM
2. MSF	The semantics of the function — corresponds to the IA in the Model “A” of Ki
3. MCn	The connection with a function — in all models looks identical

The functions in Model “A,” each having its own particular semantics and performing concrete work in the human psyche, at the same time form a single whole, and this integrality, as observation of the physiological systems of the organism shows, can be expressed by the fact that in each function there is a representation of all the others. Thus, in the first function there is a zone most fully representing the work of the first function; there is a zone representing the second function, the third, and so on.

Here the combination of symbols sIl is understood thus: the informational filling of the function is introverted sensing (s); this is the program function (I); this is the subfunction of the program function answering for the connection with the communicative function (l). At first glance such an expansion of Model “A” may seem a formal overcomplication having no sufficient grounds under it, or fruitless theoretical fantasizing unconnected with empirical facts. However, the analysis of the psychophysiological structure of the organism points to the fact that among the real systems of the organism there is precisely such a connection, built on the representation of an organ of one system in another system. Thus, for example, the musculoskeletal system of the organism is represented in the nervous system by bundles of muscle fibers directly serving the elements of the nervous system, and, on the contrary, the nervous system is represented in the musculoskeletal system by the cerebellum. Exactly thus does the matter stand with all eight systems of the organism. The musculoskeletal, hormonal, digestive, cardiovascular, respiratory, sensory, nervous, and integrating¹⁸ systems are mutually represented in one another. In all there must be sixty-four such functional representations.

For the seven first systems this is not difficult to show, while the hypothetical integrating system at the present time is not designated in psychophysiology and is not acknowledged. Its only materialized representative is the intracerebral ventricles, whose purpose in physiology is not very clear. However, presumably, it is precisely there, alongside the frontal neocortex integrating the personality, that the integration of all the functions of the organism — both physiological and psychic — occurs. This assertion bears a hypothetical character and stands in need of empirical verification.

Analogously, the energetic meridians have mutual representations on one another, so that the principle of mutual representation can be considered a universal principle of systemic connection; and, the reverse, the presence of the mutual representation of the subsystems of an object transforms it into a system. Another form of mutual representation is feedback connections. Feedback connections arise when one element receives information about the work of another element and, depending on the information received, changes the parameters of its functioning and immediately transmits information about the changed parameters to the other element. At the functional level this can be interpreted as the representation of one element in another. So that, if this hypothesis is confirmed, physiologists will have more work, connected with the establishment of the functional representations of the subsystems of the organism.

V. D. Ermak worked much and interestingly on the understanding of Model “A.” In his methodological complex, systems theory dominates. All his elaborations and results are presented in numerous articles and in the book [11]. Here I shall try to consider only some moments of his position. I want to warn in advance that I by no means intend to refute systems theory or control theory, but only want to draw attention to their correct use.

In his article [10], V. D. Ermak, in building a model of the psyche, leans on control theory. There he writes: “First let us try to make sense of the structure of the psyche.” And further: “Let us pose the question — how, then, must an element of a system be arranged, in order to perceive a controlling influence and, in accordance with the parameters inherent in it (the characteristics of individuality and personality), to work out an executive reaction? From the general theory of control (and simply from common sense!) there has long been known such a universal structure of the proposition, known in systems theory, about the arrangement of an element of a system capable of perceiving ‘a controlling influence and, in accordance with the parameters inherent in it, working out an executive reaction’” [11]. And further he adduces a schematic depiction of such a structure — fig. 4.22.

Fig. 4.22. Scheme of an element of a system capable of perceiving a controlling influence [10]: Control → Decision-making → Execution → Reaction.

Probably, from the point of view of control theory, this is correct. Only, at once the question arises of how legitimate it is to transfer the scheme of the control of an object from control theory onto notions about the structure of the psyche. Can it really be that this is self-evident, and this can be done by default, “simply proceeding from common sense”? It is quite natural that in control theory everything is considered from the point of view of control theory — but socionics, after all, is not a part of control theory, and one must specially stipulate the applicability of the postulates of the latter in another subject sphere.

“Thus is arranged any ‘living’ element of Nature, and the general theory of control permits the strict grounding of all that is said below,” writes V. D. Ermak [10]. If this is a scheme from control theory, then here it is difficult to object to anything. But the terminology used here, as applied to socionics, does not seem irreproachable. After all, it is by no means obligatory to understand an external influence as control. Although one may. Control is a particular case of influence, and the equating of a particular case to the general one is fraught with the non-distinguishing of subtle nuances, which can lead to errors of various degrees of severity. This is from the category of “cutting everyone with the same comb.” For example, there may appear such questions, long since become classical themes of scientific discussions, as “can a machine think?” But to this one can also add such questions as: “Can a machine feel?”, “Can a machine experience?”, “Can a machine have a psyche?”, “Can a machine have a soul?”, “Can a machine be alive?” The incorrectness of such questions is obvious. One can also think up “reverse questions,” like: “Can the living be a machine?” and even “Is the soul a machine?” Some of such questions may be perceived not only as incorrect, but also as absurd. However, this occurs because behind the key concepts used in these questions there are, in everyday language, fixed definite meanings. It is precisely they that enter into explicit and hidden contradiction when they collide with one another in a single question or assertion. If we pose the question “Can a machine process information?”, then to the contemporary person it will not seem absurd. Taking into account what has been said, one can understand that when technical concepts are applied to technical systems, this is not the same as when technical concepts are applied to the living — to say nothing of the soul, which has a direct relation to the psyche and, thereby, to psychology.

Therefore, when what is at issue is the concept of “decision-making” in response to a “controlling influence,” then, in my view, and as applied to socionics, several intermediate links are omitted here. After all, before the mechanism of decision-making is launched, the controlling influence must be perceived. After this it must be evaluated with the help of comparison with certain standards present in the system. And these standards, after all, must also be stored somewhere. And only then can the mechanism of decision-making be launched, as the answer to the necessity of finding dynamic equilibrium in the homeostat “object–environment.” In addition, the very category of “decision-making” can only very artificially and with great strain be extended to the reactive actions of primitive (and even not very primitive) “living” elements of Nature, like bacteria, green algae, jellyfish, and the like. Can it really be that about some stage of the formation of the behavior of a bacterium it is preferable to say that it makes a decision, rather than that it reacts? And even the application of this term to the behavior of technical devices does not look so very justified. Except, perhaps, at the level of a specially stipulated scientific or technical term — and even then, the homonymic shift in comparison with conscious decision-making will be evident. Of course, if what is at issue is decision-making by a human being, then here the application of this concept is justified by the conscious character of this action. That is, the seme of consciousness in the concept of decision-making is present and significant. It is precisely for this reason that one has to enclose the term “decision-making by a technical device” in quotation marks. True, after some habituation the quotation marks are removed, and the possibility opens up of using the term, by default, in other subject domains, as if everything were clear to everyone.

And, of course, it is not very understandable in what way execution in the proposed scheme differs from reaction. Is execution really not a reaction to “control”? In systems-theoretic investigations the simplest scheme is the notion of a stimulus acting on the system, and the reaction of the system. One can try to describe the “reaction” from the proposed scheme as the reaction of the environment to the execution, but this is in no way stipulated, and, in addition, it somehow distorts the primary scheme S → R (stimulus–reaction). Therefore, when V. D. Ermak says that “Thus is arranged any ‘living’ element of Nature,” then in the context he proposes this is perceived as an unjustified simplification — after all, the arrangement of the living is probably more diverse and more complex, and, it appears, in the general case must be described by other categories. And, of course, it ought to have been said that this is an initial assumption, and not an absolute truth. Possibly, V. D. Ermak could object that he had in mind the scheme of elementary feedback, but in theoretical reasonings it is precisely customary to say what one has in mind, and not to distort, on the whole, understandable and simple things.

And so, having proposed the scheme adduced above, which already contains conceptual defects, V. D. Ermak begins to develop it. Having passed over in silence the mechanisms of the perception of the controlling influence (and at the level of socionic generalization this is very important), he passes at once to the stage that can be designated as “mine — not mine” and “I can — I cannot.” Of course, in technical systems with a well-established division of labor these two criteria can be taken into account and used; however, for the wild, “primary” situation these criteria can be evaluated as secondary, subsequent, and specific. The loading influence of the environment on an object in general, and on a living creature in particular, often requires an immediate reaction directed at the preservation of integrity, or at survival, which, in the end, must conclude with adaptation or destruction. And such an influence, and such a reaction, hardly depend in any way on the categories “mine — not mine” and “I can — I cannot” — that is, the influence on a living creature occurs independently of whether it is “its or not its” and whether “it can or cannot.” Therefore the criteria that are suitable for evaluating the work of technical devices created by man for the solution of concrete tasks — when a technical device can be chosen by the principle “can — cannot” — are not necessarily adequate in situations of evaluating the behavior of living creatures. Therefore these two criteria, possibly effective in the solution of quite definite tasks of a technical character, do not look like matters of first importance in attempts to evaluate the structure of the psyche of living creatures.

Now let us look a little more attentively at these two criteria from the side of their semantics. What, in this context, do “mine” and “I can” mean? From the reasonings of V. D. Ermak one can understand that “mine” is when “the task has arrived at the right address,” and “I can” is when the “element” possesses the means to fulfill the task. The combination of these two concepts presupposes their combinatorics, presented in table 4.05.

Table 4.05

	I can	I cannot
Mine	mine, and I can	mine, but I cannot
Not mine	not mine, but I can	not mine, and I cannot

If with the first and fourth combination everything is more or less understandable, then with the two middle ones it is desirable to sort things out more attentively. How can it come about that “the task is mine, but I cannot fulfill it”? In the sphere of human relations such a thing is easy to suppose. For example, a person is incompetent but occupies a post that presupposes the ability to perform the corresponding work. Such a situation in society one can encounter as much as one likes. Such a situation, when a person occupies a place that does not correspond to his competence, can be called a “mis-sorting.” But this is at the level of concrete social situations. How, then, could this be realized at the level of abstract system elements? Or at least at the level of a computer? How can it be that a task is addressed to an element on the supposition that it is “its,” while it is incapable of fulfilling it? After all, what is at issue here is an abstract element, and not a corrupted social system. Still, let us try somehow to explain this situation evolutionarily. For example, a “controlling influence” is supplied to an element and it is “its,” but it “cannot” — this could be understood in the sense that the element needs to learn. But what, in this case, does “its” mean? It very much wants to? It very much needs to? Or that the influence more or less by chance landed on this element? Or, in the instrumental understanding, the element as an instrument qualitatively corresponds to the supposed task, but quantitatively its productivity turns out to be insufficient? For example, a watering can passes a stream of water, but a task appears when one must pass a significantly greater quantity? Then passing water is, for the watering can, “its,” while passing much water is “I cannot.”

The third combination of these categories can also be evaluated critically. What does it mean when a task turns out to be “not its” for an element, while it “can fulfill it”? At the social level, with its professional “mis-sorting,” such a thing is encountered. But how is one to understand this for the level of abstract schematic elements, for the level of an abstract element base? “I don’t want to”? “It’s not needed”? And here, after all, the instrumental metaphor does not pass — and, that means, it is not applicable to the preceding case either. The first thing that comes to mind is functional redundancy — but this, after all, does not mean that the element “cannot,” but exactly the reverse: that it can do much that is various, and this too. In technology such redundancy may be deliberately laid into schematic elements — for example, with the aim of ensuring reliability, flexibility, or universality of functioning. As for the adaptational processes in the evolution of living creatures, where the principle operates that “nature creates nothing superfluous and cuts off everything superfluous,” the supposition of functional redundancy requires a special theoretical grounding. I do not assert that this is impossible to do, but I consider that it is necessary to do when principled theoretical concepts are introduced.

The analysis adduced shows that not everything is so simple with these, it would seem, elementary concepts. And these concepts themselves, along with the others used by V. D. Ermak for the grounding of Model “A,” are not explicated by him, and are used as self-evident.

Why would a systems programmer — or, perhaps, the Systems Programmer — need such elements? It is easier to suppose that at a sufficient level of abstraction “mine” and “I can” coincide, and, consequently, lose the meaning of separate categories. One cannot, after all, so straightforwardly transfer the terminology and jargon of the systems programmer, who deals with computer “hardware,” into a context where what is at issue is the structure of the human psyche.

And when V. D. Ermak says further that “Having reasoned a while, it is not difficult to convince oneself that these two procedures are, in general, necessary and sufficient for decision-making” [10], then, probably, to some degree he is right, if what is at issue is, for example, decision-making in the technical, economic, or everyday sphere. But one can hardly agree with him when what is at issue is the global strategies of the survival of living creatures under the conditions of the often unpredictable pressure of the environment. As for the assertions about necessity and sufficiency in this context, they look not only ungrounded but also superficial — after all, in theories of decision-making significantly more necessary parameters are mentioned; and as for sufficiency, here everything is still more complex. In order for an aggregate of parameters to be sufficient, it is necessary that with respect to this aggregate the theoretical requirement of completeness be fulfilled. V. D. Ermak did not perform such work, and reasons at the level of the approximateness of common sense.

Further V. D. Ermak writes that for the execution of the decision made, the presence is necessary of “a certain ‘program,’ or set of rules (technology), of the fulfillment of the task, and also of a definite ‘instrument’ for the realization of the result.” With this one can agree, if only one does not mix up programs and technologies: programs are an introverted category, and technologies an extraverted one. In addition, as I understand it, one cannot oppose technologies and instruments, which, at the level of socionic generalization, are one and the same.

One way or another, V. D. Ermak obtains what can be called a preliminary blank of the model of the psyche, as he understands it — if I understand him correctly — though perhaps he formulates this in other words, calling such a scheme “the structure of an element of a system” (see fig. 4.23).

Fig. 4.23. The structure of an element of a system according to V. D. Ermak. DMB — decision-making block (“mine — not mine”; “I can — I cannot”); EB — execution block (program / no program; instrument / no instrument). Control → [DMB → EB] → Reaction.

It is interesting that in this scheme the possibility of the absence of programs and of the instrument is provided for. From the evolutionary point of view this is incomprehensible. Can it really be that the living principle could remain, even for a short time, defenseless in the face of the environment? An individual specimen can, but the species to which it belongs is always defended in the measure of its adaptedness.

V. D. Ermak supposes that in the process of evolution there was formed not one block, which could be calculated only for standard situations, when the task is “mine” and the subject possesses the necessary instrument (“I can”), but two blocks — one for the solution of standard tasks, and the other for the solution of non-standard tasks (“not mine,” “I cannot”). Here the question arises of when, then, the second block was formed, and what the first one was like. Probably, the block of standard tasks could not have been first, because it simply would not have survived as soon as it turned out that the task was “its,” while it “could not.” Consequently, the block of non-standard tasks must have been formed first — but then it is incomprehensible why it would need the standard block, for standard tasks are a particular case of non-standard ones, and not the reverse.

One way or another, V. D. Ermak proposes a final model, or structure, of the psyche, consisting of a superblock of vital activity and a superblock of creativity. The first is intended for effective work in the standard situations of everyday life, and the second switches on when one must find a way out of a non-standard situation [10]. This sounds quite plausible.

However, analyzing this reasoning, it is difficult to rid oneself of the sensation of a certain redundancy and mechanicalness of the supposed construction. After all, it is not difficult to suppose the possibility of an effective “one-block” psyche, when in any situation the capacity for creativity is used. Objections, like the one that this is too energy-costly, here still need to be grounded by exact knowledge of the possibilities of the living and of its possible strategies — after all, having two blocks may turn out to be more energy-costly. However, in the structure of highly developed living organisms there are present, at the least, two brains — the spinal and the cephalic — and between them there is a quite definite “division of labor.” But does it correspond to the scheme proposed by V. D. Ermak? It is quite possible that it corresponds, but this must be specially proven.

Proceeding from the biological knowledge available at the present time, one can designate the tendency of living creatures toward the formation of systems of the organism occupying themselves with the technological solution of the tasks arising before them. One is simply amazed when one sees the films, shot with the use of the microscope, about intracellular and intratissue processes, where an enormous quantity of organelles, like ants in an anthill, participate in a coordinated way in one or another technological process. Such a situation can quite well be connected with automatic behavior (in opposition to creative behavior). But what, then, in the living organism (let us for now leave homo sapiens aside) corresponds to creative processes? This question must be answered if we proceed from the notion of the universality of the psychic structure. We see the astonishing complexity, the practically infinite diversity, and the unique adaptedness of living creatures to the conditions of their existence. By the present time, in biology sufficient proofs have accumulated that not everything in the evolution of living creatures can be explained by natural selection. It is not excluded that part of the evolutionary phenomenology can be explained by the creative behavior of individual specimens, although a strong obstacle here is “Morgan’s prohibition,” in accordance with which individually acquired peculiarities of the organism are not inherited. As is known, Morgan conducted a genetic experiment in which, over twenty generations, the tails of rats were chopped off, but the result was negative — he did not manage to breed genetically tailless rats by this method. From this it ought to follow that the results of individual creativity directed at the acquisition of useful adaptations to the environment will not be fixed in the genetic apparatus. But living creatures of a sufficiently high level found another strategy — the useful results of individual creativity began to be fixed not genetically but socially, and to be transmitted in the process of social learning. In the human being this process acquired especially large-scale dimensions, but it has essential significance in other higher animals as well — for example, wolves, lions, elephants, and so on. Thus, individual creativity has not only a personal but also a social meaning. And, from this point of view, the hypothesis of V. D. Ermak could have a basis — but it does not explain the becoming of the block of creativity, but only declares its desirability, or else simply announces its existence. But desirability alone in biology, without rigid compulsory mechanisms, is insufficient. And it is precisely here that we discover a serious shortcoming in the hypothesis of V. D. Ermak, when it is supposed that in the psyche of a living creature a creative block appears simply because this living creature, if you please, felt like solving creative tasks. Probably, it does not happen thus. This block exists in the psyche, but it has a different structure than in the model of V. D. Ermak, and behind it stand mechanisms of becoming, and not of sudden appearance, in the manner of a deus ex machina, when in ancient stage presentations, for the resolution of a difficult situation, a deity appeared from under the stage and delivered the heroes from the necessity of struggling and solving their problems independently.

The truly creative function in Model “A” is the PPF — the first, “Kyiv-style,” or 3/1, according to Aušra — and not, correspondingly, the CPF, the second, or 4/1. It is precisely thanks to the work of function 3/1 that, as the result of intuitive insight, the awareness and understanding of the peculiarities of a concrete situation is realized, concluding with the construction of an internal model of the external environment. Here essential creativity occurs, while the communicative-probing function (CPF) carries out creativity at the level of the culture of the presentation of the result obtained on the program-potential function (PPF). This variety of creativity can be called advertising-packaging creativity. This by no means diminishes its significance in communicative processes, but emphasizes its specificity. Therefore I would not identify intellect with 1f, and “creativity”¹⁹ with 2f. Rather, the reverse.

A serious reproach to model “E” is that the semantics of the functions corresponding to it diverges significantly from the semantics of the functions of Model “A.” What is at issue here is not some dogmatic prohibition, in the sense that the results obtained by Aušra Augustinavičiūtė can in no way be corrected. It is not excluded that other researchers will find ever new semantic shades in the functions and blocks of Model “A” and thereby enrich the understanding of this model. But these must be results that do not destroy, do not lower the level attained by those who were ahead, but that develop, supplement, enrich, refine, correct at a high theoretical level.

Important also is the fact that the scheme proposed by V. D. Ermak generates a completely different semantics than Aušra Augustinavičiūtė’s, which is evident from table 4.06. The semantic divergences in the understanding of the work of the functions by Aušra and by V. D. Ermak are so obvious that comments are superfluous.

Table 4.06

Function	Model “A”²⁰	Model “E”
1	Program	intellect
2	Creative	creativity
3	Orientational	social norms
4	PLR	social experience
5	Suggestive	individual experience
6	Mobilizational	individual norms
7	Controlling	working programs
8	Demonstrational	instrument

And even such a, it would seem, completely insignificant “trifle” as the numbering of the functions in model “E” places its identity with Model “A” in doubt. Here one can speak of its similarity with model “G,” but there, after all, the grounding is completely different. Why in model “E” is the function of individual experience (the suggestive one, according to Aušra) the fifth? Does this follow from the peculiarities of the work of the model, or is the number assigned to the function more or less by chance? Must this be understood in the sense that its work directly depends on the function of social experience, or, perhaps, that it is a link in the processing of information following immediately after the function of social experience? Incidentally, on what basis did the function of social experience turn out to correspond to the PLR? In any case, model “E” does not reflect Aušra’s idea that the functions of the mental and vital ring work not only in parallel, but also simultaneously.

A few words about Filimonov’s model. In the article [27] a notion is given of model “F” as an expansion of Model “A.” The authors of the article propose to divide each information aspect adopted in socionics into two dichotomous poles by the trait — living–non-living nature. In doing so they write that “the division into two subaspects for each aspect of Model ‘A’ is very strict and intuitively clear; each of the subaspects obtained in this way occupies an equal volume, but behind each of them stands a different essence” [27]. This, in the authors’ opinion, must be done in connection with the fact that “The organization of the living creature generates the psychic, which is the reflection of informo-elements in dead, non-living space.”

Here at once several objections can be made. First, in this assertion is contained the supposition that the psychic is generated by the organization of the living. Of course, it is the authors’ personal affair what views concerning the living and the psyche they hold; but since such an assertion is exceptionally important for the theme being developed, it is desirable that it be explicated more fully. I, for example, consider that the psychic is inherent in the living from the very beginning, and by no means appears for the first time as the result of some organization of the living. It is only that its phenomenology and content become ever more complex in the measure of the complexification of the organization of the living. And this is an entirely different matter.

Second, the content of the psyche is the reflection not only of the IA in “dead, non-living space” [27], but of everything that takes place in Nature — and, that means, also of the living, which, of course, is present in space and is not only a subject but also an object of reflection in the psyche. And if this is so, then the main argument of the authors in favor of the splitting of the eight IA into sixteen subaspects turns out to be contentless. This by no means signifies that the aspects cannot be split, but it signifies that their splitting by the trait “living — non-living” is not grounded.

Possibly, one of the causes here is the absence and difficulty of a logical definition of the living and the dead with that degree of conceptual generalization which socionics presupposes. In the given case it is insufficient simply to say that we know “perfectly well” what this is. It would also do no harm here to come to a determination concerning the concept and understanding of the psyche.

The authors’ assertion that the division into living and dead is “very strict and intuitively clear” also stands in need of refinements. It appears that this conviction is connected with the absence of specific information. The point is that in science there existed a division into the living and the dead, and this division was intuitively clear, but not very strict, because no strict definitions on this theme existed. The outstanding Russian scientist V. I. Vernadsky approached the division of nature in a new way. He grounded the notion that the substance present in our world should be divided into the living, the non-living, and the inert. The non-living is that which was living but, in connection with certain circumstances, ceased to be so. In contradistinction to the non-living, the inert never was living. The non-living is a distinctive buffer between the living and the inert. Thus table salt is an inert substance, and if it is poured onto a wound, where the living substance turns out to be unprotected, then this will be painful. The surface of the skin, however, is covered with non-living scales, which perform a protective role. The same can be said of fish scales, birds’ feathers, the fur of animals, or the shell of a tortoise. But perhaps more astonishing is the fact that the non-living can be located in the very depths of the living. Thus, non-living are the mitochondria — intracellular organelles one of whose functions is the utilization of oxygen for the synthesis of ATP, adenosine triphosphoric acid, the basic source of the energy of the heart. The reference adduced shows that the intuitive clarity of the division of nature into the living and the dead turns out to be doubtful.

As for the semantics of the proposed subaspects, the impression is created that it turned out to be insufficiently worked through. Why is idea opposed to meaning, as the living to the dead? Let us suppose that these are conditional terms, whose content differs from the general-scientific, similarly to how this happened with the socionic terms “logic” and “ethics,” and that therefore one must turn to their content, presented in the third column of Filimonov’s table of aspects [27]. However, there too, in one of the meanings, idea and meaning are opposed — but now in the general-scientific sense. As far as I understand, the concepts of idea and meaning are very close in their semantics. Both the one and the other are that which changes the state of the subject. They differ, above all, etymologically — the first originates from ancient Greek, and the second is Slavic. “Idea” has a semantic shade of greater independence — it is, as it were, capable of “being in the air.” Of course, one can relate to this as to a metaphor, but this depends on the initial suppositions. Whether ideas exist in the form of independent energoinformational complexes capable of moving in space — this is as yet unknown to science. The concept of “meaning,” however, seems more local, fixed to signs and their systems; but to consider meaning, because of this, something dead — there are no grounds whatsoever. Without additional explanations this seems incomprehensible. To consider meaning something dead and to equate it, for example, to a sign or a hieroglyph — this contradicts the definitions available in logic. In the same row of “dead” black intuition is located also “essence.” Essence and meaning, by their general-scientific content, can be identified²¹ — but it is incomprehensible why these two concepts must in socionics be opposed to the concept of idea and be assigned to the category of the dead. One wants to believe that behind the authors’ attempt to comprehend the opposition of the living and the dead stood some “correct” intuition, but, unfortunately, from their text it is difficult to guess precisely which.

When one reads Filimonov’s table of aspects [27], it is difficult to rid oneself of the sensation of the approximateness of its content. Approximateness generates approximateness.

Exactly likewise, there is no sense in considering force living, and greed dead. It is incomprehensible, for example, why greed lands in one category with quality. To assign sound to the dead is possible only by understanding it as acoustic vibrations — but sound, after all, is the subjective experience of these vibrations. The same can be said of music, which does not exist outside the subject.

However, the idea of comprehending Model “A” more deeply should hardly, in itself, be placed in doubt, and to such an attempt one can relate only with respect. As a result one has to acknowledge that the attempt to construct model “F” on the basis of the opposition of the concepts of the living and the dead cannot be considered grounded. An additional argument against such a detailing of the model may also be the fact that the degree of socionic generalization overlaps the level of such an opposition.

At the XXII International Conference on Socionics, the St. Petersburg psychophysiologist V. L. Talanov, in the report “The substantive filling and physiological interpretation of the socionic traits ‘constructivists–emotivists,’ ‘tacticians–strategists,’ ‘yielding–obstinate,’ and ‘carefree–provident,’” told of his own vision of Model “A,” using psychophysiological, and not psychological, terminology, as is done in socionics. Basing himself on the results of his experiments, he emphasized that there are not eight generalized socionic functions, but only four — but each, in contradistinction to the canonical Model “A,” is characterized by two parameters, namely by thresholds of excitation and of inhibition. For high and low thresholds, the zones of signal intensity optimal for them do not intersect; the thresholds turn out to be filters capable of passing through themselves either only strong-signal or only weak-signal stimulation. The channel of the excitation of a function has both an input (the excitation of the function by signals — its own or from other functions) and an output (the generation of a signal for translation to another function or to another individual), while the channel of inhibition has only an input. A high threshold of excitation corresponds to the extravertedness of the given function in the sense of its energy-costliness and its specialization in strong incoming and outgoing signals, and a low threshold — to introvertedness. If a person is an extravert, then his two first functions in the traditional first ring of Model “A” have a high threshold of stimulation, a high level of optimal excitation, and a high level of outgoing signals, while the third and fourth have a low one. In introverts it is the reverse. A high threshold of inhibition, however, always corresponds to the “white” color of the functions. Such functions V. L. Talanov calls intratim functions; for them a heightened inhibitability is characteristic at a high intensity of the stimulation, arriving from other functions, that lands on the receptor. Extratim functions (black), on the contrary, are inhibited at a weak level of signals. Thus the concepts of extravertedness and extratimness turn out to be non-coinciding and independent of each other. The color of the functions in the ring alternates; analogously to its alternation alternates also the height of the thresholds of inhibition. The first and fourth functions are always unbalanced in the height of the thresholds of inhibition and excitation (to high thresholds of excitation correspond low thresholds of inhibition, and the reverse), while for the third and fourth functions it automatically comes out that the thresholds of excitation and inhibition have the same height — that is, these functions are, in the psychophysiological sense, balanced and can self-regulate even by their own signals, inside their own functional sphere.

The model of V. L. Talanov (model “T”) explains, in psychophysiological language, the character of the mutual influence of the functions inside the ring, the peculiarities of each of the four functions (for example, the program character of the first function and the creative character of the second), and also, proceeding from the character of the interaction of the thresholds in one and the same function but in different TIMs, predicts the peculiarities of intertype relations that arise in practice. For example, the full model of Don Quixote, according to Talanov (model “T”), will look like the following formula:

(H/H) ᴴIn·ʟ ᴴLg·ʜ ᴸSn·ʟ ᴸEt·ʜ — for the balanced (initial) subtype of Don Quixote;

(H/L) ᴴIn·ʟ ᴴLg·ʜ ᴸSn·ʟ ᴸEt·ʜ — for the unbalanced (terminal) subtype of Don Quixote.

In these formulas the left upper index next to a function points to the optimal threshold of its excitation (H — high, L — low), and the right lower index, with the same designations, points to the optimal threshold of inhibition. In — intuition, Lg — logic, Sn — sensing, Et — ethics. The fraction in brackets before the formula shows the general properties of the strength-weakness of the individual’s nervous system with respect to excitation (in the numerator) and with respect to inhibition (in the denominator). To the strong corresponds the letter H (high thresholds), to the weak — L (low thresholds). In contradistinction to the particular (partial) properties of the nervous system, expressed by the indices next to the functions and relating to each function separately, the general properties influence all the functions of the individual identically. In doing so, the action is facilitated of those partial functional channels which, by the height of the threshold, coincide with the corresponding threshold of the general property of the nervous system; in addition, there also occurs a certain shift of the partial thresholds in the direction of the general ones. Therefore the indication of the general property of the strength-weakness of the nervous system with respect to excitation, by the index in the numerator of the fraction, sets which of the two unbalanced functions of Don Quixote will be the program one (the one whose threshold of excitation coincides with the index of the general property of the nervous system). The index in the denominator of the fraction (the general strength-weakness with respect to inhibition), interacting with the lower indices of the functions, forms the accentuation of the type and sets the subtype.

Independently of the subtype, the intuition of Don Quixote, in accordance with the adduced model of Talanov, is strong-signal with respect to excitation and weak-signal with respect to inhibition. Analogously are evaluated all the remaining functions as well.

If one now takes the model “T” of some other type — for example, of Hamlet:

ᴴEt·ʟ ᴴIn·ʜ ᴸLg·ʟ ᴸSn·ʜ

— then it will not be difficult to describe the character of the interaction of the two psychic structures. The intuition of Hamlet is capable of exciting the intuition of Don Quixote, and the reverse, because in both of them intuition is strong-signal with respect to excitation. However, the intuition of Hamlet is not capable of inhibiting the intuition of Don Quixote, because for this a low, and not a high, signal is needed. At the same time, the intuition of Don Quixote is capable of both exciting and inhibiting the intuition of Hamlet, which it is not difficult to interpret as the possibility of controlling it. Analogously are revealed the interactions of all the remaining functions. As a result, in the case of Don Quixote and Hamlet, there arises a picture of the positive domination of Don Quixote over Hamlet, which, possibly, is close to the concept of the socionic order.

A special problem is presented by the concept of the dimensionality of the functions, consistently elaborated by A. V. Bukalov.

The concept of dimensionality introduces into the concept of the socionic model the notion of geometric spatiality. As a result it comes out as if the functions were located in spaces of different dimensionality — and, moreover, in different spaces, since their qualities are different; after all, in the end, ethical, logical, or sensing parameters are not one and the same. If the concept of space in this case is used conditionally, metaphorically, and not literally, then this can be regarded only as an auxiliary means — on the whole, alien to the conceptual structure of socionics, but, in some sense, useful.

This by no means signifies that the concept of space cannot be applied in socionics. True, the point is not at all to apply it, but to discover spatial categories and parameters as inherent in socionic concepts. A. V. Bukalov proposes a certain notion of space — but is it geometrically real, or is it only a parametric set called a space within the framework of the mathematical-terminological style? Both possibilities remain potentially useful, but a refinement of the concepts is necessary. The four parameters of A. V. Bukalov — experience, norms, situations, and time — constitute a set whose completeness is problematic — that is, it has not been proven; the elements themselves of this set are not built deductively but discovered empirically, which, of course, is also not bad, but not sufficient. And, what is chief, the semantics of this set does not follow from the semantics of the model. These parameters are perceived as something plausible, but not obligatory, though empirically registered.

What could a geometrically real space of the socionic functions represent? This could be the hypothetical energoinformational space, already introduced into scientific circulation, in which, for example, presumably, are located the informational flows of television broadcasts and telephone conversations. Though here the banal answer suggests itself that this is simply the space of electromagnetic waves. However, let us consider this question more attentively.

First, in the geometric sense, the set of electromagnetic waves falls under the definition of a space, since this is a “place” in which electromagnetic entities are located, and in which they can change their location, or coordinates. But I believe (though, alas, there are as yet no scientific proofs, although there is personal experience) that the psyche is connected with another, more general or more subtle, energetics than electromagnetism. And so, if we admit the existence of an energoinformational space based on another, “living,” energetics, where psychic entities are located, then all socionic reasonings could relate to this space. And then psychic entities become real objects of this space, and not scientific abstractions. And then they cannot be assigned arbitrarily, but must be discovered with all their peculiarities — and, desirably, in a strictly controlled laboratory experiment, and not speculatively. It is understandable that the speculative stage is inevitable, but it must lean on empirics, be confirmed by empirics, be controlled by empirics, and be embodied in practically useful technologies. Incidentally, the last comes out very successfully for the International Institute of Socionics, and already over the course of many years.

If the psychoinformational space of which A. V. Bukalov speaks is real — that is, sooner or later can be recognized by instruments — then the dimensionality of the functions, as psychic organs, is not a mathematical abstraction but something real. And it is precisely here that I suppose that the dimensionality of all the functions is identical — like, for example, the dimensionality of the organs of the physical body. That is, there are no logical grounds to consider that the dimensionalities of these organs are different; and that which “seems” to us a difference in productivity, in energy consumption, or in other quantitative parameters of the functions may turn out to be a semantic difference — in the sense that the functions have different production, which is subjectively evaluated differently. But this must be investigated.

And so, let us first analyze the categories of A. V. Bukalov.

Selfhood. Most likely, this is an undefinable entity, because it goes off into some depths of being. One can elucidate it, but to define it is difficult or impossible. Selfhood is not only the equivalent of integrality — and, consequently, also of systemness — but also the intention toward the maintenance of the existential trajectory, that is, of the path and history of individual existence. Selfhood as the equivalent of integrality can only be designated. With selfhood are connected the choice of a goal and decision-making. This is the basis and embryo of behavior, which can also be understood as the center of subjectivity, the essence of subjectivity, and, in the end, as the subject. If this is so, then the entities standing behind the concepts of selfhood and of the subject are identical, and their terminological formulation depends only on inclusion in the corresponding subject domain. The subject is from philosophy, and selfhood from psychology. Selfhood as the equivalent of the individual — which literally means “indivisible” — but, in another conceptual-terminological formulation, seems something different. But selfhood, after all, is also indivisible. Selfhood as the embryo of independence, but not yet independence. One must grow up to that, mature. This is the existential core. But this is not a definition — this is an attempt to unfold the semantic field of the concept of selfhood. The status in being of selfhood is incomprehensible — what is this? An entity possessing physical and spatio-temporal characteristics? A parameter — that is, a measurable property of an object? If selfhood is a parameter determining existence–nonexistence, then it is incomprehensible how and why it must be placed in one row with physically observable quantities — norms and situations. An abstraction helping to fix some intuitively caught meaning relating to primary identification or self-identification?

Experience. It appears that experience is that which ensures the greatest differences among individualities. At the XXII International Conference on Socionics, several of its participants discussed the concept of experience in comparison with the concept of memory. They converged approximately on the point that experience is processed memory, though each of the participants in the discussion had his own shades characterizing the concept of experience. Undoubtedly, in the concept of experience the seme of memory is present, but all the same between these concepts there is a quite palpable difference. Memory is, above all, an informational base. Experience, however, is technologized memory, mobilized memory — memory in the form of a working instrument that the personality can use for the optimization of its behavior.

Norms and situations. Two categories that apparently have a quite real meaning, which strongly opposes them to selfhood, about which it is in general difficult to say anything or to match anything to it, apart from synonymic tautologies. But it is precisely this opposition that puts one on one’s guard. The belonging of these categories to one set together with selfhood stands in need of special grounding. Norms can be regarded as relatively rigid constants limiting behavior. A norm in such a sense presupposes the presence of internal standards and of the capacity to compare external circumstances with them, and the coincidence or deviation of the circumstances and manifestations of the subject from the standards. Situations can be understood as variable circumstances requiring an adequate reaction. Of whom? Of selfhood? Of the subject? An adequate reaction presupposes the analysis of the situation with the subsequent synthesis of behavior.

Time. A universal physical parameter, complementary to the dynamics of the object and comparable with it. The level of abstraction of this category differs strongly from the level of abstraction of the categories of norm and situation, since time acts as a universal argument and, in this sense, controls any entities as functions depending on it.

And one thing more. What is the meaning of the fact that these parameters are called and depicted as vectors? By definition, a vector is an entity characterized by magnitude and orientation. Let us suppose one can speak of the vector of time — but how is one to represent selfhood in the form of a vector? Time we can measure in certain units — but how to measure selfhood? In order to represent experience and norms in the form of vectors, one must first agree in what units we measure them, and then indicate in what their directedness consists. If intervals of time can be represented as durations adjoining one another, it is difficult to represent norms, or units of experience, adjoining one another and thereby forming a “normative continuum” or a continuum of units of experience. True, one can imagine a certain card file into which are placed cards with “different” norms fixed on them, or assertions in which personal experience is fixed. Then the unit of the measurement of norms could be one such card. But if there can be infinitely many segments of time, at least theoretically, then an infinite quantity of norms is something unimaginable. Any segment of time in the past and future can be designated by a number and made the basis of a calculation, a prognosis, or a prediction. But if the cards in the card file of norms are designated by numbers, then how is one to establish an unambiguous correspondence between the numbers and the norms? The directedness of time is easy to connect with the concepts of the past and the future — but in what could the directedness of norms consist? Such reference points as good and evil have a different generalized semantic coloring than the past and the future. The dynamics of an object is easily matched with the directedness from the past into the future — but can one speak of the dynamics of a subject from evil toward good? In any case, empirical facts demonstrate nothing of the kind. As for experience, it is easy to represent its scalar growth, but that in which its directedness could be expressed remains incomprehensible.

All the preceding reasonings relating to the concepts of experience and norms can be repeated also with respect to the concept of situations. A situation is a form of the compatibility of events. A situation can also be defined as the condition of the acquisition and fixation of experience. Only in situations does the personality, or the subject, acquire experience. In the end, situations are transformed into units of memory — but by what principle they are stored there, this as yet no one knows. By time? By alphabet? By association? By analogy? By mutual references?

And still one cannot get rid of the thought that experience, norms, and situations are important for the personality, and that these are useful categories for the investigation of human behavior. Without “situations” the personality could not learn and acquire experience. In the end, norms too are formed for situations, and not just so. A norm is the subjective law of a situation. These are the boundaries of subjective optimality. Experience is precisely the aggregate of generalized norms. To understand a norm only as an ethical limitation proposed or imposed by the socium is, at the least, not obligatory. A physical law is also a norm. A norm is an element of ordered behavior. A law is a “rule of the game” of the objective world; a norm is a rule of the game of the subjective world. A norm is a parameter of the technology of behavior in a concrete situation. But situations change. And even a small, almost imperceptible change of the situation can essentially change the corresponding norm. A norm is always a norm of reaction and behavior. But at the level of socionic generalization it is impossible to oppose reaction and behavior — at this level these categories are identified, become indistinguishable. A reaction is an answer to a situation. This is a change of the parameters of the subjective state in answer to a change of the parameters of the environment. The environment can also be understood as a source or generator of situations.

Taking into account socionic concepts, one can distinguish the object and subject components of the environment. Both these components of the environment are objective, but the first is connected with the logical, and the second with the ethical relation to the environment. One of the general-scientific concepts of objectivity reduces to the independence of the existence of the object in general — and, in particular, of the environment — from the subject. But what, then, about the principle of uncertainty? One of its formulations — or, more precisely, consequences — asserts that, entering into any contact with an object or with the environment, the subject changes them. That is, even the presence of the subject next to the object must change something. But what is the measure here? “Next to” — is how much, at what distance? And if we change, then what exactly? Are we not generalizing the principle of uncertainty too much? Let us return to its primary formulation, which states that one cannot simultaneously measure the coordinate of an elementary particle and its energy.

Such a state of affairs is connected with the logical definitions of the concepts. What is the coordinate of a particle? After all, if a particle has dimensions (such a concept also stands in need of refinement), then it occupies some part of the space in which it can be detected. To which point of this space must one assign the coordinates of the whole particle, if there are, from the mathematical point of view, infinitely many points in this section of space? Therefore the concept of the coordinate of a particle turns out to be a conditional concept. And if we indicate a point coordinate, then we thereby indicate an infinitely small part of the particle — and then it is understandable that in an infinitely small part of the particle there will be located an infinitely small quantity of its energy. But the greater the part of the particle we encompass in order to evaluate the energy of the particle, the more indeterminate becomes its position. If, however, the theoretician comes to the conclusion that this is not at all a corpuscle having limited dimensions, but a wave formation, which in the limit extends over the whole space of its existence, then one must in some special way define its position. The fact that a particle may turn out to be infinite by no means signifies that it will have infinite energy.

Mathematically this is well understood by analogy with infinite curves whose area has a finite magnitude. For example, the famous Gaussian curve. The same can be said of certain infinite (here it would be more exact to speak not of infinity but of unboundedness) surfaces whose volume is bounded. One of such surfaces can be obtained by rotating the Gaussian curve around the axis of its symmetry. From the preceding reasonings it appears to follow that the principle of uncertainty owes its formulation to imprecise definitions.

However, let us continue the discussion of this famous and, apparently, paradoxical principle. Let us consider the concrete situation of the measurement of temperature with the help of a thermometer. A simple analysis shows that the thermometer shows not at all the temperature of the object, but its own. And its readings approach the truth — that is, correspond to the temperature of the object — only in the case where the mass of the thermometer is incommensurably smaller than the mass of the controlled object. Thus, if we measure the temperature of the water in a thimble, the distortion may turn out to be very great. And to measure the temperature of a drop in this way is in general impossible.

Is the anthropic principle not an illusion? After all, the point of view is quite possible that the world constants are tuned to the presence of the human being not by virtue of the existence of an a priori “anthropic principle,” but because the human being was formed, in the process of evolution, in the field of action of these constants, tuned himself to these constants, and came to correspond to them. Therefore it is incomprehensible what one should be surprised at here — that, at the least, some world constants are, in some sense, tuned to the human being. However, the point is that certain deviations of the world constants from their existing values would turn out to be incompatible with the appearance in the world not only of reason, but of life as we know it.

To begin with, I would not hurry to introduce and evaluate the spatial characteristics of the psychic functions. I would like first to make sense of their systemic connection. Quite dialectical is the thought that all the functions are connected among themselves. Properly speaking, in this is the meaning of systemness and, in particular, of integrality. There is a way to express such a connection theoretically. For this one can imagine that in each function all the others are represented. And thus one can, for example, speak of the representation of the PPF in the CPF or the ALF, and so on. This gives the possibility of introducing the concept of an identical dimensionality of all the functions, which in such a case will be equal to 8. But is there in general any sense in introducing spatial notions into the concept of a psychic function, if there is no definiteness with psychic space?

Now one can pose the question of why in socionics one speaks of a different intensity of the work of the psychic functions. One of the preliminary answers could consist in the fact that this is simply incorrect. All the functions are loaded approximately identically, but this, for example, may occur not simultaneously — by analogy with the blinking lamps on an operator’s console. In the end, they all work on the creation of the final psychic product. It is another matter that the work of each of the functions may be differently made conscious. Let us also not forget that the functions differing in vertedness work in parallel, as follows from Model “A,” and not sequentially, as this is presented in model “G” (V. V. Gulenko) or “E” (V. D. Ermak).

The survey adduced of the various approaches to the understanding of Model “A,” and also of its hypothetical generalizations, shows that socionists discover ever new sides in this model and try to coordinate it with their own practical experience and methodological complexes. Possibly, not all of what the authors propose will pass the check of practice; but the very fact that the scientific search continues points, on the one hand, to the fact that not all the problems of the socionic modeling of the psyche have been solved, and, on the other, instills the hope that sooner or later they will be solved. However, socionists must also be ready for the possibility of interpretations of Model “A” differing to one or another degree from those existing at the present time — which will only broaden and deepen our notions about the structure and work of the psyche.

There also exists a problem in connection with the concept of the reception and putting-out of information by each of the generalized psychic functions. In some socionic publications the functioning of the model is described as if information were linearly transmitted from one function to another, and thus some functions work on reception and others on putting-out. However, directly from Model “A” it follows that all the functions both receive and put out information. Since the blocks can also be regarded as functions of the next level of generalization, the question of the reception and putting-out of information relates to them as well. However, there is not enough empirical material to suppose with confidence how this process is accomplished. And since each pair of blocks forms a ring, they too must be regarded as still more generalized functions, and the question of the reception and transmission of information here too must be solved.

The transmission and reception of information inside the psychic structure can be understood in the sense that information generated in one part of the psyche is, with the help of one or another material carrier, transmitted into another part, which becomes the consumer of this information and, on its basis, in accordance with its possibilities, generates some new information. Does some information received by the receiving block, ring, or function return, after its processing, to the sender? This is a problem that must be investigated experimentally.

In connection with the problem formulated, Aušra came to the conclusion that “the mental ring can be called accepting, but this is correct only with respect to the perceived information, on the basis of which the vital ring of the dual acts.” This partially sheds light on the exchange of information at all levels of functional generalization. That is, information always returns, but not necessarily directly, and the delay time may turn out to be as great as one likes. In the end, human society holds together not only on the direct exchange of information in real time, but also on the deferred communication of generations and of individual personalities.

In the information metabolism of the functions, blocks, and rings, it appears, both parallelism and sequence are present; but for the clarification of their peculiarities experimental investigations are necessary.

All the models of the psyche considered above, including Model “A,” bear a speculative character, and therefore stand in need of experimental verification. Of special attention, from the point of view of the grounding of Model “A” and of its verification, is worthy the above-mentioned model “T,” since it is formulated in psychophysiological terms admitting direct instrumental measurement. The author of model “T,” V. L. Talanov, considers that model “T” is fully verified in a strictly controlled psychophysiological experiment, and this can also be understood thus: that, with a suitable choice of terms, the verification of model “T” can be transferred onto the verification of Model “A.”

Thus, if there exists a way of the equivalent transformation of model “T” into Model “A,” then this signifies that the verification of model “T” is simultaneously a verification of Model “A.”

Let us try to sketch the algorithm of such a transformation.

In model “T,” if I understand it correctly, each function is represented as having two inputs, one of which is connected with excitation, and the other with inhibition. In doing so, each of these inputs works both on the reception of a signal and on its putting-out. Let us consider more attentively the model “T” (Ki), that is, of Don Quixote:

(H/H) ᴴIn·ʟ ᴴLg·ʜ ᴸSn·ʟ ᴸEt·ʜ

In accordance with this formula-model, the intuitive function of Ki is excited only by a strong signal. This can be understood in the sense that it becomes effective only in sufficiently tense situations and requires for itself large tasks, a large sweep. It is precisely thus that Aušra describes the behavior of the ILE in extreme situations and his general set toward the solution of global problems. And, on the contrary, in stable or routine situations, when the “intuitive differential” approaches zero, this function is inhibited, and its bearer passes into the regime of “calm contemplation” in expectation of new intuitive loads. In an analogous regime works the first function of any extravert, being excited at the arrival of a high, or strong, signal along the IA of its filling.

Let us recall that in building Model “A” Aušra proceeded from the premise that the functions of the mental and vital rings work synchronously. At a certain degree of generalization, this can be understood thus: that the functions with identical aspects of different vertedness represent a single function, whose mental and vital parts are only its different inputs. Can one not interpret such a state of affairs thus: that the mental channel of a function ensures the excitation of the function, and the vital its inhibition? It is not excluded that in doing so one will need to change the terminology in a suitable way and refine the concepts standing behind it. According to Model “A,” the extravert, along the program-potential function (PPF), actively seeks high loads, since in this case its tonus turns out to be in harmony with the situation. But this, in physiological terminology, precisely means that the function is excited — that is, enters into the working state — at the appearance of a strong signal. In addition, it is not difficult to understand that the signal arriving along the mental function is precisely the switching-on signal, or, in accordance with physiological terminology, the exciting one. It is not excluded that significant conceptual refinements are necessary here.

Complementary by IA to the PPF is the ITF — the imperative-temporal function. Can it be understood as the channel of inhibition? This is a passive function; it only imperatively ensures the fulfillment of the programs of the PPF. And if here anything can be stopped, or inhibited, then it is precisely the ITF. Now one can already draw the general hypothetical conclusion that the mental part of each paired function is the channel of its excitation, and the vital the channel of its inhibition.

The construction of algorithms for the transformation of models “A” and “T” into each other would become a full-fledged means of the deepened understanding of each of them. Of course, the psychophysiological model is necessary, but it is not sufficient, since in practical activity people need psychological instruments.

Conclusions to Chapter Four

1. By virtue of its high level of abstraction, Model “A,” like mathematical formulas, admits various substantive interpretations. Theoreticians of socionics have proposed various schemes directed at refining the understanding of Model “A.” It is not excluded that each of such proposals reflects a definite side of reality.
2. A refinement of the semantic fields of the functions of Model “A” has been performed.
3. An understanding of Model “A” as a set of sixteen functional blocks, ready for immediate contact with the corresponding situations in the surrounding environment, has been proposed and grounded.
4. An unfolded model of the TIM has been proposed and grounded, obtained as the result of the linear arrangement of the blocks of Model “A” and their regrouping.
5. An understanding of Model “A” as a set of functions having mutual representations in one another, which is equivalent to a systemic connection among them, has been proposed and grounded. As a physiological analogue, the example of the mutual representation of the systems of the organism has been adduced.
6. The problem of the experimental verification of Model “A” has been considered, and the necessity of building an algorithm of transition from psychophysiological models to psychological ones and back.

References

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Notes

1. Of course, living organisms belong to such systems.
2. At the present time it is an anachronism to represent “feelings” as the sole material of internal modeling.
3. From the psychoanalytic point of view, it is useful here to draw attention to the aggressive shade of the lexicon used by the authors, characteristic of totalitarian ideology.
4. M. Brazier, “How Informational Models Can Be Used in Neurophysiology,” in The Concept of Information and Biological Systems, Moscow, 1988, p. 220.
5. If it is proposed.
6. Or its possibility.
7. The first, intuitive operation of the intellect. The capacity of the human intellect to understand, so habitual for the human being, remains a riddle for science.
8. The two aspects of sensing.
9. The two emotional-relational aspects.
10. The two aspects of intuition.
11. The two logical-technological aspects.
12. That is, the choice between extra- and introversion.
13. That is, independent of the subject.
14. Or, in other words, extraverted.
15. In the most general form.
16. That is, of functions of one name but different vertedness.
17. That is, of a technology.
18. Hypothetical.
19. What would this mean in opposition to intellect in model “E” and in the given context?
20. One of the versions.
21. In the expressions “what is the meaning” and “what is the essence” these concepts are identical.