Section 10: A Programmer Tries to Improve Socionics
(Skripnik D.A., “The Interaction of Psychological Functions in the Model of Information Metabolism”)
Translator’s note: “Author” (Автор) marks quotations from Skripnik’s article; “Commentary” (Комментарий) is Churyumov’s response. Abbreviations: IM = information metabolism; TIM = type of information metabolism; IR (ИО) = intertype relations; SF = socionic function(s); IA = information aspect(s); IMS (ВМС) = internal model of the environment; RTF = realization-technological function; [UChK] = reference to Churyumov’s book.
The author of the article, Skripnik, is a programmer, and judging by the text of the article, he seems to have a command of modern psychological language. This allows me to express surprise that a person versed in the psychology of programming so distortedly understands the basic categories of socionics. Then again, this is yet more evidence of its deep complexity. But I am sympathetic to his very attempt to make at least some sense of socionic concepts, which are far from simple.
Author: One of the definitions of socionics is the theory of information metabolism.
Commentary: Alas, such a definition of socionics can only be given by people who do not know the logical rules of definition. Such a definition is incommensurate with the socio-psychological specialization of socionics, which is limited to IM in psychic structures and structures closely connected with them. A commensurate definition of socionics defines it as the science of information metabolism in psychic structures, which singles out the specific domain of IM.
Author: “Information metabolism” (IM) is a very frequently repeated term, but many socionists find it rather difficult to explain what it actually means. The aim of this article is an attempt to unpack this ambiguous concept.
Commentary: This is not merely a “frequently repeated term” — it is one of the basic categories of socionics. And this concept is not ambiguous, nor should it be. In socionics it has acquired the character of a fundamental category. The term “information metabolism” was coined by A. Kępiński, a Polish psychiatrist, by analogy with physiological metabolism, and was used by him to explain pathological processes in schizophrenia, which he treated. It should be specially emphasized that this remarkable physician had no “Theory of IM,” as socionists sometimes write, and his conceptual-terminological find was never formalized by him as a “principle of information metabolism in the psyche.” It was Aušra Augustinavičiūtė who gave this term its fundamental character, filling it with a meaning connected not with the particular utilization of information, as with Kępiński, but with its essential significance for the functioning of the psyche. There is nothing mystical in such a concept of IM — its full scope includes the processes of receiving information, its storage, its processing by the psyche, and the output of information outward — processes conceptually formalized in cybernetics and consolidated in informatics. The reception of information corresponds in psychology to perception, the work of the sense organs or, more generally, sensorics. The storage of information is memory. The processing of information by the psyche is directed, first of all, at constructing an internal model of the external environment (IME), which is the business of intuition. This also includes the formation of behavioral programs adequate to the conditions of survival, which is connected with the processes of emoting and thinking. The output of information outward has two forms — communication and technology. Communication includes introverted forms of thinking and extraverted emoting, corresponding to speech and its emotional accompaniment. Technological contact with the environment, which in socionics corresponds to extraverted thinking, represents the technological obtaining of various forms of resources necessary for life. This contact is essential in the process of a living being’s adaptation to the conditions of its life set by its habitat. From such an understanding of IM it is no longer difficult to pass to a global understanding of the fundamental role of information in world processes. Cybernetics came right up to this, but it stopped at the fundamental significance of information in control processes, apparently not daring to acknowledge its not merely essential but substantive role in the Universe, alongside energy and matter. This part of the generalization was carried out by me in [UChK].
It must be said that Kępiński understood information metabolism extremely concretely — at the level of the direct utilization of information in the human organism and, above all, in the sick person, since he himself was a practicing psychiatrist, and he did not elevate IM into a principle. A typical example of the level at which Kępiński used this concept is the following quotation: “An autonomous decision concerning the need for food or the absence thereof depends on interoceptive signals informing about the level of glucose in the blood, the tone of the muscles of the stomach, intestines, etc., while an automated decision depends on the established mealtime, on exteroceptive signals such as the smell, taste, and appearance of delicacies, etc.” One may say that the Polish psychiatrist drew attention to the importance of informational signals received by the patient from within and without for the automated, that is, subconscious, decision about taking food, which may enter into the clinical picture of an illness. There is no question of a principle here. This is a solid working category, and that is remarkable in itself.
An author writing about Kępiński summarizes the Polish psychiatrist’s hypothesis thus: “In order for a living organism to carry out an energy exchange with its surroundings, it must orient itself within them. Therefore, already at the early stages of phylogenesis, alongside energy exchange there appears information exchange or, as the author metaphorically (emphasis mine — S.Ch.) designates this process, information metabolism. In man, the development of the nervous system creates an exceptional situation specific to him. In this situation information metabolism plays an extraordinarily important role and is closely connected with energy metabolism.” And one more quotation, from which it is not hard to grasp Kępiński’s narrowly professional understanding of information metabolism: “The author treats schizophrenia as a disturbance of information metabolism. In the premorbid period of the lives of schizophrenia patients one often observes a dominance of the so-called position away from the surroundings. Frequently from childhood, and usually from puberty, future patients feel bad in their surroundings, flee into a world of fantasy, feel themselves to be different from their peers, and do not take part in games with them, which are of great importance for normal human development. The autistic attitude, as Professor Kępiński believes, is based, in essence, on a weakening of the connection of information metabolism with the surrounding world (emphasis mine — S.Ch.).” It appears that here Kępiński uses the concept of information metabolism as a narrowly specialized function of the psyche, alongside which there are others.
Obviously, Aušra Augustinavičiūtė went further. It was she who turned Kępiński’s felicitous working find into a principle, that is, a maximally generalized and at the same time fundamental notion. It was precisely in this variant of generalization that positivist-minded psychologists, sociologists, philosophers, physicians, etc. refused to accept the, on the whole, quite plausible hypothesis of the universality and fundamentality of the phenomenon of information metabolism — the reception of informational signals from the habitat, fundamentally important for the functioning of a living being; the processing of these signals for the needs of adaptation to the environment; the fixing of the consequences of such adaptation in the anatomical and physiological structures of the individual and in his behavioral programs. Such an understanding of IM has not been accepted by official science to this day, even at the level of metaphor.
Author: As is well known, socionics begins with C.G. Jung’s work “Psychological Types,” in which he described four psychological functions: thinking, feeling, sensation, and intuition.
Commentary: Of Jung one could say that he was one of the precursors of socionics, but to say that socionics begins with him and that this is common knowledge is not correct, since it distorts the real history of socionics. In exactly the same way one could say that socionics begins with Freud, for it was he who discovered the structure of the personality represented by ego, superego, and id — but he, like Jung, should be classed among the precursors. Inaccuracies in the author’s presentation of socionic information immediately cast suspicion on the correctness of his entire text.
What is known is something entirely different: socionics begins with Aušra Augustinavičiūtė’s construction of a model which she called model “Yu” (“Ю”), although, as became clear later, this model ought to have been called model “A-Yu,” since Jung had no models at all, and the model proposed by Aušra was her own development based on the motifs of Jung’s scheme. Aušra translated Jung’s empirical semantics into a constructive plane, clarifying the meaning of the two auxiliary functions and fixing their position in the technological chain of IM; and the positioning of the functions which Jung had groped toward, she made explicit, assigning the functions ordinal numbers from 1 to 4 in the technological chain of IM and giving them functional names: program, creative, PoLR, and suggestive.
Author: What does the concept of a “function” mean in psychology? …these are elementary psychophysiological processes occurring in the organism under certain conditions. Thus one may speak of sensitivity as a function of nerve endings; of the mnemonic function, based on the nervous system’s capacity to memorize and reproduce the data of sensitivity; of the tonic function, manifested in temperament, in affective excitability, etc. One way or another, a psychophysiological function reduces to the activity of nerve cells.
Commentary: The concept of a function is a general scientific one, and in every subject area it may acquire its own semantic shades; it is wrong to assert that in psychology it reduces to elementary psychophysiological processes — these are merely examples of functions. Did the author give a definition of a function in psychology and socionics? Alas, no. All he did was give examples. Clearly, the statement that “these are elementary psychophysiological processes occurring in the organism under certain conditions” cannot be considered a definition, simply because it does not satisfy the requirements imposed on definitions: here one unknown is defined through others, and the scope of the concept is considerably narrowed.
Author: Psychophysiological functions are the basis of a more complex object of psychological study — psychic processes.
Commentary: The author reproduces concepts from official psychology textbooks written under the strong influence of positivism, uncritically assimilated. Judging by the quoted phrase, the author, following his chosen authorities, opposes psychophysiological functions to psychic processes, apparently not understanding that the latter are also functions, belonging to a higher level of the individual’s vital activity. It is also obvious that the author does not distinguish the levels of functional activity of a living being, which is fundamental for determining the quality of the functional product. At the very least, psychology has long held the notion of the irreducibility of the psychic to the physiological, and of the psychological to the psychic.
Author: Although psychic processes arise on a functional basis, they are not reducible to it. For example, perception is not a function in the same sense in which sensitivity is a function — it is a more complex but nevertheless specific process. Sensitivity participates in it, but its precondition is also a certain level of development of the tonic function; moreover, in the process of perception there also participate comprehension, the reproduction of past experience, etc.
Commentary: The misunderstanding underlying the author’s notions of the concept of function is confirmed and reinforced in the quoted passage by the fact that psychic processes are opposed by the author to a “functional basis.” Yes, perception is not a function in the same sense in which sensitivity is a function, but both the one and the other are functions in the sense that both perception and sensitivity are the process and result of the work of specific organs. The difference between these organs determines the difference in their functioning, but here one must also take into account that the content of functioning finds its expression in the structure and features of the organ.
Author: Psychic processes, including as their components various psychophysical functions, are in turn included in various concrete forms of activity, within which and depending on which they are formed. When we analyze human activity, we characterize it as intellectual or emotional according to the component predominating in it, which stamps its defining imprint on the activity as a whole. From this point of view no activity can be of a “pure type” — we can speak only of the relative predominance in it of certain psychic processes.
Commentary: Without giving definitions of the basic components of the individual’s activity, the author distinguishes functions, processes, and activity, apparently not understanding that all of these are different levels of functioning, which within socionics can be connected with the notion of functions of varying degrees of generality. This is fundamentally important, since in socionics from the very beginning of its emergence the discussion has concerned psychic and psychological functions, and there are no visible grounds for changing this terminology to suit a methodologically insufficiently generalized terminology entrenched in the minds of some psychologists. At the same time, the author can be reproached for denying the category of activity its “purity,” since activity can perfectly well be defined, first of all, as such, and only then can its concretized subdivisions be introduced. Let us turn to the origin of this term.
As is known, in Soviet philosophy, and under its influence in psychology, the category of activity was quite justifiably introduced as the purposeful activity of individual people and their collectives in accordance with the interests of society.
The Great Encyclopedic Dictionary (BES) gives this definition of activity: “ACTIVITY: a specifically human form of active relation to the surrounding world, whose content is its purposeful alteration and transformation. Human activity presupposes a certain opposition of the subject and object of activity: man opposes to himself the object of activity as material that must receive a new form and properties, turning from material into the product of activity.”
This definition does not negate the understanding of activity as a social function connected with adaptation and the interaction of society with nature. The organ of activity, as the function of transforming the human habitat, is society. However, socionics allows one to look at activity as a generalization of the realization-technological function (RTF) inherent in the individual — one of the eight socionic functions (SF), which in the series of psychic functions are connected with a high level of generalization, incorporating a large number of psychic functions of a lower level.
However, as can be seen from the encyclopedic definition quoted, activity is not subdivided into intellectual and emotional, but represents purposeful activity secured not only by the intellectual and emotional but also by the sensory and intuitive components. And this too is reflected in the encyclopedic definition, where it is said that “Marxist philosophy in its treatment of activity overcame the limitations of narrowly rationalistic and idealistic understandings of activity. Marxism proceeds from a holistic understanding of activity as objectual, as the organic unity of sensuous-practical and theoretical forms of activity.” This quite official definition of activity may serve as an argument against the author’s superficially intuitive innovations.
Author: C.G. Jung called the forms of psychic activity psychological functions.
Commentary: Jung did not use the term activity, and hence did not do what the author attributes to him — without giving a special definition of psychic and psychological function, he used the concept of function by default, as a general scientific one for his time. Moreover, the author introduces the concept of psychic activity without giving a differentiated definition of it that would distinguish it from the category of activity introduced in Soviet philosophy. The result is confusion among the concepts psychic function, psychological function, psychic process, psychic activity. It appears that the last term arose in Soviet psychology in imitation of the philosophical term, under the influence of “ideological expediency.” An understanding of the semantics of the RTF (realization-technological function) in socionics allows one to conclude that the concept of psychic activity is contrived, lacking any real basis. Indeed, by analogy with the philosophical definition of activity, psychic activity would have to mean “a specifically human form of active relation to the psychic world, whose content is its purposeful alteration and transformation.” However, the author has proposed no definition of his own, and therefore his reasoning on this score loses its foundation.
Author: However, with the above in mind, psychological functions should be the name for the components determining this form — psychic processes.
Commentary: After the critical remarks made, it should be clear that the author does not propose reasoned approaches to unifying functional terminology, and there is no particular need to oppose psychic processes to psychological functions, considering also that the concept of process is more general than the concept of function, and consequently all functions are processes but not all processes are functions; hence the arbitrary use of these terms only creates confusion. Let us draw the distinction between physiological, psychophysiological, psychic, and psychological functions. The physiological relates directly to the body. The psychic relates to the individual, and the psychological to the personality and society. Psychophysiological functions can apparently be connected, for example, with the endocrine system and the activity of the nervous system, which secures the work of the psychic functions. In any case, the work of refining the terminology must be continued.
Author: We can observe psychic activity directly, but, as was said above, it cannot be of a “pure type.”
Commentary: The author uses terminology carelessly in speaking of “psychic activity,” since the concept of activity belongs to the level of the personality and society; but perhaps the author has in mind psychic activity in the sense of animation, and the phenomenology connected with it.
Author: In this respect psychological functions are ideal, “pure” forms: we cannot observe them directly, but can only infer their manifestation by observing psychic activity.
Commentary: Here the discussion may concern functions of different levels of generalization. Thus, for example, socionic sensorics is a generalization of all the sense organs as input devices through which information is introduced into the psyche, which is the beginning of IM.
Author: On the other hand, there are preconditions for identifying psychological functions on the basis of psychophysiological research; however, in this case too, psychological functions remain ideal forms resulting from the approximation of psychophysiological measurements (Fig. 1).
Commentary: Here we encounter the consequences of the harmful action of the positivist paradigm, one of whose negative results has been the reduction of psychological phenomenology to psychophysiological measurements. And although the pragmatic results in such cases can be, and often are, useful, the theory corresponding to them, being an anachronism, objectively turns out to be an intellectual virus that has a pernicious effect on the scientist’s mental health.
The author gives no definition of the psyche, but only approximately, according to his own intuitive understanding, uses psychological terminology — at the level he has attained. What do his reasonings give socionics? They muddle socionic theory while clarifying nothing.
Author: It is precisely the fact that psychological functions are ideal forms that makes them suitable as elements of a model of the human psyche.
Commentary: The author proceeds from the premise that psychological functions are ideal forms; but since he has not given a definition of function — either in general or of the psychological function in particular — it remains unclear what can be done with his reasonings except to consider them meaningless. When the author calls psychological functions ideal forms, he thereby opposes them to material forms and introduces into the experimental basis of psychological research a controversial philosophical theme, whereas the concept of a generalized function introduces a useful notion of functional hierarchy and levels of functioning.
Author: …the model [of the psyche] was composed by Aušra Augustinavičiūtė and was named “model Yu” in honor of C.G. Jung (Fig. 2). This model demonstrates the regularity with which various psychological functions manifest themselves in psychic activity.
Commentary: The author, for reasons unclear, applies the trivializing notion “was composed” in assessing model “A.” The greatest discovery of the 20th century in psychology is thereby lowered to the level of something insignificant and optional — as if Aušra Augustinavičiūtė had not done colossal work extracting the hidden meaning from Jung’s substantial but largely preliminary developments. Model “A” is attuned to the concept of IM and is described in terms of functioning; the author, apparently, tries to evaluate it in pre-socionic concepts. Model “A” demonstrates not a “regularity” but represents a structural law of the psyche, that is, a generalized statement indicating the fundamental parameters of the psyche.
Author: The most differentiated function occupies the first position and is the guiding principle of psychic activity. The auxiliary function (second position), despite being relatively unconscious, exerts a significant influence on psychic activity, determining its form, which allows the block formed by the first and second functions to be regarded as a single whole. The third and fourth functions analogously form an “unconscious blocking.”
Commentary: These are all very approximate, blurry reasonings, which is largely due to the author’s lack of adequate definitions. The author introduces notions, going back to Jung, about the degree of consciousness of the functions, which, without corresponding substantiation, gives the impression of arbitrary inventions. What is “the guiding principle of psychic activity”? What is that about? Have you ever encountered this combination of words in works on psychology? How does the author know that “the auxiliary function (second position), despite being relatively unconscious (emphasis mine — S.I.), exerts a significant influence on psychic activity”? And it itself — does it not belong to “psychic activity”? Aušra called this function creative in the sense that in contact with the external world it shapes that contact so as, if possible, to elicit a positive response from the environment — but is it possible to do this in an unconscious state?
Author: Since the functions occupying positions No. 3 and No. 4 are unambiguously determined by functions No. 1 and No. 2, we can say that the form of psychic activity is determined by the first two functions of the model.
Commentary: Here the author passes from the substantive plane to the plane of formal representation. Say it we can, but this is merely a technical abbreviation; what actually works, and hence determines psychic activity, is all four functions — just as a song is realized by all its words, not only the first ones. In particular, one could with equal success hold that “the form of psychic activity” is determined by the functions occupying the last positions. Incidentally, what is “the form of psychic activity”? Possibly what hides behind this is the semantics of the functions, and the author, instead of dealing with the problem of the semantics of the functions, resorts to the category “form of psychic activity.”
Author: In socionics one can often encounter yet another definition of psychological functions — structural elements of the psyche, or certain “devices” performing definite actions.
Commentary: The authors of such definitions at least take upon themselves the labor of defining psychological and psychic function, unlike the author of this text. However, the author transmits the supposed definitions with obvious distortions, and on the whole what the author is trying to retell here is nonsense. The correctly restored original text to which the author apparently refers might read: “a psychic function is the process and result of the work of a structural element of the psyche.” Compare this with the author’s formulation and you will see substantial semantic distortions. Note that the author speaks of a psychological function without first establishing the distinction between the psychic and the psychological. The psychological relates to the personal and social plane of the individual’s existence and is not reducible to the psychic. In socionics and in Jung there is no talk of psychological functions: the functions are psychic, while the types are psychological. But of course one can speak of psychological functions too — only that will be a different subject, for example sociology. In that case the organs of such functions will be social agents. In sociology such functions are often called roles, but that is a purely terminological variation. For the unification of terminology it is still better to speak of social functions.
Author: Elements of information metabolism, in relation to psychological functions, are a second-order abstraction: they are imaginary devices carrying out psychic processes, which in themselves are already an abstraction based on actually observed psychic activity (Fig. 3).
Commentary: Here the author introduces the concept “elements of information metabolism,” again without giving definitions or explications. The result is an increase in the number of vague theoretical images which, of course, can be used for analysis and criticism, but which are completely unsuitable either for practical work or for a full-fledged theory. But the height of absurdity is his reasoning about imaginary devices which, apparently, yield a real psychological result — namely, the purposeful behavior of the personality and its social consequences. By unsuccessfully involving such constructs as psychic processes in socionic constructions, the author tries to reduce socionics to confusedly understood concepts from psychology. Still, it is quite plausible that the author is using the concept of abstraction incorrectly, perhaps meaning generalization.
Author: The use of elements of information metabolism makes it possible to create a model of information metabolism more convenient for understanding; however, it can also lead to certain misconceptions. Thus, for example, as a result of identifying psychological functions with the corresponding elements of IM, a reasonable question arises: “what happens to the weak functions while the strong functions are working?” Such a question is meaningless if by psychological functions we understand precisely psychic processes: it is as absurd as asking, “what happens to running when a person walks?”
Commentary: A most substantial intention of the author: “to create a model of information metabolism more convenient for understanding,” from which it must follow that he considers model “A” less convenient. Obviously this is the author’s subjective conviction, since he has no criterion of “convenience of understanding” and is oriented toward himself. Look at the author’s Fig. 3. At its beginning a human figure is depicted, and beneath it is written: “psychic activity.” This can be understood as an example of the metaphorical use of symbolism, but it is also an example of approximately understood reality. Clearly a human being is not “psychic activity”; moreover, he does not even engage in it, except perhaps as an object of scientific study. Man as a social being engages in activity, that is, the conscious transformation of his habitat. I hope the reader has understood the distinction I have in mind.
At the end of this picture are depicted four cells with four of Aušra Augustinavičiūtė’s symbols inscribed in them, by which she designated the IA. One can guess that this is the author’s representation of model “A-Yu” for Don Quixote, but beneath it is written: “Elements of IM.” Bear in mind that the corresponding concepts were not introduced and are probably assumed to be understood by default. This is a serious misunderstanding.
Nevertheless, let us try to reconstruct the meaning of the elements of IM. Such elements — that is, further indecomposable entities structuring processes — could be, for example, elementary operators of the psyche’s information processing, or the small groups of neurons discovered by the psychophysiologists Hubel and Wiesel, responsible for distinguishing elementary features such as vertical and horizontal striping.
But perhaps the author understands the term “elements” differently. For example, as enlarged constituent links — components. Such components of IM are the RECEPTION, EVALUATION, PROCESSING, and PRACTICAL USE (TECHNOLOGY) OF INFORMATION [see “UChK”]. This scheme is a socionic refinement of the cybernetic scheme RECEPTION–PROCESSING–STORAGE–OUTPUT of information, and this refinement is essential, since it relates to a more fundamental level of the functioning of information in psychic structures, in contrast to the level to which cybernetics-informatics appeals, namely control processes in technical devices. And although Wiener from the very beginning of his work assumed the applicability of cybernetic concepts to living beings as well, their specificity was thereby lowered to the level of automata, from which the presence of a soul-related and spiritual component is excluded. From the author’s figure it is hard to understand what concretely he means by elements of IM: the SF of Don Quixote, the IA, TIMs, the psychic functions Jung addressed?
In the middle of this figure are depicted four sinusoids, which evidently are meant to indicate psychic processes, as is indeed labeled below. I have already discussed the difference between functions and processes, and I consider it inadmissible in psychology not to distinguish processes from functions. Does the author want his scheme to say that the elements of IM, however he himself understands them, are the basis, the cause, or something else in relation to what he calls psychic processes; or does he consider them co-ordinate, with the personal configuration of “psychic processes” constituting the phenomenology of “psychic activity”? Obviously all this ought to be clarified, not presumed known by default. In this picture, for the sake of optimization, I would remove the middle link as duplicating the functioning of the psyche represented by its model, and would superimpose the model, as a symbol of the psyche, on the naturalistic depiction of the human being, emphasizing the inseparable unity of the psyche and its bearer.
Author: In speaking of psychological functions, one should remember that we mean by this first of all the forms of manifestation of psychic activity, and only then the abstractions describing them.
Commentary: Both Jung and socionics speak of psychic functions — it is the types that are psychological, so the author only confuses the matter by calling the psychic functions with which socionics deals psychological. Thus the author gives no definition of the socionic function and imposes his own homegrown views on socionics.
Author: Still, if we reason within the framework of a model composed of elements of IM, we can say the following: psychic energy is redistributed among the elements of IM. By psychic energy in this case should be understood the degree of psychic activity, and by its distribution among the elements of IM — the predominance in this activity of certain psychic processes.
Commentary: This is an example of reasoning perhaps intelligible to the author (after all, he puts some meaning into it), but difficult to interpret from the standpoint of socionics. The author evidently does not understand that: 1) the model is “composed” not of elements of IM but of symbols of the SF; 2) socionics does not focus attention on psychic energy but considers the movement of information between the SF; 3) it is hard to agree with the understanding of psychic energy as the degree of psychic activity — simply because a degree is not energy, although the degree of activity is of course connected with energy. Here the author’s positivist-behaviorist complexes compel him to distort concepts, substituting phenomenon for essence and blindly repeating Jung’s understanding of psychic energy. 4) The author uses, for describing model “A,” a blurry psychological terminology inadequate to it.
Author: We speak of a psychological type as the habitual, natural form of activity for a particular individual; however, in different situations the individual’s psychic activity can take different forms.
Commentary: Of course, if we speak of “the habitual, natural form of activity for a particular individual” — for example scientific, engineering, or political — then it is not this that determines the psychological type… Rather, the TIM should determine the kind of activity; at the very least it determines the degree of well-being of the TIM’s bearer in the course of the activity he carries out.
Author: Before considering the mechanism of the change in the form of psychic activity under the influence of other individuals, we should dwell on one more concept — the vertness of a function.
Commentary: This is something quite new: apparently the author understands IR as “the mechanism of the change in the form of psychic activity under the influence of other individuals.” One wonders what this gives him.
Author: Besides the four functional attitudes based on the psychological functions, C.G. Jung also described the extraverted and introverted attitudes. These attitudes imply the direction of psychic energy either at the object, “outward,” or at the subject, “inward.” The vert attitude of consciousness is determined by the corresponding attitude of the leading psychological function.
Commentary: Jung spoke of psychic, not psychological functions — for him the psychological ones are the types. Furthermore, Jung had four basic functions, and he never wrote of four functional attitudes — incidentally, what would that mean in the author’s understanding? Distortions of this kind cast a shadow on the author’s competence.
Author: The unconscious functions, in Jung’s opinion, are in the opposite, compensating attitude. In socionics, however, it is accepted that each pair of functions united in a blocking has the opposite vert attitude. In this case the functional model of the psyche will look as follows (Fig. 4): a pair of functions of opposite vertness in the strong, conscious block, and a pair of functions of opposite vertness in the weak, unconscious block.
Commentary: The author confuses Jung’s concepts and at the same time is slavishly dependent on them, trying on such a basis to form his own understanding of socionics. The point is that although Jung discovered the concepts of extraversion and introversion, he never fully sorted them out. Because of this, several variants of understanding these categories appeared among his followers, including one that is the exact opposite. Even in socionics, one of its most productive developers, V. Gulenko, argued in one of his articles that if extraverted functions were counted as introverted and vice versa, nothing would change. The article was written very persuasively, but the idea nevertheless turned out to be wrong. These concepts — extraversion and introversion — are not so simple. Moreover, it is now clear that Jung, for all his theoretical talents, did not fully understand what he had discovered. As a result, from his working drafts there developed in America the very brisk but reality-distorting Myers-Briggs school, while in the Baltics Aušra Augustinavičiūtė succeeded in finding the true keys to understanding Jung’s psychological types. But her followers, in turn, have invented no fewer than two and a half dozen understandings of socionics, so different that they have never been able to come to agreement. Here before you is yet another variant of understanding socionics — Skripnik’s. And all because beginning socionic theorists set about their developments not from the beginning but from that middle point at which it starts to seem to them that they have already sorted socionics out fairly well. A mass of interesting ideas starts coming into their heads; they are ready to rewrite socionics in accordance with their understanding of it, and they tell everyone that this way it is much clearer.
Let us recall once more that the psyche is an energy-information system regulating the physical, physiological, and psychic activity of the organism; in it the subject’s activity is formed, and by it that activity is accompanied. Sensorics, intuition, thinking, and emoting in Jung and in socionics are not attitudes but functions; the author tries to replace the primary terminology of Jung and Aušra Augustinavičiūtė with his own concepts, which are reminiscences of positivist-behaviorist terminology. The positioning of the functions in the psyche — this remarkable discovery of Jung’s — was never fully reflected upon by him, as a result of which subsequent psychologists invented their own interpretations of these concepts.
Author: Now, having dealt with the abstractions, we can pass to modeling the interaction of two individuals with each other.
Commentary: It would be closer to the point to say: having raised a fog… Nevertheless, the problem of modeling the interaction of two individuals with each other is, without question, of both socionic and general-psychological interest. All the same, it would have been proper to make at least some preliminary survey of the attempts of other scholars to solve it [see UChK]. This problem was solved quite satisfactorily by Aušra Augustinavičiūtė — her scheme, based on drawing transactional connections between functions with identical aspect content in the “A-Yu” models of different TIMs, may well be regarded as a model of IR. The result she obtained was correct, although her substantiations of the semantics of the relations she constructed should be regarded as preliminary and debatable. The main doubt was raised by her hypothesis that in the psyche functions with identical aspect content interact. This was explained by such functions having a common “subject matter” for interaction. Later the idea appeared that such functions “resonate” — and “at once everything became clear to everyone.” Alas, the NLP effect was at work here: the ringing, vibrating word “resonate” contains enough energy to make an impression on the subconscious. Still, as a hypothesis it is even beautiful, but next there should follow laboratory experiments that could detect the “effect of resonance of generalized psychic functions” — but, alas, the state does not fund socionics. Be that as it may, the inventive methodological device applied by Aušra Augustinavičiūtė for discovering the semantics of IR bore fruit and in any case proved heuristic. Aušra called the phenomenon she discovered intertype relations (IR). Alas, it is not hard to show that she was mistaken: she did indeed make a discovery, but what she discovered were not intertype but interfunctional relations, since functions with identical aspect content exist in any two TIMs, and this content can be taken outside the brackets, leaving a bare scheme in which the transaction line connects not aspects but functions. That is precisely why she discovered 14 relations, and not 16×16=256, or at least 128!
Later Aušra’s student and colleague N. Medvedev attempted to build a model of IR on the basis of drawing transactional connections between functions with identical aspect content in “A” models, but did not carry this work through to the end. Properly speaking, he did not obtain a construct more convenient for a fuller interpretation of the semantics of IR than the schemes based on the “A-Yu” model provided. Such a model I succeeded in building, relying on the principle of the duality of TIM and IR. In this case one can establish a one-to-one correspondence between TIM and IR, and then prove that the model of any TIM is the model of the IR corresponding to that TIM. It also turned out that the assumption of interaction between functions with identical aspect content is superfluous, and in Aušra’s schemes one can obtain the same result she did by proceeding from the systemic connections between the generalized functions in the psyche. Having made this brief survey, let us see what new thing the author intends to offer us.
Author: In socionics it is accepted that informational influence is transmitted only between functions of the same type. How does this happen? The “St. Petersburg Working Group” discovered, and used in its research, a phenomenon known as the resonance effect in small groups. This effect consists in the fact that when individuals with identical functions in the “ego” block interact, the activity of the given function increases in each of them. At the same time, on bearers of functions of the opposite vertness a resonance group produces the opposite effect, causing a state of discomfort. One may conclude that same-type psychological functions having the same vertness mutually activate each other, “resonate,” while functions of opposite vertness extinguish each other. Let us consider this using the examples of certain intertype relations.
Commentary: Alas, the erroneous hypothesis continues to retain its “persuasive” effect. Moreover, it receives development with the addition of the idea that “same-type psychological functions having the same vertness mutually activate each other, ‘resonate’” (this needs experimental confirmation!) “while functions of opposite vertness extinguish each other” — and this is pure invention, by analogy with “resonance.” Though as metaphors it is beautiful.
Author: Identity relations (Fig. 5) are characterized by the complete identity of the arrangement of functions in the model.
Commentary: Naturally, “identity relations are characterized” not by this — this is a purely formal feature, from which what characterizes identity relations should in fact follow. The formal feature in this case gives some grounds for calling these relations identical. What characterizes them is that in this pair the extraverted intuition of one partner is counterposed to the extraverted intuition of the other, which can lead to competition, and so on.
Author: Strong functions resonate with strong functions and their activity increases, while weak functions are not subjected to influence and their activity falls because psychic energy is redirected to the strong functions. This is the natural energetic state for the psychotype, and in this state it feels comfortable.
Commentary: Here we are dealing with a vivid example of psychological metaphysics, when a scholar very confidently builds schemes and offers their explanation while relying on unfounded notions about psychic processes. By way of counterposition to the author’s approach, I will give an interpretation of the identity relation on the model of this relation proposed by me.
In accordance with the principle of duality of TIM and IR, the model of the identity relation is isomorphic to the model of the TIM Don Quixote.
Here the partner’s IA stand in parentheses. For the group of interfunctional relations this is always Don Quixote. 1) I(I) → the programs (I), plans (I), potential possibilities (I) of one partner are counterposed to the programs (I), plans (I), potential possibilities (I) of the other partner. 2) l(l) → the communicative acts (l) of one partner are counterposed to the communicative acts (l) of the other partner. 3) S(S) → the volitional mobilization (S) of one partner is counterposed to the volitional mobilization (S) of the other partner. 4) e(e) → the objects of critical attitude (e) of one partner are counterposed to the objects of critical attitude (e) of the other partner. 5) s(s) → the expectation of a resource (s), the resource (s), the requirements for the consumer quality of the resource (s) of one partner are counterposed to the expectation of a resource (s), the resource (s), the requirements for the consumer quality of the resource (s) of the other partner. 6) E(E) → the conditions of emotional mobilization (E) of one partner are counterposed to the conditions of emotional mobilization (E) of the other partner. 7) i(i) → the parameters of inner concentration (i) of one partner are counterposed to the parameters of inner concentration (i) of the other partner. 8) P(P) → the technological realization of the typological product (P) of one partner is counterposed to the technological realization of the typological product (P) of the other partner.
This is the maximally brief semantic interpretation of the identity relation from its model. Here all 8 functions of the relation model have been interpreted.
What, then, does the author offer? First of all, let us note that the author uses as his basis a somewhat modified “A-Yu” model, which allows it to be renamed model “A-Yu-R.” This in itself already limits its interpretive possibilities. Secondly, the author uses the same transactional connections that Aušra and Medvedev had, which provides no novelty. And thirdly, the author bases his interpretations on several weakly substantiated rules: 1) functions with identical homovert IA activate each other; 2) functions with identical heterovert IA extinguish each other; 3) strong functions resonate with strong functions and their activity increases; 4) weak functions are not subjected to influence and their activity falls because psychic energy is redirected to the strong functions.
Alas, without an adequate logical foundation these “simple rules” turn into metaphysical inventions and are subject to criticism. But where is the interpretive novelty one might have expected from the innovations made? There is none.
Author: Now let us consider another kind of relation — conflict relations (Fig. 6). In this case the strong functions enter into resonance with the weak functions of the conflicter, redirecting his psychic energy into a channel unaccustomed for him. As a result a feeling of discomfort arises.
Commentary: Here again we see metaphysical pronouncements about the redirection of psychic energy. What, then, does the interpretation of the dual model of CF (conflict) give?
This is the “A” model of CF, dual to the “A” model of ESI (Dreiser). 1) e(I) → the programs (I), plans (I), potential possibilities (I) of one partner evoke in the other partner a negative attitude (e). 2) S(l) → the communicative acts (l) of one partner provoke in the other partner a state of volitional opposition (S). 3) l(S) → the volitional mobilization (S) of one partner evokes in the other partner an attitude of critical analysis (l). 4) I(e) → the objects of critical attitude (e) of one partner evoke in the other partner deep, substantive reflections (I). 5) P(s) → the expectation of a resource (s), the resource (s), the requirements for the consumer quality of the resource (s) of one partner evoke in the other partner the desire to obtain (P) the resource he needs by himself. 6) i(E) → the conditions of emotional mobilization (E) and motivation (E) of one partner provoke in the other partner the desire to withdraw, to isolate himself from the first (i), to free himself (i) from him. 7) E(i) → the parameters of inner concentration (i) of one partner evoke in the other a negative emotional reaction (E). 8) s(P) → the technological realization of the typological product (P) by one partner provokes in the other a negative aesthetic evaluation (s) of it.
This is the maximally brief semantic interpretation of the conflict relation from its model. Here all 8 functions of the relation model have been interpreted, which gives a vivid picture of the basic parameters of this relation instead of the author’s isolated “feeling of discomfort.”
Author: An analogous situation arises in the case of relations of complete extinguishment; however, the mechanism of the functions’ influence is somewhat different (Fig. 7). Here functions of the same type have different vertness, and therefore extinguish each other’s psychic energy. As a result psychic energy may be redirected to the weak functions, likewise causing discomfort.
Commentary: Evidently the author does not know that the relation of PC (polar counterposition), unfortunately named complete extinguishment by Aušra, belongs to the category of positive relations, to the group of passive synergy — the same group as duality, semi-duality, and mirage. The result is the impression that the author is fitting an explanation to the semantics of the PC relation as he has uncritically accepted it. That is, we are dealing here with an invention that does not correspond to reality — which is one of the understandings of philosophical metaphysics.
Author: In the case of dual relations (Fig. 8) an extinguishment of functions likewise occurs; however, this extinguishment does not cause a feeling of discomfort — the energy of the weak functions is extinguished, and thereby psychic energy is redirected to the strong functions.
Commentary: And here is how the semantics of the dual relation (DU) is reproduced from its dual model.
This is the “A” model of DU (duality), dual to the “A” model of SEI (Dumas). 1) s(I) → the programs (I), plans (I), potential possibilities (I) of one partner are perceived by the other as a resource (s). 2) E(l) → the communicative acts (l) of one partner are perceived by the other with a positive emotional uplift (E). 3) i(S) → the volitional mobilization (S) of one partner in tense conditions inspires (i) the other, evokes in him a feeling of hope (i) and optimistic expectation (i). 4) P(e) → the objects of critical attitude (e), the state of helplessness (e) connected with the unacceptability of some factor, of one partner evoke in the other partner a readiness to help him, up to and including the performance of the necessary physical work (P). 5) I(s) → the expectation of a resource (s), the resource (s), the requirements for the consumer quality of the resource (s) of one partner prompt the other partner to convey to him essential information (I) connected with this. 6) l(E) → the conditions of emotional mobilization (E) of one partner evoke in the other a readiness to render him communicative support (l). 7) S(i) → the inner concentration (i) of one partner evokes in the other a readiness to render him volitional support (S). 8) e(P) → the technological realization of the typological product (P) by one partner forms in the other a positive attitude toward him (e).
This is the maximally brief semantic interpretation of the dual relation from its model. Here all 8 functions of the relation model have been interpreted, which gives a vivid picture of the basic features of this relation instead of the dubious “extinguishment of the energy of the weak functions,” as a result of which “psychic energy is redirected to the strong functions.” Nevertheless, the author must be given his due for his ability to compose “block-and-arrow schemes” that visually show “what goes where and what is connected with what.” Such schemes could form the basis for planning an experiment in which the author’s vague notions about the movement of psychic energy in the structures of the psyche could be verified.
Author: The models described above take into account far from all the nuances of intertype relations, but they make it possible to better understand the mechanism of their arising.
Commentary: The models described by the author show that the author is trying to sort out socionic material that is far from simple, and that the author has great theoretical potential, but realizing it will not be easy owing to gaps in his methodological preparation. The author tries to solve socionic problems from the level he himself has attained, whereas he should have begun at the beginning, that is, with the basic concepts. But those still need to be identified in full. As for the author’s confidence in the effectiveness of his schemes, one is forced to say that they not only do not “make it possible to better (emphasis mine — S.Ch.) understand the mechanism of the arising of intertype relations,” but even obscure the essence of the matter, substituting the movement of energies for informational contacts.
Author: I will repeat once more the main points that are the starting points for understanding information metabolism from the standpoint of psychological functions:
1. The psyche is regarded as psychic activity, or behavior.
Commentary: The author evidently does not grasp the difference in the ontological status of the entities that stand behind the concepts “psyche” and “behavior.” The psyche is an energy-information complex securing the survival of a living being, an ontological entity really present in this world and representing the bearer of subjectivity, an active agent capable of transforming the environment — and potentially the whole world. Whereas behavior is a totality of purposeful acts whose programs are formed by the psyche; hence to identify the psyche with behavior is in no way permissible. Moreover, one must take into account that behavior is a personal, and consequently psychological, not a psychic function. Such is the essential definition of these concepts. The author tries to give an operational definition, but says something unintelligible… A scientist, however, must understand that if he commits an error of any modality at a key point of his research or theoretical constructions, his entire work remains in question until that error is eliminated.
Author: 2. Psychic activity can be represented as a totality of psychic processes — psychological functions.
Commentary: Psychological functions are here identified with totalities of psychic processes, which contradicts the author’s previous statements and the notions already established in psychology about the irreducibility of the psychological to the psychic. Moreover, I consider that the term “psychic activity” introduces semantic indeterminacy into psychological terminology, creating semantic interference with the philosophical concept of activity, since the author understands psychic activity simply as psychic animation, whereas activity is not simply animation, like moving one’s arms and legs, but the purposeful transformation of the environment with a conscious counterposition of the subject and object of that transformation. That the author in fact understands psychic activity as psychic animation also follows from its being reduced to a “totality of psychic processes.” Activity as a psychological process cannot be reduced to the psychic — which is a characteristic metaphysical error.
Author: 3. Psychological functions can be represented as the result of the work of the elements of information metabolism.
Commentary: But the author has not done this. Unfortunately, the author did not refer to the works of S.I. Churyumov, in which the problem of the concept of function in different subject areas is analyzed and the notion is introduced of the various degrees of generality of this concept in the practice of its use in mathematics, technology, sociology, medicine, and other sciences. The problem here, however, is that although the work of psychic functions underlies psychological functions—
Author: 4. Psychic energy is redistributed among the elements of IM in such a way that the activation of one element entails a decline in the activity of other elements.
Commentary: This statement could be considered a discovery in psychology, but properly formalized protocols of the corresponding experiments are needed.
Author: 5. Same-type elements of IM resonate when their vertness coincides and extinguish each other when their vertness does not coincide.
Commentary: Obviously, here the “elements of IM” are regarded as fully real, and not “imaginary abstractions” — otherwise, how could they resonate? However, this entire line of reasoning is a misunderstanding. The idea of the resonance of SF when their IA coincide has the character of a purely speculative hypothesis and cannot claim to be the sole explanation of the effects of IR. The concept of resonance belongs to physical phenomena, and it is unclear how it could be applied to psychic processes.
A more plausible explanation of the interaction of any SF is given by the informational approach adequate to the socionic paradigm. Let us first note that the character of the IR discovered by Aušra Augustinavičiūtė does not depend on the aspect semantics of the functions but rests entirely on their positional semantics, which makes it possible not to use the concept of resonance — on the whole dubious in this case — but to turn to the direct informational interaction of functions occupying the same place in the model. The comparison of different IA in the position of identical functions can be interpreted as a generalized informational address, whose features determine one or another parameter of the relation.
Notes
1. “The science of the socion, the socionic structure of society and the socionic nature of man, of the different types of information metabolism and the different forms of relations between them, of the structure and functioning of the model of information metabolism, we shall call socionics.” (A. Augustinavičiūtė, “The Socion”)
Commentary: This is Aušra Augustinavičiūtė’s most complete authorial definition of socionics. Here the main themes of socionics that Aušra herself dealt with directly are enumerated. An editor might here have attempted to optimize the formulation concerning “the different types of information metabolism and the different forms of relations between them,” removing in both cases the word “different” and leaving only “the types of information metabolism and the forms of relations between them,” since the sets of TIMs and IR are characterized by completeness, meaning the number of TIMs and IR is strictly determined and cannot be changed either upward or downward; and although the elements of these sets are of course different, this needs no additional statement. But this is already a scientific-editorial subtlety, and in a popular exposition it need not be taken into account.
2. “Taking into account the physiological aspect expressed in it, we restrict the concept of function only to those psychophysical manifestations that are unambiguously determined in terms of psychophysiological functioning.” (S.L. Rubinstein, “Foundations of General Psychology”)
Commentary: This is one of the manifestations of materialist positivism, which for many years blocked the intellect of Soviet scientists. Obviously Rubinstein understands function in a purely physiological way — that says it all.
3. “By a psychological function I understand a certain form of psychic activity that in principle remains equal to itself under differing circumstances.” (C.G. Jung, “Psychological Types”)
Commentary: Alas, it is hard to imagine a more blurred piece of reasoning on a concretely posed question: “What is a psychological function?” For it remains immediately unclear of what “certain form of psychic activity” the great psychologist speaks. It appears that we have here an unfortunate translation of some German word close in meaning to the Russian words “a certain,” “a definite,” “some,” “a concrete,” etc. The definition given by Jung cannot be called anything other than metaphysical. A realistic definition here might read: “A psychological function is the process or result of the work of one or another social structure, including its elementary cell — the concrete human being, with reference to the concept of personality.” Thus the organ of a psychological function is one or another social structure in which the accent falls on the human personality. The psychological functions that an individual personality can carry out are, in some works and psychological schools, called roles, which somewhat theatricalizes this term and masks its real nature, connected with the social activity of individual people and their groups. The psychological function here is compared and contrasted, on the one hand, with physiological, psychophysiological, and psychic functions and, on the other, with social functions, whose organs are elements of the social infrastructure and whose product is the social relations characterizing society as a whole, and not only the socially motivated behavior of individual people in which the subjective side of the personality is realized.
4. “From these mixtures arise the well-known images — for example, practical intellect combined with sensation; speculative intellect permeated with intuition; artistic intuition that selects and depicts its pictures with the help of judgment tinged with feeling; philosophical intuition that with the help of a mighty intellect translates its vision into the sphere of the comprehensible, and so on.” (C.G. Jung, “Psychological Types”)
Commentary: This reasoning belongs to the beginning of the 20th century with its characteristic semantics and lexical collocability — at that time “speculative intellect” was understood as connected with metaphysical reasoning rather than as aimed at commercial manipulations. The mixtures Jung speaks of are the result of an absence of methodological reflection. Methodological distinctions, on the contrary, make it possible from the outset to deal with the components of a synthetic term. Socionics makes it possible to distinguish effectively the corresponding types of intellect — Il, iL, lI, Li, Sl, sL, lS, Ls, and others. As we see, their number is considerably greater than untrained intuition allows one to distinguish.
5. “In actual fact, the model depicted in Fig. 2 differs somewhat from the model Yu proposed by A. Augustinavičiūtė. In her model the 3rd and 4th functions correspond to the 4th and 5th in model A. Here the 3rd and 4th functions have the same meaning as in model A. The vertness of the functions is not taken into account in this model; the ‘weak’ functions are marked in blue.”
Commentary: When I hear the expression “In actual fact…”, I imagine that the person uttering it has privileged access to “actual-factness”; but since that is very doubtful, one is forced to conclude that this person simply has insufficient methodological preparation. In the present case, however, we are dealing with the author’s modification of the “A-Yu” model, and hence it ought to be designated model “A-Yu-S” (Aušra–Jung–Skripnik). Therefore here “In actual fact…” has the sense of an authorial clarification. Unfortunately, this model represents the mental ring detached from model “A,” at which point the question immediately arises: “On what grounds does Skripnik use in his model only part of model ‘A’ and not the whole of it?” Clearly, by using a “truncated” model “A” to construct a relation model, the author will also obtain a truncated relation model. Obviously “the game is not worth the candle,” since a considerable loss of information connected with the semantics of the relation is built in from the start. It would be simpler for Skripnik to acquaint himself with the relation model developed by Churyumov.
6. “One can imagine a certain ‘processor 1’ which as it were ‘computes’ the geometric (real or virtual) characteristics of objects and their mutual position (the geometric metric of objects) and forms a secondary component of the information flow, namely: information about space (the macro-aspect ‘space’).” (V.D. Yermak, “How to Learn to Understand People”)
Commentary: That “as it were ‘computes’” considerably lowers the cognitive status of the quoted reasoning. The scholar evidently cannot cope with the conceptual-terminological structure of the subject of research, and his conclusions are of an approximate or preliminary character. Nevertheless, it is evident that this text is written by a very intelligent person, though not an intuitive logician. It is written by a person with great engineering-design experience, in which computation constituted a significant part of the work. As a result we have a quite persuasive text which, though it distorts reality, does not strike the eye immediately or for everyone, while the scholar himself is deeply convinced of his rightness.
7. “Psychic energy is the intensity of a psychic process, its psychological value. By this should not be understood any ascribed value — of a moral, aesthetic, or intellectual character; rather, the given psychological value is simply determined by its determining force, which manifests itself in definite psychic acts (‘achievements’). But in speaking of libido I do not mean some psychic force, which has frequently, through misunderstanding, been ascribed to me by my critics. I do not hypostasize the concept of energy, but use it as a concept for designating intensities or values. The question of whether or not a special psychic force exists has nothing in common with the concept of libido.” (C.G. Jung, “Psychological Types”)
Commentary: Despite Jung’s authority, one is nonetheless forced to state that energy cannot be defined as intensity, although these two concepts may be closely connected. Such a definition substitutes derivative phenomenological images for essence. As for psychological value, it ought to have been defined separately, since this concept can hardly be considered self-evident. Jung tries in fact to do something of the sort, but clearly cannot cope with the definitional procedure. In particular, one cannot build a definition on negations. What is valuable in this reasoning, however, is that Jung in the end admits that by energy he understands not force at all, but a certain subjective impression of a “determining force” manifested in the results of psychically determined behavior. Alas, this can only be perceived as an evasion, when the accent is shifted from cause to effect. Did Jung really not acknowledge that psychic phenomena are secured by at least some specific energy, or is he simply following the lead of positivist prejudices?
8. “…in individual cases the introverted and extraverted attitudes can never be demonstrated per se — they appear only in the form of the specificity of the dominant conscious function. Analogously, there exists no general attitude of the unconscious, but only typically modified forms of unconscious functions, and only through the investigation of the unconscious functions and their features can the unconscious attitude be scientifically established.” (C.G. Jung, “Psychological Types”)
Commentary: This reasoning yields to analysis only with difficulty, but perhaps this is connected with the peculiarities of the translation of the German text into Russian. In socionics, the determination of the TIM undoubtedly presupposes, among other things, the determination of the attitude in concrete individual cases. And if the TIM is determined correctly — and with experienced socionists this happens in at least 85% of cases — then the vert attitude is thereby discovered as well. But judging by the Russian text, Jung places the accent on the possibility of the direct demonstration of such an attitude, yet gives no corresponding definition. Socionists know that the skill of directly observing vert features is acquired by persistent training, and these features themselves are always of a combined character — a little of everything and always just a bit, which might be called a combined hint, and in many cases this is difficult to verbalize. Therefore straightforward demands to construct a logically consistent chain of arguments are not always easy to satisfy. As for the second sentence of this paragraph: first, it contains no analogy with the first, as should follow from the first, since the TIM is the integral result of the work of all the functions, and no “unconscious” TIM exists. As for the necessity of a thorough investigation of the entire system of functions — that is precisely the ideal to which socionics must come in order to become a full-fledged science.
9. “Delivered as a unified information flow, the lexicon of an aspect evokes a resonance effect (a switch to the given lexicon, a change in nonverbal reactions: change of posture, tonus, speech tempo, oculomotor reactions, etc.) in representatives of any type, but in bearers of the aspect it comes out stronger.” (V. Mironov, “Socionics. The Semantics of Information Aspects”)
Commentary: The idea of informational resonance undoubtedly possesses aesthetic merits, but it just as undoubtedly needs thorough experimental elaboration. The primary arguments in favor of the resonance idea obtained by the author’s group fully secure the idea a hypothetical status, but there are as yet insufficient grounds for considering this effect fully proven, since the group, personal, and typological samples of the authors of this idea were too limited.
10. “For example, for the types LSE and LIE the resonance state in the aspect of introverted logic was perceived as more uncomfortable than the states in introverted intuition for LSE and introverted sensorics for LIE.” (V. Mironov, “Socionics. The Semantics of Information Aspects”)
Commentary: While giving due credit to the great research work carried out by the authors, one must nonetheless acknowledge that the reliability of this assertion is not sufficiently high.
Skripnik, apparently considering the concepts of socionics insufficiently correct, attempted to describe what others had already described, in his own terms. He introduces several concepts not used in socionics: elements of IM, psychic processes, psychic activity, and psychological function. Unfortunately, he gives no corresponding definitions, but seems to consider the use of some of these categories in psychology a fully sufficient basis for using them in socionics. By elements of IM, judging from his text, he understands a combination of IA and SF. But let us try to give a definition. IM is a part of the aggregate material-energy-information metabolism (MEIM) — the joint transformation of matter, energy, and information continuously taking place in nature, with various variants of shifted accents toward the predominance of matter, energy, or information in each concrete process. Obviously, in physiological processes the material and energy components predominate, while in the work of the psyche, in psychic processes, the energy-information components do. The TIM of a personality is determined by the predominance of one or another variety of information that the person preferentially consumes. A psychic process is the basis of psychic phenomenology, which may be accessible to direct sensory or instrumental observation. A psychic process can also be understood as psychic activity not formalized, or not reflected upon, as functional. Such processes are described in detail, though not exhaustively, in psychology. They include, first of all, perception, memory, attention, emotional reactions, thinking, intuition, will, and others. These processes underlie psychological processes, which have their own specificity and are not reducible to psychic processes. Psychological processes unfold within the system of social relations. Here belong, above all, the specific relations between people — love, friendship, enmity, persistence, reliability — but not, for example, struggle, which already belongs to social processes. On the basis of psychological processes there unfold social processes, which accordingly are not reducible to psychological ones. A psychic process can be understood as the result of the work of psychic organs. In socionics, part of the psychic processes is concretized as connected with generalized psychic functions. A function is the process or result of the work of a specific organ. There is no function without an organ — and, indeed, the converse is also true. Note that organs may be virtual — for example, as the situational interaction of various parts of the psyche. A function is a more concrete concept than the concept of a process: all functions are processes, but not all processes are functions. All psychic functions are connected with information processing. Such are vision, hearing, smell, touch, nociception, emoting, thinking, attention, and so on. However, one must understand that there exist different levels of functioning, beginning with the level of neurons and physiological organs (eyes, ears), up to the level of high generalization, where concrete abilities are no longer singled out and generalized processes are considered instead — perception without indication of modality (its synonym in socionics is sensorics), emoting, thinking, resistance to environmental pressure (will), and others. Here one may pose the legitimate question of the existence of corresponding organs. The answer will be positive, though far from generally accepted. For this it is necessary to introduce into psychology the concept of energy centers, whose material substrates, incidentally, are well known in anatomy — these are the plexus sacralis, lumbalis, solaris, cardialis, and others. It is not hard to understand that such material formations are the basis, and apparently also the result, of the heightened energy concentration connected with functional activity. Without taking into account the distinctions considered above, it is impossible to understand adequately socionics as a scientific direction dealing with highly generalized psychic functions.
The work done by the author testifies that he belongs to the number of very intelligent people who try to sort out exceptionally difficult psychological material, offering in the process their own interpretation and thereby increasing the number of different interpretations: at present it is already approaching three dozen.