Chapter 8
The Problem of the Correlation of the Concepts of Type and Character
On the golden porch there sat: the Tsar, the Tsarevich, the King, the Prince, the Cobbler, the Tailor — and who might you be? — Russian children’s counting rhyme
If one poses the naive question — which theme in contemporary psychology is the most important? — it is the one toward which all the other divisions of psychology work; the one that is the output product of all elaborations in psychology and that is at the same time the most popular. In my view, this is the teaching about human character. In the end, for the human being there is nothing more important than the human being, and the characters of people — the character of a person — is one of the most important orientations ensuring the effective functioning of a person among people. Alongside the concept of character, in psychology the concept of the psychological type is widely used, and at the intuitive level there is a sensation that these two concepts are deeply connected between themselves — but what is their actual correlation?
In other words: are type and character in psychology one and the same, or do different concepts stand behind these terms? And if different, then to what degree, and what concepts are they?
Let us begin with definitions. In psychological reference books one can encounter, for example, this: “character represents an individual combination of stable psychic peculiarities of a person, conditioning the mode of behavior typical for the given personality in definite life conditions and circumstances” [1]. It looks as if in this definition the term “typical” is used as a synonym of the term “characteristic” and replaces it for the avoidance of tautology. However, if one turns to the Greek meaning of the word character, it means “trait, peculiarity”; and in a reference book on logic one can find also such a definition of the concept of character: CHARACTER IS THE AGGREGATE OF THE STABLE DISTINGUISHING FEATURES OF AN OBJECT OR PHENOMENON, WHICH ARE PLACED AT THE BASIS OF A CHARACTERIZATION. A characterization, in turn, is one of the devices of acquaintance with an object in those cases where a definition of the concept is impossible or is not required. In a characterization certain noticeable features are indicated that have a definite situational significance. A characterization may be full and incomplete, correct and incorrect, positive and negative, all-sided and one-sided — but one quality that must be inherent in any characterization is objectivity [2]. Of course, we understand that in the corrupted practice of bureaucratism this last requirement is easily neglected.
In the literature other definitions and explications of character are also encountered. “Character is the frame of the personality, into which enter only the most expressed and closely interconnected properties of the personality, distinctly manifesting themselves in various kinds of activity.” “All traits of character are traits of the personality, but not all traits of the personality are traits of character.” “Character is an individual combination of the most stable, essential peculiarities of the personality, manifesting themselves in the behavior of a person, in a definite relation: 1) to himself (the degree of exactingness, criticalness, self-evaluation); 2) to other people (individualism or collectivism, egoism or altruism, cruelty or kindness, indifference or sensitivity, rudeness or politeness, mendacity or truthfulness, and the like); 3) to the task entrusted (laziness or industriousness, tidiness or slovenliness, initiative or passivity, perseverance or impatience, responsibility or irresponsibility, organizedness, and the like); 4) in character are reflected the volitional qualities: the readiness to overcome obstacles, mental and physical pain, the degree of persistence, independence, resoluteness, disciplinedness.”
To say of character that it is the frame of the personality is to resort to a metaphor, which transforms the two concepts used here into synonyms. Of course, this is not a definition. The second part of the assertion being analyzed is more like a definition, but in it an indication of the nearest genus is absent. It is understandable that the term “frame” cannot fulfill such a role. Such a nearest genus here could be the set of the traits of the personality, while the indication of the species here is the expression “only the most expressed and closely interconnected properties of the personality, distinctly manifesting themselves in various kinds of activity.” It is obvious that such an expression relates to the category of the blurred, since a definition is absent of what one must understand by “most expressed and closely interconnected.” In addition, the indication of “various kinds of activity” implicitly excludes that which is difficult or impossible to bring under the concept of activity — for example, rest. No, of course, rest too can be assigned to a kind of activity — but then the concept of activity loses its definiteness as conscious activity directed at the transformation of the environment, which, presumably, must distinguish the human being from the animal.
The discriminative assertion that “all traits of character are traits of the personality, but not all traits of the personality are traits of character” points to the fact that the author of this assertion more or less unambiguously divides the traits of the personality into those entering into the character of the personality and those not entering into it. Can this be understood in the sense that some traits of the personality characterize it, and some do not? Apparently, one can speak of little-essential or altogether inessential manifestations of the personality, but here exact definitions are necessary. Are the concepts “property of the personality,” “peculiarity of the personality,” “trait of the personality,” and “manifestation of the personality” identical among themselves? It looks as if in the examples adduced these concepts are used as synonyms. However, if “property,” “peculiarity,” and “trait” can indeed be identified as something potentially inherent in the personality, then “manifestation” represents the kinetic form of the potential possibility that the personality possesses — and this precisely needs to be taken into account in the use of these terms. So can a personality possess properties, peculiarities, and traits that do not characterize it? For example, if a person is ill, this may be uncharacteristic for him — but illness, after all, relates not to the personality but to the individual, even if it is a psychic illness. And if the illness is characteristic for the personality, then how is one to proceed here? Such questions point to definite problems with the use of concepts in psychology. Probably they are not very difficult, but all the same it is not worth leaving them unsolved.
“TYPE — a specimen that expresses the general, essential traits of a definite group of objects or phenomena; a form, kind, model to which a definite class of objects corresponds; in literature and art — an image that has embodied in itself the general, characteristic (emphasis mine — S.Ch.) social traits of some definite part of a concrete collective (group, class)…” [2]
Comparing the adduced definitions of character and type, one can see that in the definition of character the term “typical” is used, and in the definition of type the term “characteristic” — from which one can draw the non-strict conclusion that, as general-scientific terms, these are perceived as very close. At the least, when we use the expression “What a type!” with respect to a concrete person, what is at issue is, of course, character.
But let us look into the meaning of these concepts more attentively. “Typical” is that which repeats, which is present in all objects, specimens, cases; “characteristic” is that which is present only in the chosen element or specimen. True, a feature present in one object could turn up in another as well — and this, apparently, must mean that by this characteristic feature these objects belong to one type.
Such reasonings lead to the thought that CHARACTER singles out the personality of a concrete person among other people, points to what is special in the person — and not to what unites him with others, as must be the case when a person belongs to a definite TYPE of people.
So that, when these two concepts stand side by side in one context, they can be distinguished by connecting character with the individual peculiarities of the personality — that is, with what points to the differences among people — and the concept of type with what singles out the common in different people.
Character points to individual differences, and type to “individual similarities.” Character shows in what the given person differs from others, while type, on the contrary, singles out that which permits assigning a person to a definite group of people. Already from this one can draw the conclusion that there may exist people belonging to one type but having different characters. And, on the contrary, there may exist people with an identical character but belonging to different types. For example, two hysterics — but one “explosive,” inclined to smashing things up, and the other demonstrative, with an inclination to boasting and confabulation.¹ Or two quiet, accommodating, shy people — but one of them by type a psychasthenic,² and the other labile.³
In ordinary everyday situations, when asking about the CHARACTER of a person, people are often satisfied with a very simple answer. To the question “What kind of character does he have?” one may hear in answer: good, normal, so-so, better not to get involved, or something of that kind. A more detailed answer could look like this: “His character is resolute, persistent,” or “He is a calm, judicious person.” If in the first case one asks to add something more, then quite probably one will be able to hear “he knows how to get his way,” and in the second case, for example, “well-balanced” — but of course not only this. One can quite well imagine what a persistent but irresolute person looks like, or a calm but unbalanced one. Often between characterizing concepts there may be deep correlations. They may be synonymous, complement each other, or be incompatible.
For example, combinations like “he is merry but cruel” are perceived with strain, since the semantic field of “merriness,” apparently, does not presuppose negative shades — although one can imagine situations in which such a combination of words will be justified.
In other cases one may hear a characterization built on contrast, where two definitions are joined by the conjunction “but”: “She is kind, but very light-minded,” “She is kind, but spiteful,” “He is disciplined, but extremely cruel,” or “He is a very good specialist, but a drunkard.” Is what is at issue here two sides of one and the same person, or is this simply a way of describing something single, for which we simply have no exact word? Is the human being single or mosaic? Does something single, whole, stand behind the mosaic of the manifestations of one and the same person? By what, in the final count, are all these manifestations determined — or is a person a set of disparate qualities that are somehow combined in him and that are switched on, in one or another sequence, by suitable conditions of the external environment? Is much said about a person by such a characterization, or little? Have we exhausted, by such an answer, the whole fullness of the concrete personality? Can one derive, from such a minimal characterization, the whole multitude of behavioral facts of which the given person is capable? Intuitively it is easy to answer this question in the negative, but from the logical point of view such an answer stands in need of scrupulous scientific analysis. This is so if only because the concepts characterizing a person may have very different extensions, and in some cases these will be essential but particular traits and peculiarities, which can be interpreted quite unambiguously, while in other cases they are capacious characterizations from which far-reaching conclusions can be drawn: “a heroic personality,” “an unmercenary,” “a complete scoundrel.”
It is understandable that a characterization of a person can be made quite extended — let us recall the classic: “character Nordic, not observed in compromising connections…”
Character can be defined both as the aggregate of the psychic peculiarities of the personality, and as the aggregate of reactions to the stimuli presented to a person by the environment in the process of his vital activity, and as the aggregate of the stable behavioral peculiarities of the personality, and as the set of the psychic features of a concrete personality… These definitions are in many respects equivalent, but for definiteness, in this chapter we shall understand by CHARACTER — THE UNIQUE COMBINATION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL TRAITS INHERENT IN A CONCRETE PERSON, and by TYPE — THE GENERALIZED CHARACTERISTIC OF A GROUP OF PEOPLE, each of whom, though differing from the others in details, at the same time has a definite quantity of behavioral peculiarities similar to theirs.
The problems connected with type and character, apparently, presented interest for people from time immemorial, and each epoch gave its answer to the questions connected with these problems — let us recall chiromancy, graphology, physiognomy, astrology, and the other ancient sciences — but even up to the present time these problems cannot be considered fully solved.
By the beginning of the nineteenth century, psychology — in particular, clinical psychology — had accumulated a large quantity of information about the psychic manifestations of the human being and about the differences between the psychic norm and pathology. On this basis many psychologists and psychiatrists undertook various attempts at the generalization of psychological experience. Among them one of the best can be named E. Kretschmer, the Austrian psychiatrist who worked much and fruitfully in the clinic. Apparently, to him first belongs the idea of the presence of similarity between pathological symptoms and the typical behavior of people in the norm. He came to the conclusion that such differences have in the main a quantitative character, and that behind them stand similar psychic or constitutional factors, with respect to which he applied the term “radicals” [3]. To designate the degree of manifestation of a constitutional radical, E. Kretschmer used the suffixes “-thymia” for the level of the norm, “-oid” for borderline states, and the corresponding psychiatric term for pathology. Thus the radical answering for the psychic manifestations of epilepsy, in the norm, conditions the behavior of the epithymic — a person healthy in the psychic respect, but characterized by relative seriousness, exactingness, adherence to order and discipline. If, however, the degree of manifestation of this radical brings a person out onto the boundary between illness and health, such a person is characterized as an epileptoid and is distinguished by a heightened sticking in details, a viscosity of life habits, explosiveness.
The matter stands analogously, for example, with the radicals “schizo” and “cyclo.” In the latter case, in the cycloid, the mood changes with a significantly greater amplitude than in the cyclothymic, but all the same does not reach those limits which can be observed in the case of manic-depressive psychosis. Proceeding from what has been said, one can state that E. Kretschmer managed to establish certain psychic invariants connecting the norm and pathology.
Subsequently, developing the ideas of E. Kretschmer, the German psychiatrist K. Leonhard proposed ten accentuations of the psychic sphere, the notions of which he used in his clinical practice for the correction and treatment of states on the borderline between norm and pathology.
Independently of K. Leonhard, but likewise leaning on the results attained in psychology and psychiatry, the American psychologists from Minnesota S. Hathaway and J. McKinley worked out a multi-profile psychological test, at whose basis were placed clinical notions about the types of psychopathies, which they interpreted as syndromes of the disharmonious development of the personality. This test received wide dissemination both in work with the ill and in work with healthy people, who on the basis of this methodology could receive a large quantity of recommendations connected with various sides of vital activity — for example, with professional orientation. However, the ten psychological categories they chose in the main did not coincide with those which K. Leonhard placed at the basis of his system of accentuations.
In Russia analogous work was done in the laboratory of A. Lichko. True, it was directed at the diagnostics of the type of psychopathies and accentuations in adolescents, but could be used also for work with adults. And in this case, despite the practical identity of the objects of investigation,⁴ as the base set there was chosen a set of psychic categories differing sufficiently both from those which K. Leonhard chose and from those which were used in the MMPI.
In the work [4] the data on the three approaches to the evaluation of the psychological status of the personality mentioned above are brought together in one table (Table 8.01). Here into one row fell those categories behind which stand similar or equivalent descriptions in the form of an aggregate of psychic symptoms.
Table 8.01
| No. | MMPI | Leonhard | Lichko |
|---|---|---|---|
| 01 | Hypochondria | — | Astheno-neurotic |
| 02 | Depression | Dysthymic | — |
| 03 | Hysteria | Demonstrative | Hysteroid |
| 04 | Psychopathy | — | Unstable |
| 05 | Femininity | — | — |
| 06 | Paranoialness | Stuck (perseverating) | — |
| 07 | Psychasthenia | Pedantic | Psychasthenic |
| 08 | Schizoidness | — | Schizoid |
| 09 | Hypomania | Hyperthymic | Hyperthymic |
| 10 | Introversion | — | — |
| 11 | — | Excitable | Epileptoid |
| 12 | — | Anxious-fearful | Sensitive |
| 13 | — | Cyclothymic | Cycloid |
| 14 | — | Affective-exalted | Labile |
| 15 | — | Emotive | Labile |
| 16 | — | — | Conformal |
Even at a cursory glance at this table it is evident that the three presented approaches have much in common — and this should not be surprising: after all, all three schools worked with one and the same massif of psychic symptoms. What surprises, rather, is something else — why are they, all the same, so different? In order to answer this question, one needs to turn to questions of the methodology of science. This we shall do somewhat later — after the survey of Table 8.01.
Of course, the socionist-scientist is put on the alert by the appearance of the number sixteen — although by a representative of the empirical or positivist approaches this may be perceived as pure chance. And indeed, if the specialists of the presented schools had discovered a greater quantity of types, then, possibly, their summary quantity would have been different. But this supposition too can be subjected to doubt — after all, possibly, the additional types would only have filled the empty places in table 8.01.
However, when the socionist-scientist begins to read attentively into the descriptions of the presented categories, he begins to recognize — at least behind some of them — even if insufficiently clear, still, acceptable in a first approximation, features of the socionic types. Thus to the third row (Hysteria, Demonstrative, Hysteroid) one can easily match the most demonstrative type in the socion — Napoleon (Se). Yes, this type not merely strives to be at the center of attention, but disposes of the means necessary for this and knows how to end up, and to remain, at the center of the attention of his surroundings. Of course, one needs to take into account that the adduced typologies give a description of the personality, above all, from the pathological point of view.
The seventh row could quite well correspond to Balzac (iL), the eighth to Don Quixote (Il), the ninth to London (Li). Alas, one cannot manage here without stretches — but, I repeat, in a first approximation such a collation presents interest. In what follows we shall show the causes of such “stretches,” and this will help one look at the developing situation in a completely different way.
And so, if into table 8.01, with a definite share of conditionality, one substitutes the socionic types, then we obtain table 8.02.
Table 8.02
| No. | MMPI | Leonhard | Lichko | Socionic |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 01 | Hypochondria | — | Astheno-neurotic | lS |
| 02 | Depression | Dysthymic | — | eI |
| 03 | Hysteria | Demonstrative | Hysteroid | Se |
| 04 | Psychopathy | — | Unstable | eS |
| 05 | Femininity | — | — | sE |
| 06 | Paranoialness | Stuck | — | Sl |
| 07 | Psychasthenia | Pedantic | Psychasthenic | iL |
| 08 | Schizoidness | — | Schizoid | Il |
| 09 | Hypomania | Hyperthymic | Hyperthymic | Li |
| 10 | Introversion | — | — | sL |
| 11 | — | Excitable | Epileptoid | Es |
| 12 | — | Anxious-fearful | Sensitive | lI |
| 13 | — | Cyclothymic | Cycloid | Ie |
| 14 | — | Affective-exalted | Labile | Ei |
| 15 | — | Emotive | Labile | iE |
| 16 | — | — | Conformal | Ls |
Here it is difficult to agree that to the scale “femininity” in the MMPI there must correspond the type sE (“Dumas”) — especially in its male hypostasis. Although, then, someone does call this type the “Mediator,” someone the keeper of the domestic hearth, or even, as G. A. Shulman calls this type, the “House-Spirit.” It is also difficult to agree that to the scale “social introversion” there must correspond sL (“Gabin”) — although in the description of this MMPI scale there stands: “High scores on the Si⁵ scale occur in persons who lack equilibrium and confidence in human relations. In company they are easily abashed, feel constraint, grow nervous, easily lose mental equilibrium. Possibly for this reason they hold themselves coldly and aloofly. However, they are not affected in their aloofness — they simply try to observe distance, to keep to the side, opposing nothing, respect the rights of others, and do not impose their own views [4].” “In company they are easily abashed…” — of course, this is not about Dumas, Dreiser, or Yesenin — socionic introverts who feel splendid precisely in the company of other people. Nor will those types fit under this description in whom ethics is located in the position of the ALF (lI, lS) — they are adapted to behavior in company. Most of all the description suits those in whom emotionality is connected with the CCF — and this is precisely sL, well, and also Balzac (iL); but the latter is, after all, capable of withstanding the emotional pressure of Napoleon (Se). So that under the adduced description of the Si scale it is, after all, precisely Gabin (sL) that fits maximally. The point is simply that the meaning of this scale in the MMPI does not coincide with how introversion is understood in socionics.
Taking into account all that has been said above, one can advance the preliminary supposition that, possibly, out of a hypothetical base set of human types characterizing the behavior of the practically healthy person, the three typologies considered — leaning on notions about the pathological manifestations of the psyche — chose their scales or accentuations in different ways; but for some reasons this limited choice, possibly, did not affect the effectiveness of the clinical work of the representatives of these schools. Possibly, some compensating effect manifested itself. This question we shall discuss later.
The proposed case with the three typologies can be regarded as an astonishing precedent in science, when researchers worked with one and the same object but obtained results sufficiently different — and, in any case, not identical. Of course, here it is appropriate to recall the principle of uncertainty, in accordance with which the result of a measurement — and, in the general case, of an investigation — depends on the peculiarities of the measuring instrument and of the researcher; and this explains something, but not everything. Apparently, a deeper cause of the empirical limitedness of the presented typologies is the positivist set toward the refusal to solve the “eternal” philosophical questions, allegedly contraindicated for serious science — and, together with this, the refusal of a full theoretical solution of the problem. All these typologies limited themselves to what suited the researchers in their practical work.
The first question that must be posed in the consideration of similar typologies is the question of their completeness. In what way can we be guaranteed that in one or another typology certain important elements have not been omitted — that in them everything relating to the subject has been taken into account? As the considered precedent shows, in the case of empirical typologies there simply can be no special guarantees.
The next question in the evaluation of any typologies and classifications is the question of the independence of the elements entering into them. In evaluating each of the presented typologies, one can turn attention to the fact that some of the concept-types singled out by a typology have common properties — and, thus, they are not orthogonal, or, what is the same, fully independent. Thus in the MMPI, for the scales “Hypochondria,” “Depression,” “Femininity,” “Psychasthenia,” and “Introversion,” the feature uniting them is introversion as it is understood in socionics. Common features exist also among the concepts of the two other typologies. So that a deeper analysis of the obtained empirical material is necessary, with the aim of revealing the fundamental factors standing behind them. But it is precisely this that the researchers did not do — and possibly precisely because their worldview and methodological positions turn out to be an insuperable limitation for them.
An attempt to go further than the empirical level is undertaken in the work [4], where V. M. Melnikov and L. T. Yampolsky in their theoretical elaborations use factor analysis as an instrument, as a result of which they single out several groups of factors of various levels, describing from different sides the empirical set they chose of features (single psychological traits) and types (integral characteristics of the personality). As the task of their investigation they advance the collation of “concept-types” and “concept-traits” with the aim of “breaking them up into homogeneous groups with the subsequent replacement of each of the groups by a new concept that is a function of the initial ones. It is essential that what is at issue is not simply a grouping of concepts, but the construction of a new system of concepts, integral relative to both approaches” [4].
Incidentally, V. M. Melnikov and L. T. Yampolsky in their book devote a section to the construction of a model of the personality; however, despite the remarkable work done by them, this model represents only a primary generalization of empirical material. Here we shall not adduce it, and refer those wishing to become more closely acquainted with it to the work [4]. General information about this model is presented in the chapter devoted to the modeling of the psyche. The named authors describe rather fully the methodological structure of their research apparatus, which gives the possibility of giving its theoretical analysis.
The authors use mathematical algorithms permitting the performance of an optimal grouping of features relative to chosen criteria and the formation of factors in the form of linear combinations of the corresponding features. The authors take into account that “the quality of the partitions and their substantiveness essentially depend on how many factors are singled out” and that “in the case of an incorrect assignment of the number of factors, the obtained grouping will not reflect the structure of the phenomenon under investigation.” Therefore the authors perform a sequential series of calculations, as a result of which several groups of factors are obtained, from which the best is then chosen. And since the choice of the best variant cannot be made only on the basis of statistical indicators, for such a choice definite theoretical criteria are used: interpretability, homogeneity, contrast, stability, and informational reliability. Let us turn attention to the fact that the constructs singled out by the authors bear a highly theoretical character, and without their use it is difficult to imagine a high-quality investigation.
The interpretability of factors is understood as the degree of correspondence of the content of a factor to theoretical notions about the structure of the individual-psychological peculiarities of the personality.
Homogeneity, or the internal uniformity of factors, is evaluated by the share of features closely connected with the factor. For the singling-out of the corresponding factors, a threshold value of the coefficient of correlation of the features with the corresponding factor is used.
The contrast of a factor solution is the higher, the higher the connections among the features forming a factor are in relation to the connections among the factors. Contrast so defined is used by the authors in order to get around the natural requirement of the orthogonality of the factors.
The stability of the basic structure of the factors is understood as the preservation of the factors with an increase of the number of their groups. For its evaluation an indicator, calculated by formulas, of the conjugacy of two sequential groupings of factors is used.
Informational stability is ensured at the expense of the uniting in a factor of a large number of interconnected features.
Besides the analysis of various groupings of features into factors, the authors performed an evaluation of the features themselves for closeness to the general structure of the remaining features and for their stability. A feature is considered close to the general set of features if it enters into the composition of a factor with high loadings — that is, is essential for the characterization of the given factor. A feature is considered stable, or reliable, if it constantly groups itself with one and the same features, and does not change its position in the groups of features.
The authors use the literary data of their predecessors, where from the scales of the MMPI and of Cattell’s questionnaire four factors were singled out; and as a result of their own experiments they obtain two results — with four factors not fully coinciding with the results of their predecessors, and with six factors differing in various degrees from those described in the literary sources. These are the factors “Spiritual organization,” “Extraversion,” “Psychoticism,” “Anxiety,” “Neuroticism,” and “Control of behavior.” Despite the most interesting work conducted by the authors and the well-worked-out methodology used in the investigation, there remains an impression of the ambiguity, incompleteness, and even non-obligatoriness of the obtained set of factors — although one cannot doubt the possibility of their practical use and their effectiveness for the economical description of the individual-psychological peculiarities of the personality.
In order to evaluate the situation under consideration from the methodological point of view, one needs to turn to the collation and opposition of the empirical and the theoretical. In the history of science this opposition repeatedly turned up, and continues to remain in our time, in the field of vision of scientists, and relative solutions of the given problem exist in science. However, the impression remains that this problem was never finally solved. How can one fail to recall here Sextus Empiricus with his tropes asserting the unreliability of human cognition — and together with him the agnostics, nihilists, positivists, and behaviorists. Although between some of these gnoseological schools there exists an enormous difference, what is common to them is that they merely find a gnoseological niche convenient for their theoretical existence, at whose basis lies the notion of the uncognizability of the world. Unfortunately, this by no means removes from the agenda the necessity of further advancement in human cognition, since it does not solve the eternal philosophical — among them methodological — questions. But if the skeptics simply denied the reliability of knowledge, the positivists discard that part of cognition which seems to them torn away from pragmatic concreteness and using theoretical constructions that are, from the point of view of positivism, difficult to verify. But perhaps, all the same, humanity in its progressive development is capable of growing up to any level of complexity assigned in advance — and what today seems unliftable to positivistically minded scientists will tomorrow take its place in the row of contemporary technologies.
And so, let us again return to the consideration of the polar pair of categories “empirical — theoretical.” Let us give the necessary definitions. The empirical is that which is directly perceived by the human sense organs, or else perceived by those same sense organs but already with the use of additional adaptations — instruments, machines, devices. The theoretical is that which is brought into the empirical by the human intellect: selection, ordering, classification, analysis, bringing into a system, the construction of a theory. Taking this into account, one can say that the theoretical is generated by the human intellect and in this sense is its functional synonym.
In considering the problem of the correlation of the empirical and the theoretical, it is appropriate to recall Immanuel Kant, who brought into scientific usage the opposition of analytic and synthetic judgments — and at the same time let us emphasize that the seemingly maximally abstract ideas of the philosophers of all times and peoples have the most direct relation to the advanced line of cognition in our time, while the attempt to brush philosophy aside leads to the result that researchers one way or another repeat the historical development of philosophical ideas, but do this, as a rule, unprofessionally, and are compelled again and again to collide with the old paradoxes of thinking.
If one speaks very briefly, the essence of the problem reduces to the fact that some judgments the human intellect perceives as true a priori — that is, without leaning on experience, without resorting to experience, without conducting experiments — while the truth of others can be confirmed only in experience. One can argue about whether no experience whatsoever really stands behind analytic judgments,⁶ but it is obvious that this must be some other kind of experience — for example, the experience of all humanity — and this is sufficient to oppose the two kinds of judgments. But one can also approach this question from another side. Let us proceed from the fact that the empirical material, which is the source of synthetic judgments, is processed by the human intellect — the source of analytic judgments. All the secrets of theoretical constructions are stored in the arrangement of the intellect — not in the categories with which it operates (they only mask from it itself its more deeply hidden structures and substrates), but in that subtle-material basis of the intellect which still remains problematic for science — that is, in a definite sense, for the intellect too. The problem here consists in the fact that the personality, identifying itself with the intellect, is not capable of using it for the discovery of its own basis — similarly to how the eye, observing external objects, cannot see itself.
Here we shall not go deeper into the problem of the hypothetical subtle-material basis of the intellect, but shall only accept (also in the capacity of a hypothesis) that the capacity of the intellect to generate analytic judgments reflects the evolutionary process of its adaptation to the surrounding world.
Taking into account what has been said, one can draw the conclusion that human cognition represents an arena on which empirical facts meet with the intellect, which transforms them into theory — and the theory will be the more fundamental, the deeper the layers of the structure of the intellect that are used for its working-out.
An example of a theoretically inferior elaboration in psychology can serve the neurophysiological grounding of the temperaments by the famous Russian physiologist I. P. Pavlov. Having experimentally revealed such parameters of the nervous system — and, that means, of higher nervous activity — as balancedness and unbalancedness, mobility-inertness, strength-weakness, he collated them with the Hippocratic temperaments and obtained the correspondence presented in table 8.03.
Table 8.03
| Temperament | Balancedness | Mobility | Strength |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sanguine | + | + | + |
| Phlegmatic | + | − | + |
| Choleric | − | + | + |
| Melancholic | − | + | − |
However, from abstract and methodological considerations it is completely clear that three systemic factors — in whose capacity the atomic⁷ features of higher nervous activity come forward — must generate eight distinguishable types of behavior, and thus in the table four more rows must appear (table 8.04). Of the theoretical “incorrectness” of table 8.03 one can judge by the non-symmetric arrangement of the plus and minus signs, which here should be collated with a distinctive logical figure. Having correctly (regularly) arranged the signs in table 8.04, one can discover the places of the known and the places of the unknown temperaments — thus manifests itself the prognostic effect of a morphological table.
Table 8.04
| Temperament | Balancedness | Mobility | Strength |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sanguine | + | + | + |
| ? | + | + | − |
| Phlegmatic | + | − | + |
| ? | + | − | − |
| Choleric | − | + | + |
| Melancholic | − | + | − |
| ? | − | − | + |
| ? | − | − | − |
If I. P. Pavlov or his followers — for example, E. Teplov and V. Nebylitsyn — had risen to such a, one must say, quite minimal theoretical generalization, they would have managed to broaden the element base of the theory of temperaments. The limitedness of positivist methodology and the ideological censorship of Marxism-Leninism prevented the Soviet scientists from doing this, and the honor of the introduction of an eight-element system of temperaments fell to Western scientists.
In Western Europe psychologists, in giving matrimonial recommendations, proceed from a minimal set of concepts characterizing the psychophysiological reactions of people. To such concepts belong EXCITABILITY, ACTIVITY, and the BREVITY-DURATION of sensations and nervous reactions. Let us turn attention to the fact that here, as the atomic parameters of higher nervous activity, other features than I. P. Pavlov’s have been chosen. This points either to the fact that the features we take for atomic are in reality not such, and behind them stand still more fundamental elements; or to the fact that the decomposition of the chosen level of psychic activity into base components can be performed in more than one way; or to both the one and the other. From this, far-reaching theoretical consequences may flow. The concepts enumerated above were introduced into psychology as early as the beginning of the century by the Dutch psychologists Heymans and Wiersma. All possible combinations of these base elements give eight types of psychophysiological reacting (table 8.05).
Table 8.05
| Temperament | Excitability | Activity | Duration |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ardent | + | + | + |
| Choleric | + | + | − |
| Sensitive | + | − | + |
| Nervous | + | − | − |
| Sanguine | − | + | + |
| Melancholic | − | + | − |
| Phlegmatic | − | − | + |
| Carefree | − | − | − |
It turned out that into the number of these types enter also the classical temperaments of which Hippocrates already makes mention. Thus, for example, to the choleric temperament corresponds the combination excitable-active-short-sensing, while the phlegmatic is non-excitable-active-long-sensing. What is remarkable here is that, as it turns out, the classical set of four temperaments proved incomplete — to them were added also the nervous (excitable-inactive-short-sensing), the sensitive (excitable-inactive-long-sensing), the ardent (excitable-active-long-sensing), and the carefree (non-excitable-inactive-short-sensing). Thus, that which for many years — and in official post-Soviet psychology even now — was considered self-evident turned out to be only a part of a more developed system. True, there was a certain criticism of the systems of temperaments — conclusions were drawn that pure temperaments are encountered rather rarely, and in the majority of cases the real temperament is a mixture of the base ones, and methodologies were proposed by which one can determine the percentage of cholericness, sanguineness, phlegmaticness, and melancholicness in a concrete person. However, in the technical respect a definite defect can be discerned here, since the complex — the real temperament — was expressed through the likewise complex and insufficiently explained — the set of base temperaments, which were used in place of the absent more developed system. Incidentally, in recent times, in the work of Simonov and Ershov a scientific explanation of the temperaments is presented as composite formations depending on the joint work and correlation of the functions of such brain structures as the frontal cortex, the hypothalamus, the amygdala, and the hippocampus [10].
They proceed from the fact that human behavior at the most general level is determined by two parameters: the satisfaction of one’s own needs and the taking-into-account of the events occurring around. The singling-out of the dominant need is carried out by the motivational subsystem of the brain, into which enter the amygdala and the hypothalamus. In doing so, the hypothalamus answers for the first-priority, acute, dominant needs, and the amygdala for the additional, non-urgent, subdominant ones. The anterior divisions of the neocortex orient the behavior of a person toward the signals of highly probable events, and in doing so the signals with a small probability of their reinforcement are simultaneously inhibited. Orientation toward the signals of highly probable events makes behavior adequate and resultful; however, in special conditions — in situations with a significant degree of uncertainty and with an obvious deficit of pragmatic information — it is necessary to take into account also the possibility of low-probability events. For this function the hippocampus answers, thereby supplementing the activity of the frontal divisions of the cortex.
On the basis of what has been said, it is not difficult to imagine the peculiarities of behavior in the case of the predominance of one or another of the physiological blocks. Thus, if to a definite degree the combination “hypothalamus — frontal cortex” predominates, then the behavior of the subject will be oriented not simply toward the satisfaction of the dominant need, but it will be purposefully directed at the signals of objects capable of satisfying this need. Everything that distracts the subject from the fulfillment of this task — competing motivation and signals distracting from the advancement toward the marked goal — will be ignored. Thus, the behavior of the subject will be distinguished by impulsiveness and impetuousness, which is easy to collate with the manifestations of the choleric temperament. The interests of such a person are constant and stable, but he is not at a loss on meeting difficulties, and is stubborn in overcoming them.
When, however, the combination “amygdala — hippocampus” predominates, it will, on the one hand, be difficult for the subject to single out the dominant motive, and, on the other hand, he will react to a wide spectrum of signals of little significance for the satisfaction of the need — in which one can recognize the traits of the melancholic temperament. Here the person turns out to be painfully sensitive to trifles, is easily at a loss, becomes embarrassed, is not sure of himself.
If, however, the combination “hypothalamus — hippocampus” predominates, then the dominant need is singled out easily, but in doing so the signals of events may be used that lead to the attainment of the goal only with a small probability. The person is persistent, energetic, capable of work — but only when it is interesting to him; in the opposite case he is easily distracted. It is not difficult for him to grow accustomed to a new environment or to keep within disciplinary frameworks. This is the strong, balanced, mobile type — the sanguine.
And finally, with the predominance of the combination “amygdala — frontal cortex,” the subject’s needs will be well balanced, without particular accentuation on any one of them. Such a person will ignore a multitude of the events occurring around him. Only highly significant signals can impel him to activity. He is patient, restrained, has splendid command of himself, is not distracted from the marked goal. However, it is difficult for him to switch over to the solution of new tasks; he grows accustomed to a new environment with difficulty. Behind this description one can recognize the phlegmatic.
Let us emphasize once more that in the descriptions of the temperaments adduced above, causal groundings of them are given that differ sufficiently among themselves — so that one can pose before scientists, psychologists and physiologists, the questions: which of the adduced groundings is true? Is it important that some one of them is true? What is truth in psychology and physiology? Or is all this merely a game of paradigms, and the relativist worldview of pluralism accepts any explanation?
Here one would also like to warn against a children’s disease encountered among socionists — the hasty identification of various typologies. For example, by two Kyiv socionists in 1987 an attempt was made to connect the socionic types unambiguously with concrete temperaments. For this no special theoretical elaborations were used; simply, on the basis of an intuitive rough estimate, for example, to Don Quixote once and for all the choleric temperament was ascribed, to Hugo the sanguine, to Dumas the phlegmatic, and to Robespierre the melancholic. Analogous collations were made in the remaining quadras as well. It appears that such collations are, possibly, tempting, but quite light-minded. In order to make such collations, one must sort out deeply the phenomenon under investigation. It is more reasonable to relate to the typologies worked out up to the present time as to instruments adapted to the solution of quite definite tasks, and not to generalize their application to cases in which their use was not presupposed.
Exactly likewise, attempts were undertaken to establish an unambiguous correspondence between the socionic types and the astrological signs — but it looks as if these connections are significantly more complex, if, of course, they exist.
The comparison and analysis of the three psychological typologies adduced above shows that in their working-out the researchers used the most superficial layer of the analytic means of the intellect, while the typologies themselves bear a maximally empirical character — Hegel called such a level “creeping empiricism.” But, in any case, we must be grateful to the scientists who did the priceless empirical part of the work. It is also not excluded that the developers of the typologies under consideration could have brought their typologies up to a maximally high theoretical level, if they had not limited their methodological sets by the framework of a consciously or unconsciously accepted positivism — which, in the person of its founders O. Comte⁸ and H. Spencer, factually renounced the philosophical, and a significant part of the methodological, inheritance accumulated by humanity.
The human being is complex, and to squeeze him into any simplified scheme whatsoever is obviously impossible. At the least, the system of the description of the human being must be commensurable with his complexity. On the other hand, it is useful to have diverse psychological orientations helping to sort out, explain, and foresee at least some elements of the behavior of a concrete person, or of his joint behavior in the composition of one or another group of people. Attempts to single out repeating psychological peculiarities and, on their basis, to orient oneself in contacts and work with people have been made from the most ancient times. Here, in particular, belong the astrological, chiromantic, physiognomic, and graphological characterizations.
Scientific psychology, by virtue of definite causes, opposed itself to the ancient knowledge. The basic significance here belongs to the fact that the ancient knowledge, by virtue of its esoteric character, was distorted and profaned by uninitiated users. As a result the essential keys to its understanding were lost, and scientific psychology had to begin all the work from the very beginning. A reasonable compromise here could be a relation to the pre-scientific gains of humanity as to a preliminary stage in the development of psychology deserving of attention, with the necessity of sorting it out deeply and preserving everything valuable.
It is interesting to consider the question of the choice of the basic elements in various systems of the description of the personality. In doing so, it is proposed to relate to such systems as astrology, chiromancy, and the like not from prejudiced positions, as to pseudo-scientific ones, but to regard them as the systematization of a certain experience, collected and generalized on another methodological basis, and which could be used after critical reworking from contemporary positions.
In astrology, as the basic elements the concepts of the planets are used — as certain entities capable of exerting influence on the formation of the character of a person depending on their position in the sky at the moment of his birth. Here, in particular, it is held that, for example, the Moon influences the state of health, grace, inconstancy; the Sun — origin, position in society, dignity, independence, vanity, self-love; Jupiter — enrichment, glory, benevolence, merriness, pomposity, wastefulness; Neptune — genius, inspiration, madness, absorption in one thought, and an inclination to mental experiences; Saturn — steadfastness, faithfulness, mendacity, suspiciousness, strangeness, eccentricity; Mars — energy, struggle, enterprise; and so on. For the evaluation of the positive or negative influences of the planets, a complex apparatus of the composition and interpretation of the horoscope has been worked out, which represents a distinctive psychological logic of the reading and interpretation of the base symbols. However, everything begins to look different if behind the mythological symbolics and rhetoric one sees psychological concepts. Then the planets are not difficult to collate with combined psychological functions. Here the Sun will correspond to consciousness, the ego, the personality, the sphere of self-affirmation; the Moon — the subconscious, the maternal principle, health; Mars — energy and will; Saturn — discipline; and so on. In this case the psychological observations and discoveries made by astrologers over the course of centuries become accessible. To consider that everything with which the ancient scientists occupied themselves deserves no attention would be worthy of regret.
As elements of the psyche there may be fixed various directly observable manifestations of it, or else its phenomena defined in a more complex way (the operations of abstraction, generalization, concretization, correlation, and others).
Comparing the various approaches to the description of the individual-psychological peculiarities of the personality by the ancient and the contemporary psychological systems, one can discover two approaches principally differing from each other. One of them is based on the singling-out of traits, single peculiarities, simple properties of the personality and its behavior. To such systems belong, for example, physiognomy, chiromancy, and graphology. In these systems the character of a person is, as it were, “assembled” from separate elements. For example, in physiognomy it was held that the color of the eyes, from dark to light, points to the degree of teachability: people with darker eyes learn practical skills more quickly and quickly assimilate the information accessible to them, but just as easily forget it and relearn; while those with lighter eyes assimilate more slowly, but, having assimilated, hold on to it tenaciously. Straight brows point to an analytic character of mind, upturned brows to capriciousness, lowered brows to melancholicness. In chiromancy, for example, the correlation of the extreme phalanges of the thumb is interpreted as the correlation between mind and emotionality. In graphology a reverse slant of the letters is connected with heightened obstinacy, and so on.
On the contrary, in astrology the position of the Sun in a sign (though, of course, not only it) singles out a whole type of people, who may differ significantly from one another in details, but will possess an integral property uniting them in a definite respect. Thus it is held (by definition, and confirmed by observation) that all Aries in concrete manifestations demonstrate impulsiveness and, in the first place, act from themselves; while Libras, other conditions being equal, are inclined to reckon with the opinion of other people and make a decision only having collected a sufficient quantity of information.
An analogous picture can be seen in scientific psychology as well. The Cattell factors demonstrate the “trait” approach, while, for example, the accentuations of K. Leonhard describe types of human behavior. An astonishing proof of the connection between these two approaches turned out to be socionics. Aušra Augustinavičiūtė managed to look at the typology of C. G. Jung in a completely new way. In her interpretation the Jungian types acquired maximal concreteness and depth. Now, working with the models of the TIMs, socionists in many respects differently — more exactly and more thoroughly — understand extraversion and introversion, rationality and irrationality; understand the difficulties with which the brilliant Austrian psychologist collided; and turn out to be capable of discovering in his descriptions of the types inexactitudes and even errors. And in this there is nothing surprising — after all, they use such a subtle and even, if one may so express it, elegant instrument as Model “A” represents. Using a metaphor, one can say that C. G. Jung examined his creations with the naked — though brilliant — eye, while contemporary socionists use for the same purpose a magnifying glass, in whose capacity Model “A” comes forward.
After Aušra Augustinavičiūtė built her models and thereby breathed new life into the typology of C. G. Jung, the intensive growth of the new science began, and soon G. Reinin mathematically grounded the existence of fifteen differentiating traits, using which one can divide the socion in fifteen ways into polar octaves. Soon after Reinin’s discovery, Aušra Augustinavičiūtė factually described these octaves in her work “Reinin’s Traits” — so that, incidentally, it would be correct to call these traits the Augustinavičiūtė–Reinin traits (ART). Let us note also that each differentiating trait represents a polar pair of psychological qualities.
As it became clear subsequently (O. Karpenko, S. Churyumov), there must be sixteen of these traits, and the result connecting these traits and the types, in its finished form, is presented in table 8.06.
Table 8.06 (Translator’s note: the sign pattern reproduces Table 6.03 of the chapter on differentiating traits; several TIM digraphs and a handful of cells are garbled in the source scan and have been restored from that table. The relation column follows the convention of the PSTIM chapter — for the four asymmetric relations, the relation dual to the type.)
| 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | IR | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Il | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | Id |
| sE | + | − | + | − | + | − | + | − | + | − | + | − | + | − | + | − | Du |
| Es | + | + | − | − | + | + | − | − | + | + | − | − | + | + | − | − | Ac |
| lI | + | − | − | + | + | − | − | + | + | − | − | + | + | − | − | + | Mr |
| Ei | + | + | + | + | − | − | − | − | + | + | + | + | − | − | − | − | Or |
| lS | + | − | + | − | − | + | − | + | + | − | + | − | − | + | − | + | Cn |
| Sl | + | + | − | − | − | − | + | + | + | + | − | − | − | − | + | + | Bu |
| iE | + | − | − | + | − | + | + | − | + | − | − | + | − | + | + | − | Mg |
| Li | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | − | − | − | − | − | − | − | − | Qi |
| eS | + | − | + | − | + | − | + | − | − | + | − | + | − | + | − | + | Cf |
| Se | + | + | − | − | + | + | − | − | − | − | + | + | − | − | + | + | Se |
| iL | + | − | − | + | + | − | − | + | − | + | + | − | − | + | + | − | Op |
| Ie | + | + | + | + | − | − | − | − | − | − | − | − | + | + | + | + | Kn |
| sL | + | − | + | − | − | + | − | + | − | + | − | + | + | − | + | − | Sd |
| Ls | + | + | − | − | − | − | + | + | − | − | + | + | + | + | − | − | Ro |
| eI | + | − | − | + | − | + | + | − | − | + | + | − | + | − | − | + | Rc |
This table shows that, on the one hand, each trait is determined by the opposition of one polar octave to another; and, on the other hand, each type is determined by the opposition of the positive poles of one octave of differentiating traits to the negative poles of another octave. Thus, one can speak of a full symmetry between types and traits — which, incidentally, is well visible from Table 8.06: it is symmetric relative to the descending diagonal. Taking into account the structure of the table, one can also assert that these two systems of psychological categories are mutually orthogonal. It is thought that the given conclusion fully solves the problem of the correlation of traits and types, and the question of the opposition of the “model” and the “trait” approaches to the diagnostics of the type of the personality. Solved also is the question of the correlation of the concepts of character and type — these two concepts are complementary and mutually orthogonal, and, thereby, have equal rights to the representation of the individual-psychological peculiarities of the personality. From what has been said it also follows that the Augustinavičiūtė–Reinin traits must have a model representation analogous to the models of the TIMs.
Considering Table 8.06, one can understand that for the singling-out of a type in this system it is not obligatory to take eight traits — one can manage with four as well, but not with just any four. As G. Reinin showed in his work [11], the basis for the construction of the socionic typology can be chosen in many different ways. It is precisely this, apparently, that leads to the high stability of such a typology. Here by stability is understood the reproducibility of the semantic field of the typology from a fragment of it. It is precisely by this that one can explain the relative effectiveness of the typologies of Leonhard, of Lichko, and of the MMPI. Although they do not answer the requirements of completeness and independence, the features standing behind the types presented there cover the semantics of the non-presented part of the typology — and therefore the practical use of these three typologies turns out to be effective.
Although the concept of type in psychology, within the framework of various typologies, has been used for a long time, socionics posed the question of the definition of the concept of type in a new way, having proposed a model of the type and thereby clearly outlined its boundaries and filled it with new content. The same can be said of character, which represents a description of the individual peculiarities of the personality complementary to the type.
These questions return us to a long-standing problem in psychology: is the character of a person a single quality, or a set of psychological traits?
Leaning on the experience of socionics and answering the posed question, one can formulate the following postulate: ANY SET OF DISCRETE PSYCHOLOGICAL PROPERTIES OF A PERSON CAN COME FORWARD AS A WHOLE QUALITY WITH THE CORRESPONDING INTEGRAL EFFECTS (TYPE) AND DIFFERENTIATING FEATURES (CHARACTER). This postulate answers the question of how a set of psychological characteristics is transformed into a type.
A type can also be represented as an integral quality standing behind several elementary psychological traits. In particular, within the framework of socionics, one can speak of trait-types, of which, in accordance with the quantity of the poles of the ART, there will be 30 (extravert — introvert, logician — ethicist, and so on); but in doing so one and the same type will enter into various possible groupings. One can also speak of types uniting two poles of different ART. For example, the introvert-static. Of these, in accordance with the combinatorial formulas, there will be 105. However, by virtue of the systemic dependence of the ART, these 105 binary types too will be systemically dependent, forming triples of identical types, each of which will be determined by two ART — which in itself presents not only psychological but also logical interest. From the psychological point of view it is interesting to understand how, in the uniting of different pairs of ART, functionally identical types are obtained. From the logical point of view, interest is presented by the fact that although functionally identical types are obtained, the logical concepts standing behind these types will be different. Since two ART single out a foursome of full socionic types, it is precisely each such foursome that is the bearer of a binary type. Of these, in accordance with the combinatorial formulas, there will be (15×14):2×4 = 35×4 = 140.
Leaning on the preceding reasoning, one can say that if in the socionic typology one takes only one differentiating trait, it will divide the socion into two octaves. If each of these octaves is regarded as an aggregate, or generalized, subject, then it will be possible to speak of two types of subjects, each of which has a single feature distinguishing it from the other, while by all the remaining features they are indistinguishable. Thus, for example, if one takes the octave of extraverts, then by all the remaining features, apart from extraversion, it differs in nothing from the octave of introverts. Both in the one and in the other octave there are present logic and ethics, intuition and sensing, rationality and irrationality, dynamics and statics, positivity and negativity, declatimity and questimity, and all the rest. Thus, in this case the type is characterized by a single trait — and then the trait approach to the description of the subject of behavior coincides with the typological one.
One can also speak of types uniting three poles of dichotomous traits. Of such types— (Translator’s note: the sentence breaks off here in the source — evidently a typesetting defect in the printed edition.)
Directly adjoining the theme connected with the concepts of type and character is the theme in which the concept of the subject of psychic phenomena is considered. Two approaches to this thematics are presented in the works of V. V. Petukhov [12] and I. Yu. Litvinenko [13]. These works, and the approaches developed in them, are good in themselves, executed conscientiously and with all possible care. In the given place I would by no means want to criticize them, and all that I shall do is oppose — or, better said, collate — my own position with them.
I proceed from the premise that in the consideration of psychic phenomena it is necessary to correlate them with the carrier, the subject, and the object of these phenomena. A materialist methodology must presuppose that the carrier of psychic phenomenology can only be a material substrate. However, this substrate cannot be appointed out of any dogmatic considerations — it can only be discovered in exactly posed experiments. At the present time the problem of the psychic substrate cannot be considered not merely finally solved, but even clearly formulated. Can the brain or the nervous system be considered such a substrate? It is quite plausible that these are only material apparatuses that are the conductors and transformers of the hypothetical substrate of psychic phenomena. Although in a certain sense — a derivative, secondary one — they too can be considered a substrate, but then this is already the substrate of a substrate. In these overlappings, various variants of the non-distinguishing of entities and concepts are possible.
The subject of psychological phenomenology is, apparently, that internal instance on which depend the singling-out of the parameters and the evaluation of the content of the phenomenological flow. The object of psychological phenomenology is the instance for which the phenomenological flow is the cause of internal and external changes.
Unfortunately, the concepts adduced cannot be considered sufficient, since it is not excluded that their denotations may fully or partially coincide, and non-linear connections may exist between them. In addition, one needs to take into account that the presumed denotations relate to the internal plane. On the external plane they may acquire forms directly or indirectly depending on the situational levels. Such forms, in this case, represent functional projections of the internal instances. But, of course, one can also suppose the existence of internal entities that are projections of external aggregates.
To the nearest external realizations of the introduced internal instances belong such aggregates as the human being, the organism, the individual, individuality, the personality, the group, society, the people, humanity, nature, culture. Let us for now leave aside such macro-units as nature or humanity, and let us consider more attentively that which is directly connected with the subject of psychology and psychophysiology.
Above all, let us determine what can be assigned to the category of psychic phenomenology. Of course, here belongs the experiencing by a person of his internal world. But, apparently, here one must also assign that which is not directly experienced by a person, though it has a direct relation to his personality — the unconscious, the subconscious, the preconscious, the postconscious, the superconscious. In doing so, consciousness itself is distinguished by a maximal neutrality in relation to the process of experiencing. To be in consciousness is for a person so natural that only a special assignment can switch attention over to beginning to be aware of one’s own consciousness. Unfortunately, in the literature and at conferences one can to this day encounter cases where consciousness is confused with its content. However, to the category of psychic phenomenology one can assign the whole phenomenology of behavior, activity, and self-realization, which can be experienced and materialized both on the internal and on the external plane.
Since the organism represents a material-energo-informational unity, it is the carrier of psychic phenomenology as an energoinformational entity, alongside the physical and chemical phenomenology. Such phenomenology, relating to the external plane, can often serve as an indicator of internal psychic processes and complexes. The difference between processes and complexes can be connected with the predominance of dynamic or static parameters.
The concept of the human being in the subject domain of psychology many psychologists connect with the concept and name of the biological species homo sapiens, and with this one can agree, although in everyday use this concept is blurred. The human being as a biological species is also a carrier of psychic phenomenology. Various sides of this phenomenology are the subject of study of psychology, psychophysiology, psychiatry.
The concept of the subject is a general-scientific one, and therefore it is extremely undesirable to deform it as applied to the subject domain of psychology. However, one must emphasize that the subject is not the carrier of psychic phenomenology, but itself relates to it.
The concept of the individual, proceeding from its Latin semantics, can be reduced to the concept of a species and social unit. The individual is a separate representative of human society. Here a substantive analogy with the atom is quite appropriate. The individual is a social atom — that is, something further indivisible from the social point of view.
The personality is the aggregate of the human values formed within the framework of the individual — that with which others reckon, which they respect and value, or, on the contrary, do not accept in him. It is the subject adapted to society. The personality can also be considered the value core of the individual. One can say that an individual possesses a personality if a value core has been formed in him. The personality is the value component of the individual. The human being appears in the world as an individual — that is, a ready integrality capable of further development. The individual, from the very moment of birth, begins to form and unfold his infrastructure. A ready, innate element of the infrastructure of the individual is his TIM.
One can consider that the personality is that which makes a person a full-fledged member of society — but, unfortunately, here the concept of full-fledgedness turns out to be blurred. In real life a personality can be observed even in small children, although many would prefer here to speak of the rudiments of a personality. But here we again collide with the blurredness of concepts. If, however, the personality is defined as the aggregate of the socially significant parameters of the individual, then one will be able to speak of a personality in the presence of any quantity of such parameters — even one. From this point of view, one can speak of the personality of a child as soon as there appears in him at least one socially significant parameter, at least one cultural reflex. With such a refinement of the concept of personality, the possibility appears of the qualitative and quantitative measurement of the personality.
Individuality is the human integrality, the inseparability of all his properties, the integral manifestation of the human being. Individuality is the form of the personality; the personality is the content of individuality. Individuality, in accordance with the primary semantics of this concept, is the joint, integral existence and manifestation of all the peculiarities of a person — it is the human being as a psychoinformational system. The personality, however, concretizes this system.
Character is the operative component of the individual. It is the aggregate of the behavioral instruments that the personality uses for the solution of situational tasks.
Conclusions to Chapter Eight
- The concepts of type and character are closely connected between themselves. Type opposes groups of objects to one another, while character opposes separate objects to one another.
- The solution of the question of the correlation of the concepts of type and character is at the same time the solution of the question of the correlation of the “model” and the “trait” approaches to the diagnostics of the type of the personality.
- The Augustinavičiūtė–Reinin traits represent a theoretical construct ensuring the completeness of the description of the socion.
References
- Gamezo, M. V., and Domashenko, I. A., Atlas of Psychology, Moscow, Prosveshcheniye, 1986, 271 pp.
- Kondakov, N. I., Logical Dictionary-Reference Book, Nauka, Moscow, 1976, 717 pp.
- Kretschmer, E., Medizinische Psychologie, Berlin, 1922.
- Melnikov, V. M., and Yampolsky, L. T., Introduction to the Experimental Psychology of the Personality, Moscow, Prosveshcheniye, 1985, 317 pp.
- Kant, I., Critique of Pure Reason, Works, vol. 3, Moscow, Mysl, 1964, 800 pp.
- Shepetko, E., Peculiarities of Model A, manuscript.
- Augustinavičiūtė, A., Reinin’s Traits, manuscript.
- Robert, M.-A., and Tilman, F., The Psychology of the Individual and the Group, Moscow, Progress, 1988.
- Short Psychological Dictionary, ed. A. V. Petrovsky, Moscow, Publishing House of Political Literature, 1985, 431 pp.
- Simonov, P. V., and Ershov, P. M., Temperament, Character, Personality, Moscow, Nauka, 160 pp.
- Reinin, G., The Morphology of Small Groups, Leningrad, manuscript, 1986, 18 pp.
- Petukhov, V. V., “The Concept of the Personality. The Functional Differences of Nature and Culture,” in the collection General Psychology, vol. 1, Moscow, 2001.
- Litvinenko, I. Yu., “The Subject of Psychic Reflection: ‘Semantic Fields’,” SMiPL 6, 2001.
Notes
- The composing of non-existent stories.
- The PSYCHASTHENIC type is distinguished by heightened anxiety, mistrustfulness, an inclination to doubts; it is very difficult for him to make any final decision, and therefore he carefully thinks over his behavior, weighs every step, repeatedly rechecks and redoes work already finished.
- The LABILE type is distinguished by changeability of mood; sometimes even insignificant events exert an essential influence on him; the smallest unpleasantness is capable of plunging him into gloomy experience, while pleasant events, or even only their prospect, are capable of raising the mood, returning merriment and faith in life; on the current mood everything depends — well-being, capacity for work, plans for the future, the relation to other people.
- The work was conducted with one and the same set of psychic symptoms.
- Social introversion.
- There exist philosophical schools that do not acknowledge the Kantian opposition of analytic and synthetic judgments.
- Not decomposable, or not further decomposable, within the limits of the subject domain under investigation.
- In the literature one encounters the mention that by specialty he was a railway engineer. If this is really so, then this ties in not badly with the origin of his positivist ideas.