Chapter 5

The Problem of the Existence, Uniqueness, and Diversity within the TIM

Note, Watson, that when we lose a hat, we in fact lose two hats: one is the one we lost, and, after all, another one has to be bought. — Jokes about Sherlock Holmes

THE PROBLEM OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE TIM

Does the socionic type exist really? Such a question sooner or later comes into the head not only of theoreticians, but also of people simply using socionics. To answer this question without immersing oneself in philosophical subtleties is impossible. Unfortunately, there are people who, not knowing philosophy, relate to it with extreme disdain. I had an acquaintance (I shall not name him), by no means a stupid person, who, if he heard philosophical reasonings, called them ravings or verbiage. Therefore the further reasonings are not for such people.

And so, in order to answer the question about the real existence of the type, one must first answer the questions of what “really” is and what “existence” is. In different philosophical systems this question is answered differently. We propose the following answer, oriented not toward philosophers but toward scientists. One of the meanings of the word “really” is a synonym of the word “objectively.” In this sense, both words point to that which exists independently of the subjective confidence of the observer. Representatives of various philosophical schools may point to a whole series of defects of such an assertion, but this will depend on the definitions they use. Nevertheless, we shall use the words under consideration in the indicated sense. So that we shall speak of real existence if the object standing behind the word designating it can be observed and used for practical purposes by a professional of the corresponding profile.

The concept of “existence” is significantly more complex. One encounters philosophical schools that consider that the physical world represents an illusion, and they adduce convincing arguments in favor of this. In this text we shall accept that the physical world exists really — that is, it is in “engagement” with the subject, so that the subject-agent cannot ignore it, cannot take it outside the “brackets,” is compelled to reckon with it and to adapt to it. In this sense, it is easy to acknowledge as existing the objects perceived by the sense organs or registered by instruments, which are the continuation and amplifiers of the sensory system of the human being. However, problems arise with those objects that are not registered by existing instruments. To them, in particular, belong the socionic types as well. It is simplest to suppose that the socionic types are not material but informational objects. Then one can speak of the existence of a type if there exists a program of typal behavior fixed in the psyche.

Existential judgments, or judgments about the existence of an object [1], alongside attributive and relational judgments, represent an important class of logical judgments, establishing the primary qualification of an object as existing or not existing. Without such a qualification, all further logical procedures connected with the object under consideration lose all meaning. Does the TIM, the initial object of socionics, exist, and what meaning is attributed to the concept of its existence? Is the TIM a natural object, which can in one way or another be observed in natural conditions or in the conditions of an experiment? Or is it a certain artificial formation or contrivance, which is introduced for the convenience of describing certain peculiarities of a more complex object, such as, for example, the human being or his psyche? Or — the question can also be posed in this way — is it a certain virtual phenomenon, accessible to formal fixation under certain special conditions, outside of which the TIM is not observed? Questions of this kind should by no means be regarded as idle, since the concept of the TIM is still not generally accepted in science, has not entered into encyclopedic reference books and dictionaries, and, moreover, it does not belong to the number of the self-evident.

At the present time in the experimental psychology of the personality [2] categories are used that are directed at the description of various parameters of the human psyche and that have a sufficiently complex multi-level construction, representing a combination of concepts obtained also by a sufficiently complex path with the help of methodologies that have received wide recognition in psychology. To the number of such categories one can assign, for example, the so-called factors, assigned to different levels and correspondingly designated as factors of the first, second, and third order (it goes without saying that the formation of factors of a higher order is also possible). Thus one of the factors of the first order, SPIRITUAL ORGANIZATION, is defined as a combination of two scales from the MMPI (Hy+, Mf+) and four scales from Cattell’s questionnaire (B+, I+, M+, Q1+) [2].

A factor represents a generalized name of a group of scales and is introduced for the economical description of the individual-psychological peculiarities of the personality. The semantic content of a factor is disclosed through the scales from which it is formed, and this content can be refined by passing to the analysis of the structure of the scales at the level of the questions.

What, then, can one say about the reality and existence of the objects presumably standing behind such categories? To answer this question, let us first somewhat generalize the concept of factor, and for this let us introduce the concept of a factor of zero order, which represents a really observable peculiarity, trait, feature, element of behavior, or reaction of a concrete person. Here one can assign the color of the eyes, and the form of the lips, and height, and the tempo of speech, and gestures, and postures, and the characteristic time of decision-making, and everything, everything, everything that can be measured and described in direct observation. Then to the factors of the first order one could assign those directly non-observable and non-measurable peculiarities of the human psyche — like resoluteness, will, kindness, openness, teachability, perspicacity, suspiciousness, and the like — that statistically correlate with one or another factor of zero order and can be revealed with their use and with the help of special procedures, to whose number, in particular, belong psychological tests. Further, one can unite the factors of the first order into well-interpretable groups, for which, of course, sufficient inventiveness is needed, and the integral effect connected with these groups can be regarded as factors of the second order. And this process can be continued until one obtains a small quantity of categories giving the possibility of economically explaining various aspects of the behavior of people. Such an assembly of factors resembles the composition of toy models from the parts of a child’s construction set — from one and the same parts one can compose a large quantity of models unlike one another; and, in addition, among them there may be models not corresponding to really existing objects — although, undoubtedly, some of the latter can be relatively easily interpreted by imagining a suitable thing, granted a non-existing one, but one that could quite well be manufactured and used according to the purpose flowing from its construction.

Still, such an analogy is not complete, and one can suppose that, in contradistinction to the mechanical construction set, any combinations of factors of a lower order always form a factor of the next level, and it can in one way or another be interpreted within the framework of an ad hoc (for the occasion) synthesized theory. Thus, there may exist various psychological theories, whose number is determined by the combinatorial potential of the set of initial factors. Apparently, the reasoning adduced can serve as one of the explanations of the fact that there exist rather many psychological theories explaining the peculiarities of the human psyche from different sides and in different ways. The factors themselves represent, in varying degrees, generalized characteristics of separate sides of human behavior. Thus, the existence of factors of higher orders can be reduced to the directly observable primary factors of zero order, and their existence, by virtue of obviousness, does not stand in need of special grounding.

However, in the case of a living organism — in particular, the human being — the factors of zero order can be regarded as the trace, the projection, or the relatively stable “sediment” of factors of a higher order that operate in the organism. If one takes two such factors as a square chin and obstinacy, then various opinions are possible concerning the causal connection between them. One can suppose that it is precisely obstinacy, with the physiological processes accompanying it, that leads to the formation of such a physiognomic trait. But a directly opposite point of view is also possible, in accordance with which one can assert that it is precisely the presence of the square chin that is the element switching on the physiological mechanisms on which obstinacy depends. At the least, in psychology it is known that if a person is merry, he smiles — but the reverse is also possible: it is sufficient to depict a sincere smile, and you will become merry. So that both points of view have empirical confirmation.

But a third point of view is also possible, in accordance with which both obstinacy and the square chin are two forms of the unfolding of some factor standing behind these two phenomena. Properly speaking, the answer here need not be sought far — such a factor may turn out to be a quite definite gene. The ancient Greek philosopher Prodicus said: “A horse I see, but horseness I do not see.” This theme the medieval scholastics continued in the disputes about the reality of the singular and the general. Possibly, Prodicus and the scholastics would have changed their opinion if they had known genetics and socionics. Genetics shows that in the genome of all horses there are common structural elements ensuring the form of the horse, while socionics turns to the extraverted and introverted forms of objects, which are equally real, but only differently represented in the physical world. In the introverted form of an object one can single out fragments ensuring the frame structure common to all objects of one class. Analogously to this, one can speak of the existence of frame programs of behavior, which set the most general parameters of the acts of a person. One can single out a large quantity of such programs. However, many of them, already proposed and used in psychology, bear a fragmentary or redundant character. This is explained by the fact that they do not satisfy the principled methodological requirements of completeness, non-contradictoriness, independence, necessity, sufficiency, and often a series of others as well. It turns out that such more or less chance combinations of generalized behavioral algorithms, on closer examination, do not satisfy a series of well-known logical requirements that are presented, for example, to definitions, to the divisions of concepts into classes, to judgments, and to inferences. It is precisely this that we observe in such famous psychological brands as the set of Cattell’s factors, the MMPI, or the accentuations singled out by Leonhard. And even such an ancient deductive system of psychology as astrology did not escape a series of methodological errors. Incidentally, this is one of the causes of its rejection by science. And, strange as it may be, many scientists in their reasonings and theoretical constructions commit methodological errors while being deeply convinced of their rightness. Why go far, when a large quantity of attempts is known to prove Euclid’s postulate about parallel lines, considering it a theorem. This was done by very disciplined mathematical minds, and all the same it turned out that in their constructions there were very subtle logical errors. What, then, is one to say of non-mathematicians!

Summing up the preceding reasonings, one can say that THE SOCIONIC TYPE REALLY EXISTS AS A COMBINATION OF QUITE DEFINITE FRAME PROGRAMS OF BEHAVIOR, FIXED IN PSYCHIC AND PHYSIOLOGICAL CARRIERS. By a frame program we here understand generalized and maximally generalized limitations within whose framework concrete behavior is formed.

Socionics represents a systematic and coherent theory founded on observable data. The structural-phenomenological approach, which can be placed at the foundation of the theoretical constructions of socionics, permits the classification and exact description of certain generalized processes occurring in connection with the human personality. The TIM is not a conceptual fiction, a mysterious entity, or a theoretical artifact — it is a structural-phenomenological object, which can be detected as the result of the processing of empirical observations. It is completely incorrect to consider Jung’s typological discoveries some sort of “conceptual constructions,” as is done, for example, by E. Berne [11]. Their theoretical quality is not a bit worse than E. Berne’s transactional analysis, although they are expounded in the scientific-philosophical manner that was still widely spread at the beginning of the twentieth century. However, by their nature these are admissible generalizations of clinical experience, of which Jung had more than enough. All that is necessary here is to expound his results in phenomenological language, as is done, for example, by E. Berne. As for E. Berne himself, then, despite the high effectiveness of the theoretical scheme worked out by him, to him too one can present a methodological reproach, connected with the absence of a grounding of the completeness of the set of personal positions represented in his methodology. The empirical obviousness of this set must not lead us into delusion.

Returning to the problem of the existence of the TIM, one can say that the latter represents one of the possible psychological factors, since it can be assembled from a multitude of differential features, and thus its reality and existence are determined by the reality and existence of the separate differential features and their sets.

The problem of the existence of the TIM can also be approached from another, formal, side. Properly, the existence of the TIM is the initial hypothesis of socionics, and the acknowledgment or non-acknowledgment of such existence determines whether socionics has its own subject of investigation and has a direct relation to its scientific status.

Since the hypothesis of the existence of the TIM has passed practical verification in various groups, clubs, and in the solution of applied social tasks, the existence of the TIM must be acknowledged a fact. As such a fact it is acknowledged by those who work professionally with this object.

From the formal-theoretical point of view, however, the TIM is postulated by a set of axioms whose truth is discerned intuitively. To the number of such axioms one can assign:

1. The presence of the generalized information aspects S, s, I, i, E, e, L, l.
2. The presence of generalized psychological functions, within the framework of socionics called socionic and observed in the work of the human psyche.
3. The connection of an information aspect with the work of a psychic function.
4. The polarity of the generalized information aspects, observed and established directly upon the singling-out of these aspects.
5. The absence of a smooth transition between the poles marked by the information aspects.

This does not exhaust all the axioms. Here are adduced only those necessary for the solution of the task posed.

Knowing the semantics of the information aspects, it is easy to order them, using comparison and opposition. Opposing the aspects S, I, E, L to the aspects s, i, e, l, we obtain the axis EXTRAVERSION — INTROVERSION. Opposing the aspects S, I, s, i to the aspects E, e, L, l, we obtain the axis IRRATIONALITY — RATIONALITY. Opposing the aspects S, s to the aspects I, i, we obtain the axis SENSING — INTUITION. Opposing the aspects E, e to the aspects L, l, we obtain the axis EMOTIONING — THINKING. The assignment of the properties of the psyche of a real person to the corresponding poles leads to the establishment of the TIM. Unambiguity here is attained only in the case where axiom 5 is fulfilled. That is, if the transition from one pole to the other is accomplished by a leap, if between the poles there is no gradual transition, no gradations. Here it is easy to object by pointing to the possibility, or the factual presence, of various degrees of extraversion, rationality, sensingness, logicalness, and so on. But, after all, the intensity of the quality of a pole by no means relates to qualities intermediate between the poles. Intermediate qualities would have to be represented as linear combinations of the qualities of the poles, of the type 3A + B and so on, and to have, at least in possibility, particular names. In the space of the initial model of the TIM this is not provided for, and a discrete transition is presupposed — a leap from one arrangement of the poles in the model to the opposite one. Such a leap can be compared with the quantum transition of an electron from one orbit to another, and it is not excluded that such an analogy has a real basis, if it turns out that the substrate of the psyche is some energetic field capable of quantization, and that to its quantum states correspond certain psychic properties, granted very generalized ones. At the least, the presence in the human body of energetic meridians, with which concrete psychic and psychological semantics is groundedly connected, is a sufficient basis for the hypothesis expressed above. Partially this problem was discussed in the chapter devoted to the hypothetical substrate of the psyche.

As for the really observable spread of the intensities of qualities, it is connected with the fact that, by default, onto the socionic scale some other scale is superimposed — for example, the scale of temperament, of erudition, of profession, or some others besides. One can say that, from the point of view of socionics, one INTUITIVE-LOGICAL EXTRAVERT differs in nothing from another, since this is a type; but a real person of this type, as a rule, differs very strongly from another real person — only these differences are determined by other scales, on whose basis other typologies are built. One must not mix up type and character, since these are different realities (see [3]).

THE PROBLEM OF THE UNIQUENESS OF THE TIM

Can a concrete person have several TIMs — and not only simultaneously, but, for example, changing depending on circumstances, situations, or at the wish of the person himself? The answer to this question depends to a significant degree on definitions. In socionics, by the TIM is understood the integral adaptation of the psyche to the perception, selection, and processing of generalized informational flows. However, in a broader sense, apparently, one should speak of the perception, selection, and processing of MEI-complexes — integrated combinations of various forms of the manifestation of matter, energy, and information. As a result of this there arise secondary entities, qualitatively distinct from one another and determining the phenomenological base of the environment of human habitation, including within itself not only the physical world, but also the social and individual world.

As the result of the total phylogenetic adaptation of the psyche of a concrete person to the conditions of being, each generalized psychic function is bound to, or turns out to be adapted to, the processing of one IA — and this, apparently, is a consequence of generalized thermodynamic regularities prescribing the minimization of energy expenditures and of energy-consuming configurations. If one excludes a small percentage of special cases, one can say that the overwhelming majority of people, as the result of interaction with the circumstances of their life, work out some one type of generalized adaptation, used by them every time the environment of habitation compels them to it. Moreover, such types, in the process of the evolution of the human being, could have become fixed genetically.

Here one must distinguish the general form of adaptive reactions from the particular psychological means used by a concrete person, which may be highly diverse. A person, according to the situation, may use various kinds of adjustments or psychological defenses, but all of them, as socionic experience shows, will be located within the framework of a single generalized adaptive form — which is precisely what the TIM of the given person is.

Since the TIM is realized on the structure of the generalized psychological functions — which precisely became the subject of socionics and received the name of socionic — at least two variants of the coexistence of different TIMs could be revealed: the presence of duplicating functional configurations filled with different IA, or the filling of one and the same socionic functions with different IA competing among themselves. Both these cases present theoretical interest and could be realized in actuality, at least in a pathological variant, but at the present time experimental data on this question are absent.

To the problem of the uniqueness of the TIM directly adjoins the problem of the possibility of a change of the TIM as the result of the specific pressure of life circumstances or of purposeful training. In particular, one can pose the question of the possibility of a convincing imitation of behavior corresponding to a TIM other than the one the given person has. This could be done, for example, by actors or other professionals with the aim of creating a stage image or a psychological adjustment. The well-known expert on the training of space crews Bogdashevsky, by way of experiment, proposed to well-known Russian actors that they play the socionic types — but it turned out that an actor, even the most talented, is not capable of full-fledgedly imitating more than 8 types. All who remember the remarkable Russian actor Vitsin can relate with understanding to the fact that he could not have played, for example, the great commander G. K. Zhukov, whom the outstanding Russian actor Ulyanov played so brilliantly. Let us recall that Ulyanov was a bearer of the same TIM as Zhukov, taken by Aušra as the prototype of sensory-logical extraversion.

The stability, and the uniqueness connected with it, of the TIM in a concrete person is well explained by thermodynamic considerations. The TIM — independently of whether it is determined genetically or acquired under the influence of life circumstances¹ — is connected with a definite adaptation and specialization, which, from the point of view of thermodynamics, correlates with the minimization of energetic expenditures in the process of the phylogenetic development of the human being in the environment of his habitation. Since one TIM differs from another by eight Augustinavičiūtė–Reinin traits, and to this corresponds a definite energetic barrier, the transition from one TIM into another is energetically disadvantageous and has practically not been observed — although one can suppose that, with the expenditure of a definite energy, it can be changed; but for the period of the transition from one type into another the individual would have to throw off the protective shell of the TIM and remain unprotected, deprived of all the available means of effective communication and psychological defense. But practically no one goes in for this.

As a productive analogy here, the comparison of the TIM with, for example, the specialization of an athlete in one or another kind of sport would be suitable. A weightlifter, for the attainment of Olympic form, must concentrate fully on the fulfillment of the program of training; and after the attainment of a record, it would be practically impossible for him to requalify and become a track athlete capable of laying claim to the attainment of Olympic records in, for example, the 100-meter dash.

THE PROBLEM OF DIVERSITY WITHIN THE TIM

The diversity that can be observed within one type — that is, among people belonging to one type but having different characters — is apparently determined precisely by the fact that a person cannot be described by one psychological scale. Attempts to explain all the peculiarities of a person by his socionic model can be designated as a distinctive socionic monoideism. This in the best case. And more extreme categories here could be socionic fanaticism and socionic chauvinism.

At the present time there are several attempts to explain the diversity within the type and the difficulties of socionic testing connected with it.

To the number of such attempts belongs, for example, the opposition of type and character. The type in this case is represented as the basis, the framework, the skeleton of the diverse manifestations of the personality, and character as a superstructure over this basis, reflecting the concrete details of the functioning of the personality, connected with temperament, upbringing, education, and special personal circumstances. Thus, two bearers of one and the same type may possess very differing characters. The speed of reactions, the degree of persistence, softness, kindness, principledness, the peculiarities of humor, the predominant mood, the spectrum of mental possibilities, and the like may differ in a wide range, which may lead to the similarity of the concrete manifestations of different types or to the sufficient difference of identical ones — and this, naturally, leads to difficulties of socionic testing. The type is masked by the character.

Another attempt to explain intra-type differences is the hypothesis of subtypes (V. Gulenko, A. Didenko, and others). This hypothesis presupposes the division of the type into two subtypes — the rational and the irrational — depending on the domination, in the manifestations of the type, of the first or the second function. True, here one can make the remark that the first and second functions always differ not only in “-ality,” but also in vertedness, on which the authors of the hypothesis of subtypes for some reason did not sharpen their attention. The authors of this idea proceed from the premise that in the model the first or the second function may energetically predominate, and therefore a socionic subtype arises. However, this does not solve the question of diversity, since it is, in the best case, only transferred inside the subtype. All the more so since the concept of a subtype connected with the socionic model runs up against the logical difficulty of the introduction of this classificational category as a taxonomic unit.

The point is that in the case of socionics what must be at issue is not simply a subtype, a characterological variety of the type, but a subtype of information metabolism as a specific process, which is described by an integral model, whose quality, as such, is not graduated. Therefore, for the introduction of the concept of a subtype of the TIM, one would need to build an independent model admitting its own gradations. Therefore special proofs are necessary that the fluctuations, observed in reality, of the characterological peculiarities of people belonging to a definite TIM have “intra-model” causes. At the present time such proofs are absent.

The hypothesis of subtypes has one merit and two shortcomings.

The merit consists in the fact that the hypothesis factually fixes a definite difference in the character of types, although this all the same does not eliminate the problem of the diversity of manifestations within the type, but only shifts it to another level — to the level of subtypes. And all the same there remains the problem of testing, which now relates to the subtype.

On the other hand, this hypothesis has a subtle semantic defect: after all, the socionic type is the TIM — the type of information metabolism — while the concept of subtype is a classificational characteristic, widely used in science for the fixation of a difference by one basis. In other words, the introduction of subtypes is, factually, the introduction of a new, more detailed classification of types and, taking into account all the consequences flowing from this, must be accompanied by the introduction of another structural basis of information metabolism — that is, by the expansion of the functional basis of the type, which is equivalent to the introduction of a new model. Thus, here we observe a subtle substitution of logical concepts. But, of course, it is impossible to forbid the vulgar² use of the concept of subtype. Still, this is already a matter of scientific taste.

The introduction of the subtype as a sub-TIM, however, is a hidden paradox — for if the type does not function as such, but only as a subtype, that is, a sub-TIM, then it is already not a TIM, and, therefore, not a type. The dis-identification of the type with itself within the boundaries of the models used (“J” and “A”) at the everyday level means nothing other than a psychic disorder.

However, the attempt to reveal diversity within the limits of the type has a real basis under it: this diversity is directly observed. The searches for the causes of this diversity cannot fail to trouble socionists; and, in connection with the attempt to introduce subtypes, one can suppose that the energetic proportion among all the functions (and not only between the first and the second), within the limits of the preservation of the TIM, may indeed explain part of the intra-type diversity. In other words, the behavior of a bearer of a definite type with a strengthened PPF will differ from the behavior of a bearer of the same type but, say, with a strengthened ITF. But is it admissible to evaluate this as a subtype? After all, if one supposes that the activity or manifestedness of any function may vary in wide limits from one bearer of the TIM to another, then beginning with what difference in this indicator can one speak of a subtype? However, all this is subject to deep experimental verification. Theoretically it is even difficult to formulate what, properly, the strengthening of the work of some generalized function means. On the other hand, practically it is not difficult to observe significant differences in the behavior of people of one type, when one of them, for example, is better educated or differently brought up. But does this relate to the strengthening of some generalized function? After all, their type is identical! It is also not excluded that the idea of the subtype appears as the result of the imperfection of testing procedures. Also possible is the variant that the observation of a subtype by an expert is no more than an illusion arising as the result of the superimposition of other psychic factors onto the type.

At the XXII International Socionic Conference, Gulenko, in the report “The Theory of Subtypes: the DCNH System” (domination, creativity, normativity, harmonization), uses a completely different notion of subtypes. He superimposes one typology onto another, and the types of this other typology he regards as subtypes of the first typology. It is understandable that in this case one can propose as many systems of subtypes as there are different typologies you wish to use. Here the concept of subtype, losing its genetic connection with the base typology, acquires a situational shade, when anyone who wishes can consider as subtypes any aggregate of peculiarities that he can detect in a person.

As yet another source of intra-type non-homogeneity one can also propose the hypothesis of socionic accentuations [14]. The author of this concept proceeds from the observable fact consisting in this, that the socionic type can be “colored” by the manifestations of any other type, and not only be softer or harder, as comes out in the case of the acceptance of the theory of subtypes.

We shall call a socionic accentuation the case when, within the framework of a definite socionic type — sometimes masking it, sometimes emphasizing it, but in the general case deforming it — the manifestations of another type are demonstrated. The appearance of such “phantom” effects has been noted by many socionists. Earlier than others, and more often than others, the “phantom” of the dual was noted. The first to speak of this was A. Augustinavičiūtė in her lectures on socionics. She connected this with the process of self-dualization, setting in under certain special conditions in the absence of the dual, when, given the necessity of performing the work that is usually expected from the dual, the functions of the vital ring are activated. Subsequently, in the process of testing, other phantoms too began to be encountered. For example, cases turned up when part of the external manifestations — above all the physiognomic ones — corresponded to the mirror partner, the activator, the quasi-identical, the kindred, the superego partner, and even the conflictor. Here one can speak, for example, of a Don Quixote (Il) with an accentuation of Dumas (sE) — Il(sE) — or of Il(eS), when Don Quixote (Il) becomes similar to his conflictor, and so on. Pairs of Don Quixote and Dreiser were encountered, similar in the ferocity of the expression of the face, in the hardness of the carrying-through of their line. However, on further investigation it turned out that in Don Quixote this was connected with a mental confidence in the correctness of his ideas, in the correctness of his position, while in Dreiser this was connected with a subjective self-assurance, reinforced by the capacity to oppose to the partner an unbending sternness. One can note also the pairs Huxley – Gorky, physiognomically similar in mustaches of a special construction (“brush mustaches”) and a wittily caustic expression of the face. Subsequently it turned out that in Huxley the construction of the mustaches gravitates toward the form of a convex brush, and in Gorky toward the form of a straight brush. The conflict in this pair often develops in the style of witty sparring, but the character of the wit differs in them. In Gorky the wit has the character of subtle logical constructions, while in Huxley it is a firework of unexpected comparisons and the like. In the pairs Stirlitz — Yesenin one can often observe a similarity in the character of tidiness and everyday neatness in clothing, but the bases of this are each type’s own: Stirlitz feels the quality of the goods, “keeps up” the form, while Yesenin is subconsciously tuned to gladdening his somewhat gloomy dual.

The generalization of the observations adduced leads to the thought that phantom accentuations of the socionic type are possible along all kinds of relations. For the grounding of such a hypothesis a corresponding model is necessary. The appearance of phantom accentuations within the limits of the quadra is easiest of all to explain. Within the limits of the quadra, identical or mirror-symmetric functions of Model “A” are used. Each function, working in the corresponding energetic regime, gives its contribution to the energetic aura of the type, which is reflected in the corresponding elements of the appearance. So that, given the constancy of the conditions of the activation of some function, the possibility appears of a change of its energetics with the corresponding consequences. Let us recall the effect of the astonishing similarity of spouses who have lived a long joint life, or the “resemblance” of dogs and cats to their owners.

The concept of socionic accentuation increases the possibilities of diversity, but all the same does not exhaust it. Incidentally, the supposition of socionic accentuations does not require the introduction of an additional taxonomic unit and can be explained by the strengthening of the intra-model radical of the corresponding TIM. Such a strengthening may occur under the influence of external and internal causes. Here may belong upbringing, self-dualization, purposeful training, the necessity of a secondary adaptation to changed circumstances.

An interesting hypothesis, offering its contribution to the explanation of the diversity within the TIM, is used in his work by V. D. Ermak. What is at issue is the so-called communicative models. The author proceeds from the premise that the type turns out to be covered by a mask of conditioned reflexes not characteristic of such a type, worked out in a definite social surrounding, on the basis of which it can be erroneously assigned to another type. Here too arises the problem of the logical qualification of the concepts. If what is at issue here is a model, then which one? If this is a model similar to the socionic one, but at the same time differing from the basic TIM, then it is necessary to prove that in the human psyche, alongside the structure of the socionic functions, an alternative structure arises, fully duplicating or replacing the basic socionic structure. In the opposite case the term “model” is either superfluous or has a semantics not coinciding with the semantics of the socionic model. Here, for example, one could speak of a mask, but this concept too requires theoretical grounding.

Undoubtedly, the possibility of the existence of a communicative model covers some part of the diversity within the type, but likewise does not exhaust it.

The “stances” of Virginia Satir (A. Panchenko) could also make their contribution to the solution of the problem under consideration. In this case a superimposition of the scale of Virginia Satir onto the socionic model is made — and, of course, a Hugo-placator will differ from a Hugo-computer almost to the exactness of a conflictor. Of course, such a comparison is productive, but it too does not exhaust the diversity of human characters. Incidentally, a fuller list of manipulative stances can be found in Everett Shostrom. Well, and it is also necessary to prove that any type can be combined with any stance. It is not difficult to imagine that logicians can be “computers” — but is this just with respect to ethicists?

Onto the socionic type one can also superimpose the scale of the astrological signs, and then one can obtain, for example, a Dostoevsky-Pisces and a Dostoevsky-Leo, quite noticeably differing from each other. However, in this case, besides the grounding of the astrological model and the proof of its existence in the psychological sense, it is necessary to propose a mechanism of the superposition of the astrological and the socionic component. Such work, as far as I know, has at the present time not been done. Of course, what is meant is not hasty and light-minded identifications of astrological concepts with socionic ones, but a fundamental investigation on a full-fledged methodological basis and with experimental verification.

Analogous reasonings are applicable to all monoclassifications reflecting some one layer of the human psyche or adapted for the solution of a narrow class of pragmatic tasks.

The impression arises that the problem of the complexity of the human character cannot be solved within the framework of some one typology. However, it is interesting to consider from this point of view the possibilities of socionics. Without laying claim to categoricalness and finality of conclusions, let us consider the hypothesis of the COMPLETENESS OF THE SOCIONIC REPRESENTATION OF THE HUMAN CHARACTER.

Socionics, as was shown in the work “Type and Character” [3], is, by its semantic completeness, comparable with such three well-known typologies, distinguished by universality, as the MMPI, Leonhard’s typology of accentuations, and Lichko’s typology. The logical sum of their semantic fields coincides with the semantic field of socionics.

On the other hand, if one compares between themselves the diagnostic possibilities of the MMPI and of Cattell’s questionnaire, then, taking into account the universality of both methodologies and the character of the results obtained in them, one can say that the effectiveness of these methodologies is approximately identical. From this one can draw the conclusion that the semantic fields of both methodologies are, at the least, close — which, of course, is not surprising, since both methodologies are oriented toward a wide class of applications and executed by professional psychologists of high class. From this it also follows that the semantic field of socionics is, at the least, not smaller — and that means that on its basis methodologies can be created no less powerful than Cattell’s questionnaire and the MMPI. These conclusions instill the hope that the problem of diversity within the TIM can, in the end, be resolved by the internal possibilities of socionics itself. Work in this direction continues.

This hypothesis has yet one more, no less important, basis. As early as 1993, A. V. Bukalov showed that in socionics, in various forms, the principle of fractality is realized, as applied to various structures in one way or another connected with the basic socionic Model “A.” Such, for example, is the structure of the small group — well, but, as it turned out after A. V. Bukalov’s article, insufficiently, studied in psychology: the full number of roles in this group is equal not to seven, as is written in psychology textbooks, but to eight, and its structure, “to the exactness of fractality,” corresponds to the structure of Model “A.” Fractals of Model “A” are also the socion itself, and the quadras, and the fractal expansions of Model “A” into the physical and supramental region (A. V. Bukalov, V. D. Ermak). A fractal analogue of Model “A” is also the socionic structure of the ethnos (A. V. Bukalov). And even the situational representation of the subjective perception by an operator of traits in the process of the diagnostics of the TIM fits into a fractal structure, which may look (according to A. V. Bukalov), for example, as in table 5.01.

Table 5.01

Ethics (et)	Irrationality (ir)
Extraversion (ex)	Intuition (it)

This means that in the process of diagnostics the operator “saw” first the belonging of the TIM of the person under investigation to the ethical pole, then he revealed in him irrationality, and so on. As a result it turned out that the TIM corresponds to the IEE, but the very expressedness of the Jungian traits in the person under investigation permits the introduction of yet one more dimension, helping to distinguish bearers of one and the same TIM — and this creates yet one more possibility of tracking the diversity within the TIM. Here the combinatorics generates 24 variants of the basic type. Work on the study of this virtual structure continues.

Into the framework of the principle of fractality, as A. V. Bukalov showed [5], also fits the “don Juan group” described by C. Castaneda.

Let us note also that the types of manipulators and actualizers adduced in E. Shostrom’s book Man, the Manipulator can likewise be packed into a structure that is a fractal equivalent of Model “A” (see tables 5.02 and 5.03).

Table 5.02. Types of manipulators

Dictator	Nice Guy
Judge	Protector
Clinging Vine	Weakling
Calculator	Bully

Table 5.03. Types of actualizers

Leader	Carer
Expresser	Guide
Appreciator	Sympathizer
Attentive One	Assertor

Here to the PPF of Model “A” correspond the Dictator and the Leader, which it is not difficult to put into correspondence with the semantics of this function. To the CPF may quite well correspond the Nice Guy and the Carer; to the ALF — the Protector and the Guide; to the CCF — the Judge and the Expresser; to the ERF — the Weakling and the Sympathizer; to the MMF — the Clinging Vine and the Appreciator; to the ITF — the Calculator and the Attentive One; and to the RTF — the Bully and the Assertor. Still, the last correspondence seems very doubtful. Possibly, the Bully and the Assertor need to be put into correspondence with the ALF, and the Protector and the Guide with the RTF. Or, possibly, the list of manipulative stances needs to be refined. Since the semantics of part of the role-stances agrees well with the semantics of the corresponding functions, it seems quite plausible (of course, this still remains to be proven!) that the remaining stances too correspond, or must correspond, to other functions.

One of the psychic fractals exerting influence on the diversity within the TIM is what can be called the typology of the psychosomatic accentuation of character (V. K. Torchak). This typological direction takes its beginning from Freud, who described three stages of the erotic becoming of the personality: the oral, the anal, and the genital. Psychic fixations at one or another stage in childhood manifest themselves in the adult state by quite definite traits of character. For example, the anal fixation forms such traits of the personality as obstinacy, thrift, tidiness, and also fixation on the past. Somewhere toward the middle of the nineties of the twentieth century this typology, by the efforts of several psychologists, was brought up to eight types, to which, besides those mentioned, were added the urethral, the cutaneous, the visual, the olfactory, the verbal, and the auditory. In the presented form, the set of psychosomatic accentuations of character looks like an eclectic-empirical list, since there is no proof of its completeness. In addition, into it are included the representational systems from NLP, which makes these typological units unequal in their psychological qualification. Undoubtedly, this list stands in need of further theoretical working-through. However, a certain hint at a psychosomatic fractal and its influence on the diversity within the type is present here.

To the fractal psychological set one can also assign the psychogeometry of S. Dellinger, who managed to make a brand out of a rather simple little typology.

In his time Freud worked out the theme of psychological defenses, of which he had eight; however, subsequently various psychologists revealed about two dozen more defenses, and they too can be represented as a single fractal, whose theoretical working-through still awaits its researchers.

To the solution of the problem of diversity within the TIM a direct relation is also had by the hypothesis, advanced by A. V. Bukalov, of the psychoinformational field, the carrier of informational functions and structures [6]. In accordance with this hypothesis, all the structural phenomena connected with the psyche, the socium, and the ethnos are resonances of the hypothetical field, and therefore, according to its laws, will be to a definite degree similar. If this hypothesis is proven experimentally, then yet another promising direction will open up for the substantive description of the diversity within the TIM — and, possibly, it will then prove possible to find a common basis for the large quantity of typologies existing at the present time.

In conclusion let us note that, possibly, from the practical point of view, there is no particular sense in bringing all the typologies to a common denominator, since they are effectively used as working instruments in their subject domain; however, it is not excluded that a unified theory of the psychoinformational field could not simply become the common basis of many typologies, but they, besides a deeper theoretical grounding, could appear in a new light, and their effectiveness would become higher.

Within the framework of socionics there exists, at the least, yet one more possibility of describing the diversity within the TIM — as the different percentage content of the radicals of relations and the radicals of types in the type. This may look completely extravagant; nevertheless, as a hypothesis, it has the right to existence. As was shown in the chapter on the modeling of the human psyche, the socionic type can be represented as a set of psychic radicals, representing informational-energetic instruments ready for contact with the corresponding type of situations. Each such radical can be represented either as a generalized relation or as a typal intention. A typal intention can be defined as a maximally folded typological reaction. On the switching-on of such an intention the personality does not become a bearer of another type, but uses the corresponding radical as an instrument of adaptation to the environment of habitation. The role of such radicals is especially noticeable in pathological or conditionally pathological cases. Thus, if in a person the mechanism of identity (Id) is weakened, distorted, or destroyed, then the task of self-realization becomes for him either hampered or in general unfulfillable. On the destruction of the mechanism of dualization (Du), a person turns out to be doomed to solitude. If, however, the mechanism of activation (Ac) is weakened or put out of commission, then the person will constantly be at a low energetic level, which dooms him to lowered productivity. On the destruction of the mirror mechanisms (Mr), a person turns out to be incapable of a realistic and adequate perception of actuality, with all the dramatic consequences flowing from this. Defects in the mechanisms of order and control (Or, Ro, Cn, Rc) make a person inadequate in the transmission of social influences, which leads to his inferiority as a social being. The destruction of the business valence (Bu) is expressed in the incapacity to make contact with other people on equal terms. And a defect of the mirage radical (Mg) leads to a slavish dependence on any possible influences, to the internal unfreedom of the personality. Analogous conclusions are possible for all sixteen psychic radicals.

Of special interest here is the fact that in each person the expressedness of any psychic radical is individual and varies in wide limits — from complete absence to magnitudes determined by fractions of unity. Thus, the concrete “hand” of the fractional magnitude of the psychic radicals determines with high exactness the life effectiveness of the personality. Let us take, for example, a concrete bearer of the type Zhukov with the hand [Id=0.8, Du=0.3, Ac=1, Mr=0.5, Or=1, Ro=0.2, Cn=0.9, Rc=1, Bu=0.4, Mg=0.6, Qi=0.1, Cf=0.7, Se=0.5, Op=0.1, Kn=0.9, Sd=0.7]. What, then, is hidden behind this? This is a creature with a rather high intention toward self-realization (Id=0.8), yet almost incapable of loving (Du=0.3), but highly active (Ac=1). Already this fragment of the characterization sets a sufficiently definite image of generalized behavior of a robot-like type. If to this one adds a not-high level of adequacy of the evaluation of the proposed circumstances (Mr=0.5), a maximal capacity to project himself onto others (Or=1), and a very low capacity for empathy (Ro=0.2), then it will become understandable that here a strong accusing position is combined with an absence of sympathy for the other. If one now takes into account that the creature under investigation tracks objects and circumstances with high intensity in order to intervene (Cn=0.9), but at the same time depends almost slavishly on another instance (Rc=1), then it will become understandable that this is a hard and uncompromising executor of another’s will. Usually this is the will of higher-standing superiors or of a close person (wife, daughter, and so on). Also possible is the variant of the petty-tyrant-dictator-henpecked-husband. In addition, such a person possesses a very limited outlook (Qi=0.1), is similar to a dog ready at any moment to break loose from the chain (Cf=0.7), but at the same time is almost incapable of the independent working-out of goals (Op=0.1), and, on top of that, does not fully command diplomatic skills (Se=0.5). It remains to add to what has been said that he has sufficient artistic abilities (Kn=0.9) and very many pretensions (Sd=0.7). In general, by mediocrity, something midway between Caligula and Nero.

However, what interests us here is not the concrete subject we have sketched, but the possibility of a sufficient detailing of the character with a taking-into-account of the fractional evaluation of the psychic radicals entering into the structure of the personality.³ Of course, here one can also speak of a personal profile expressed in socionic radicals.

With the aim of explaining typological blurredness, in the works of I. Kalinauskas and T. Prokofieva the concept of the mask is used. Of this same thing, in his book [12], E. Krivosheyev also speaks. The concept of the mask likewise sheds a certain light on the problem of diversity within the type; however, it is not difficult to understand that it does not cover this theme fully, since the real life of the personality cannot be reduced only to the masking of the process of self-realization. More fully this theme is discussed in the chapter “Socionics and Psychology.”

Conclusions to Chapter Five

1. The existence of the TIM is the initial hypothesis of socionics, and the acknowledgment or non-acknowledgment of such existence determines whether socionics has its own subject of investigation and has a direct relation to its scientific status.
2. THE SOCIONIC TYPE REALLY EXISTS AS A COMBINATION OF QUITE DEFINITE FRAME PROGRAMS OF BEHAVIOR, FIXED IN PSYCHIC AND PHYSIOLOGICAL CARRIERS.
3. Returning to the problem of the existence of the TIM, one can say that the latter represents one of the possible psychological factors, since it can be assembled from a multitude of differential features, and thus its reality and existence are determined by the reality and existence of the separate differential features and their sets.
4. From the formal-theoretical point of view, the TIM — and, that means, its existence — is postulated by a set of axioms whose truth is discerned intuitively or accepted out of practical considerations.
5. Since the hypothesis of the existence of the TIM has passed practical verification in various groups, clubs, and in the solution of applied social tasks, the existence of the TIM must be acknowledged a fact. As such a fact it is acknowledged by those who work professionally with this object.
6. As the result of the total phylogenetic adaptation of the psyche of a concrete person to the conditions of being, each psychic function is bound to, or turns out to be adapted to, the processing of one IA, and this ensures the uniqueness of the TIM in the separate person; however, the structure of the psyche admits an additional adaptation to changing conditions of existence, as the result of which adaptive accentuations may appear, which, by virtue of their peripheral position in the model, all the same do not substitute for the basic type, but only superimpose an additional shade onto it.
7. The diversity within the TIM can be explained by the superimposition of other typological scales onto the socionic type; however, of interest is the possibility of explaining the diversity within the type by the variative fractalization of the primary informational entity.

References

1. Ivlev, Yu. V., Logic, Moscow, 1992, 270 pp.
2. Melnikov, V. M., and Yampolsky, L. T., Introduction to the Experimental Psychology of the Personality, Moscow, Prosveshcheniye, 1985, 317 pp.
3. Churyumov, S. I., “Type and Character,” SMiPL 1, 2000.
4. Bukalov, A. V., Integral Socionics. Types of Collectives, Nations, States.
5. Bukalov, A. V., “Socionics, Psychology, and the Secrets of Magic: Deciphering the Riddles of C. Castaneda,” SMiPL 4, 1997.
6. Bukalov, A. V., “The Theory of Psychoinformational Space, Its Fields and Structure,” SMiPL 5, 1999.
7. Shepetko, E., Peculiarities of Model “A,” manuscript, 1992, 20 pp.
8. Augustinavičiūtė, A., Reinin’s Traits, manuscript, Vilnius, 1986.
9. Gulenko, V. V., Jung in School, publishing house of Novosibirsk University, 1998.
10. Svetlov, V. A., Practical Logic, St. Petersburg, 1995.
11. Berne, E., Transactional Analysis and Psychotherapy, St. Petersburg, 1994.
12. Krivosheyev, E. M., Socionics through the Eyes of a Psychologist, Moscow, 2005.
13. Psychology, a dictionary, Moscow, 1990.
14. Churyumov, S. I., “Socionic Accentuations,” SMiPL 1, 1995.

Notes

1. On this account there are as yet only hypotheses.
2. That is, theoretically unjustified.
3. In this direction a large and interesting work is being conducted by E. Litrovnik.