Chapter 6

The Problem of Differentiating Traits in Psychology and Socionics

(Epigraph: the opening of Vadim Levin’s children’s poem about Jonathan Bill — the man who killed a bear in the Black Wood, bought a kangaroo, saved up two trunkfuls of corks, and, above all, very much loved compote. Not reproduced here in full.)

In psychology there exists the concept of personality traits. In the literature [1] one can find the following definition of this concept: personality traits are stable peculiarities of the behavior of an individual, repeating themselves in various situations [1]. In order to be considered personality traits, these peculiarities of behavior must possess certain obligatory parameters. To their number belong trans-situativity and potential measurability. The term “trans-situativity” means that the indicated peculiarities of the behavior of the personality can be observed in the most diverse situations, while “potential measurability” is the possibility of evaluating one or another peculiarity of behavior by the degree of its expressedness, intensity, and the like, with the use of methodologies specially worked out and adapted for this. It is held [1] that some personality traits have been studied in more detail — for example, extraversion and introversion — and some in less detail, in connection with the unelaboratedness of the corresponding theoretical concepts. However, to declarations of this kind one must relate with caution, since they depend on the initial positions of the corresponding scientific schools. Thus, for example, in connection with the development of socionics it was discovered that different authors of various psychological methodologies fill the concepts of extraversion and introversion with different content, sometimes far from coinciding with that which was invested in it by its discoverer. Thus, at the present time there exist at least four variants of this concept — according to Jung, according to Eysenck, the experimental-psychological, and the socionic. Here we shall not go deep into the analysis of these differences, but shall only note that the socionic understanding of extraversion is maximally close to its treatment according to C. G. Jung, but has its own semantic overtones in connection with the fact that in C. G. Jung these concepts were less elaborated in comparison with socionics.

In the general-scientific sense, personality traits can be regarded as features with whose help one personality can be distinguished from another, or an identification of the elements of behavior of the same personality can be performed. This may be done with the aim of arguing the possibility that a concrete action — for example, a crime — was committed by a definite person. In the case where such a feature can be used as a distinguishing, or oppositional, one, it can be assigned to the category of differentiating traits.

Differentiating traits may relate to different levels of the functioning of the personality and individuality. In different sources a different number of such levels is indicated. In connection with the peculiarities of the theme, one can propose a more unfolded list of levels. It appears that as such levels and areas there could be: the genetic, physiological, archetypal, physical, everyday, stereotypical, psychic, interpersonal, professional, ethnic, worldview, and spiritual. However, one would want this list to be not empirical but deductively grounded.

Genetic: phenotypical features, energetic peculiarities, recessiveness-dominance.

Physiological: peculiarities of the functioning of the physiological systems — among them, the functioning of the nervous system with its balancedness-unbalancedness, strength-weakness, parameters of excitation and inhibition, mediator system, and the like.

Archetypal: primary sets relating to the most general dividing-up of actuality. This level sets the reality with which the consciousness of the individual deals.

Physical: build, height, plasticity, peculiarities of the form of separate parts of the body — the head, face, forehead, brows, eyes, nose, mouth, lips, ears, hair covering, chin, hands, fingers; timbre, energeticness, and variations of the loudness of the voice; variations of the motor tempo-rhythm, and the like.

Cultural-everyday: tidiness, thriftiness, organizedness, well-bred-ness, relation to the surrounding environment, habits and stereotypes.

Psychic: temperament, level of accentuatedness, volitional peculiarities, peculiarities of attention and memory, self-control, and the like.

Interpersonal: politeness, distance, initiative, and the like.

Professional: degree of professionalism, presence of professional skills.

Ethnic: peculiarities of behavior connected with belonging to a definite ethnos and culture.

Worldview: the presence of convictions and their character, the presence of prejudices, ideological commitment, conscientiousness, pragmatism, patriotism, subjectivity, tolerance, and the like.

Spiritual: the degree of spiritual maturity and aspiration, enlightenedness…

The author insists neither on the completeness of this list nor on its theoretical correctness, but adduces it as an example of an empirical enumeration with all the shortcomings and contradictions inherent in the empirical approach.

It would be unjustified to oppose the two directions existing in psychology in the investigation of the personality — with the help of the singling-out of psychological traits characterizing the personality, and with the help of the singling-out of personality types. The indication only of the type of a concrete personality, without an indication of its characteristic peculiarities, strongly impoverishes and simplifies the notion of the person being diagnosed, making such a notion schematic. On the other hand, an enumeration of characteristic traits, if it is sufficiently full, gives the possibility of unambiguously identifying a person — which, of course, is of first importance for concrete work, but makes such a list problematic from the point of view of its completeness. In addition, when there is a list of characteristic peculiarities, then an indication of the type may become a valuable generalization of such a list, helping to create an integral image of the person. Therefore both approaches are not only valuable each in itself, but are deeply connected between themselves. The point is that as a typological criterion any quantity of traits can be used — including one. For example, if as such a trait we take boldness, then one can speak of the singling-out of the type of bold people, who in everything else may be as different among themselves as you like — but such information can be effectively used in the formation of groups or contingents for the fulfillment of certain special tasks. However, this approach may mask the polar character of such a construct as a trait is — after all, having singled out the type of the bold person, we thereby, explicitly or implicitly, single out the type of the un-bold person. Here it is useful to draw attention to the fact that the pair “bold — un-bold” is characterized in logic as contradictory, in contradistinction to the pair “bold — cowardly,” which relates to the category of contrary pairs. The first pair points to two non-intersecting sets, while between the poles of the second pair there may be located as many intermediate elements as you like. Nevertheless, both pairs point to blurred sets, and in psychology ways of working with such sets have as yet not been found. In other subject domains — for example, in technology or jurisprudence — the problem of blurred sets is in many cases solved conventionally: that is, limitations suitable for the solution of the task are artificially established. However, in psychology such artificial limitations look like a capitulation before the necessity of the theoretical working-through of this theme. For example, one can try artificially to assign 3, 4, 5, 100 gradations of boldness, having written the corresponding explications or tests, if such a practical need arises — but will a real entity stand behind this? At the same time, in the given case, there exist real psychophysiological processes ensuring the psychic reaction that can be placed at the foundation of the provision of boldness as a psychological phenomenon — these are the real differences in the peculiarities of the vegetative nervous system. In any case, a psychological trait is always the pole of a construct consisting of at least two poles. Although one can imagine differentiating constructs consisting of three, four, five, and more poles.

If as a typological basis two traits are taken — and, precisely, in polar formulation — then they generate four types. N polar traits generate 2^N types.

The naive-empirical approach to the concept of a personality trait is well reflected in ordinary word usage in various languages. Of a person one may speak as of a merry but tight-fisted one; a cautious but simple one; a forgetful but treacherous one; a liberal but base one; and so on. Characteristic categories of this kind have been worked out in the culture of all peoples, and they quite suffice for the servicing of “folk” psychology and habitual everyday situations.

A more developed, semi-theoretical approach can be discovered in scientific psychology, when, with the help of tests worked out on one or another theoretical basis, one tries to determine such parameters of a person as businesslikeness (the test “How businesslike are you”), what you represent in the capacity of a colleague (the test “What kind of colleague are you”), how independent you are (the test “Independence bothers no one”), whether you are sufficiently active, whether you are resolute, whether you have a talent for conducting business discussions, how well you orient yourself in arbitrary situations, whether you have “breakthrough force,” whether you are ready for surprises, whether objectivity is inherent in you, whether you know how to influence others, what the level of your pretensions is, how accommodating you are, whether you are reliable and can be relied upon, whether you are charming, what your stress-resistance is and whether a nervous breakdown threatens you, whether luck accompanies you, whether you know how to listen to others, how conflict-prone you are, whether those around you love you, how organized you are, whether you can organize people and lead them behind you, whether you know yourself, whether you know how to take risks, whether you are authoritative, whether you have a strong will, and so on. Even this small enumeration of tests mentioned in the psychological literature gives the possibility of imagining the empirical randomness of the categories chosen for the evaluation of a person. The usual criteria for the evaluation of similar lists — how complete and obligatory they are, and how mutually independent and non-contradictory the categories used in them are — show that the massif of tests existing at the present time represents a large but weakly organized multitude.

In connection with the notion of the mutual dependence or independence of characterological concepts, there arises the problem of the singling-out of basic categories through which all the others could be expressed. There exists a far from grounded supposition that, for example, in the systems of Cattell and the MMPI such categories have been singled out, and through them all the remaining characteristics of a person can be expressed. It is precisely on this that the recommendations are based which can be given to a person after his examination with the help of the tests used in these systems.

However, there are also subtler and more masked criteria of the evaluation of concepts. One of them is the definiteness, unambiguity, or clarity-blurredness (in the logical sense) of the concepts used in such lists. If one takes, for example, such a psychological quality as will, then its ordinary, everyday meaning, intuitively understandable to the bearers of the language, does not withstand a critical analysis conducted with the use of scientific methodology. In this case it is very quickly discovered that behind this simple word, as a term, there hide several not simply different but even opposite concepts. Thus, one can distinguish the will directed at the overcoming of external obstacles — the will of breakthrough — and the will that gives the possibility of stopping the internal, subconscious pressure that makes a person a marionette of his own desires and impulses. And often people capable of winning a heavy confrontation with an experienced and strong opponent turn out to be helpless not merely before drugs, into dependence on which they have fallen, but cannot cope even with entirely “harmless” smoking. One can even suppose that such volitional, “tough” people cannot, for example, quit smoking because it is precisely their will that “smokes” — and with itself it precisely cannot cope, since it is equal to itself.

An original approach to the formation of a massif of psychological characteristics of a person was used by the American psychologists G. W. Allport and H. S. Odbert, and by the one who continued the work begun by them and subsequently became famous — R. B. Cattell. G. W. Allport and H. S. Odbert conducted work on the compilation of a dictionary of terms that are usually used for the description of a person. They analyzed 18,000 words present in dictionaries with a “psychological” shade and selected from them 4,500 words clearly — in their understanding — designating personality traits and stable characteristics of behavior. Cattell performed further work with this list, having singled out in it synonymic groups, and then from each such group he chose the word most vividly, in his opinion, expressing the basic semantic content of such a group — as a result of which he obtained a list of 171 words, which cannot yet be considered terms, since they had not passed full technological processing within the framework of a scientific theory. This list Cattell subjected to further processing, which consisted in its evaluation by a group of experts, where each indicated the degree of his acquaintance with each of these 171 characteristics of the personality. Having conducted a correlational analysis of the massif of evaluations obtained as the result of the experts’ work, Cattell singled out 36 correlational pleiades, inside which were located highly correlating concepts expressing, as he considered, one and the same meanings. Into these pleiades entered also members with a high negative correlation, like: taciturn — talkative, merry — sad, trusting — suspicious, and the like. This massif of polar characteristics, in the quantity of 36, Cattell supplemented up to 46 pairs, having added to it special terms taken from the works of other researchers. And, finally, for each pair a technical definition was composed. As examples of such definitions one can take those adduced below.

Flexible. Easily changes his plans, easily readjusts, is capable of compromises. He is not surprised, does not become irritable, does not renounce what he has conceived, and does not change his plans if the development of events does not coincide with his expectations.

Rigid. Insists that everything be performed the way he is accustomed to doing it; does not change his habits and behavior under the pressure of those around him; is at a loss if the habitual modes of behavior do not lead to success.

Conscientious. Always honest, knows the rules of behavior well and always follows them, even if no one is observing him. Never lies or deceives; relates to other people with respect.

Unscrupulous. Not particular in his means, does not strive to observe moral principles; when the matter concerns personal advantage, may resort to lying and deception; does not respect the dignity of other people.

Incidentally, let us note that even in such scientifically oriented explications one does not manage to avoid ambiguity. For example, it comes out that conscientiousness coincides with honesty and respect for people — as if a person could not be honest and at the same time not respect people, or, say, consciously commit evil and not observe the rules of behavior.

Subsequently Cattell came to the conclusion that this multitude of bipolar features could be “folded” down to 12–15 factors. Using this circumstance, Cattell built the 16-factor “Q”-test — that is, a test based on the analysis of answers to specially composed questions. Subsequently the quantity of factors was expanded to 19.

The work done by Cattell represents a pragmatic attempt to single out “pure” psychological concepts whose effectiveness would be high and would not evoke doubts. Cattell managed to build such a methodology of the interpretation of the multitude of factors characterizing a concrete person that with its help one can give a large quantity of practical recommendations, which may quite well turn out to be useful. It is held that this test has recommended itself well, and it enjoyed and enjoys sufficient popularity.

However, a more attentive methodological analysis of Cattell’s approach to the singling-out of the basic psychological categories places in doubt, for example, the completeness and obligatoriness of the multitude of factors he obtained. The impression is created that there could have been more or fewer of them — 12, 16, 19 — and this would not have played a particular role in the working-out of the apparatus of their interpretation. The multitude of Cattell’s factors resembles a good set of carpenter’s tools, into which enter hammers, saws, drills, chisels, gouges, and the like, and which can, when necessary, be replenished with yet another useful tool. And this is not bad — at least at first glance. Who, indeed, will object to a set of good tools?

Analogous remarks can be made also with respect to a multitude of other psychological typologies — for example, the MMPI methodology, in which its ten basic categories were a generalization of rich clinical experience, but bear a still more down-to-earth empirical character than Cattell’s factors. All this, incidentally, agrees splendidly with the peculiarities of the American national character, where practical usefulness is placed ahead of theoretical “intricacies.”

The same can be said of the “stances” of Virginia Satir, the types of manipulators of Everett Shostrom, or the “geometric” types of Dellinger. Of these sets of categories one can say that they are practical, aesthetic, and heuristic, but their theoretical grounding leaves much to be desired or is completely absent. Thus, for example, S. Dellinger considers that she has built a “psychic system,” a psychological system, only on the basis that the methodology worked out by her has been introduced in more than 20 countries, is easily assimilated by the consumer, and leads to easily identifiable practical results. Of course, this is good — but what relation does all this have to theoretical exactness? Such elaborations can be assigned to the category of technologies, but, alas, not to the category of science.

In some cases the completeness of a multitude of derivative categories is successfully ensured at the expense of a successfully chosen polar pair of concepts. Thus, for example, in T. Leary’s methodology of the diagnostics of interpersonal relations, three polar pairs of categories — “domination — submission,” “friendliness — unfriendliness,” “emotionality — analyticity” — determine eight derivative concepts, which are then used for the description of situations arising in intertype relations. But in this methodology too the basic categories do not seem obligatory, although, from the pragmatic point of view, they look successful. Of course, there may also exist the answer that absolutely preferable categories do not in principle exist — but this, all the same, would need to be proven.

In logic there has long existed the problem of clear and blurred concepts [2]. Blurred are not only evaluative concepts with a subjective coloring, like “good” or “beautiful,” but also qualitative concepts whose denotation — that is, the reality standing behind them — could quite well be evaluated quantitatively, like “old,” “fat,” “healthy,” “merry.” Such words, quite suitable for the description of everyday cases and for use in artistic literature, become non-constructive as soon as one begins to relate to them as to scientific terms.

By the degree of definiteness several groups of concepts are singled out: 1) with definite content and a sharp, registrable or non-registrable, extension (“African countries,” “molecule”); 2) with indefinite content and a sharp, registrable or non-registrable, extension (“an experienced instructor of our university,” “butterfly”); 3) with indefinite content and a non-sharp, registrable or non-registrable, extension (“an overcast November morning,” “a good broadcast”). For example, as concerns the indefiniteness of the concept “butterfly”: possibly, for an entomologist there are no particular problems here, but for a simple person it would be not simple to draw the boundary between all possible moths and clothes-moths, on the one hand, and full-fledged butterflies, on the other.

In professional and scientific practice, where the indefiniteness of concepts leads not simply to errors and misunderstandings but may bear a dramatic and even tragic character, this logical defect is eliminated by the introduction of more exact criteria for the distinguishing of denotations, or by special conventions. For example, a person may be considered of age from the moment of receiving a passport — and then two adolescents with a difference in age of one day will, for one and the same crime, receive very different punishments only because one has turned sixteen and the other has not.

One must also take into account that pairs of concepts with a high negative correlation may stand in the relation of contrariety and of contradictoriness. In the first case the concepts represent polar values of a more general category (“white — black”), between which a countless multitude of intermediate values may be located. In the second case there are no intermediate values between the poles, but on the other hand one of the poles may be extremely blurred — for example, “white — non-white.” In the case of physical objects, definiteness can be attained at the expense of measurements and conventions. In the case of psychological categories, however, their measurability represents a difficult problem.

In view of the extreme importance of the problem of differentiating traits in psychology, many attempts have been made to solve it, and the results attained in this direction were used in practice with one or another degree of effectiveness. Let us consider two such approaches.

In 1957, Ch. Osgood worked out the concept of the semantic differential, intended for measuring the differences in the understanding by concrete people of objects, situations, and categories (see [6]). This was done with the aim of establishing the subjective and individual relation of the given person, formed in him as the result of personal practical experience. With this aim, the object under investigation (in verbal or non-verbal form) is proposed to be matched with the value of a scale set by polar features. By default it is accepted that the space between these features is continuous, and the expressedness of the feature changes monotonically from the zero value, located in the middle between the poles, toward one or the other pole. Ch. Osgood used three generalized scale-factors: the factor of evaluation, the factor of force, and the factor of activity. In accordance with Ch. Osgood’s hypothesis, onto these three scales one can project any object and any concept. The scales themselves, being, presumably, orthogonal, set a three-dimensional factor space. The position of an object in such a space is determined qualitatively (by correspondence to the scale) and quantitatively (by the remoteness from the zero value of the factor). Thus, an object of arbitrary nature can be represented by a point in a three-dimensional factor space, which gives the possibility of establishing the degree of similarity or difference between objects with the help of the procedure of the measurement of the Pythagorean distance between the points representing the objects. Undoubtedly, this is a beautiful and heuristic idea, and it has not exhausted itself fully to this day. However, the vulnerable place here is the supposition of the continuity of the space of the feature — and, what is chief, the subjectivity in the coordinate-semantic positioning of a concrete object.

Taking into account the limitations in the construction of Osgood’s space imposed by the subject domain of psychology, with the help of such a methodological instrument one can obtain useful results. However, the very choice of the initial factors all the same does not satisfy the criterion of completeness — at the least, it has not been proven that three factors are sufficient to describe the psychological space of a person. In addition, in the methodology of the semantic differential it is accepted by default that the chosen factors are universal and adequate with respect to an arbitrary subject.

In 1955, E. Kelly worked out an individually oriented approach to subjective scaling [4], in which the determining factors were not imposed by the experimenter from outside, but were extracted from the subjective experience of the personality under investigation. This method was named by the author the technique of repertory grids. It is intended for the revealing of the individual system of constructs, or primary categories, formed in the psyche of a person on the basis of personal experience for the evaluation of objects, phenomena, and situations inside the environment of his habitation. With the aim of revealing the system of personal constructs, the subject is proposed to indicate, in his own words — and, consequently, with reliance only on his own experience — the difference between objects personally significant for him. With this aim universal roles are chosen, having concrete significance in the life of every person — father, mother, grandmother, grandfather, son, brother, sister, girlfriend, friend, boss, subordinate, and so on. In all, twenty-six roles, of which not all may be used, and the subject must indicate the existing differences between separate real people from his surroundings and various groupings of them, by the type: in what do these two simultaneously differ from some one other. The processing of the results obtained in this way with the help of the methods of latent analysis permits the revealing of the structure of the semantic parameters constituting the basis of the perception by a person of himself and of the surrounding world.

The difference between the approaches of Ch. Osgood and E. Kelly consists in the fact that the first proposed to a person to insert an object into a space prepared for this in advance — with, generally speaking, evaluative scales alien to the subject — while the second proposes to the person to build the semantic space himself. Both approaches have their positive and negative sides. In the case of the semantic differential, the experimenter cannot assert and cannot be sure that the subject understands the categories proposed to him exactly as the experimenter does; and in the case of repertory grids the matter stands in exactly the opposite way: the experimenter cannot assert and cannot be sure that he understands the categories used by the subject exactly as the subject does. For the experimenter, depending on the tasks standing before him, it may present interest why and how the subject uses his own categories for the description of, it would seem, the same reality. Possibly, this would help shed light on the mysteries of subjectivity — but, after all, in many cases the experimenter needs to, or has to, answer entirely different questions, when the subjective world of the subject may remain in the background.

In both cases we run up against one and the same masked problem. In the methodology of the semantic differential it is presupposed by default that the person under investigation understands the meaning of the factors chosen by the experimenter in the same way as the experimenter himself — but this is not at all obligatory. In the technique of repertory grids it is accepted by default that the experimenter understands the constructs of the person under investigation in the same way as the person himself. Neither in the one case nor in the other is this problem specially stipulated — and that means that the source of hidden errors remains unrevealed.

Let us take note of this, and let us try to use the positive sides of both methodologies in the solution of the problem of differentiating traits.

First, let us renounce the understanding of a trait in its linguistic formulation, since it at once falls into the category of the blurred. Second, let us take into account that the verbal form of the representation of a trait stands in need of the revealing of its internal semantic spectrum — that is, of the determination of the qualitative and quantitative gradations existing inside it. And, third, let us accept that traits are objectively realized in the opposition of objects or of their sets, as extensive and intensive differences between them.

The last moment let us stipulate specially. Differences may bear an extensive and an intensive character. By the extensive representation of differences we shall understand the directly registrable sensory distinctions of one object from another. An intensive difference, however, arises in the comparison of objects as integral formations: in what does the given object, or set of them, differ from another object, or set of them, as a whole. In simple cases the difference between the extensive and the intensive may disappear or be masked. For example, apples can be sorted by the directly observable extensive feature of ripeness, size, worminess, and so on — or by the intensive feature which the variety of the apple is: the variety can be reduced to an aggregate of extensive features, but it can also be perceived directly, as an integral image.

When what is at issue is psychological traits, then many of them, being factors of higher orders than the zero one, cannot be considered sensorily perceivable. Boldness or timidity, egoism or altruism, caution or riskiness are evaluated as an integral feature of the object on the basis of the observation and evaluation of a multitude of extensive features connected with the behavior of a person. The integral image of an object is very concrete and can hardly be unambiguously expressed by one word behind which stands one or another scientific concept — although it, undoubtedly, can be designated by some word, as by a name.

In view of the extreme complexity of the problem of differentiating traits, let us approach it in a maximally generalized way. Let us try to reveal the principles of such a construction for a limited set of psychological traits distinguishing the socionic types from one another.

All psychologically significant differentiating traits are, in their essence, either elementary or generalized traits of character. As was shown in the article [5], the set of differentiating traits, or traits of character, is dual with respect to the set of types built on them.

Deductively, the set of differentiating traits can be determined through the opposition of antisymmetric octaves. If, for example, one opposes all extraverts to all introverts, then thereby the trait of extraversion-introversion will be set (not defined!). This trait itself we shall, at the given level of investigation, consider atomic — which, incidentally, here corresponds to intensiveness. This trait can somehow be described in words, synonymic forms can be found for it, and this, undoubtedly, needs to be done; but the essence consists in the fact that it exists as an intensive difference at once between all extraverts and all introverts. In accordance with its primary nature, it has no gradations. Extraversion-introversion is not a scale — these are two poles, two opposite states. Either the one, or the other. This trait may be masked, leveled out, at the expense of other peculiarities of the personality, so that an impression may be created of greater or lesser extravertedness or introvertedness, and even of ambivertedness — but in itself it is constant. This is an example of the quantum fixation of a state of the psyche. Such a concept can be used only proceeding from the supposition that the substrate of the psyche is a certain energoinformational field, and that psychic realities represent quanta or resonances of this field — that is, its stable configurations, between which there is no continual transition, and thereby their set is discrete.

Apparently, exactly thus does the matter stand with all the remaining socionic traits revealed by Reinin and Aušra Augustinavičiūtė — these are the fifteen differentiating traits known in socionics; but to them it is necessary to add yet one more, a non-differentiating or, more exactly said, 0-differentiating trait, connected with the existence of the object (the Karpenko–Churyumov trait).

Therefore, when what is at issue is rationality — irrationality (in the socionic understanding), thinking or logic — more exactly, its archetype (= L/l) — emotioning or ethics (also an archetype) (= E/e), sensing (= S/s) or intuition (= I/i), then these traits must be understood as intensive and non-graduated. If, in the general-scientific understanding of the concept of logic, one can speak of a person as distinguished by greater or lesser logicalness, then in the socionic sense one must speak of the position in which one or another archetype is located in the structure of the psyche. And of course, the interference of the general-scientific and the socionic meaning of the terms hampers the discussion of this problem. But it is precisely the position of the IA in the structure of Model “A” that ensures its contribution to the behavior of a concrete person. Thus, the integral behavior of a person represents a superposition of the contributions of each function, as a result of which there may arise the effect of a greater or lesser degree of expressedness of the archetypal property. And on this basis one can organize a diagnostic procedure for the revealing of how manifested a trait is — but all the same such manifestedness is an indirect indication of the position of the IA in the structure of the psyche. The matter here lies not simply in the degree, but also in the quality of manifestedness. Quantitatively an IA may be manifested to a different degree simply because the corresponding function was, in the course of life, subjected to training or, on the contrary, was not trained; but the quality of its manifestedness will be different depending on what position it occupies in the structure of the psyche of the concrete person. Thus, for example, a woman Don Quixote (Il) may be a ballerina and attain great successes in this, since Don Quixotes are very industrious and do not spare labor on training. Using intuition, they can create highly artistic images, making them exceptionally lifelike — but at the same time in them there will be a certain limit-quality, a breadth of generalization, and, most likely, a very subtly played element of detachment, of spiritual illuminatedness and aspiration toward the highest limits. A Hamlet (Ei) in an analogous case will create a dramatic image, emotionally saturated, with a shade of tragism, which will leave no one indifferent. In Hugo (Es), alongside dramatism and emotional saturation, in the personage created by him a great vital force and steadfastness will be noticeable; while in the same case in Yesenin (iE) the image will be permeated with a subtle lyricism and, depending on the plot, either sad, evoking acute sympathy, or foolishly merry, which will make even very tough fellows smile. And on the contrary, if by the force of circumstances a Yesenin (iE) becomes a programmer or a mathematician, then he will be able to work quite effectively in these fields, using his strong functions. Of course, he will use routine operations too in the writing of programs, but he will obligatorily have the striving to find his own, original way of doing this work, and there will appear an element of a relation to them as to a work of art. In mathematics he may discover new theorems and create new theories, but they will either turn out to be extremely original and so far ahead of their time that not everyone will be able to understand them at once — and he will be almost incapable of explaining them, since, most likely, he will be investing in them a completely different meaning from the one that will be discovered in them subsequently — or, being works of “logical” art, they may turn out to be beautiful and very plausible artifacts with which it will be very difficult for the author to part. If a Yesenin makes such a discovery, then this will happen easily and spontaneously, and subsequently he will try to bring his brainchild to the consciousness of the greatest possible number of people, and will do this with inspiration and inventiveness and on every convenient occasion — at seminars, conferences, including international ones, at various courses, and so on. And still it may turn out that what he with such enthusiasm disseminated around himself will not withstand the check of time and will turn out to be untenable from the scientific point of view.

Differentiating traits acquire concreteness when they are correlated with a position in the model; in the opposite case they remain approximate abstractions relating to the category of blurred concepts. Thus, one can speak of eight qualitative gradations of a differentiating trait. One can also suppose that extraversion and introversion as traits represent the sum of the extraversions and introversions connected with the corresponding functions. Thus, the extraversion of the type Don Quixote (Il) is composed of the extraversions of the first, third, sixth, and eighth functions — that is, the formula of his extraversion could look like I_PPF + S_ALF + E_MMF + L_RTF (1+3+6+8); but, taking into account the strength of the functions, this formula should be rewritten as I_PPF + L_RTF + S_ALF + E_MMF — while, for example, in Hugo (Es) the full extraversion looks like E_MMF… more exactly, E_PPF + S_ALF + L_RTF + I_MMF (1+8+3+6). Can one compare these two extraversions by intensity? In any case, one can try to do so. For example, the extraverted emotionality of Hugo (Es) will be more demonstrative than the extraverted intuition of Don Quixote (Il). The same can be said of the extraverted sensing of Hugo in comparison with the extraverted sensing of Don Quixote. Therefore Hugo (Es) as a whole may be perceived as initially more extraverted, although each atomic component of extraversion, within the limits of each concrete bearer, will be distinguished by its own intensity. If one takes the full extraversion of such an introvert as Dumas (sE), then it will look like E_CPF + S_ITF + L_CCF + I_ERF (2+7+4+5). A bearer of such a TIM will, in his emotional manifestations, look far more demonstrative than a Don Quixote — and, in comparing them by the manifestation of emotionality, the impression may be created that the first is an extravert and the second an introvert. However, what must be at issue here is not the greater or lesser demonstrativeness of separate functions, but the integral set of the bearer of the type — and then the vertedness will be determined not by the external manifestations, but by the parameters of the PPF. The same can be said of rationality-irrationality and all the other typological characteristics.

At different times several socionists (Reinin, Shepetko, Gut) expressed suppositions that, besides the ART, there must exist other traits as well, connected with the opposition of other groups of socionic types to one another. So that one could speak of a very extensive set of Reinin–Shepetko–Gut traits. Of course, there remains the problem of the substantive interpretation of these traits. It is not at all easy to discern intuitively what trait must be determined by the opposition of the octaves of extraverts and introverts if in them, for example, (Il) and (sE) are made to change places. However, in accordance with the ideas of E. Kelly, such a trait could exist. However, a theoretical proof is necessary that an arbitrary division of the set of types of any typology can be interpreted as a DT. Such a proof does not exist, and therefore to speak of the existence of DTs over and above the ART — and, all the more, of ones independent of them — is as yet premature.

In the given work it would be difficult to give a final solution of the problem posed in this chapter — over this a large collective and a multitude of scientists must work. However, here one can outline certain promising approaches to its solution.

The Augustinavičiūtė–Reinin traits (ART) are not simple properties of the psyche, but correspond to the archetypes standing behind them — generalized concepts that cannot be unambiguously expressed by commonly used words. One can try to interpret them, but this is not at all simple. A remarkable example of the complexity in the explanation of psychological concepts is the case of extraversion and introversion. Jung did not give definitions of these concepts, but only tried to explain and discuss them at least somehow. Such remarkable psychologists as Eysenck, Cattell, Guilford, and, following them, many others began to use these terms — but, as it turned out, they connected them with rather different concepts: that is, in the way that seemed right to them. Thus, the aggregate of the uses of these words by various authors represents an unrecognized case of homonymy — that is, the words used are identical, but the meaning invested in them is different. So that it is high time for psychology to bring order into its conceptual economy.

Exactly likewise, attempts at the straightforward projection of such ART as statics-dynamics, obstinate-yielding, questimity-declatimity, strategy-tactics, and the like onto concepts known in psychology look, at the least, naive.

Above all, let us turn attention to the levels of generality of traits. Traits one of whose poles is obligatorily present in any person (excluding pathological cases) we shall call universal, or typological. Traits separating off a relatively small group of people in connection with their professional, ethnic, cultural, pathological, and similar peculiarities we shall call local. Traits singling out a separate person, opposing him to all the rest of humanity, we shall call particular. Traits appearing and disappearing in a concrete person depending on the conditions in which he has found himself we shall call situational. Now one can pose the question: do the terms that Aušra Augustinavičiūtė used for the designation of the objectively existing typological Augustinavičiūtė–Reinin traits (ART) correspond to traits of precisely such a level, or do local, particular, and situational traits stand behind them? I do not see theoretical sense in dividing the ART into primary, secondary, tertiary, and quaternary, similarly to how D. Lytov does this, since I consider that all these traits are single-level, in the sense in which this was defined above. Therefore I shall consider them all in order, as this comes out in the ordered system of the ART.

A set-theoretic description of a trait is possible, when the trait can be represented as the result of operations on sets — at the least, disjunctions, conjunctions, and negations.

One can speak of the spectrum of a trait. All the general names of traits, expressed in words, need to be represented in the form of a conceptual spectrum. Thus, for example, the concept “bold” as a differentiating trait has the shortcoming that it relates to the number of the blurred. “Bold” may mean not-timid, or may mean recklessly brave, or may approach the meaning of insolent. A person may be bold in battle but grow timid in the presence of a beloved being. Greedy, stingy, tight-fisted, economical, thrifty, calculating, thrifty-householderly — a set of concepts behind which stands a generalized trait opposed to light-mindedness and thoughtlessness in the handling of material values.

The decomposition of a trait into semantic factors. Factually, to this reduces Osgood’s idea — the representation of a concept as referred to the basis coordinate axes of a phase space. But this case can be regarded as the limiting one, when any concepts are represented in one and the same basis. This is the limiting level of the generalization of the concept of a semantic factor.

A trait can be regarded as a binary structure. In this case, as a trait one should regard not a separately taken concept, but a pair of polarly correlated concepts — as indeed comes out in the case of the ART. In socionics a trait is always a polar pair, which, correspondingly, may have a common name. For example, extravertedness-introvertedness in socionics is matched with the common name vertedness. However, for example, for the pair rationality-irrationality no one has proposed such a name — while in practical work the necessity of using a common name for this pair does arise. Part of the socionists use for this the neologism “nality,” which appears to be an entirely successful term for this case.

Similarly to the Augustinavičiūtė–Reinin traits, referred to the set of the sixteen socionic types, one can speak of traits referred to the set of the IA. Of them, correspondingly, there will be seven (and with the uniting trait of existence — eight). This work, at least partially, was done by V. V. Gulenko, and it will be natural to call them by his name — the Gulenko traits. At the present time I am conducting work on the analysis of still more general groups of traits, so that the field of work here is very extensive.

The principle of the duality of type and relation advanced by me can quite well be applied also to the set of traits. Thus, traits can and must be referred to the Jungian (or any other) axes, which gives the possibility, first, of representing them in the system of these axes, and, second, of building a model of the trait — and this means that with the trait one will be able to work on the same methodological basis as with the TIM. Work in this direction is being conducted.

Let us show that the set of Aušra–Reinin traits is ordered — and even strictly ordered, if one considers the set of socionic types strictly ordered too, as is done, for example, in the Lyashkyavichus table with the Churyumov correction.

Let us consider the table of the Augustinavičiūtė–Reinin traits as it was filled in by Aušra Augustinavičiūtė, having changed only the form of presentation — designating the traits by numbers, and their poles by plus and minus signs. Then we obtain table 6.01.

Table 6.01 (type abbreviations: Ki = Don Quixote, Dm = Dumas, Hu = Hugo, Ro = Robespierre, Hm = Hamlet, Go = Gorky, Zh = Zhukov, Ye = Yesenin, Lo = London, Dr = Dreiser, Na = Napoleon, Ba = Balzac, He = Huxley, Ga = Gabin, St = Stirlitz, Do = Dostoevsky)

AA	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
Ki	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Dm	−	+	−	−	+	−	+	+	+	−	−	−	−	+	+
Hu	+	+	+	+	+	−	−	−	+	+	−	−	−	−	−
Ro	−	+	−	−	+	+	−	−	+	−	+	+	+	−	−
Hm	+	−	−	−	−	+	−	−	+	+	+	−	−	+	+
Go	−	−	+	+	−	+	−	+	+	−	−	−	+	−	+
Zh	+	−	−	−	−	−	+	+	+	+	−	+	+	−	−
Ye	−	−	+	+	−	+	+	+	+	−	+	−	−	−	−
Lo	+	−	+	−	+	−	+	−	−	−	+	−	+	−	+
Dr	−	−	−	+	+	+	+	−	−	+	−	+	−	−	+
Na	+	−	+	−	+	+	−	+	−	−	−	+	−	+	−
Ba	−	−	−	+	+	−	−	+	−	+	+	−	+	+	−
He	+	+	−	+	−	−	−	+	−	−	+	+	−	−	+
Ga	−	+	+	−	−	+	−	+	−	+	−	−	+	−	+
St	+	+	−	+	−	+	+	−	−	−	−	−	+	+	−
Do	−	+	+	−	−	−	+	−	−	+	+	+	−	+	−

Even a cursory glance at table 6.01 is sufficient to convince oneself of its insufficient regularity. In other words, there is no law-governedness in the pattern of the distribution of the poles of the traits among the types. However, from G. R. Reinin’s idea that the socion and the set of traits determining the difference between the types represent an algebraic group, and from the works of Ya. A. Dubrov on the definition of the socion as a topos, by virtue of the relative simplicity and internal symmetry of these objects, one is given the possibility of supposing that the pattern of the traits must be distinguished by regularity. And this is not simply a formal peculiarity, but a peculiarity behind which stands an essential meaning, reflecting the deep structure of the nature of things. Apparently, there exist many ways of attaining regularity of the pattern in this table, but for an algebraic group with a unit it is natural to suppose the existence of a natural orderedness. Such an ordering is attained with the help of the Cayley transformation (the mathematician, and not the namesake of the psychologist Kelly!).

This transformation can be described by the following algorithm: 1) in the rectangular 15×16 table let us single out the middle column, and from the top down to the middle inclusive let us place eight pluses (or other signs designating polarity), while the remaining cells in this column we fill with minuses; 2) in the middle column of the left half of the table let us place four pluses and four minuses, and let us extend this same configuration onto the lower part of this column; 3) of the three columns remaining on the left, let us fill the middle one with alternating pairs of plus and minus signs; 4) the extreme left column let us fill with alternating plus and minus signs; 5) now all the right columns, symmetric relative to the previously filled middle columns, let us fill in such a way that the upper halves of the columns are filled identically, while the lower ones are inverted — that is, in the place of pluses minuses are placed, and the reverse. Such a construction of the table bears a purely algebraic character and has no relation whatsoever to intuitive-amateur arbitrariness!

As a result there comes out a pattern of signs as in table 6.02.

Table 6.02

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
Ki	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Dm	−	+	−	+	−	+	−	+	−	+	−	+	−	+	−
Hu	+	−	−	+	+	−	−	+	+	−	−	+	+	−	−
Ro	−	−	+	+	−	−	+	+	−	−	+	+	−	−	+
Hm	+	+	+	−	−	−	−	+	+	+	+	−	−	−	−
Go	−	+	−	−	+	−	+	+	−	+	−	−	+	−	+
Zh	+	−	−	−	−	+	+	+	+	−	−	−	−	+	+
Ye	−	−	+	−	+	+	−	+	−	−	+	−	+	+	−
Lo	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−
Dr	−	+	−	+	−	+	−	−	+	−	+	−	+	−	+
Na	+	−	−	+	+	−	−	−	−	+	+	−	−	+	+
Ba	−	−	+	+	−	−	+	−	+	+	−	−	+	+	−
He	+	+	+	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	+	+	+	+
Ga	−	+	−	−	+	−	+	−	+	−	+	+	−	+	−
St	+	−	−	−	−	+	+	−	−	+	+	+	+	−	−
Do	−	−	+	−	+	+	−	−	+	+	−	+	−	−	+

If in this table one pays no attention to the first row, filled entirely with pluses, then one can notice that the remaining part will be symmetric relative to the left diagonal.¹ In order for the whole table, together with the first row, to become symmetric relative to the left diagonal, one needs to add to it a zeroth column filled with pluses. It is obvious that the trait represented by this column is not a distinguishing, differentiating trait; but if one regards the identity of two types as the minimal, or zero, difference, then everything falls into place, and in the group of traits we obtain the group unit. Substantively, this trait can be interpreted as existence, since this is the only thing that is common to all types. The introduction of such a trait is interesting and substantive from the ontological point of view as well, since, in order to consider something and compare it with another, it must, above all, exist.

Let us add to table 6.02 the zeroth trait, and we obtain table 6.03.

Table 6.03 (last column: the intertype relation corresponding to each type-row; marker key as in Chapter 4)

	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	IR
Ki	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	Id
Dm	+	−	+	−	+	−	+	−	+	−	+	−	+	−	+	−	Du
Hu	+	+	−	−	+	+	−	−	+	+	−	−	+	+	−	−	Ac
Ro	+	−	−	+	+	−	−	+	+	−	−	+	+	−	−	+	Mr
Hm	+	+	+	+	−	−	−	−	+	+	+	+	−	−	−	−	Ro
Go	+	−	+	−	−	+	−	+	+	−	+	−	−	+	−	+	Rc
Zh	+	+	−	−	−	−	+	+	+	+	−	−	−	−	+	+	Bu
Ye	+	−	−	+	−	+	+	−	+	−	−	+	−	+	+	−	Mg
Lo	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	Qi
Dr	+	−	+	−	+	−	+	−	−	+	−	+	−	+	−	+	Cf
Na	+	+	−	−	+	+	−	−	−	−	+	+	−	−	+	+	Se
Ba	+	−	−	+	+	−	−	+	−	+	+	−	−	+	+	−	Op
He	+	+	+	+	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	+	+	+	+	Kn
Ga	+	−	+	−	−	+	−	+	−	+	−	+	+	−	+	−	Sd
St	+	+	−	−	−	−	+	+	−	−	+	+	+	+	−	−	Or
Do	+	−	−	+	−	+	+	−	−	+	+	−	+	−	−	+	Cn

Into the last column of table 6.03 are inscribed the IR in the order of their correspondence to the types. Since on the basis of the principle of duality one can suppose an unambiguous correspondence between types and traits, then the same correspondence can be supposed between traits and IR (but this, of course, still needs to be argued!).

Since in table 6.03 the arrangement of the traits has been brought to their group-theoretic canonical form, one can suppose that it is precisely in this order that the traits correspond to the types and IR. In order that too light-minded critics not have the temptation to qualify the further reasonings as the fitting of explanations to a theoretical construct thought up for the occasion, let us first try to find at least heuristic arguments in favor of such a correspondence. But first let us collate the table of Aušra Augustinavičiūtė and table 6.03 built by Churyumov, for which purpose let us bring these data together in table 6.04.

Table 6.04. The correspondence of the orders of Aušra Augustinavičiūtė and of Churyumov

Chu	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
AA	—	1	12	5	13	4	11	6	14	8	9	3	15	7	10	2

The names of the ART and their Latinized designations are given in table 6.05.

Table 6.05

No.	Designation	Name of the trait
0.	is-no	Existence
1.	ex-in	Vertedness
2.	pr-ft	Carefree — provident
3.	it-sn	Intuition — sensing
4.	αγ	Democrats — aristocrats
5.	ps-ng	Positivism — negativism
6.	sb-yd	Obstinate — yielding
7.	lg-et	Logic — ethics
8.	αβ	Merry — serious
9.	kn-em	Constructivists — emotivists
10.	lf-rt	Left — right
11.	qu-dc	Questims — declatims
12.	αδ	Resolute — reasonable
13.	sg-tk	Strategy — tactics
14.	ir-ra	Irrational — rational
15.	st-dn	Statics — dynamics

The arrangement of the signs of the poles in table 6.04 and its regularity give the possibility of representing the expression of the semantic structure of the types through the ART in more economical codes. It is obvious that each row can be broken up into groups of two signs. Then we shall have four varieties of such groups of signs: (++), (−−), (+−), and (−+). Let us designate the group (++) by the letter a; then (−−) will be its opposite, which can be designated as ā. Let us designate (+−) as b, and its opposite (−+) as b̄. The result of the recoding is presented in table 6.06.

Table 6.06

Ki	(a a)	(a a)	(a a)	(a a)
Dm	(b b)	(b b)	(b b)	(b b)
Hu	(a ā)	(a ā)	(a ā)	(a ā)
Ro	(b b̄)	(b b̄)	(b b̄)	(b b̄)
Hm	(a a)	(ā ā)	(a a)	(ā ā)
Go	(b b)	(b̄ b̄)	(b b)	(b̄ b̄)
Zh	(a ā)	(ā a)	(a ā)	(ā a)
Ye	(b b̄)	(b̄ b)	(b b̄)	(b̄ b)
Lo	(a a)	(a a)	(ā ā)	(ā ā)
Dr	(b b)	(b b)	(b̄ b̄)	(b̄ b̄)
Na	(a ā)	(a ā)	(ā a)	(ā a)
Ba	(b b̄)	(b b̄)	(b̄ b)	(b̄ b)
He	(a a)	(ā ā)	(ā ā)	(a a)
Ga	(b b)	(b̄ b̄)	(b̄ b̄)	(b b)
St	(a ā)	(ā a)	(ā a)	(a ā)
Do	(b b̄)	(b̄ b)	(b̄ b)	(b b̄)

Having now introduced the designations (a a) = A, (ā ā) = Ā, (a ā) = C, (ā a) = C̄, (b b) = B, (b̄ b̄) = B̄, (b b̄) = D, (b̄ b) = D̄, let us give the coding of the TIMs a still simpler and more surveyable form, presented in table 6.07.

Table 6.07

Ki	A	A	A	A
Dm	B	B	B	B
Hu	C	C	C	C
Ro	D	D	D	D
Hm	A	Ā	A	Ā
Go	B	B̄	B	B̄
Zh	C	C̄	C	C̄
Ye	D	D̄	D	D̄
Lo	A	A	Ā	Ā
Dr	B	B	B̄	B̄
Na	C	C	C̄	C̄
Ba	D	D	D̄	D̄
He	A	Ā	Ā	A
Ga	B	B̄	B̄	B
St	C	C̄	C̄	C
Do	D	D̄	D̄	D

In this form the structural similarity of the construction of the quadras, and the structural similarity of the construction of the types inside the quadras, is well noticeable. The revealing of similar law-governednesses leads one to the thought that the semantics of the archetypes is closely connected with their deep structure. In addition, the identity of the trait structures of the types from one quadra makes impossible any movement whatsoever of types between quadras.

The zeroth trait is not difficult to match with Don Quixote (Il), as the beginning, the point of reckoning. With this by no means everyone will agree, considering that in this place one can put any type, and Don Quixote turned up there only because the creatress of socionics “completely by chance” turned out to be a bearer of this type. However, this idea becomes more plausible if one takes into account that Don Quixote is structurally matched with the identity relation, which, of course, it is natural to accept as the initial one. This is all the more logical to do since the identity transformation in algebraic groups corresponds to the unit in a multiplicative group. It is quite natural to match² Dumas (sE) with the trait extraversion-introversion — this is the first introvert in the socion, and it is the most extraverted introvert, so that in this type the poles of this trait are well opposed and collated. It is quite natural to match to the trait intuition-sensing the semantic field of the type Robespierre (lI) — this is an intuitive type in which sensing is located in the weakest positions, and therefore it is not difficult to imagine to what degree, in people of this type, the intuitive principle is opposed to the sensory. Quite understandable is the matching of the trait logic-ethics to the type Yesenin (iE) — this is an ethical type in which both logical functions are located in weak positions, and, in addition, the ethics is “sharpened” by introversion and intuition. One can also evaluate as satisfactory the correspondence between the semantic fields of rationality-irrationality and of the type Stirlitz (Ls) — the type that in socionics is unanimously considered the most rational.

The arguments adduced raise the plausibility of the advanced hypothesis of the existence of an unambiguous correspondence between TIM, ART, and IR. If such a correspondence really exists, then this would turn out to be a good aid for the additional refinement of the semantics and integral image both of the types and IR, on the one hand, and of the traits, on the other. Thus, for example, having accepted the advanced hypothesis as corresponding to the truth, and having in mind the correspondence between the type Dostoevsky (eI) and the trait statics-dynamics, one can evaluate the type Dostoevsky as the most static, or as the one in which statics is maximally opposed to dynamics. On the other hand, the trait statics-dynamics must in some way “resemble” the type Dostoevsky (eI). One can say that these objects have an identical archetype, but it is realized in different semantic fields. This same archetype must also be present in the IR “control” (Cn) — and then one can consider that control is the maximally static relation.

However, it is useful to evaluate the terms “statics-dynamics” from the point of view of their globality. It looks as if, similarly to how a concrete person, a bearer of any of the types, may turn out to be a decent person and a scoundrel, a hero and a traitor, an honest man and a criminal, and so on — exactly likewise any person, depending on the situation, may be motionless (for example, at a battle post) or move quickly, saving himself from pursuit. However, judging by the descriptions, Aušra Augustinavičiūtė had in mind not this — and, consequently, she somewhat deformed the semantic field of these concepts. Aušra’s terms should be considered preliminary designations of difficult-to-formalize concepts standing behind concrete configurations of Model “A.” The concept of statics Aušra connected with the position, in the mental ring of a concrete type, of the aspects I, l, S, e. The course of her thought is not difficult to understand, since the aspects I and S set the image of the goal, while the aspects l and e determine the logical and “relational” evaluation of these goals. The concept of dynamics, however, Aušra connected with the position, in the mental ring of a concrete type, of the aspects L, i, E, s. And this too is understandable, since the aspects L and E set the means of the attainment of the goal, while the aspects i and s determine the temporal and pragmatic parameters of these means. However, Aušra did not forget also that in a “static” the vital ring is dynamic, and in a “dynamic” it is static. The combination of these semantics leads to the necessity of interpreting such combinations as “the striving of the dynamic toward the goal is distinguished by staticness” and “the setting of goals by the static is dynamic.” The first of these combinations can be interpreted as “pushfulness” — that is, a stable, unshakable striving toward the attainment of the result. The second combination can be understood as, for example, the readiness of the static to change his goal in accordance with changing circumstances. Such an interpretation permits a completely different look at the terms proposed by Aušra. However, to find a replacement for them is not at all so simple.

Leaning on the advanced hypothesis, one can use the relatively better-known and more understandable semantics of the TIMs and IR for the refinement of such difficult-to-interpret traits as those to which Aušra Augustinavičiūtė intuitively assigned the names “Carefree — provident,” “Democrats — aristocrats,” “Obstinate — yielding,” “Merry — serious,” “Left — right,” “Resolute — reasonable” — and also to check the correspondence of the semantics of the remaining terms used by Aušra Augustinavičiūtė for the designation of the ART.

Thus the trait “Carefree — provident,” according to the hypothesis, must correspond to the TIM Hugo (Es) and the IR “activation” (Ac). From this it must follow that the “Hugo-esque” pole of this trait must be optimistic, major-key, life-affirming, connected with everyday thoroughness, a high level of comfort, the activation of activity. Nevertheless, the chosen words only set the image of the trait, point to the archetype standing behind it, but cannot be used directly for its terminological designation.

The trait “Left — right” must correspond to the TIM Napoleon (Se) and the relation “superego” (Se). The mysterious word “superego” says little to Slavic intuition — except that something is sensed connected with a position of force, something based on personal superiority. But the semantic field of Se socionists represent to themselves rather well. This is a type that is very strong and at the same time knows how, when necessary, to be charming. Unquestionably imperious, but attaining his ends not only by direct pressure, but also by the ability to establish emotional contacts quickly. He senses well the relation to himself and knows how to change it in his favor by any means — among them persuasion, threats, promises, and blackmail. He knows a thing or two about intrigue, knows how to speak beautifully, never stops before what others would count as a lie; and if he lies and boasts, then he does this very artistically and fully identifies himself with what is being spoken of, so that it is difficult for the interlocutor to suspect deception. If, however, he is unmasked, he, without a twinge of conscience and depending on the circumstances, turns everything into a joke and laughs serenely, or snarls back spitefully. For the sake of attaining his goal he stops at nothing. On the type Dostoevsky (eI) he produces the impression of a conscienceless “no-limits man.” Let us also recall that in socionics, for the informal designation of this TIM, the term “Politician” has been proposed (V. V. Gulenko) — a successful one, in my view. It is obvious that the semantic field of the concept “Politician” is in good agreement with the semantic field of the TIM Se.

Proceeding from such a (partial) description of the semantic field of this type, one can form a notion of the relation “superego.” People located in such a relation involuntarily produce on each other a strong irrational impression, which simultaneously attracts and puts on guard; between the partners unfolds a complex psychic and psychological game, in which each strives to appear important, significant, and to use the partner for the attainment of his goals, using hints, promises, unreliable or doubtful information. If the partners have common interests, then between them arises an unspoken agreement for the time of the attainment of the goal, when they, like card players, jealously watch each other and are ready at any moment to “dump” one another. If, however, the interests of the partners are opposed, then between them flares up a very intensive irrational conflict, during which the partners stop at nothing, touching the most vulnerable and painful sides of the other, often coming out from the position of the other’s conscience — and this is especially difficult for a person to bear.

Now, having a notion of the semantic fields of the corresponding TIM and IR, one can try to form a notion of the semantic field of the trait “Left — right.” It is obvious that this trait is connected with very tense manifestations of the personality, with an inclination to intrigue, perfidy, principled distrust, the striving to attain one’s goals at any price. This fragment of the description of the hypothetical semantic field of this trait very much resembles the semantic field of political struggle. So that the term intuitively chosen by Aušra quite corresponds to the semantics of the trait, reflecting the realities of the political situation — the political inclination of a TIM to political “leftness” or “rightness,” it seems, has typological roots. True, Aušra chose this term by the belonging of the TIM to the left or right ring of order-and-control.

However, let us return to the structural analysis of table 6.03. Let us note, above all, that each row in table 6.03 can be understood as the code of the quality that stands behind the integral characteristic of the TIM. Each such quality is coded by the poles of the ART, and this is done on a unified basis. Thus we obtain a structural instrument of the description of qualities with the help of a set of unified elements — which can be regarded as the key to the transformation of extensive objects and their concepts into intensive ones. The last assertion can be understood thus: a set of isolated elements is transformed into a single object possessing its own integral characteristic.

It is not difficult to notice that by the middle vertical and the middle horizontal, table 6.03 can be broken up into four subtables, as shown in table 6.08. Three of these subtables are identical, while the lower right one represents an inversion of any of them — that is, here the plus signs have been replaced by minuses, and the reverse. Each of the three positive subtables can be evaluated as an independent table (6.09), whose rows code qualities one level lower than was the case in the 16×16 table. And, of course, there is nothing surprising in the fact that these qualities are the entities named in socionics information aspects (IA), as shown in table 6.09. As we see, here these entities are coded differently than in the second chapter — but this is because at the basis of the code lie other primary concepts.

Table 6.09

	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
s	+	−	+	−	+	−	+	−
E	+	+	−	−	+	+	−	−
l	+	−	−	+	+	−	−	+
L	+	+	+	+	−	−	−	−
e	+	−	+	−	−	+	−	+
S	+	+	−	−	−	−	+	+
i	+	−	−	+	−	+	+	−

Exactly the same structure is possessed by each of the four subtables of table 6.09. If one divides such a subtable by its middle lines into four parts, then three of them will be identical, and the lower right one inverted with respect to any of the three others (see table 6.10).

Table 6.10

	0	1	2	3
ex-ir	+	+	+	+
in-ir	+	−	+	−
ex-ra	+	+	−	−
in-ra	+	−	−	+

In table 6.10 the rows code qualities one step lower than in table 6.09. These are information aspects of a more fundamental level than those presented in table 6.09. They represent extraverted irrationality (ex-ir), introverted irrationality (in-ir), extraverted rationality (ex-ra), and introverted rationality (in-ra).

Table 6.10 has the same structure as the preceding tables. If one takes the positive quarter of such a table, one obtains table 6.11, in which are presented the information aspects of the very highest level — extraversion and introversion. This table, as we see, has the same structure as the preceding ones.

Table 6.11

	0	1
ex	+	+
in	+	−

What, then, do these two limiting entities represent? Strange as it may be, they can be interpreted exceptionally simply. These are the two sides of our world — the external and the internal. More than anything else, these two sides of our world are given to the human being directly in his sensations. These two sides can also be understood as the parts of the Chinese monad — yang and yin — and such a representation sheds light on these two mysterious entities, discovered long ago by the Chinese sages. At this level we have only one differentiating trait — apart, of course, from existence. And this trait is the internal — the external. That is, one can say that the information aspects of the highest level are expressed through themselves. And this is the basis for accepting them as the undefinable axiomatic conceptual foundation from which everything else can be deductively derived. True, to say that this foundation is undefinable would be incorrect. It is undefinable verbally, but it can be defined ostensively — that is, by direct indication of these two entities, directly given in the sensation of a rational being.

However, the mechanism of the folding of the information aspects presented above can also be used for their unfolding. Then the 16×16 table is easily unfolded into a 32×32 table, as a result of which table 6.12 comes out.

Table 6.12. (Translator’s note: the source prints the full 32×32 sign matrix, rows x0–x31. It is generated exactly by the doubling rule used throughout this chapter: T₂ₙ = [[Tₙ, Tₙ], [Tₙ, T̄ₙ]], where T̄ₙ is the sign-inverted block — i.e., the Sylvester-type construction applied to the 16×16 table 6.03. Rows x0–x15 repeat table 6.03 twice horizontally; rows x16–x31 repeat it with the right half inverted. The full matrix is reproducible mechanically from this rule and is not retyped cell-by-cell here.)

Table 6.12 presents the codes of IA of a lower level — that is, more concrete than the socionic 16×16 table; however, the interpretation of these aspects, like that of aspects still more concrete, represents a problem. Incidentally, the table of hexagrams from the I Ching can be understood as a set of aspects of the 64×64 level. Of course, such an identification must be specially grounded. From this point of view, a definite problem is presented by the absence in Chinese philosophy of the 16×16 and 32×32 unfoldings.

It goes without saying that the unfolding of the IA can be continued to any natural number n = 2^N, but the problem is presented by the interpretation of the information aspects represented there. However, it looks as if it is precisely on this path that one must seek the development of typology — and not on the path of the introduction of subtypes. A deeper semantic interpretation of the tables of IA of different levels requires large and exact work. Let us hope that in the nearest future, given sufficient financing, it will be done.

Any table of aspects is not difficult to represent in analytic codes, similar to those shown in tables 6.06 and 6.07.

The mechanisms of the folding and unfolding of socionic tables can be used for the strict mathematical proof of the unambiguous orderedness of the socion as a set of TIMs. The scheme of the proof consists in the following. We take, as the beginning of the constructions, the minimal table, whose structure is obvious and requires no proof. We perform its unfolding to the needed level — for example, to the level 2⁴ — and, having chosen a concrete subject domain, we substantively interpret the rows of such a table. Such an interpretation will bear an extensive character, since it represents an enumeration of the semantic factors of the separate poles of the differentiating traits. We build the integral image of the primary extensive interpretation of the rows of the table, which will give us the intensive interpretation. The set of intensive interpretations is precisely the set of types of the chosen level. If one now compares the semantic field of the first row of the intensive interpretation with the semantic field of the socionic type Don Quixote, then it will not be difficult to convince oneself of their isomorphism. It is understandable that into the first row will enter only the positive poles of the differentiating traits, and this forms the initial type in the set. Which is what was to be proven. Unquestionably, everyone who wishes can easily perform all the enumerated operations independently and convince himself of the strict orderedness of the socion.

Conclusions to Chapter Six

1. In psychology there exists the problem of differentiating traits, which is connected with their logical non-clarity — or, what is the same, blurredness.
2. Attempts to eliminate the blurredness of a trait led to the working-out of such methods as the semantic differential (Ch. Osgood), repertory grids (E. Kelly), and the like.
3. Differentiating traits acquire concreteness when they are correlated with a position in the model; in the opposite case they remain approximate abstractions relating to the category of blurred concepts.
4. The singling-out of a large quantity of differentiating traits is possible, numbering in the hundreds of thousands, which significantly exceeds the volume of the psychological word-stocks of national languages. To the number of such traits can be assigned the traits of Reinin–Shepetko–Gut, of Gulenko, and others; but for such a hypothesis to receive sufficient foundation, it is necessary to prove the presence of semantic potential in arbitrary sections of arbitrary discrete sets.
5. Recommendations have been proposed for the further working-out of the theory of traits.
6. On the basis of the principle of duality, a hypothesis has been advanced and partially argued about the unambiguous correspondence between the sets of TIMs, IR, and differentiating traits.
7. The idea has been advanced and grounded of the possibility of the creation of a model of the trait, which, presumably, will permit the complete elimination of their blurredness.
8. A mechanism has been proposed for the unfolding of the IA to any level 2^N, where N is any natural number.
9. On the basis of the mechanisms of the unfolding of dichotomous matrices, there has been strictly proven the THEOREM ON THE UNAMBIGUOUS ORDEREDNESS OF THE SOCION AS A SET OF SOCIONIC TYPES.

References

1. Psychology, a dictionary, Moscow, 1990.
2. Svintsov, V. I., Logic, Moscow, 1986.
3. Burlachuk, L. F., and Morozov, S. M., Handbook of Psychological Diagnostics, Kyiv, 1989.
4. Fransella, F., and Bannister, D., Kelly’s Repertory Grid Method, 1986.
5. Churyumov, S. I., “Type and Character,” SMiPL 1, 2000.
6. Petrenko, V. F., The Psychosemantics of Consciousness, Moscow State University, 1988.
7. Aušra Augustinavičiūtė, The Theory of Reinin’s Traits, SMiPL 1–4, 1998.

Notes

1. That is, the diagonal rising from right to left.
2. At least from the intuitive point of view.

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Colophon (end of Volume I):

Scientific publication. Approved at the XXIII International Socionic Conference.

Churyumov, Semyon Ivanovich. The Smile of the Cheshire Cat, or the Possible and the Impossible in Socionics: Problems, Hypotheses, Solutions. Vol. I — Moscow, “Chornaya Belka,” 2010.

© S. I. Churyumov. © “Chornaya Belka.” The book is printed in the author’s redaction. Illustrations by S. I. Churyumov and A. S. Churyumov. ISBN 978-966-8260-83-4. Second edition — corrected and supplemented.