35
Section 2
Aushra and Jung
It is pointless to discuss whether Aushra could have discovered socionics if Jung had not discovered his typology. Just as pointless is the question of whether Jung could have discovered his typology if Freud had not preceded him. And Freud too made his discoveries not in an informational vacuum, but only because he stood on the shoulders of predecessors. Looking back on the history of modern psychology, one can say that it was a single path of cognition of the structure of the human psyche, and it is by no means finished; but each successive creator found something new, and in that new thing was contained some portion of psychological truth. Knowing socionics, one can — with astonishment! — understand that Freud was mistaken in much and failed to understand much. The same can be said of Jung. Aushra too had inaccuracies and errors. Aushra’s followers committed an enormous number of errors. The numerous followers of Freud and Jung did much for the knowledge of man, but they too did not escape delusions, inaccuracies, and errors. Below is an analysis of some of Jung’s and Aushra’s delusions and inaccuracies, which in no way diminishes the greatness of what they did, but allows their results to be assessed in working mode so that, without dogmatizing them, we may go further.
In my book [UChK] I, proceeding from the principle of complementarity, partially examined the results of some psychologists who worked between Freud and Jung, and also between Jung and Aushra. According to the principle of complementarity, each successive theory in a given subject area must include the preceding theories as a special case. However, on the basis of comparison and analysis of actual results in psychology, the formulation of the principle of complementarity can be somewhat refined, which might look as follows: EACH SUCCESSIVE THEORY IN A GIVEN SUBJECT AREA RESTS ON THE RESULTS ACHIEVED BY ITS PREDECESSORS, BUT THIS FACT MUST BE REFLECTED UPON, WITH AN INDICATION OF SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES, WITH AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE STAGED CHARACTER OF THE RESULTS ACHIEVED, AND WITH A CLARIFICATION OF THE VECTOR OF THE SUBJECT AREA’S DEVELOPMENT IN THE DIRECTION OF TRUTH.
36
Aushra
Aushra was a woman of genius, a scholar. One can only guess how the idea of a model of the psyche arose in her as a result of an illumination under the influence of studying the works of C. G. Jung, K. Leonhard, A. Kępiński, and many others — and, incidentally, K. Marx as well. Much, however, can be understood by reading her work [2]. There she writes, for example: “And much has to be discovered anew, in order to become convinced that in Jung it ‘was already there,’ only — not fully developed, imprecisely formulated.” This is a very subtle remark, which can be understood to mean that Aushra, reading Jung, arrives at her own conclusions. That is usually how it is with scholars reading primary sources. She then develops the ideas that have arisen, brings them to a conceptual level, and afterwards discovers in Jung’s other books passages that more or less correspond to what she has done — but it remains very much an open question whether Jung himself would have arrived at these ideas if he had continued working in this direction. What Aushra did is not a mechanical continuation of C. G. Jung’s work — it is a synthesis of the ideas of many scholars. For example, Jung did not have the idea of information metabolism — it came to Aushra from A. Kępiński, who was not at all a like-minded ally of C. G. Jung. Aushra’s thought works precisely, but of course from the standpoint of an intuitive thinking type. And V. D. Ermak reproaches her for slovenliness in vain — those are his literal words, spoken by him on 22 May 2000 at a socionics seminar in the Kyiv House of Teachers. It is simply that Aushra thinks in Lithuanian and does not always translate into Russian with impeccable observance of the rules of Russian style; and besides, as socionics teaches, one person’s perception of another depends on their types.
Here is what Aushra says about Jung’s terminology: “Jung is often charged with unscientificness, obscurity, and unintelligibility of the terminology he uses. But after all, working in the first half of the 20th century (1875–1961), he found himself in the sphere of unidentified objects. Most of the terms Jung uses play the role of, as it were, initial, provisional ‘nicknames,’ needed in order to distinguish one part of a not-yet-fully-understood phenomenon from another (emphasis mine — S.Ch.). Without this, further comprehension of the object under study is impossible. A scholar trying to solve the riddle of the human psyche is in the position of, say, a physicist studying deep processes that cannot be seen with one’s own eyes and information about which is gathered only on the basis of observing the external interaction of objects.” [1]
An analogous assessment of the terminology introduced by Aushra into socionics can be encountered even now. Yes, a pair of her terms — namely, logic and ethics in the socionic understanding — were at first not perceived [37] unambiguously by everyone, although Aushra did explain her choice. She proposed these terms in place of Jung’s thinking and feeling. She said that thinking and feeling are present in everyone, and that within their framework logical and ethical processes unfold, the character of which differs typologically. Now that we have grown accustomed to the terms logic and ethics in the socionic sense and do not confuse them with their general-scientific and everyday usage, we understand that they are not only no better than Jung’s but worse; yet habit has made them entirely acceptable. Nevertheless, I consider that here one must return to Jung’s terminology.
It should not be forgotten that Aushra introduced a remarkable socionic symbolism, which is precisely what should be regarded as the designation of what is difficult or altogether impossible to define, and to which terms point only indirectly. What is at issue here are archetypes, which can now be understood as energy-informational complexes circulating in some regime within the space of the psychic carrier and capable of influencing the informational state of the subject. The semantic component of an archetype is to one degree or another caught by intuition, but archetypes yield to verbalization only with great difficulty. Work on terminology must unquestionably be continued.
The core of Aushra’s methodological complex may be provisionally designated as the level of brilliant conjecture and a capacity for intuitive construction. And although some of the terms she proposed proved erroneous, this in no way diminishes her scientific feat, which is by no means lesser than what Freud and Jung accomplished, and in some respects significantly surpasses them.
Below is an analysis of Aushra’s specification of the IA symbols [2]. At present it can be stated that almost everything in this specification is far too approximate, and sometimes simply wrong. However, this work, as a first step, played its positive role in the elaboration of IA semantics, and it should be treated with due respect.
Aushra: I — black intuition. The content of the object. Its potential energy and inner content, inner possibilities. The program laid down in the object, its internal structure, any concrete abilities of a person. What K. Marx called labor power, i.e., the sum of a person’s physical and psychic abilities. A sense of the presence or absence of hidden inner abilities and possibilities, giving the capacity to see the permanence or transience of some object or phenomenon.
Commentary: I have already written about the use of the adjectives “black” and “white” with the names of aspects — it is undesirable, not only because of their slang-jargon character, but also because it introduces an inadequate semantics of color into the content of the function. Of what Aushra included in the specification as her current understanding of the aspect, not everything withstands criticism today. Closest to Aushra’s understanding of IA I is the term “POTENTIAL POSSIBILITIES.” Everything else — an attempt at explication, a search for suitable correspondences for the verbal expression of the archetype — proved unsuccessful. [38] However, one must take into account that, in the absence of definitions, all the concepts used here must immediately be assigned to the category of fuzzy ones.
Let us try to work out what POTENTIAL POSSIBILITIES are. Because of the high level of abstraction, this is not at all simple. “Potential” and “possibilities” are two words that have overlapping meanings. Potency = ⟨force, capacity⟩; potential (n.) = ⟨resource, reserve⟩; potential (adj.) = ⟨hidden, unmanifested but ready for manifestation, possible⟩; possible = ⟨probable⟩; possibility = ⟨resource⟩; resource = ⟨a source for the satisfaction of a need⟩. This last concept in the chain we shall take as axiomatic, that is, as considered known — although this, of course, is not obligatory, and those who wish may extend the analysis further. Selecting from the chain under examination the most stable semes, the concept “POTENTIAL POSSIBILITIES” can be reduced to the concept, more transparent in this case, of “HIDDEN RESOURCE.” This means that as the nearest verbal equivalent of the archetype I as an IA one may take this last concept. This is to be understood as follows: extraverted intuition is directed at the detection of a HIDDEN RESOURCE which may be contained in an object of the external world and may be used to satisfy the NEEDS of the subject. At the everyday level, the detection of a HIDDEN RESOURCE manifests itself as an UNDERSTANDING OF THE RESOURCE POTENTIAL OF AN OBJECT, and in the limiting case it is the DISCOVERY OF A NATURAL LAW, which points to a generalized form of RESOURCE and, in the end, is that form. It is precisely at this that the work of extraverted intuition as a psychic function is directed. One can see that the concepts “POTENTIAL POSSIBILITIES” and “HIDDEN RESOURCE” are very close and in some cases may be interchangeable.
As a key word for IA I, however, the closest fit is LAW. This may be understood as follows: in the external world, which is the environment of the subject’s presence, the RESOURCES which the subject may use to satisfy his needs are subject to LAWS. In order to act effectively in his habitat, the subject must come to know the LAWS of that environment. LAW is the realization of the internal coherence of the environment. This means that LAW belongs to the external, extraverted plane of the subject’s life. On the internal, introverted plane, LAW appears as KNOWLEDGE. Here we are dealing with a subtle distinction between LAW as an extraverted entity and its formulation or reflection on the internal, introverted plane in the form of KNOWLEDGE. By virtue of their adjacency, these entities may fail to be distinguished not only by non-professionals but by scholars as well. However, in the end, KNOWLEDGE is KNOWLEDGE OF LAWS.
As the key concept for IA I Aushra here proposes “the content of the object” — but what does this mean? Such a term has no general-scientific currency, although of course one could try to interpret it somehow. One might, for example, speak of the concept of a concrete object, or of the content of a concept; but in that case we move from the sphere of extraversion [39] into the sphere of introversion, and then, since “concept” is a logical category, aspect I would apparently have to be replaced by aspect l. Nor does the term “inner content” clarify anything — it is clear that the two terms “content” and “inner content,” in the general-scientific sense, are identical and merely produce the impression of differing in something. In any case, a distinction between external and internal content has not been introduced in science. Though one can guess at the thought Aushra wished to express. Alas, this is very hard to do — what is at issue is an archetype, and these are entities that yield to verbalization only with difficulty, which is precisely what we observe in Aushra’s specification. Closest to it are the concepts “POTENTIAL POSSIBILITIES,” “HIDDEN RESOURCE,” and “LAW,” analyzed above.
“The potential energy of the object,” understood in a concrete physical sense, may have various modalities: gravitational, electromagnetic, full Einsteinian, and so on. Can the POTENTIAL ENERGY OF AN OBJECT turn out to be a resource? Obviously, yes. And in this sense one may also speak of it as POTENTIAL POSSIBILITIES — but this is a special case of POTENTIAL POSSIBILITIES, which must be considered among others, and consequently it cannot be regarded as basic or used as the key term for an IA. How, then, from the socionic point of view, can the POTENTIAL ENERGY OF AN OBJECT be understood? For the subject, the POTENTIAL ENERGY OF AN OBJECT, as a universal equivalent of hidden force, may, from the informational point of view, indicate a possible danger or its absence, and also a RESOURCE. Here one may speak of the useful employment of an object’s potential energy, but this is possible only after the danger connected with the energy has been eliminated — such is the energy of the Sun, of fire, of electricity, and now of the atom as well. Danger, safety, and utility — this is the maximally generalized informational meaning of this entity. Since such danger or its absence is potential, the subject can register its significance in the form of an attitude toward it, and this belongs to aspect e — introverted emotionating. Thus the POTENTIAL ENERGY OF AN OBJECT, on the side of its signal realization, is an entity that may represent a danger to the subject or, on the contrary, in controlled form be a source of well-being. This can be understood as those features of an object which are connected with its evaluation and with an attitude toward it as dangerous or safe, acceptable or unacceptable. As we see, the POTENTIAL ENERGY OF AN OBJECT is connected with two levels of its informational evaluation: a preliminary one, at which the subject’s generalized attitude toward it is formed, and a subsequent one, when the subject gains access to its use as a resource.
The concept “the program laid down in the object” also has no general-scientific usage, although it too can be understood as “POTENTIAL POSSIBILITIES” — but this would be an illegitimate filling with meaning of a combination of words [40] that has no currency in science. It is clear that with the words “content of the object” Aushra was trying to express a meaning she intuitively grasped. But what could be understood by this? Of course, “POTENTIAL POSSIBILITIES.” But is there another suitable term for it besides HIDDEN RESOURCE? I would propose the concept of “FUNCTIONAL REALIZATION OF THE OBJECT.” By the sense of the words entering into this expression, it can be understood as THE POSSIBILITY OF THE PURPOSEFUL USE OF AN OBJECT. In the end, this is a useful synonymic replacement for the expression “POTENTIAL POSSIBILITIES.”
“INTERNAL STRUCTURE” is nothing other than simply STRUCTURE. Structure is not the material arrangement of an object but only its description — that is, the informational code of the mutual disposition of its material parts. The material parts of the object themselves, in their concrete disposition, are an objectively existing, extraverted entity, as the result of the processes of their formation, and belong to the IA of extraverted logic L. One may also try to understand structure as something possessing potential possibility, or as something that can be used as a resource — and this looks very plausible; but in this case a semantic error arises, since we are separating structure from the object of which it is an organic part. Yes, an object possesses certain potential possibilities precisely thanks to its structure; but in that case structure cannot be opposed to the object itself — it is embodied, realized in the object, transferred from its introverted form as a description or algorithm of the mutual disposition of the object’s parts into an extraverted form, which is precisely the object itself. On the other hand, the description or understanding of an object’s structure — that is, its introverted representation — belongs to the IA of introverted logic l.
“Concrete abilities of a person” are absorbed by the concept “POTENTIAL POSSIBILITIES” as applied to a human being. What K. Marx said about “the sum of physical and psychic abilities” coincides with concrete abilities and, again, reduces to “POTENTIAL POSSIBILITIES” and “HIDDEN RESOURCE.” The attempt, however, to present a person’s concrete abilities as his separate properties — such as strength, dexterity, cunning, intelligence, and so forth — takes us outside the framework of socionic generalization.
As for the “sense of the presence or absence of hidden inner abilities,” it does not belong to IA I, but, being one of the projections of the archetype I, is the psychic function of extraverted intuition, designated by the same letter.
Thus one is compelled to conclude that the core of the content of archetype I consists of POTENTIAL POSSIBILITIES, HIDDEN RESOURCE, LAW, and FUNCTIONAL REALIZATION OF THE OBJECT. Here too, apparently, belong all phenomena of law-governed interaction of objects in nature — for example, the motion of planets along their orbits within the Solar System. That is, everything that can be expressed in the form of a LAW or REGULARITY and is the goal of scientific research, the object of cognition, and the content of knowledge. [41]
The suitable Jungian term for the corresponding SF is extraverted intuition. The term “intuition of possibilities,” invented by Gulenko, belongs to homemade socionic slang and is perceived as adapted to a simplified intellect. Yet it is clear that socionics cannot do without the concepts of “extraversion” and “introversion,” and therefore there is no sense, “for the sake of reducing the load on people’s capacity to understand anything” (Gulenko), in excluding these terms from the basic terminology and terminological circulation of socionics — all the more so since they go back to Jung and satisfy all criteria of scientificity, whereas the substitution of jargon for scientific terms, being an act of sabotage against the Russian language, merely compromises socionics. Jung’s terminology is entirely accessible to the contemporary educated person, and there is no visible sense in deforming it in the spirit of “criminal-underworld subculture.”
Aushra: S — black sensing. The form of the object. The kinetic energy of the object, its readiness to use its energy. Its external qualities — color, outline, smoothness or roughness of surface, external mobilization, a person’s will, the ability and readiness to use it in relation to oneself and others. A sense of the object’s readiness or unreadiness for the manifestation of will and force; a sense of the object’s aestheticness or unaestheticness.
Commentary: Unfortunately, as of today Aushra’s entire explication comes across as far too approximate, although it does make it possible to penetrate into her creative laboratory and to picture the course of her thought. Note that in her specification Aushra uses two series of concepts weakly connected — or not connected in any intelligible way at all. What is common between “the external qualities of the object — color, outline, smoothness…” and “external mobilization, a person’s will, the ability and readiness to use it in relation to oneself and others”? Presumably Aushra is making an error here. But what error? It appears that the error is connected with a conflation of the introverted and extraverted planes.
Extraverted sensing, S, as an IA represents the very BEING OF THE OBJECT, its IMMEDIATE PRESENCE, its CAPACITY TO BE ITSELF and to RESIST NON-BEING, ANNIHILATION, DESTRUCTION, and also to EXERT REAL — including FORCEFUL and VOLITIONAL — INFLUENCE on its surroundings. As the key concept Aushra here proposes “the form of the object,” and one could agree with this, understanding by form the whole aggregate of parameters irrespective of their modality, as a criterion of the object’s self-identity; but in that case there nonetheless occurs a substitution of particular properties, whose relativity and accidental character are obvious, for the object’s fundamental parameter — its being. It is also unclear how in Aushra’s consciousness the concepts of “the form of the object” and its “kinetic energy” were connected. It appears that in speaking of form Aushra had in mind external geometrical parameters — the figure, so to speak, of the object. The figure of an object can be understood as its external structure, and in that case everything said above about the structure of an object applies to it. That is, this is not an extraverted entity at all, but an introverted one.
On the other hand, “the kinetic [42] energy of the object,” at the level of ultimate generalization with which socionics deals, bears the same auxiliary character in relation to the object’s functional realization as gasoline does in relation to an automobile. It is clear that various kinds of energy may be used to perform an automobile’s basic function. However, an automobile without fuel is incapable of performing its basic function, and consequently is not a full-fledged object. Without fuel it is no more than the end product of the technological process of the automotive industry, and in that case it should be assigned to the IA of extraverted logic L. Thus we arrive at the idea that to the aspect of extraverted sensing one may assign only the full-fledged object in all the brilliance of its functional activity, but not its formal or energetic aspects.
Kinetic energy must be distinguished from will, since the former is an ontological entity while the latter is a psychic function. One of the definitions of will, as the subject’s capacity to manage his own energy, helps to make clear that these are phenomena of different levels, like a worker and his instrument, or a driver and an automobile. At the same time, kinetic energy as a universal equivalent of activity in its signal hypostasis belongs to archetype E, behind which stands extraverted energy as that which carries information about immediate danger or safety. From what has been said one must conclude that neither “the form of the object” nor “the kinetic energy of the object” should be used as basic terms for designating IA S.
“Its external qualities — color, outline, smoothness or roughness of surface,” and likewise “a sense of the object’s aestheticness or unaestheticness,” must be assigned to introverted sensing s, which presents any objects and processes as available resource whose consumer properties the corresponding psychic function must discriminate.
“External mobilization, a person’s will, the ability and readiness to use it in relation to oneself and others” unquestionably belongs to the archetype of extraverted sensing S, but represents its functional projection, being the corresponding psychic function. As for the expression “a sense of the object’s readiness or unreadiness for the manifestation of will and force,” one does not speak that way of an object — this is nothing but a personification of the object; but with respect to people it fits and points to their functional capacity.
Proceeding from what has been said, one must acknowledge that archetype S as an IA may be understood as THE FUNCTIONING OBJECT, and in the limit as BEING itself; while as an SF it is WILL.
The suitable Jungian term for the corresponding SF is extraverted sensing. This term is unquestionably better than “black sensing” (Aushra) or “volitional sensing” (Gulenko); for socionics cannot do without the concepts of extraversion and introversion anyway, so why, for the sake of a falsely conceived accessibility to “simple people,” introduce homemade ersatz terms like “volitional sensing,” in which both words — will and sensing — are mutilated?
Aushra: L — black logic. External movements. Event, fact, deed, change of place [43] in space. External manifestations of a process, its form. Displacement of an object in space and any other forms of external movement of objects. A sense of the logicality or illogicality of an act; a sense of the possibility or impossibility of withstanding what is happening.
Commentary: “External movements” is almost right, only these are not arbitrary or random movements. They are productive movements. In nature, however, all movements are productive — though it is clear that their product may also be destruction. “Event and fact” are the extraverted and introverted manifestations of one and the same archetype. An event has an extraverted nature as something occurring in reality, that is, in the external world. A fact is a description of an event, and as such has an introverted nature. “Deed” has ethical semantics, and therefore must be assigned to the archetype of introverted emotionating e. “Change of place in space” is the same thing as external movements.
“External manifestations of a process” seems to be the best abstract expression of the archetype under consideration, since one of the external manifestations of a process will be its end product. But since a process may also have unproductive manifestations, one must acknowledge that the conceptual volume of the highlighted concept is greater than the conceptual volume of IA L. As for “the form of a process,” it appears that an equals sign cannot be placed between what may be understood by this and “external manifestations of a process,” although it is very difficult to separate these two expressions. The concept of form is usually applied to objects, and by it is understood, above all, the aggregate of geometrical parameters — dimensions and the relations among geometrical elements: points, lines, surfaces. However, the concept of form must include any aggregates of parameters, that is, everything that can be perceived by the sensory system directly or with the aid of instruments. The understanding of form as a geometrical envelope has long been an anachronism. But can “external manifestations of a process” be described in any way other than by means of an aggregate of parameters? Let us not forget, all the same, that into the concept of “the form of an object” there must enter, above all, necessary parameters, whereas the concept “external manifestations of a process” includes accidental features as well. In that case one must acknowledge that “form” and “external manifestations of a process” are not full synonyms. Still, apparently, we are dealing here with subtle distinctions in the description of a process as a phenomenon and the understanding of a process as a productive entity. A process taken from the side of its productivity — that is precisely the content of aspect L.
“A sense of the logicality or illogicality of an act” seems somehow connected with the archetype of introverted thinking l. What does logicality-illogicality mean? Apparently it is correspondence to the formal rules of logic, understood in the broadest sense as any aggregate of fixations of cause-and-effect connections — that is, of objective dependencies determining the formal features of an object or process. The description of such dependencies should probably be assigned to logic (l). But the “sense of logicality-illogicality” itself, as an intuitive [44] penetration into the essence of what is observed, should apparently be assigned to archetype I. Still, deep logico-linguistic investigations are needed here. “A sense of the possibility or impossibility of withstanding what is happening” should, for the same reason — that is, as an intuitive conjecture about the potential of what is observed — likewise be assigned to archetype I. But the possibility or impossibility of withstanding something itself, as a real, that is, extraverted magnitude of reserve resistance, is closer to the archetype of extraverted sensing S.
Here, however, the thought may easily arise of the many-facetedness of the aspectual evaluation of any phenomenon, especially when high levels of generalization are involved, and more extensive investigations are indispensable here.
IA L is any processes of transformation taken from the side of their productivity, since their result is always some product, however ephemeral it may be. Geotectonic processes, the movement of clouds under the action of wind, changes on the Earth’s surface under the action of natural forces. Therefore, as a suitable meaning-generating image for IA L one may propose PRODUCTIVITY, as the capacity to obtain a product in one way or another — but to an even greater degree it is the productive process itself.
The suitable Jungian term for the corresponding PF is extraverted thinking. The jargon term “business logic” merely distorts the essence of the matter, creating the image of a subject area that does not exist but that can be imagined. And although the term “business logic,” as something practical, looks attractive, its negative suggestion is all the greater, since it only misleads, interfering with the concepts of office administration and bureaucratic activity. And if the understanding of the term extraverted thinking as physical activity directed at obtaining a concrete product seems doubtful to anyone, recall the good Russian words промысел [trade, craft] and промышленность [industry], in which thought (мысль) is presented in its materialized, that is, extraverted form.
Aushra: E — black ethics. Internal processes. Internal processes hidden from the eyes, often betraying themselves by sounds issuing from within or by changes in the object’s appearance (e.g., a reddening face). For a human being this is the range from emotional experiences to digestion. Emotional states, moods, excitement, depression. A sense of the ethicalness or unethicalness of internal impulses; a sense of the possibility or impossibility of changing what is happening in oneself or in another object.
Commentary: As an IA, archetype E correlates with the energetic filling of an object, with the external, which is at the same time the signal manifestation of the object. For the subject this is, above all, information about danger or safety, and not simply about some processes or other, about something happening. The energetic component of a process belongs to archetype E, while its productive component belongs to L. However, what is at issue here must be not only energy in itself, but also its externally signal nature, its capacity to carry a message about the object’s danger or safety for the subject.
“Emotional states, moods, excitement, depression” are particular cases [45] of archetype E in its functional hypostasis — that is, they are manifestations of the psychic function E, extraverted emotionating. “A sense of the ethicalness or unethicalness of internal impulses,” as an intuitive penetration into essence, should be assigned to archetype I. But the functional reaction to the ethicalness-unethicalness of an intertype situation apparently belongs to the archetype of introverted emotionating e. “A sense of the possibility or impossibility of changing what is happening in oneself or in another object,” because of the presence here of a component of volitional mobilization, should possibly be assigned to archetype S. But deeper investigations are needed here. The most suitable key word for IA E is STATE.
The suitable Jungian term for the corresponding SF is extraverted emotionating. The combination of words “ethics of emotions” (Gulenko), however, is a terminological monster, and its introduction into socionics constitutes a linguistic act of sabotage against the Russian language. Possibly this is not immediately obvious to everyone, since a certain level of culture is required for it. The point is that what is at issue here is of course not the observance of any ethical norms in the process of emotionating, although this combination of words provokes such a sense. Besides, the history of this term is connected with the fact that Aushra decided to replace Jung’s term “emotionating” with “ethics,” and therefore these two words standing side by side in fact have one and the same secondary meaning. A literal decoding of this word combination might look like “emotionating about emotionating,” like “observance of the norms of emotionating,” and even like “an ethical attitude toward ethics” — that is, if one reverses the substitution of ethics for emotionating proposed by Aushra. Obviously these meanings may in some situations be entirely justified, but they have no relation to the psychic function of extraverted emotionating.
Aushra: white intuition — i. Time. The subjective time of the object and objective calendar time. The duration of the functioning or existence of an object, determined by the presence of potential energy and its use per unit of time. The external situation of an object among other objects, that is, its situation in time. Intervals of time between events, the duration of individual events, the sequence of events and processes, their rhythm in time, quickness, slowness. All this pertains both to external and to internal processes. A sense of timeliness or untimeliness, of haste or unhurriedness, and so forth; a sense of the relativity of what happens in time.
Commentary: For this aspect Aushra proposes Time as the key concept. However, time is only a particular, and not even the chief, factor of the subject’s inner life. The most fundamental factor here is MEANING. If the external plane of the subject’s existence is determined by LAW, then his internal plane is organized by MEANING. TIME is merely a parameter of the unfolding and realization of MEANING.
“The subjective time of the object and objective calendar time” is merely a concretization of the general concept of time. TIME is the measure of change, and that is why it is important for the subject. In the external world, [46] on the extraverted plane, there exists no time whatsoever apart from processes of change. In the internal world, on the introverted plane, time is the measure of the realization of MEANING. He who wastes time in vain, who “kills” it, forfeits the MEANING OF LIFE, kills MEANING. But other points of view are possible here as well.
“The duration of the functioning or existence of an object, determined by the presence of potential energy and its use per unit of time” — this is a very interesting concept, but also a difficult one to grasp. A simple registration of duration is, it seems, a subjective perception of time. But behind simple registration there may stand an evaluation of existence, which can be assigned to archetype I. However, a subtle nuance is possible here, connected with the fact that this evaluation may relate to the temporal instances of past and future.
An awareness of the potentiality of temporal periods, the impressions, presentiments, and evaluations connected with them, may quite well be correlated both with archetype I and with archetype i. However, in the subject’s internal world, on the introverted plane, such awareness may become the equivalent of MEANING. But deeper investigations are needed here.
“The external situation of an object among other objects, that is, its situation in time” — I do not understand why the external situation among other objects is correlated with a situation in time. Why is this not space? I think that a situation in time is what came before, what will come after, how much time has passed or will pass, and also notions of an object connected with eternity — this too is content of archetype i, since all of it is a measure of the realization of MEANING. As an IA, i correlates with any processes from the standpoint of simple change, but is not reducible to them, since for the subject change is only a form whose content is precisely MEANING.
“Intervals of time between events, the duration of individual events, the sequence of events and processes, their rhythm in time, quickness, slowness” — all this can be connected with IA i, but is such content a priority for the subject? It may be important to any degree, but its importance is determined by MEANINGS connected with NEEDS, and not by absolute magnitudes of temporal intervals. Here we have an example of how a scholar — in this case Aushra — having intuitively hit upon some sense of the sought entity, begins to hypertrophy it and may cross the boundary of the working zone beyond which the idea ceases to function. In this case it appears that Aushra hypertrophied the concept of TIME as the verbal equivalent of the archetype standing behind the symbol i, since TIME is merely a measure of changes and not their essence. It is only a formal magnitude allowing one to point to changes, but determining neither their SIGNIFICANCE — that is, their objective presentation in the environment — nor [47] their MEANING — that is, the basis of a subjective attitude toward them. And since the perception of TIME is adjacent to the MAKING SENSE of changes, the experience of their SEMANTIC importance may be transferred onto TIME as well.
“A sense of timeliness or untimeliness, of haste or unhurriedness, and so forth; a sense of the relativity of what happens in time.” — Since what is at issue here is a sense, that is, a functional processing of what happens in time — and that is nothing other than CHANGES — this whole statement must be assigned not to the IA but to the corresponding function of introverted intuition. Here too one can see the dependence of evaluations such as timeliness-untimeliness, haste-unhurriedness, and so forth, on the correlations of subjective meanings; for otherwise, where would an awareness of timeliness, for example, come from?
“The subjective time of the object” — this expression is not very clear. I personally do not know how to interpret it in a literal sense. But since Aushra in this specification, as applied to concrete situations, sometimes understands the subject as an object, then everything falls into place, for the subjective evaluation of time intervals strongly depends on SEMANTIC emphases. Besides, by this one might understand, for example, the duration of an object’s existence — but such duration is objective. A situation is also possible in which different subjects evaluate the duration of existence of different objects differently, but this is quite another matter — a particular case of the subjective registration of internal and external changes, and it would be a great stretch to call this “the subjective time of the object.”
I consider that not merely a significant but the principal part of archetype i correlates with the complexity, the prospectiveness, the potentiality of the manifolds hidden in the subject’s inner world. Dreams, fantasies, designs, plans — all of it comes from there; but in this case a shade of IA I appears, since the subject too has potential possibilities, and from the side of another subject they may be evaluated in precisely that way.
“Objective calendar time,” as the registration and succession of dates, because of their formal character, nevertheless gravitates more toward archetype l. But this requires additional investigation.
The most suitable key word for IA i is MEANING. This concept must be regarded as ultimately fundamental, because it pertains not only to the subject but to the world as a whole. In this case the concept of MEANING is ontologized, and it becomes natural that one may speak of MEANING as an objective entity, which is what the corresponding IA is.
The suitable Jungian term for the corresponding SF is introverted intuition. The term “intuition of time,” however, belongs to jargon, although among the other jargonoids proposed by Gulenko it looks the least monstrous. [48]
Aushra: white sensing — s. Well-being [self-sensation]. The internal situation of an object among other objects, their effect on its well-being, their reflection in its well-being. One might say, the “sounding” of space inside the object. Well-being is determined by both external and internal processes. A sense of pleasantness or unpleasantness, of physical and aesthetic satisfaction and dissatisfaction.
Commentary: As the key word for IA s Aushra adopted “well-being.” But what is at issue here is an IA, that is, an objective entity really present in the external environment. WELL-BEING, however, belongs to the internal plane of the subject’s life and may be regarded as a psychic function. Let us try to find such an entity. WELL-BEING has an EXTERNAL CAUSE. At the level of socionic generalization, such a PROXIMATE CAUSE is the SATISFACTION or NON-SATISFACTION of a NEED. A NEED is satisfied by a RESOURCE. This is precisely the objective entity that the subject very much needs. He actively awaits its appearance in his immediate surroundings. The subject has everything necessary to see, hear, recognize, and discriminate a RESOURCE — one might even say, with utmost respect, HIS MAJESTY THE RESOURCE. An astonishing fact of human life is that as soon as the concrete resource needed by a concrete person appears, he does everything else himself.
“The internal situation of an object among other objects, their effect on its well-being, their reflection in its well-being.” — This is an example of Aushra intuitively searching for the needed concept. And one can see that it is not easy. Who will explain to me what “THE INTERNAL SITUATION OF AN OBJECT AMONG OTHER OBJECTS” is? But “their effect on its well-being” — of course, the well-being of an object is meant — immediately indicates that what is at issue is a subject, who of course may also be an object. Recall: when you are given a towel, a robe, or a coat to hold, for a while you turn into a coat rack — that is, your objective, not your subjective, qualities are being used. And this three-part impersonal-nominative sentence ends with the fragment “their reflection in its well-being.” Of course, what is meant is the WELL-BEING of the object, with respect to which we have concluded that it is a subject — but a subject, by virtue of the capacities inherent in him, may act in the capacity of an object. Shoot me if you like, I have no idea how to construe all this, but in my gut I feel that what is at issue is RESOURCE. Here Aushra gives the following clarification: “the sounding of space inside the object.” This is very beautiful, very poetic, very intuitive, and very metaphorical. But what is a thinking type to do with it? Yet the second part of the sentence under consideration, though indirectly, still points to RESOURCE: “their effect on its well-being.” Their — that is, the objects’. It is precisely these objects that are the RESOURCE — or possibly only the image of a RESOURCE. But a thinking type needs a simple and clear definition. And indeed, in reality everything is significantly more prosaic. The subject needs a RESOURCE in order to satisfy a NEED, [49] and the subject detects it thanks to his sensory system. The subject discriminates the RESOURCE by its RESOURCE MARKERS. At the market or in a shop we speak of PRESENTABILITY [marketable appearance]. In another case it may be AESTHETICS or an indication of the USEFULNESS of something. As in advertising. It is precisely with the detection of RESOURCE (s) that the sensory system is occupied, represented in socionics by sensing (s). Both are designated identically, since they are projections of one and the same archetype.
“Well-being is determined by both external and internal processes. A sense of pleasantness or unpleasantness, of physical and aesthetic satisfaction and dissatisfaction.” Here everything is significantly clearer already: the external processes by which well-being is determined are the projection of the presumed archetype in the form of an IA. But “a sense of pleasantness-unpleasantness, of physical and aesthetic satisfaction and dissatisfaction” does not belong to the IA — it is the SF of introverted sensing (s). As an IA, s is the RESOURCE that the external environment can provide to the subject. Of course it is not “well-being,” which is a psychic function and not an IA. The expression “The internal situation of an object among other objects, their effect on its well-being, their reflection in its well-being” is an example of the personification of an object; how else can one understand that an object has well-being? This could be applied to a human being, but then what would be at issue is not an IA but a psychic function. The same can be said of the last phrase of this part of the explication.
The suitable Jungian term for the corresponding SF is introverted sensing. The combination of words “sensing of sensations” (Gulenko), however, is a jargonoid in which two synonymous words stand side by side, and the term itself is perceived along the lines of “buttery butter.” But to notice this, one must possess sufficient linguistic culture.
Aushra: white logic — l. Distance in space, space. The distance between objects, place in space or among other objects, hierarchy. System as the sum of established or settled distances, a system of objective law-governed interrelations in nature and society. A person’s objective needs, that is, the system of relations with various objects that he requires, beginning with food products. All distances are the result of external displacements. A sense of logicality-illogicality, the reasonable and the unreasonable.
Commentary: This part of Aushra’s specification proved perhaps the most successful. As an IA, l is space and spatial relations: nearer, farther, higher, lower, and so forth. So one can fully agree with the first part of this explication of Aushra’s. “Objective needs” is an equivalent of resource, and therefore they must be assigned to archetype s, since both objective and subjective needs belong to the internal plane of the subject’s life. As for “a sense of logicality-illogicality, the reasonable and the unreasonable,” it must be assigned to the psychic function I, as an intuitive understanding and evaluation of the essential features of a situation.
The suitable Jungian term for the corresponding PF is introverted [50] thinking. The term “structural logic” (Gulenko), being a neologism, not only fails to correspond to the archetype of the IA under consideration, but on top of that has a jargon character. Although it produces the impression of something indicating the existence of a separate scientific direction, what is really at issue is the capacity of the human intellect to structure a particular variety of information. That is precisely the essence of thinking. The attempt to replace thinking with logic in a socionic context is connected with a failure to distinguish the general from the particular. The general, in this case, is thinking, while the particular is logic, which constitutes merely the formal-normative part of thinking, merely one of its instruments.
Aushra: white ethics — e. The attractive force of objects, attraction. This might be called the “subjective distances” between objects. For a human being this is, for example, love and hatred. A beloved person is close even at a great distance; a hated one is distant even at a small one. A sense of the ethicalness-unethicalness of relations, of a person’s kindness or his bad qualities, a sense of desire and disinclination, etc.
Commentary: As the key concept for designating the IA under consideration, Aushra proposes the expression “the attractive force of objects, attraction.” If attraction is understood in the literal, physical sense — that is, as a gravitational or electromagnetic effect — then special proofs are needed that psychic and psychological attraction has the very same nature. The expression “the attractive force of objects,” however, has a double meaning: psychological, as the attractiveness of objects, and physical, as real gravitational or electromagnetic interaction. One might have doubted this, but the addition of the word “attraction” to the list dispels all doubts as to Aushra’s acceptance of both senses. Aushra’s tendency toward the ontologization of socionic concepts also manifests itself in the expression “This might be called ‘subjective distances’ between objects.” Here, as in several preceding cases, we see that Aushra considers it possible in certain situations to equate subjects with objects — which is entirely understandable when a subject, in the virtual fields of situations, turns out to be an agent quite comparable to an object, and may direct his own activity upon himself or upon other bearers of subjectivity.
The archetype standing behind the symbol e must be correlated with the universality and totality of the entire field of relations, and then it acquires the cosmic dimensions befitting the situation — of WHOLENESS and of the unity of the World. Here relation is ontologized and turns into an IA.
What Aushra calls “a sense of the ethicalness-unethicalness of relations, of a person’s kindness or his bad qualities, a sense of desire and disinclination, etc.” belongs to the corresponding psychic function and not to the IA. Relations transform disconnected units into a system, and the most important feature of a system is wholeness. From the informational point of view, within the framework of IA e, relations between objects constitute signal [51] units that carry information indicating, at the level of ultimate generalization, the potential danger or safety of the situation. And only after such an evaluation does the turn come for the resource perception of the object.
In the case of “the attractive force of objects,” one must bear in mind the difference from the attractiveness of objects, which belongs to IA s. The most important part of archetype e is that which characterizes the wholeness of systems.
The suitable Jungian term for the corresponding SF is introverted emotionating. The combination of words “ethics of relations,” invented by Gulenko to designate this IA, is a jargonoid that competes with the existing concept of “ethics of relations” in the language, the sense of which has no bearing on socionics but may be realized in cultural subject matter, such as “the ethics of relations in everyday life,” “the ethics of relations in science,” and so forth.
Let us sum up the interpretation of the IA symbols (Table Au.01).
Table Au.01
| IA | Key concept | SF |
|---|---|---|
| I | LAW | extraverted intuition |
| i | MEANING | introverted intuition |
| S | PRESSURE OF THE ENVIRONMENT | extraverted sensing |
| s | RESOURCE, VALUE | introverted sensing |
| L | PRODUCTIVITY | extraverted thinking |
| l | SPACE, STRUCTURE | introverted thinking |
| E | STATE | extraverted emotionating |
| e | WHOLENESS, SYSTEM | introverted emotionating |
Let us note that in socionics a link has become established between archetype l and the concepts of system and structure, although it is clear that these words are by no means synonyms — but they may of course be considered projections of one and the same archetype. However, this needs to be proved. The concept of system is equivalent to the concept of wholeness, while the concept of structure represents space concretized by the mutual disposition of elements.
After this attempt to refine the semantics of the aspects, one may ask: to what extent does an imprecise understanding of these entities affect socionic practice? The semantics of the aspects is implicitly present in the semantics of the SFs. However, in order to extract it from there, one must pass from the subject area of the subject’s functioning into the subject area of ontology, which at the level of socionic generalization is not at all simple. For determining TIM, one needs above all a knowledge of the behavioral projections of the archetypes, which to a first approximation is present in the MB (Myers-Briggs) questionnaire — which, although it can in no way be considered a test, did play its role as a calibration table for the operator. The point is that repeated re-reading of this questionnaire gradually forms an intuitive image of the dominant behavioral traits, and the operator begins to orient himself to some degree among the TIMs, although the probability of error [52] still remains large, which is precisely what is observed in socionic practice.
What Aushra built may be considered the classical core of socionics. It is sufficiently clear, or at least seems so: 16 types — well, all those Don Quixotes and Hamlets — 16 relations and 16 traits, and of course Model “A,” and, ah yes, the small groups… This is attractive, this is interesting; but what, then, are people lacking? What are they trying to get to the bottom of? What they lack is a hundred-percent reliable diagnostics. And indeed, why has no one so far managed to propose a foolproof diagnostics of TIM? And here lies the mystery. No one has managed it — because it is genuinely hard. Everything seems clear, but it does not come out to 100%. People start digging deeper, and there — thickets. Intuitives need no bread, for they live “not by bread alone”; while sensing types need certainty — someone has to earn the money for the intuitives’ bread, since they themselves are not very… And after everything that has happened in socionics, can one really say it is a simple science? Why do two or three dozen leading socionists understand everything so differently that they cannot come to terms among themselves at all? Now it can be said: because socionics is complex. The complexity of socionics goes down into the depths of its concepts.
In the already-mentioned work “Commentary on Jung’s Typology and an Introduction to Information Metabolism” [2], in the subsection “Extraverted, Extraverts, Extratims,” Aushra Augustinavičiūtė gives a comparative characterization of these concepts: “…to designate individuals with psychic equilibrium, by analogy with the terms schizothyme–cyclothyme, we shall use the terms extratim–introtim.
Aushra: Extraverted or introverted we shall call individuals with manifestly extraverted or introverted behavior.
Commentary: Obviously, Kretschmer’s terminology made an impression on Aushra, and she found it possible to introduce his suffixes into the key concepts of Jung’s typology. However, now, after many years, one can say that here she made an error. Kretschmer introduced his suffixes “-thyme” and “-oid” to distinguish psychic norm from accentuation, whereas Jung’s typology is from the very beginning oriented toward the norm, and in it there is no need to distinguish extratims from extravertoids. Therefore Jung’s term “extravert” is entirely sufficient.
It is possible, however, to distinguish semantic nuances in the terms extravert and extraverted. The first term is an integral characteristic of the TIM, the second a directedness. Thus extraverted means directed outward, and introverted means directed inward. In this case the words “extravert-type” and “introvert-type” point to entities belonging wholly to the external or, respectively, the internal plane. At the same time, the terms “introverted–extraverted” pertain to functions, indicating their directedness — toward the subject’s internal world or toward the external world, which constitutes the subject’s habitat. Not all socionists catch these distinctions. [53]
Another inaccuracy of Aushra’s was the identification of Kretschmer’s schizothymes and cyclothymes with sensing types and intuitive types respectively. This was the result of a hasty conflation of terms from different subject areas. At present it is clear that the radicals “schizo-” and “cyclo-” are to a greater degree connected with the socionic concepts of “rationality” and “irrationality” — but all of this needs to be investigated more deeply.
Aushra: Unfortunately, C. G. Jung’s names are… not entirely suitable for us. Therefore what he called thinking we shall provisionally call logic; what he called emotions — ethics. [5?]
Commentary: This is the very place where Aushra resorted to a terminological substitution and committed a semantic error. However, further on she writes:
Aushra: We do not undertake to assert that our names are ideal and that in the future nothing more suitable will be found, but they are more precise than Jung’s. For example, when C. G. Jung opposes thinking types to emotional ones, the impression is created that the first “think” while the second “live by emotions.” [5?]
Commentary: Here we are in the very center of the intellectual laboratory of the brilliant creator of socionics. She is not categorical, she is searching, she has doubts — and this does her credit. But of course it is by no means obligatory to understand Jung’s opposition of thinking types to emotional ones so unambiguously. Now, thanks to socionics, we understand that formally what distinguishes the first from the second is their leading function. All types have everything, but it is realized differently in behavior. And there is no need whatsoever to replace the all-encompassing terms “thinking” and “emotionating” — which are, incidentally, fully validated in psychology — with terms from another subject area: logic belongs to the theory of knowledge, and ethics comes from the domain of morality, not psychology. Therefore it is necessary to rehabilitate Jung’s terms and restore their full use in socionics. This, incidentally, will amount only to the fact that in the names of TIMs, instead of “logical” we shall use “thinking,” and instead of “ethical” — “emotionating.”
Aushra: …It seemed to Jung that, say, “emotional extraverted types” are guided in their judgments only by feelings and not by reason. And he was himself surprised that such individuals fall in love consciously. From here it was only one step to the conclusion that not only “thinking types” “think,” that the thinking of other types is no less conscious, qualitative, and rational — only each “thinks” in a genuinely conscious way about something else or in another situation. Jung did not take this step.
Commentary: If it did seem so to Jung, in socionics it is now known that what is at issue here is not some all-consuming absolute but a relative dominance of the corresponding functions, a matter of priorities. But Aushra’s assertion that “the thinking of other types is no less conscious, qualitative, and rational” is a misunderstanding. For what is at issue here is a comparison of the thinking of types — precisely types, not concrete people — along three parameters: consciousness, quality, and rationality. [54] It is clear that at the intuitive level such assessments can be made only approximately. And as far as I know, laboratory methods for such a comparison are lacking. Many years of socionic practice give sufficient grounds for considering that typological features of thinking and emotionating really exist. Yes, all types both think and emotionate, but there are precisely qualitative differences in these psychic processes. It was precisely this that Jung noted in his clinical practice, and that became the empirical basis of his typological discovery. Thinking or emotionating in the models of different types are connected with qualitatively different functions, which is not hard to connect with differences in their generalized parameters as well. Thus in the position of the leading function they are distinguished by maturity, initiative, developedness, and sophistication; whereas in the position of, say, the conservative-critical function, although they do provide for everyday intellectual needs, they remain in the shadow of the dominant process and are less conscious. And that the level of consciousness of thinking, for example, may vary is well known from psychology. Moreover, clarity of thinking in one and the same person may change over the course of a day. Also essential are the differences in the thinking of rational and irrational types — and this has been proved in socionics. It is likewise well known that people’s ability to control their emotions varies within wide limits — from complete emotional unrestraint to emotional asceticism. And this is partly connected with a person’s upbringing, and partly must be attributed to his psychological type. Thus there can be no doubt that typological differences in thinking and emotionating exist.
Aushra: As a result… the impression formed that although all types are in some way useful to society, they are far from equally valuable, and that the “most high-quality” is undoubtedly the “thinking” one. Others may to some extent even be errors of upbringing.
Commentary: Jung nowhere draws such a conclusion. However, in society not only prejudices of this kind but conscious attitudes may indeed be present; for one does not, say, hire just anyone for a particular job vacancy, but hires according to the candidate’s functional suitability. Nonetheless, Aushra’s warning has value of its own. A person need not conform to some social standard if he is capable of using the advantages of his own type for self-realization. And here a knowledge of typology may prove exceptionally useful.
Aushra: On examination it turned out that the psychic functions are nothing other than the perception of different sides of a concrete and completely objective reality. The whole typology is based on the fact that information about the external world is differentiated, that different personality types fully consciously perceive and evaluate different sides of one and the same objective material world.
Commentary: This reasoning of Aushra’s is interesting in several respects. The turn of phrase “On examination it turned out…” has as its background merely the very [55] existence of the typology and a more or less limited practice of applying it; no special testing or verification of it in laboratory experiments was carried out. So there is more emotion here than logic. The maxim regarding “a concrete and completely objective reality” points to Aushra’s materialist worldview, and may of course be subjected to criticism by some analytic or phenomenological philosopher. Here it would have sufficed to say that IAs exist objectively, that is, independently of their subjective perception by anyone whatsoever. However, the opinion that IAs exist objectively requires substantiation. Such substantiation is extremely difficult or even impossible without introducing the informational paradigm into socionics (see the section “The Problem of Truth in the Humanities” in this book). Aushra took the first step in this direction by connecting the concept of information metabolism with socionics. However, it was necessary to carry out work on refining the concept of information, regarding which much indeterminacy remained in science; to give methodologically sound definitions; and to find an axiomatic basis for the deductive construction of the IAs. This work I have carried out. The IAs constitute maximally generalized informational complexes, represented by code records on energetic carriers constituting the ontological basis of our world. Proceeding from this, one can understand and accept Aushra’s assertion that “the typology is based on the fact that information about the external world is differentiated.” However, it is unclear on what grounds Aushra asserts that “different personality types fully consciously perceive and evaluate different sides of one and the same objective material world.” Where does this “fully consciously” come from? From general methodological considerations this cannot be asserted. On the contrary, taking Freud’s work into account, a more probable supposition here would be an understanding of this process as only partially amenable to conscious awareness — but the measure of that awareness has yet to be determined in strictly controlled laboratory experiments, which is no simple task for scientific psychology.
Aushra: Jung’s psychic types are types of thinking, or of intellect. But probably the simplest thing will be to call them types of information metabolism, since the basic difference between types of people is the difference in the exchange of information with the external world. Besides, with this name we shall at least partly render due to the classic of Polish psychiatry A. Kępiński, creator of an original theory of information metabolism fully consonant with our typology.
Commentary: Here Aushra made a slip of the pen: of course not psychic but psychological types. And of course Jung’s psychological types are built not on differences in thinking alone, but rest on all four generalized functions of the psyche: thinking, emotionating, sensing, and intuition — and Aushra knew this. One may speak here of a certain emotional haste on Aushra’s part in formulating her thought. And, needless to say, psychological types should be called “types of information metabolism” not because it is “simpler” [56] — what simplification is at issue here? — but because this more precisely expresses their essence, which is precisely Aushra’s brilliant conjecture. Nor does Aushra’s confidence that Kępiński created a theory of information metabolism entirely correspond to reality. He had several not-fully-organized ideas concerning the role that information plays in the development and course of schizophrenia; and, having a medical education and command of the concept of physiological metabolism, he quite naturally transferred it to informational processes. Kępiński himself limited the term “information metabolism” to a notion of a certain intellectual function whose incorrect operation leads to mental disorder. But Aushra’s intuitive perspicacity led to the transformation of this term into a fundamental general-scientific category.
Aushra: In reality they all think, only they think about different things: the first about the objective, the second about the subjective in the world around them. Therefore if we say of the latter, “In these people ethical thinking predominates,” it will not sound like such an absurdity as if we said, “In these people emotional thinking predominates.” People with “ethical” thinking have a tendency to evaluate and discuss their surroundings from the standpoint of the ethicalness-unethicalness of relations and deeds. People with “logical” thinking are mainly interested in the logicality-illogicality of relations and deeds. [5, sec. 3, p. 5]
Commentary: Here Aushra is working with a difficult, though at first approximation comprehensible, thought about the existence of fundamental differences in the thinking of different types. In her previous statements there was a complete denial of differences in the thinking of different types along the parameters of consciousness, quality, and rationality (these concepts, of course, require methodologically sound definitions); here she gives an assessment of different types along a quite different parameter — aspectual subject matter — that is, she shifts the emphasis and the thesis of the discussion. But this can also be understood as another step in the attempt to make sense of this by no means simple problem. Of course, in discussions of highly abstract topics one cannot use expressions like “In reality,” since they implicitly contain a claim to the speaker’s privileged access to reality, and this requires special substantiation and cannot be accepted by default. The conclusion that “they all think about different things” rests on the fact that in the models of different types different IAs stand in the position of the PPF (program-potential function), so this conclusion has a foundation. But further on we are dealing with a very complex thought of Aushra’s, and this thought is connected with an intuitive leap onto the adjacent topic of justifying the advantage of the term “ethical thinking” over the term “emotional thinking.” She concludes that the first term “will not sound like such an absurdity…” Obviously, Aushra subconsciously senses the insufficient adequacy of such terms, but nonetheless goes on to accept them under the influence of a fleeting intuitive insight. This is a vivid example of how difficult Aushra’s construction of the contours of socionics was. She came to it through brilliant illuminations, through fortunate and [57] unfortunate intuitive suppositions, through arduous searches for suitable terms, and, alas, through errors — often, it is true, subtly masked. In this paragraph we are dealing with precisely such an error.
But what rational sense could be hidden behind the terms “ethical thinking” and “emotional thinking”? Here Aushra followed the false trail of a “plausible” word combination — logical thinking / ethical thinking. But the truth, all the same, is that one must not confuse two different psychic processes: thinking and emotionating. Both processes are used by all types, but with different intensity, freedom, and effectiveness.
To move further, one must return to definitions. I proceed from the position that introverted thinking — and it is precisely this that is at issue here — is the processing of information inside the psyche using intellectual operators such as naming, definition, comparison, generalization, abstraction, and so forth. And by this criterion the thinking of thinking types and of emotional types does not differ, although there may be quantitative differences in the frequency of use of such operators. And this too may quite well be perceived by an attentive observer as a qualitative difference, one that is possibly not at all simple to describe. But this needs to be investigated more deeply.
Socionic practice permits the conclusion that typological differences in thinking are connected not with the intellectual operators themselves, but with the material used for the internal modeling of the surrounding environment. The matter here is not one of subject matter, since any subject matter may be thought about and discussed by people of any type — but with the use of a qualitatively (not thematically!) different informational substrate, so to speak, which is directly connected with the IA in the position of the PPF (program-potential function). Thus ESE models the world in the key of emotional-sensing extraversion, while, for example, IEI (Yesenin) uses for this the key of intuitive-emotional introversion. How can this be understood? It is very hard to understand, since to this day science lacks a suitable terminology and the intellectual constructs conjoined with it; but one has to begin sometime — and in this consists one of the meanings of the discovery and elaboration of the socionic approach to the human psyche.
Having some experience in handling socionic concepts, I would offer the following clarifications. IEI sees the world through the prism of a fine, piercing lyricism — but these are very approximate terms, which correlate with the corresponding archetype only with a great stretch and may be applied to certain other types as well, for example to EII (Dostoevsky). And of course this by no means means that every bearer of this type will necessarily be a poet, singer, artist, or performer — those are limiting realizations of such a type, when lines are born such as: “And the cranes, flying sadly past, no longer regret anything…” The “average” Yesenin, however, is [58] above all a person who finely senses the state of the people present and is ready to connect to it emotionally. This may be sympathy, support, or a scene, but it results in an emotional probing of the situation in order to expose the problem. In IEI one always senses a certain desperate daring, which, incidentally, EII lacks; and if interested witnesses happen to be nearby, he can display it with demonstrative ease. It is to him above all that the saying “even death is beautiful when others are watching” applies. In particular, he is capable of throwing a hysterical fit almost without particular consequences for himself, of moving from wrenching tears to giggling; he easily takes the desired for the actual and easily believes that it is so. A professional psychologist will easily see here the characterization of a hysteroid — but from the standpoint of socionics, these too come in different types, at least four of them.
If we make a comparison here with ESE (Hugo), then the latter looks above all more substantial, emotionally filled to the brim with a dense emotionality, always ready to join a company in which he will be the toastmaster — but he always, unlike IEI, soberly assesses the situation, taking possible consequences into account. Positive tone predominates in him over negative, which, incidentally, given a partly similar depth of emotionality, opposes him to EIE (Hamlet). But all this too is very approximate.
Here one may ask: “If everything is so approximate and hard to express, then how can one work with it?” Working is difficult, but possible. It must be done subtly and with account taken of the high level of generalization of socionic concepts. Many enthusiasts of socionics, sometimes not merely intelligent but very intelligent people, often fail to understand this and substitute homemade surrogates for the hard-to-express concepts of socionics pertaining to the functioning of the psyche — surrogates which, moreover, they self-confidently impose on the unprepared reader.
Summing up the reasoning of Aushra’s under discussion, one may say that the thinking of thinking types — that is, those in whom the thinking function stands in the dominant position (the leading function, according to Jung, or the PPF — program-potential function, in my variant of the exposition of socionics) — is accompanied by a different emotional background than the thinking of emotional types. Here too one may speak of the predominance in each of these cases of different emotional operators. Thus the serious but insistent concentration of LSE (Stierlitz) on setting out his thought will differ noticeably from an exposition of analogous subject matter accompanied by the dense emotional vibration of ESE, or with the addition of the sprightly intonations of IEI. LII (Robespierre), in an analogous case, relies on an unforceful intonation with shades of soft politeness, which may be accompanied by an unobtrusive and, as it were, only barely indicated smile. However, from the standpoint of the use of intellectual operators, the exposition of a topic by LSE and LII will always be not only more consistent but more deeply grounded logically than that of IEI, who may very confidently and with great pathos transmit argumentation often uncritically absorbed from a source authoritative [59] for him. And if a logical inaccuracy should be there and be pointed out to him, he will with great probability resort to ethical stratagems — for instance, get personal — but will be unable to arrive at the conclusion that the authority he acknowledges might have been mistaken.
The intellectual style of thinking types corresponds to a greater degree to scientific rigor in conducting experiments, in the inductive processing of their results, and in the construction of a theoretical scheme. However, emotional types may quite well master the elements — at least the external ones — of such a style and will be quite able to reproduce it successfully in routine situations. This is how an enormous number of men and women of emotional types work in scientific institutions, sometimes defending dissertations needed by no one but themselves and their supervisors. On the other hand, emotional types find artistic performance easier, sometimes effortless; but thinking types too are capable of mastering emotional operators — only for this they need a well-developed system. Say, at least, something like the Stanislavski system — whose creator, incidentally, was a logical-sensing extravert (Stierlitz), yet emotional types too learn by his system.
And here is what C. G. Jung says on this account:
C. G. Jung: “856. …Let no one pretend that he understands the world by intellect alone: this understanding is accomplished just as much with the help of feeling. Therefore the judgment of the intellect constitutes, at best, only half the truth…”
Commentary: Here I fully agree with the great psychologist, but would add that, as follows from socionics, truth requires not the two components named by Jung, but four. Thanks to socionics we can with justification divide all scientific methods into four groups: 1) sensing — detection, observation, registration, experiment…; 2) intuitive — understanding, comparison, grouping, inductive detection of invariants, generalization…; 3) logical — naming, observance of the rules of definition, construction of judgments and of proof, use of formal methods of data processing…; 4) emotional-ethical — the emotional accompaniment of research work, public recognition, relations with colleagues and competitors, collaboration… But at the level of 8 generalized functions one may speak of 8 groups of methods.
C. G. Jung: “953… I regard feeling as a function of the soul, separating it from sensation and presentiment or intuition. … emotional evaluations, emotional judgments, and emotions in general can be not merely reasonable but also logical, consistent, and judicious, and in this sense exactly the same as thinking.” [68]
Commentary: Here I can agree with almost nothing, and I consider that the concepts used by Jung are insufficiently clarified by him — well, simply undefined. The concept of the soul does not belong to science at all, although the integral experience of humankind testifies in favor of its existence. And there is no sense whatever in speaking of the soul with people who have not undergone transcendent experience. The psyche is another matter. But of course a definition is necessary. The psyche is an energy-informational complex ensuring [60] the connection of a living organism with its habitat. This is an insufficiently complete definition, but for a start it is better than those known from Soviet encyclopedias and psychological dictionaries. Of the psyche one may say that it is a maximally generalized function ensuring survival. Two levels lower one may discover eight (exactly eight!) psychic functions, whose semantics has become accessible to understanding thanks to socionics. Following in Aushra’s footsteps I managed to show (see UChK) that these functions are strictly ordered and form the structure of the psyche. Their set meets the requirements of completeness, independence, and non-contradiction. Completeness means that functions of such a level of generalization can be neither more nor fewer — their number and semantics are derived deductively, which for the humanities looks like an innovation.
Jung speaks of functions of the soul. But since we have excluded the soul from the scientific vocabulary, how is Jung to be reformulated scientifically? To say, for example, that these are functions of the psyche would be incorrect, since the psyche is itself a function. The psyche is a function of the subject. The subject as the source of activity and the highest instance of decision-making. The subject stands above the personality. On the contrary, the personality is the result of the subject’s activity. In psychology, “subject” has been used as a pronoun for personality and individuality, but it is high time to fill this entirely scientific term with its basic philosophical content.
As for feeling, in the Russian language this word has at least two senses: the product of experience (a feeling of joy, etc.) and an organ of perception (the sense organs, the sense of hearing, etc.). For science such ambiguity is unacceptable. In socionics these concepts are separated by the terms “emotion” (the product of emotionating), “emotionating” (the psychic function producing emotions), and “sensing” (the generalized function of perceiving the world by means of the sense organs).
And, finally, about “reasonable, logical, consistent, and judicious emotions.” It is clear that, without having given definitions, one can say a great deal on an intuitive flow. On the other hand, Jung — a psychologist of genius with rich clinical experience, the inventor of psychological types — in speaking thus of emotions probably did have something real in mind. But what? And all the same, is the great psychologist not confusing something here? Let us experiment, since before him no one had uttered such words. Perhaps psychology has failed to notice some psychic phenomenon to which Jung’s idea is applicable? For instance, where should intonation be assigned? I have no doubt that this is an emotional operator. Usually we connect intonation with speech, but after all one can intone without words, and in music it is a full-fledged musical category. Now, when SLE (Zhukov) gives a command, this is unquestionably a product of his thinking. In general, speech is introverted thinking brought outward in the form of its concrete products, and they may thereby be introduced directly into the corresponding place in another individual. But Zhukov will give the very same command in quite a different way than, say, ILI (Balzac) or EII (Dostoevsky). The words uttered are the same, [61] but in them, besides the logical indication of the denotatum, there is intonation — and possibly not only intonation.
I do not recall anyone examining intonation in this key, that is, not assigning it to the category of emotions. But if this is not so, then I do not know how the judgment of Jung’s under discussion can be rationally understood. Yet in speech, besides intonation, there is the speed of pronouncing words (tempo), and there is also rhythm, the placing of accents — which, as music shows, does not coincide with rhythm: with one and the same rhythm the accents may be placed differently. To what does this belong — to thinking or to emotionating? All this needs to be investigated professionally, but in the context of what Jung said it appears that intonation should be assigned to the group of emotional operators. Moreover, socionics permits the supposition (a hypothesis) that intonation belongs to introverted emotionating brought outward in the interface of speech. This makes it possible to interpret Jung’s hint adequately: the emotion accompanying an externalized thought may look reasonable, logical, consistent, and judicious — but for evaluating intonations we apply completely different assessments. Intonation may be adequate or inadequate, corresponding or not corresponding to the text; calm, even, monotonous, polite, rude, insolent, welcoming, harsh, and so on. Alas, the doubt expressed is connected with the absence of definitions of the highlighted concepts. Let us try to define them.
Reasonable — taking circumstances into account, taking into account principal and additional factors, anticipating possible consequences…
Logical — following from what was said earlier, following from the situation, corresponding to the situation, non-contradictory, corresponding to a logical standard…
Consistent — performing acts united by a single design, a single goal, not contradicting what preceded.
Judicious — one who, before acting, weighs the pluses and minuses of a possible action, adduces arguments “for” and “against”…
Even from these incomplete definitions one may conclude that the semantic fields of the concepts under consideration partially overlap, but in their content belong above all to thinking and not to emotionating, which is evaluated in entirely different parameters. The application of the above assessments to intonation, as an objectified form of introverted emotionating, can take place only at the level of metaphor. Therefore one must acknowledge that Jung’s thought that “…emotions can be not merely reasonable but also logical, consistent, and judicious, and in this sense exactly the same as thinking” is incorrect and constitutes no more than an intuitive metaphor.
C. G. Jung: “757. Thinking is that psychic function which, following its own laws, brings given contents of representation into conceptual connection. This is… an apperceptive activity… it divides into active and passive… Active thinking is an act of will; passive thinking merely occurs, it is an event that has happened. …active thinking corresponds to what I understand by directed [62] thinking. Passive… I would characterize as intuitive thinking.”
Commentary: Alas, not commanding the concept of information, Jung did not manage — and could not manage — to get to the bottom of thinking. Although his definition comes across not badly, it nonetheless appears to contain an error: not all elements of the defining part can here be considered known. What does “conceptual connection” mean? Is this concept not a synonym for thinking? In the latter case we have not a definition but an explication, that is, an explanation of a concept in other words rather than a reduction of it to something more fundamental.
In socionics two forms of thinking are represented — introverted and extraverted. Introverted thinking is the process of processing information inside the psyche, a process having as its goal the construction of an algorithm of behavior (Churyumov). Extraverted thinking is the immediate objectification, materialization of the algorithm, its externalization, its transformation into a technological process being carried out (Churyumov). Here the concept of thinking is not only concretized but expressed through the maximally fundamental concept of information.
As for Jung’s understanding of thinking as “apperceptive activity,” one must take into account that in his time the term “apperception” was understood as the connection of perception with prior experience — now it is to a greater degree simply a synonym for perception. Thus, according to Jung, as follows from the reflection of his under consideration here, apperceptive activity must be understood as a specific correction of perception — and that is all. But can the fundamental function of thinking, that of constructing any algorithms whatever, really be reduced merely to the correction of perception? As they say in a popular cartoon, “that’s a bit thin.”
This is in itself an interesting theme for experimental research in psychology. Here it is appropriate to adduce only a few considerations. The point is that socionics deals with psychic functions of a high level of generality. And in connection with this a problem arises: where should such psychic functions as attention, representation, memory, imagination be assigned? It is more or less clear that perception is connected with sensing, that is, with the registration of objective informational codes and their transformation into subjective codes. It appears that attention too may be assigned to the generalized function of sensing — as its subfunction. It is obvious that attention organizes perception and may be considered its beginning (or its predecessor?). Attention is also directly connected with the physiological process of lateral inhibition, which must strongly affect the assessment of attention’s status. What kind of process is this after all — psychic or physiological? This is a question for scientific psychology, where an unambiguous assessment of attention still does not exist — there are at least four rather different definitions of it. Of course, it is not obligatory to pose a dilemma here: either-or. At the very least, that is not dialectical. One and the same process may have both physiological [63] support and psychic realization. The same applies to memory. It has physiological mechanisms; its functioning is a psychic process; and its content is already the domain of psychology. In memory are found both the results of the sensing function’s work and the results of the work of all the other functions, including thinking. In socionics memory is generally “taken out of the brackets” as a process ensuring the work of all the other psychic functions, and without which psychic activity is impossible altogether. Although it is not excluded that typological differences may pertain to memory too, as, for example, they pertain to the body. But let us always remember that the psychic is not reducible to the physiological.
As for representation and imagination, these two processes have so much in common that the corresponding terms may be considered synonyms. Imagine, picture to yourself, that you… But one can speak of this more substantively only after giving definitions.
Jung’s division of apperceptive activity into active and passive, however, is quite unclear. Well, he gives no definitions — only an intuitive flow. One can only guess that by active thinking he means the conscious solution of a concrete problem. Passive thinking, however, is something like a continuous internal inner dialogue whose motivation may not be immediately assessed by the subject. But if this is internal processing of information, then, according to the definition given above, this too is introverted thinking. Yet it is not excluded that Jung understood something else by it. And it is quite unclear how, according to Jung, intuitive thinking differs from intuition. For socionics, by virtue of its level of generality, these distinctions are superfluous, and four generalized functions — sensing, emotionating, intuition, and thinking, with their introverted and extraverted forms — are sufficient here.
C. G. Jung: “681. Apperception is a psychic process thanks to which a new content is assimilated to already existing contents to such a degree that it is designated as understood, grasped, and clear.”
Commentary: Here we are dealing with the standard use of the term “apperception” for Jung’s time. In socionics, however, this concept should apparently be included in the concept of sensing rather than of thinking, although what is presupposed here is a primary preparation of the received information for further use in thinking and emotionating.
And let us adduce one more small example of the understanding of the thinking function by one of the most erudite socionists of the Kyiv school, G. A. Shulman, who moreover lays claim to a methodological comprehension of socionics.
Shulman: Logic (A.), or thinking (C. Jung), is contacts with objects, with matter; it is action, it is reality, definiteness, “yes-no-ness” (Reinin) in behavioral reactions, final results, in general extreme points, shadeless situations, discreteness, no half-measures or understatement, “yes” or “no,” “whoever is not [64] with us is against us,” “if the enemy does not surrender, he is destroyed,” etc. (see, for example, the reference to I. Dziuba’s article on V. Grossman in Portrait of the Commander*.)*
Commentary: This is an example of the understanding of thinking, and along with it of logic, by one of the active enthusiasts of socionics. Since the author of the explication adduced is IEI (Yesenin), and introverted thinking in people of this type is in the position of the CCF (conservative-critical function), it is not surprising that instead of a rigorous definition we are given a poetic set of predicates accentuated by categoricalness, creating an image rather than a concept.
The maxim adduced deserves methodological analysis, since it lays claim to scientific status.
- “Thinking is contacts with objects.” — Contact with objects is provided by sensing.
- “Thinking is contacts with matter.” — Possibly this is a rhythmic repetition characteristic of poetry, but from it it follows that the author identifies objects with matter; but what, then, does he understand by matter?
- “Thinking is action.” — Since the author gives no definitions, one might even think that thinking is something like football or playing the violin. Put more simply, the author understands action too broadly by comparison with the general-scientific standard, but offers no specificity as to its concretization in the form of thinking.
- “Thinking is reality.” — Usually by reality is understood a characterization of the habitat as not dependent on its subjective perception; but thinking may be fantastic, and abstract, and altogether primitive. In particular, idealist thinking has always been considered by pragmatists to be divorced from reality.
- “Thinking is definiteness.” — Is the reasoning under examination not itself a product of thinking? Yet one could hardly call it definite — here everything is piled into one intuitive heap.
- “Thinking is ‘yes-no-ness.‘” — Obviously the author here confuses a fundamental psychic function with a variety of dogmatic thinking that sees the world through black-and-white spectacles. Of course, this is a simplified understanding of thinking — yet the author transmits such thoughts to his numerous students.
- “Thinking is final results.” — Well, as though it were incapable of having initial, and intermediate, and doubtful, and altogether absurd results. But of course final results are had not only by thinking.
- “Thinking is shadeless situations.” — A fine word, “shadeless,” but thinking is not situations; it is the process of processing information about situations.
- “Thinking is discreteness.” — Probably of thinking one could say that it works with sets of discrete signs; but both these signs themselves and the boundaries between them may be blurred to any degree. The attempt to ascribe to thinking, once and for all, a simplified relation to reality is unproductive, dogmatic, “yes-no-ish,” and characterizes the thinking of such a subject as limited.
- “Thinking is no half-measures or understatement.” — Possibly these two characteristics could [65] be considered an ideal of thinking, but human history gives a multitude of examples in which thinking proved to be both half-hearted and inconclusive.
- “Thinking is ‘whoever is not with us is against us,’ ‘if the enemy does not surrender, he is destroyed.‘” — Well, this is already at the level of a joke. But on an unprepared reader or a student on a course it may make an indelible impression, and he will always understand thinking in the spirit of the recipe-poetic hints offered to him.
Literature
- Augustinavičiūtė A., Commentaries on Jung’s Typology and an Introduction to Information Metabolism, manuscript.
- Augustinavičiūtė A., Socion, SMiPL nos. 4–5, 1996.
- Shulman G. A., Articles of Various Years.