Section 3 Jung’s Reasoning on Extraversion and Introversion in Psychological Types

(an analysis of certain statements by Jung that clarify his understanding of extraversion and introversion)

…make not unto thyself an idol…

Translator’s note. Jung is quoted here from the Russian editions Churyumov worked with, and his commentary turns repeatedly on the exact Russian wording. The Jung passages below are therefore translated from Churyumov’s Russian text rather than replaced with the standard English renderings of Jung; where the Russian is awkward or ambiguous, the English keeps that awkwardness, because Churyumov is often objecting to precisely that.

Function abbreviations used below (Churyumov’s Model A nomenclature; Russian original in brackets):

Abbr.	Full name	Russian
PPF	program-potential function	ППФ
CPF	communicative-probing function	КЗФ
ALF	adaptive-load function	АНФ
CCF	conservative-critical function	ККФ
ERF	expectational-resource function	ЭРФ
MMF	motivational-mobilizational function	ММФ
ITF	imperative-temporal function	ИВФ
RTF	realizational-technological function	РТФ

Other abbreviations: TIM — type of information metabolism; IM — information metabolism; IA — information aspect; ITR — intertype relations; IP — the information paradigm; SF — socionic functions; ARD — the Augustinavichute–Reinin dichotomies (Russian АРП). Aspect letter-codes follow Churyumov’s substitution: I/i = Ne/Ni, S/s = Se/Si, L/l = Te/Ti, E/e = Fe/Fi.

Jung: The hypothesis of introversion and extraversion allows us, first of all, to distinguish two broad groups of psychological personalities. Such a grouping, however, is of so superficial and general a character that it permits only the most general sort of distinction. A more attentive investigation of the individual psychology of the representatives of either of these groups at once reveals an enormous difference between separate individuals who nevertheless belong to one and the same group. We shall therefore have to take one more step in our investigation in order to be able to determine wherein precisely the difference between individuals consists. Experience has convinced me that, in general, individuals may be distributed not only according to their universal attribute of extraversion and introversion, but also according to their separate basic psychological functions.

Commentary: We are present at the very cradle of Jung’s discovery of the key concepts of the psychological types. He has already detected a difference between people, which he designated as extraversion and introversion, but all of this is still at the level of intuitive insight. Running ahead, one may say that Jung never did fully work these concepts out — but let us note that he correctly designated his insight as a hypothesis.

Note that Jung does not yet understand the fundamental character of the distinction he has found; he assesses it as “superficial and general,” failing to understand that many psychological invariants, taken in isolation, tell us very little, and only when gathered together are they capable of refining the assessment of a personality to the limit. A great many such invariants have been found in psychology, and work in this direction continues. And here he draws the conclusion that is key for his typology — that “individuals may be distributed not only according to their universal attribute of extraversion and introversion, but also according to their separate basic psychological functions.”

Jung: External circumstances and inner disposition not only bring about the predominance of extraversion or introversion, but in addition promote the predominance in the individual of one of the basic functions over the others. Relying on experience, I have called the basic psychological functions — namely those which differ essentially from all the rest — thinking, feeling, sensation and intuition. If one of these functions habitually dominates the others, then a corresponding type is formed. I therefore distinguish thinking, feeling, sensation and intuitive types. Each of these types, moreover, may be introverted or extraverted, according to its relation to the object, as has already been described above. In my previous work on the question of psychological types I did not yet draw such a distinction, but identified the thinking type with the introverted and the feeling type with the extraverted. Upon deeper penetration such a conflation proved untenable. To avoid misunderstanding I would ask the reader not to lose sight of the distinction drawn here.

Commentary: Jung supposes that extraversion and introversion are connected not only with inner disposition but also with external circumstances — socionic work has shown that here he was mistaken: external circumstances have nothing to do with it. Jung then indicates directly that at the beginning of his work on this theme he “identified the thinking type with the introverted and the feeling type with the extraverted,” but that he later removed this error. Unfortunately, there were some errors he never did manage to sort out. Nor did many of his followers — for example, Marie-Louise von Franz or James Hillman.

General remarks

1.

Jung: Surveying the course of human life, we see that the fate of one man is conditioned predominantly by the objects of his interest, while the fate of another is conditioned above all by his own inner life, by his subject.

Commentary: From this phrase one may gather that by “subject” Jung understood the inner life of the personality, although he is speaking here of a human being. Within the limits of this particular argument he simply does not distinguish the concepts of human being, individual, individuality, personality and subject — which is entirely understandable as a certain simplification, quite permissible in preliminary reflections. What, then, does Jung understand by object? Why, the external life, of course — and not the philosophical category denoting the direction of the interests and efforts of the subject, who is here understood as a philosophical category denoting the source of spontaneous activity. Therefore, in translating from “Jungian” into modern language, one must use the appropriate dictionary.

At the same time, socionists’ incorrect assessment of Jung’s understanding of extraversion and introversion by way of directedness toward the object (in the case of extraversion) and “directedness away from the object” (whatever that could possibly mean) has led to a great many misunderstandings. In particular, the attempt to find some rational balance here led T. N. Prokofieva, one of the most erudite socionists, to a formulation that can be briefly expressed by the formula: EX(60/40) – IN(40/60). That is, the extravert distributes his interests between the object and his own inner world in a proportion of 60% to 40%, and the introvert the reverse. Alas, this is a misunderstanding! No such proportion exists — not even approximately! And in any case no one has ever measured it in a rigorous experiment; and the main point is that the meaning of extraversion and introversion does not lie in this at all.

Jung: But since we all deviate to some known degree in one direction or the other, we are naturally disposed to understand everything in terms of our own type alone. I mention this circumstance at the very outset in order to forestall possible misunderstandings.

Commentary: This is an important reservation, which must be applied, like a coefficient, to everything Jung says — and, above all, one must not absolutize his working reflections. “To some known degree” here means “to some degree or other,” which is by no means known. As for “we are naturally disposed…” — that is no more than a hypothesis, one perhaps corresponding to Jung’s own habit, but which it is not at all obligatory to extend to all people, as the great psychologist apparently does. It is quite plausible that there exists a class of people — professionals, who are trained to assess a situation without prejudice and are capable of overcoming, at least to some degree, their own subjectivism, including that component of it which is determined by the TIM.

2

Jung: …every person possesses both mechanisms, extraversion and introversion, and only the relative preponderance of the one or the other determines the type.

Commentary: From the standpoint of socionics, it is important to emphasize here that although both mechanisms are present in everyone, the integral quality in each case appears not merely as a quantitative dominant but also as a fixed quality, one that makes the extravert identical with himself, including in his introverted manifestations. It would therefore be incorrect to say that, for instance, an extravert in some given case behaves like an introvert, notwithstanding the fact that he is using an introverted mechanism. Such a view makes it possible to distinguish the concepts “extraverted [ekstravertny]” and “extraverting [ekstravertirovanny].” The latter indicates the predominant pole, the directedness; the former specifies an integral quality. It is therefore better grounded to say of a function that it is “extraverting,” and of a type that it is “extraverted.”

3

Jung: The terms and concepts under which the mechanism of introversion and extraversion has been understood are very various and are always adapted to the point of view of the individual observer.

Commentary: It is obvious that a scientist ought to discover the invariant of all these various terms and concepts, rather than becoming confused among them and creating ever more parasitic meanings. In the present case it is not very clear what exactly Jung is emphasizing and why he is doing so: the difference between terms and concepts, which is after all determined by the general scientific understanding of these categories; the difference between the mechanisms of introversion and extraversion, which is, first, self-evident, and second, when emphasized, is perceived as banality. But the “adaptedness to the point of view of the individual observer” — adaptedness of what? Of the terms, of the concepts, or of the mechanisms of introversion and extraversion? — cannot be passed over as something self-evident. If Jung means that every bearer of a psychotype adapts the concepts of extraversion and introversion to his own personality, then although this can be understood somehow, it is entirely unclear what bearing it has on the definition of these concepts. If, on the other hand, Jung means that it is the mechanisms of extraversion and introversion themselves that function differently in each bearer of a psychotype, then of course this is interesting and requires development — but surely not before we have settled these concepts as such.

Jung: Notwithstanding the difference of formulations, one always notices something common in the basic understanding, namely a movement of interest in the direction of the object in the one case, and a movement of interest away from the object toward the subject and toward his own psychic processes in the other.

Commentary: Translated from Jungian into modern language, this may be understood to mean that the extravert is to a greater degree turned toward the external life — which of course in no way means that he has no inner life. For the introvert, on the other hand, the initial, basic position will be his inner life, although he may nevertheless be as fully involved as you please in external activity. What must be sought here is not a contradiction but a way of resolving it, and this we have in the integral assessment both of the type itself and of the concrete activity of its bearers. In life this may show itself, for example, in the introvert’s yielding the initiative more readily, restricting the range of his activity to a greater degree, more often choosing an “energy-saving” position — which, however, does not guarantee an unambiguous determination of his type by such parameters.

Jung: In the first case the object acts upon the tendencies of the subject like a magnet; it attracts them and to a significant degree conditions the subject; it even estranges the subject from himself to such a degree, so alters his qualities in the sense of assimilation to the object, that one might think the object had the greater and, in the last analysis, the decisive significance for the subject — as though the complete subordination of the subject to the object were in some known measure an absolute predetermination and a special meaning of life and destiny.

Commentary: Alas, here Jung falls into the trap of his own rhetoric. This is an example of the metaphysical elaboration of an initial idea. He begins to exaggerate the shades of meaning and literally drives the concept of extraversion into a dead end of mechanistic unambiguity. We already see the image of a pathologically programmed activity, which of course occurs as often as you please in life, but is equally characteristic of extraverts and introverts alike. The violation of semantic equivalence occurs here on the metaphor of the magnet, which shifts the semantic isolines, with the result that both the thinker and his listeners find themselves, imperceptibly to themselves, in a magical realm of illusion that entirely subordinates their capacity for common sense. What remains “in the dry residue” is a simplified image of extraversion, which bears no more relation to real extraversion than the label “zebra” on a giraffe’s cage. Nonetheless, this simplified meaning is readily assimilated by the undemanding or inexperienced consumer, precisely because of its lightened accessibility.

Jung: In the second case, on the contrary, the subject is and remains the centre of all interests. One may say that one gets the impression that all vital energy is directed toward the subject, and therefore always prevents the object from acquiring any influence whatever over the subject. It seems as though the energy goes away from the object, as though the subject were a magnet wishing to draw the object to itself.

Commentary: Of course, when the inner world entirely absorbs a person’s attention, this is no longer a type but a pathology — in this case, autism. A type is, as L. Tolstoy liked to say, always a “little bit.” It is a broad frame into which so much may be inscribed that behind this almost infinite diversity the definiteness of the type may become blurred and appear to have lost its relevance — but this is precisely the case of failing to see the wood for the trees, in which the concept of type ceases to be used constructively. Note that, from the standpoint of NLP, the words “the energy goes away from the object” contain an embedded command, and the reader, subconsciously executing this command, accepts Jung’s description as obligatory for assimilation.

4

Jung: The extraverting point of view, on the contrary, places the subject below the object, whereby the predominant value belongs to the object. The subject is always of secondary significance; the subjective phenomenon sometimes seems only a hindering and unnecessary appendage to what is objectively occurring.

Commentary: When you read the first phrase of this passage, you see a vivid picture: a thin, emaciated subject, bent double, carrying on his back a bright, shining, glittering, gilded chest of treasures with the inscription “OBJECT” — and Jung, without any negative intent, suggests to you that this is the very image of extraversion. No: real, socionic extraversion corresponds to a quite different picture — a powerful, well-built subject, with full awareness not only of his subjective programmes and of the principles he has assimilated one way or another, but also of his own “hide-saving” interests, sets about his business decisively and advances jealously in carrying it out. For introversion the picture will of course look different, but there will be nothing depressing in it either: a young man attentively listens to an older comrade with understanding, granting him the initiative, and always ready to help, to lend a shoulder and to cover his back. He is, other things being equal, a good conversation partner; it is pleasant to spend time with him; he can be relied upon; but he is delicate and unobtrusive — which of course is not an unambiguous definition of introversion.

Jung: It is clear that a psychology proceeding from these opposed points of view must fall apart into two entirely different orientations. The one regards everything from the angle of its own understanding, the other from the angle of what is objectively occurring.

Commentary: It is astonishing that a German philosopher, an heir of theoretical dialectics, should utter so metaphysical a thought. In the first place, this has not happened in the half-century and more since Jung’s death; and in the second, it would be rather strange if, as a result of Jung’s discovery, two psychologies were to appear in Europe — say, an “extraverted psychology of personality” and an “introverted psychology of personality” — with no possibility whatever of bringing them to a common denominator. What in fact appeared was socionics, which managed to combine the consideration of extraversion and introversion without exaggerations of any kind. Let us sharpen what Jung has said a little. THE-ONE-WHO-REGARDS-EVERYTHING-FROM-THE-ANGLE-OF-HIS-OWN-UNDERSTANDING: “the little sticks must be strictly perpendickular,” “a step to the left, a step to the right, I count as escape and shoot to kill,” “he who is not with us is our enemy,” “the arms and legs of our theatre’s collective ought to be broken,” “measure seven times, cut once,” “alone I come out onto the road,” “a lonely sail gleams white”… And here is THE-ONE-WHO-REGARDS-EVERYTHING-FROM-THE-ANGLE-OF-WHAT-IS-OBJECTIVELY-OCCURRING: “everything flows and changes,” “seize the moment,” “you scratch my back, I’ll scratch yours,” “heave ho…,” … Obviously, neither the one nor the other can be assigned 100% to extraverts or to introverts, and both the one and the other may pronounce both sets of phrases with a full sense of competence. Jung, in his statement, commits the standard error of using the universal quantifier “ALL, EVERYTHING” in universal affirmative judgements, to refute which a single counter-example suffices.

5

Jung: With the establishment of introversion and extraversion the possibility was for the first time given of distinguishing two broad groups of psychological individuals. Nevertheless these groupings are of so superficial and general a property that they permit only such a general distinction. A more exact investigation of the psychology of those individuals who fall into the one group or the other at once shows great differences between separate individuals who nevertheless belong to one and the same group.

Commentary: At last the great thinker has offered a balanced judgement. So he can, when he wants to. But even here one must hurry to his aid, so that he does not lose his measure of definiteness. The archetypes standing behind the terms extraversion–introversion yield to verbalization only with great difficulty. It is therefore unsurprising that in attempting to express them too straightforwardly it is so easy to make a mistake.

6

Jung: The basic functions, i.e. functions which differ essentially from the other functions, are, in my experience, thinking, emotions, sensation and intuition. If one of these functions habitually dominates, a corresponding type appears. I therefore distinguish thinking, emotional, sensory and intuitive types. Each of these types, moreover, may be introverting or extraverting, according to its behaviour in relation to the object, as was described above.

Commentary: Here Jung has expressed himself quite definitely — he distinguishes four functions, and with the predominance of any one of them a type appears. However, now, from the vantage point of socionics, one may say that the reasoning cited concerned a monotype, whereas socionics can offer 30 (!) monotypes — one for each pole of the ARD. For in socionics we can speak of rational and irrational types, static and dynamic, aristocratic and democratic, and so on. Here we see that Jung knew far from everything that his discovery pointed toward. But now we can make an important refinement that never occurred to the great psychologist.

The point is that the human functional system has several functional levels. The level with which typology deals is connected with highly generalized functions. For example, sensorics includes within itself several functions of a lower level — sight, hearing, smell, and so on. These functions include within themselves functions of a still lower level. The lowest functional level is apparently the intracellular. At any rate, in physiological experiments individual neurons were found that were responsible for distinguishing vertical from horizontal striping (Wiesel and Hubel).

7

Jung: In two preliminary communications (1) on psychological types I did not adhere to the distinction set out here, but identified the thinking type with the introverting and the emotional type with the extraverting. This conflation proved untenable upon a deeper working-through of the problem. To avoid misunderstandings I would therefore ask the reader to bear in mind the distinction drawn here.

Commentary: Here we catch the great psychologist in his creative laboratory, at the moment when he overcame the identification he had made of the thinking type simply with the introverting and of the emotional type with the extraverting. This circumstance should serve as a reminder to us that at some moment Jung was still entirely free of the idea of a psychological type, and that it then began gradually to take shape in his head. At first very approximately, and then ever more distinctly — but it never did attain the full perfection presented in socionics. This line of reasoning permits us to assert that he did not know everything about the basic concepts of his own theory, that he passed through stages of confusion and misunderstanding, that he did not discover everything in the subject area of “psychological types.” In socionics too there are at present many misunderstandings and errors, but the work continues.

8

Jung: I wish to attempt to give a general description of the psychology of the types. First this must be done for both general types, which I have designated as introverting (introvertiert) and extraverting (extravertiert). Then, in addition, I shall attempt to give some characterization of those special types whose peculiarity is determined by the fact that the individual adapts and orients himself chiefly by means of the function most developed in him. The former I would designate as general attitude-dependent types, differing from one another in the direction of their interests and the movement of their libido, and the latter as functional types. The general attitude-dependent types differ by their peculiar attitude in relation to the object.

Commentary: So, we are at the very beginning of the construction of the future typology. Jung is only just sketching the prospect of the future description. He already has the idea of a typology, but it is very approximate and rests as yet upon a very vague conception of extraversion and introversion.

9

Jung: The introverting man relates to the object abstractingly; taken in his foundation, he is always concerned to take libido away from the object, as though he had to prevent the object from gaining preponderance over him.

Commentary: Well, what can one make of this very Germanly convoluted sentence? Everything here is literally at the level of philosophical gibberish. What does it mean to relate to the object “abstractingly”? To disregard it, not to notice it, to belittle its significance, deliberately to abstract from some of its parameters? Tell me, how can a normal person do any of the above with an object? Let our object be a piece of bread… Well, tell me, how is the introvert, being hungry, going to abstract from the piece of bread he is holding in his hand? He will simply eat it and that’s that — no abstractions. But profound erudition demands a very complex packaging for a simple thought — otherwise it will be “unscientific.”

Very well: “taken in his foundation” — in Jungian language this apparently means something like “as such,” and applied to this text it is simply a concealed repetition of the concept of introversion; that is, after this Jung will name what is, from his point of view, the most important thing in the introvert’s behaviour. And obviously he does just that when he writes: “is always concerned to take libido away from the object.” Of course this looks enigmatic and dramatic — “to take libido away.” Recalling the sense of “libido” in Freud, one might even think of castration, so dramatized by the latter. But in Jung’s language it is something rather different. Unlike Freud, Jung does not reduce libido merely to sexual energy; for him it is the equivalent of psychic energy in general. And then it turns out that the introvert, in his opposition to the object, takes away from the latter its last psychic energy and thereby, as one may gather from the phrase of Jung’s under discussion, “prevents the preponderance of the object over himself.” So one pictures this terrible scene: over the introvert, small in size as he already is, there looms a practically unavoidable and threatening object. But the introvert does not surrender. Straining all his forces, which are small as it is — he is an introvert, after all! — he nonetheless wriggles free and slips out from under the object looming over him, thereby depriving it of power over himself. Possibly, if someone were to tell Jung how his phrase can be rendered into Russian, he would be not a little surprised. He, after all, understands all this within the framework of German classical philosophy. There everything is decent and seemly. But in Russian it still is not very clear. And that is because the creator of the psychological types did not fully understand it either. The introvert struggles with the object for no libido whatever. It is simply that the leading function of the introverting type — as, incidentally, of the extravert too — models the surrounding environment in terms of the IA directly connected with the psychic environment.

Jung: The extraverting man, on the contrary, relates positively to the object. He affirms the significance of the object in that he constantly orients his subjective attitude toward the object and relates to it. Taken as a foundation, the object never has sufficient value for him, and therefore its significance must be raised. Both types are so different, their opposition so clear, that their existence becomes obvious even to the layman in psychology, if his attention is once drawn to it. Everyone knows those closed, hard-to-fathom, often shy natures which constitute the strongest opposite to others — open, affable, often merry, or at least friendly and accessible characters, who get along with everyone, or who, even if they quarrel, nonetheless remain in relations permitting them to influence everyone or to allow the influence of others upon themselves. Ordinarily such differences are regarded only as individual cases of a peculiar cast of character. But whoever has had occasion to study many people thoroughly will readily make the discovery that in this opposition the matter is by no means one of isolated individual cases, but rather of typical attitudes which are far more general than can be supposed on the basis of limited psychological experience. In actual fact the matter concerns a basic opposition which is more or less distinct, but always noticeable, in individuals with a personality that is to some known degree pronounced.

Commentary: This passage, seemingly the opposite of the preceding reasoning, is likewise composed almost entirely of misunderstandings. Let us take the whole paragraph apart sentence by sentence.

“The extraverting man, on the contrary, relates positively to the object.” — There is in reality no “on the contrary” here. Both the extravert and the introvert relate positively to a positive object and negatively to a negative one. They merely model one and the same reality in different terms.

“He affirms the significance of the object in that he constantly orients his subjective attitude toward the object and relates to it.” — This sentence represents no more than a transform of the preceding one and does not merit separate analysis.

“Taken as a foundation, the object never has sufficient value for him, and therefore its significance must be raised.” — The object always has for a person its own positive or negative value, and the concepts of extraversion and introversion have nothing to do with this.

“Both types are so different, their opposition so clear, that their existence becomes obvious even to the layman in psychology, if his attention is once drawn to it.” — Yes, these types are different — if only by definition — but their opposition is far from being as clear as the great psychologist thought at a certain moment. And only to particular laymen in psychology can it appear obvious, even when the existing misunderstandings are pointed out to them directly.

“Everyone knows those closed, hard-to-fathom, often shy natures which constitute the strongest opposite to others — open, affable, often merry, or at least friendly and accessible characters, who get along with everyone, or who, even if they quarrel, nonetheless remain in relations permitting them to influence everyone or to allow the influence of others upon themselves.” — Here Jung confuses sociability with extraversion, and if this misunderstanding were pointed out to him, it is unlikely anyone could talk him out of it — so obvious does it all seem. Subsequently this error was repeated by the remarkable English psychologist Eysenck. As it turned out, none of this is so simple.

Jung: …whoever has had occasion to study many people thoroughly will readily make the discovery that in this opposition the matter is by no means one of isolated individual cases, but rather of typical attitudes which are far more general than can be supposed on the basis of limited psychological experience.

Commentary: This is the very moment when Jung makes his discovery: if we encounter cases of such opposition, then the matter is by no means one of isolated individual cases, but rather of typical attitudes…

10

Jung: We meet such people not only among the educated but generally in all strata of the population, in consequence of which our types may be found among workers and peasants just as among the highly differentiated people of any nation. In just the same way sexual differences change nothing in this fact. In all women the same oppositions are revealed.

Commentary: We see how Jung discovers ever more indications of the typological universality of the basic difference between people that he has found, and tries to make sense of it — but this he never did manage to do.

Jung: So wide a distribution could hardly take place if the matter were one of an act of consciousness, i.e. of a conscious and deliberately chosen attitude. In that case, of course, a definite class of the population, bound together by identical upbringing and education and correspondingly limited in space, would be the predominant bearer of such an attitude.

Commentary: Neither sex, nor age, nor level of intellect, nor professional affiliation, nor upbringing — what is at issue is an entirely special property of the psyche, as universal a law as, for example, the Law of Universal Gravitation.

Jung: The matter, however, stands not at all thus, but entirely the reverse: the types are distributed evidently without discrimination. In one and the same family one child will be introverting and another extraverting. Since, in accordance with these facts, the attitude-dependent type, as a general and evidently randomly distributed phenomenon, cannot be a consequence of conscious judgement or of conscious intention, it must owe its existence to an unconscious, instinctive foundation. The opposition of the types, as a general psychological phenomenon, must therefore have in some way its biological premise.

Commentary: No, Jung did not reach an understanding of extraversion and introversion as a universal psychic law; he attempts to find their foundation in biology. It is strange, but apparently he never did understand that the psychic is not reducible to the biological…

11

Jung: Here I might confine myself to a general indication, on the one hand of the extraverting man’s property of constantly squandering himself and spreading himself in everything, and on the other of the introverting man’s tendency to defend himself against external influences, to abstain so far as possible from all expenditures of energy relating directly to the object, in order thereby to create for himself the most secure and strong position possible.

Commentary: There is something in this, but it still does not work out that the manifestations of extraversion and introversion can be entirely reduced to modes of energy expenditure.

12

Jung: Blake therefore intuitively designated both types well as “prolific” and “devouring.” As general biology shows, both paths are possible and each successful in its own way; the same may be said of the typical attitudes. What the one accomplishes by mass relations, the other attains by monopoly.

Commentary: Also not it — another pair of incorrect identifications, but Jung is in the process of searching…

13

Jung: When the orientation toward the object and toward what is objectively given outweighs to such a degree that the most frequent and the principal decisions and actions are conditioned not by subjective views but by objective relations, then one speaks of an extraverting attitude.

Commentary: Over the course of several paragraphs — and in the book this is several pages — Jung attempts to formulate the difference between extraversion and introversion, but he still cannot arrive at a final formulation. And this is no accident: he has chosen an unfortunate intellectual position — to formulate this difference by leaning on everyday phenomenology. And here again he seeks the difference in orientation toward objective data. But alas, all normal people use both objective data and subjective attitudes.

14

Jung: When someone so thinks, feels and acts — in a word, so lives — as corresponds directly to objective relations and their demands, in the good and in the bad sense, then he is extraverting.

Commentary: The definition given belongs to the category of the rigid. It is easy to formulate but very difficult, practically impossible, to fix. What does it mean to live in such a way that this “corresponds directly to objective relations and their demands”? Into such a phrase everyone can put his own meaning.

Jung: He lives in such a way that the object, as a determining magnitude, evidently plays a greater role in his consciousness than his subjective opinion.

Commentary: This phrase is an equivalent transform of the preceding one and in no way alters its content.

Jung: Of course he has subjective views, but their determining force is less than the force of external objective conditions. Therefore he never expects to meet with any unconditional factor within himself, since such are known to him only outside himself. Like Epimetheus, his soul submits to external demands — not, of course, without a struggle; but the matter always ends in favour of external conditions. His entire consciousness looks outward, since the chief and decisive determination always comes to him from outside. From this basic attitude follow, so to speak, all the peculiarities of his psychology, unless they are based on the primacy of a definite psychological function or on individual peculiarities.

Commentary: Again and again Jung attempts to refine the subjective image he has, but the very essence of the difference he posits eludes him. Who will measure “the determining force of subjective views as compared with the force of external objective conditions”? Who has proposed unambiguous methods for assessing such magnitudes? Nor does the mythical image of Epimetheus save the situation — all the more so since “his soul too submits to external demands,” and moreover “not without a struggle.” There are so many hard-to-determine variables here that it is almost impossible to imagine the scheme of an experiment in which they could be identified even somehow. Moreover, knowing socionics, it is quite easy to substitute some concrete introvert into this formulation. Thus the socionic Dumas is an excellent example of a pure Epimetheus. For him it is so natural to follow the lead of a beautifully laid table, of refined bouquets of spirits and of anticipated warm company — and no particular struggle is required here either. But Jung did not yet know this then. Socionics, however, knows that this is a sensory-emotional introvert.

15

Jung: Of course, to the extraverting view such an application (Einpassung) must appear as a complete adaptation, since to such a view no other criterion is given.

Commentary: What is the great psychologist on about? How is it that “such an application” must appear as “a complete adaptation”? Does anyone understand anything in this abracadabra?

Having covered many pages with refinements of this kind, Jung never did obtain acceptable definitions of extraversion and introversion — and moreover he never understood this. Let us therefore stop here in the investigation of his attempts to clarify this difference, and let us take it that socionics has taken from Jung everything that was possible, and that there is no further sense — except, perhaps, a historical one — in turning to his typological reasonings.

16

Jung: …the extraverting man reckons with the reality of his subjective requirements and needs. His weak point consists precisely in this, that the tendency of his type is directed outward to such a degree that of all subjective facts even the one most bound up with the feelings — namely bodily health — as too little objective, as too little “external,” is insufficiently taken into consideration, so that the satisfaction of elementary needs required for physical well-being no longer takes place. In consequence the body suffers, not to mention the soul. The extraverting man ordinarily notices this last circumstance little, but it is all the more noticeable to those close to him, to the household around him. The loss of balance becomes perceptible to him only when abnormal bodily sensations appear.

Commentary: After the reasonings adduced above, it should be clear to the reader that “the reality of his subjective requirements and needs” is reckoned with by any normal person — extraverting and introverting alike. They merely model this situation differently in their consciousness.

17

Jung: An excessively extraverting attitude may to such a degree fail to reckon with the subject that the latter may be wholly sacrificed to so-called objective demands — for example, to the constant expansion of an enterprise merely because there are orders and because the opportunities presenting themselves must be fulfilled.

Commentary: Here Jung introduces the notion of an “excessively extraverting attitude,” which does not seem rational under conditions in which he is unable to cope with the typologically normal case. The description he gives should apparently be assigned to accentuations, and this only confuses a situation that has not been clarified as it is.

Jung: As it seems to me, hysteria is the most widespread neurosis of the extraverting type. The classical hysterical case is always characterized by excessive intercourse with the persons around; a characteristic feature is also the outright imitative application to circumstances. The basic feature of the hysterical character is a constant tendency to be interesting and to make an impression on those around. The correlate of this is the proverbial suggestibility, accessibility to the influence of other persons.

Commentary: Jung’s whole text is built on this “as it seems to me,” which, you will agree, is not suitable for final and serious scientific results, but corresponds quite well to the initial stage of elaborating a hypothesis.

One may therefore say that Jung began psychological typology but did not finish it, demonstrating simultaneously both genius and a quite definite limitation of his resources. It would be desirable to discuss the arising problems of psychological typology with him — would he have managed to understand the socionic solution to them, or would he have been categorically against it?

Jung: Manifest extraversion appears in hysterics also in sociability, which sometimes goes as far as tales of purely fantastic content, whence arise the accusations of hysterical lying. The hysterical character is above all an exaggeration of the normal attitude; but then it becomes complicated, on the side of the unconscious, by compensatory reactions which, by means of bodily disorders, compel to introversion an extraversion exaggerated against the psychic energy. Thanks to the reactions of the unconscious there arises another category of symptoms which have a more introverting character. Here belongs, above all, a morbidly heightened activity of fantasy. In the preceding chapter I mentioned the tendency of the extraverting attitude toward a certain one-sidedness, namely the predominant position of the objective factor in the course of the psychic act.

Commentary: Socionics has proved that a hysterical component may be present in some extraverts and in some introverts, but that practically all women have a hysterical readiness in a managed or semi-managed variant, and that those who are actually hysterics are the ones among them who are unable or unwilling to manage this form of self-presentation. Among men hysteria may manifest to a greater degree in emotional than in logical types. But all this is a task for deep laboratory investigation.

Jung: The extraverting type is always tempted (seemingly) to sacrifice himself in favour of the object, to assimilate his subject to the object. I have indicated exhaustively the consequences that may follow from an exaggeration of the extraverting attitude — namely, the harmful suppression of the subjective factor. It is therefore to be expected that the psychic compensation to the conscious extraverting attitude will particularly emphasize the subjective moment, i.e. we shall have to demonstrate a strong egocentric tendency in the unconscious.

Commentary: This is an example of the metaphysical language that obtained in German science at the beginning of the twentieth century, expressed by the means of the Russian language so far as the translator’s possibilities allowed. Such a style of discussion may mask the rational kernel presumed to be present in it. Let us therefore try to continue the analysis cautiously in search of the Jungian meaning.

Socionics is far from Jung’s categoricalness. In it, extraversion/introversion are determined not by the degree of “temptation to sacrifice oneself in favour of the object,” but by the IA in the position of the PPF (program-potential function). If the PPF is directed outward, then the TIM as a whole is characterized as an extravert. Outward, of course, means into the external world, into the habitat. And there, of course, there are objects — but they are also present in the subject’s inner world. And if in the introvert the PPF is directed into the inner, i.e. psychic, world, then it is directed toward inner objects, and by no means necessarily “toward the subject.” Incidentally, what would that mean in modern language? In the modern understanding, realized in an extensive training practice, directedness toward the subject is always work on oneself, the improvement of all parameters of one’s individuality — physical, intellectual, professional, moral-ethical, and “even” spiritual. But of course this is not necessarily realized only in group training — many people are capable of setting themselves subject-oriented goals independently, among which almost first place belongs to self-realization, though this is all too often understood as the achievement of external success. But even in this case the subject component is of course perfectly distinguishable. Yet can real bearers of extraversion not be oriented toward success? Why, this is an ordinary, widespread phenomenon. And there are no visible grounds for discerning any fundamental differences here between extraverts and introverts.

And what does “to assimilate his subject to the object” mean? It seems that Jung has in mind here some degree of fusion of subject and object. Possibly from the very superficial to a deep identification. Of course, cases of being in love may be assigned here, and also, naturally, cases of concentration on an object. Is it not thus that a writer writes a book and an artist paints a picture? Does the personality of the creator not find its expression in the creation? And can extraverts and introverts be opposed to one another in this process? Who does not strive for success, who does not attend trainings, who does not engage in self-improvement in one area or another? Who, after all, does not fall in love? So it seems that Jung had something else in mind. But it is very plausible that he simply found himself captive to his own construct and to the metaphysical technique of unfolding it. And then it is clear that the “harmful suppression of the subjective factor” may occur in extraverts and introverts alike — but no longer in the way Jung perhaps understood it, rather as a forgetting of one’s human nature, a refusal of spiritual development, or even its replacement by external ritual.

The concluding phrase of the reasoning under consideration looks like a reference to some psychoanalytic formula with a proportional sense, of the type “the greater the conscious activity, the greater the subconscious resistance.” It therefore seems that Jung considers that “the more extravertingly a person behaves, the more he is an egocentric,” i.e., quite simply, an egoist. Such is the logic of the formula, but in life we observe numerous nuances. For example, a person excessively carried away by the external signs of success may in the end lose his inner existential foundation and end his life in deep disappointment. But this does not always happen, and possibly we have not set out all the parameters and refining coefficients of the presumed formula and are interpreting it too categorically, unambiguously, in isolation from reality? And this is one of the aspects of metaphysics.

Jung: The attitude of the unconscious, for the actual completion of the conscious extraverting attitude, has the property of an introverting character. It concentrates energy on the subjective moment, i.e. on all those needs and impulses which are suppressed or displaced by the too extraverting conscious attitude. It is easy to understand, as should already have been clear from the preceding chapter, that orientation toward the object and toward what is objectively given does violence to a multitude of subjective impulses, opinions, wishes and necessities, and deprives them of the energy which by nature ought to belong to them. Man is not a machine which in every given case can be rebuilt for an entirely different purpose and which will then, in an entirely different manner, function just as correctly as before. Man always carries with him his whole history and the history of mankind.

Commentary: Here we have a further clarification of the psychoanalytic formula mentioned earlier. But here we discover new variables. If Jung refers to some “actual completion,” then it is not excluded that there are also other varieties of it — that is, in some sense, non-actual ones; though it is not excluded that this is no more than a rhetorical intensification of an existing supposition about the properties of completion. And of course let us not forget that the reasonings of Jung under consideration are only a hypothesis. Are there sufficient grounds for holding that at the level of a law the following relations hold: 1) IF CONSCIOUSNESS IS EXTRAVERTED, THEN THE SUBCONSCIOUS IS INTROVERTED, and, conversely, IF THE SUBCONSCIOUS IS EXTRAVERTED, THEN CONSCIOUSNESS IS INTROVERTED? The point is that when Jung introduced the distinction between the leading and the subordinate function, he described it thus: THE LEADING FUNCTION IS DEVELOPED, ACTIVE, CONSCIOUS, WHILE THE SUBORDINATE IS INFANTILE, UNDEVELOPED, PASSIVE. That is, he describes them as opposite in everything. But is this the only possibility? Why opposite after all, and not identical? Is he not going too far? Now, knowing socionics, and therefore possessing a full specification of the semantic differences between the functions, we can already dispense with the terms “leading — subordinate — auxiliary,” which distort the essence of the matter. And if the PPF (program-potential function) may in some (?) sense be called leading, then the remaining 7 functions will have to be considered both subordinate and auxiliary, because they all work for the PPF and with the PPF.

Jung: …complete assimilation with the object encounters the protest of what was there before and existed from the very beginning. From this very general consideration it is easy to understand why the unconscious demands of the extraverting type have, properly speaking, a primitive and infantile, egoistic character. When Freud says of the unconscious that it can “only wish,” this to a significant degree concerns the unconscious of the extraverting type. Application to what is objectively given and assimilation with it hinder the awareness of the missing subjective impulses. These tendencies (thoughts, wishes, affects, needs, feelings, etc.) take on, in accordance with the degree of their displacement, a regressive character, i.e. the less they are conscious, the more they become infantile and archaic.

Commentary: If assimilation with the object is imposed upon a person, as happens in situations of subordination, then protest is possible — but nonetheless it may also not occur. And in cases of being in love, of a hobby or of training, protest as a variety of resistance is out of the question. Yes, the subconscious, by inertia, may resist purposeful training; but in order to attain a full-fledged result, must not the trainee overcome this resistance? On the other hand, it is quite unclear why the subconscious should be “incriminated” with primitiveness, infantilism and egoism. For this is possible only as a result of comparing the subconscious with consciousness with a view to equating them functionally. But they have different functions and initially different parameters, which must ensure their effective work. Therefore, if the subconscious by its nature must be egoistic in order to defend the interests of the personality, then this is its advantage and not a defect. If the subconscious by its nature must be infantile so that consciousness can direct it, then this too is its advantage. And if the subconscious must be primitive so that consciousness can, without looking back at it, chart the paths of its further development, then this is by no means a shortcoming.

Jung, referring to Freud, supports his conclusion that the unconscious can “only wish.” Obviously his refinement, that “this to a significant degree concerns the unconscious of the extraverting type,” is defective. For from this refinement it does not follow that this has no bearing on the “introverting unconscious,” and therefore it is unclear what his presumed opposition amounts to. Besides, to hold that the unconscious can wish is an unjustified transfer of the properties of consciousness onto the unconscious. From the standpoint of the IP (information paradigm), the filling of the unconscious consists of programmes determining the imperatives of the individual’s behaviour, and these are sensed by the conscious part of the individual as striving, intention, drive, but not as wish — though to specify the differences between these categories is not at all simple. In any case, the unconscious cannot say: “I want” — it can only create a tension which in consciousness may be formulated as “I want.”

And here at last is the sentence whose meaning is the most understandable of anything so far: “Application to what is objectively given and assimilation with it hinder the awareness of the missing subjective impulses.” This may be understood as: “Directedness toward the object and fusion with it hinder the awareness of one’s own interests.” Well, and what are “missing subjective impulses”? This could be, for example, an unwillingness to fuse with the object, or an unwillingness to expend effort on it, or even banal laziness. But all this belongs to one’s own interests. So how is the refined judgement adduced to be understood? But are the subject’s interests always located only within? And those that are within — what are they like? Especially the unconscious ones? Why are psychoanalysts so certain that in a person’s subconscious there sits, for example, a wish to kill or rape someone? It is not excluded that this is one of the psychoanalytic dogmas, or even simply of the myths. In the best case it is a hypothesis. To this hypothesis one may oppose another hypothesis — for example, that in the subconscious the variants of a possible development of events are surveyed quite neutrally. And when murder is proposed by the subconscious, alongside others, as one of the variants of possible action, this is by no means necessarily to be understood as a subconscious striving toward murder. It is another matter that one may say, for instance, that the subconscious has no conscience; but when a normal person discovers such a variant in his subconscious among a list of many variants, his conscience may signal to him that this variant must be excluded. Psychoanalysis, however, imposes on a person the notion that he subconsciously wants to kill and only the superego prevents him from doing so. Along such a scenario the syndrome of envy may develop, which may be regarded as a variety of psychosis. Someone learns of another’s successes, and the subconscious offers him the variant of a negative comparison: he succeeded and I did not, and I do not like it. A formed habit of negative comparison — this is the very basis of envy. But another variant is also possible, when upbringing forms the habit of rejoicing for another and wishing him luck.

Jung: The fuller the conscious extraverting attitude, the more infantile and archaic the unconscious attitude. A crude egoism, strongly surpassing the childish and bordering on the villainous, sometimes characterizes the unconscious attitude.

Commentary: Here we see a continuation of the reasoning on the theme of the formula “the more…, the more….” However, it is not excluded that a strictly direct proportionality is an illusion connected with a hasty generalization of the possible links of consciousness with the subconscious and the unconscious. Though some grounds for supposing the possibility of a strict proportionality do exist here. Let us say a person, consciously or by force of professional circumstances, intensively develops his intellect, and he has no time left for the development of the emotional sphere, which then lags in development. But this lag does not occur in accordance with the formula “the more — the more.” Simply, the one goes forward while the other may remain unchanged; but the contrast between an intellect that has gone far ahead and an emotionating that has fallen behind it in development may be uncritically assessed by the investigator within the framework of the “the more — the more” formula. Of course the competence of the second function may degrade rather than remain constant, but even in this case it must be strictly proved that a strict proportionality obtains. One must also take into account the variant in which the second function also develops, though not as fast as the first. In this case there is no talk of “the more — the more” at all.

Jung: Here we find in full bloom those incestuous wishes which Freud describes. It goes without saying that these things are entirely unconscious and remain hidden also from the gaze of the inexperienced observer, until the extraverting conscious attitude attains a higher degree.

Commentary: Jung develops the myth of the “baseness” of the subconscious. It is unscientific to assess it in terms of baseness — it is neutral, it merely offers variants, and only upon the transfer of a socially unacceptable variant into the sphere of activity controlled by consciousness can one speak of baseness. In the psychoanalytic literature one may encounter assessments of the subconscious of writers and artists who compose plots with socially disapproved behaviour. In such a case the conclusion is drawn that all of it, all the filth they depict, was already contained in the subconscious and merely found a socially acceptable outlet for its realization. Obviously this fails to take into account the creative capacity of the subconscious, which merely combines and varies the elements of individual experience, not only without desiring the personal realization of what is socially unacceptable but, on the contrary, creating the conditions for disavowing negative programmes. But from the reasoning of Jung adduced above it may quite well follow that “upon the attainment by the extraverting conscious attitude of a higher degree” incestuous wishes will necessarily be realized, and that furthermore they become noticeable even “to the gaze of the inexperienced observer.” Only Jung’s defective understanding of the phenomena of extraversion and introversion that he had discovered became the cause of the metaphysical exaggerations in his reasonings.

Jung: But if an exaggeration of the conscious point of view occurs, then the unconscious too comes symptomatically to light, i.e. unconscious egoism, infantilism and archaism lose their original compensatory character at the moment when they enter into more or less open opposition to the conscious attitude. This shows itself above all in an absurd exaggeration of the conscious point of view, which ought to serve to suppress the unconscious, but which usually ends in a reductio ad absurdum of the conscious attitude, i.e. in collapse. The catastrophe may be objective, since objective aims were gradually distorted into subjective ones. Thus, for example, one typographer, thanks to long and heavy twenty-year labour, made himself from a simple employee into the independent owner of a considerable enterprise.

Commentary: Interesting — where does Jung see the catastrophe here? That the man changed profession? Or that he laboured hard for twenty years? It seems the example Jung adduces does not correspond to the preceding reasonings. But re-read the first sentence of the paragraph under consideration and note the realization of yet another presumed psychoanalytic formula: “AN EXAGGERATION OF THE CONSCIOUS POINT OF VIEW ENTAILS A NEGATIVE ACTIVATION OF THE SUBCONSCIOUS.” One would like to believe that although such a variant is possible, it is only as a variant. But what does “exaggeration” mean? The first thing that suggests itself is the driving of the conscious point of view to absurdity, of which Jung speaks. Is the example with the typographer really to be understood in this key? That is, instead of working “normally” as a typographer and receiving a salary until his death, the hero of Jung’s example drives such an attitude to absurdity by giving twenty years to heavy labour in order to achieve material independence and becoming the owner of a profitable enterprise. It seems that here Jung has driven his own reasonings to absurdity, or else had something else in mind.

However, let us look for a workable form of Jung’s presumed idea. Probably there is nothing absurd in a person’s attaining a goal by using his capacity for persistent labour. But was this goal conscious? Strange as it may be, Jung gives no criterion for assessing a goal by this parameter. If a person, consciously or subconsciously, had a goal and attained it, is any kind of exaggeration and driving to absurdity possible here? Without corresponding definitions, reasonings on this theme are meaningless.

Now let us imagine that a person apparently consciously sets himself a goal and even verbalizes it. How can exaggeration occur here? For example, a young man decides to play a computer game for half an hour, but after half an hour has passed he does not stop and goes on playing for several hours. Why can this happen? Because a subconscious change of goal has occurred. The subconscious pleasure centre has intercepted control of the situation, demonstrating its infantilism. After several such sessions a narcotic dependence on the game may form, which from the standpoint of consciousness may be regarded as a driving to absurdity. The person ceases to react to the alarm signals of the superego (also subconscious), and what then remains for the share of consciousness? It is displaced from the area of exaggerated interest. And this may be understood as open opposition to the conscious attitude. The catastrophe here may be seen in the fact that consciousness, though it observes what is happening, is no longer capable of managing it. Alcoholism and drug dependence develop along this scheme. Note that in the latter two cases the physiological metabolism changes as well. In the case of the game, however, the dramatic changes occur within the framework of the IM (information metabolism).

Summing up this line of reasoning, one has to acknowledge that the relations between conscious and subconscious control cannot be considered fully studied, and that part of Jung’s reasonings is contradictory.

Jung: A normal extraverting attitude does not, of course, mean that the individual always and everywhere acts according to the extraverting scheme. Under all circumstances psychic processes may be observed in the same individual in which the question is one of the mechanism of introversion.

Commentary: It seems that the last sentence of this paragraph is the result of an unsuccessful translation. The first sentence, however, confirms that Jung never fully worked out the concepts of extraversion and introversion which he himself introduced into scientific and even everyday usage. From the socionic point of view, the vertness attitude is innate and always remains equal to itself. An extravert cannot behave like an introvert; conversely, any actions of an introvert will always remain within the framework of introversion, even though outwardly they may resemble the opposite attitude. Even when pretending, even when acting, the extravert does so within the limitations of his type, and the introvert within those of his. It is not for nothing that casting of actors is carried out with a view to choosing the one most capable of embodying the director’s design. However hard he tried, Vitsin, for example, could not have replaced Ulyanov in playing the role of Zhukov in the film The Siege of Leningrad. But of course neither could Ulyanov have replaced Vitsin in the role he plays, for instance, in The Adventures of Shurik.

Jung: We call extraverting only that habitus in which the mechanism of extraversion outweighs. In this case the most differentiated function is constantly subjected to introverting, while the less differentiated functions are in introverted employment, i.e. the more full-fledged function is the most conscious and subject to the control of consciousness and of conscious intention, while the less differentiated functions are also less conscious, resp. partly unconscious, and to a far lesser degree subordinated to the conscious will.

Commentary: The mature view of socionics does not rest on the notion of a preponderance of one or another mechanism of vertness, but proceeds from the vert directedness of the PPF. The vertness of the TIM is determined by the vertness of the PPF. Jung, however, proceeds from the assumption that every individual has both vertnesses, but that one of them “outweighs.” The term Jung uses here for comparison creates the notion that the predominance of one of the vertnesses may somehow vary — from quite small values (“a little bit”) to large divergences. And a quite small preponderance suffices for it to be possible to say that he is an extravert or an introvert. Such a notion is also not contradicted by the fact that in individual cases both attitudes will be practically equal, i.e. the difference between them will be so small that their manifestations will hardly differ. For this case Jung’s followers have already invented the term “ambivalence.” Socionics permits us to raise the question of the “quantum” nature of vertness — either the one or the other, and there are no smooth transitions between them. This is an integral, not an extensive quality. And the fact that someone is unable to distinguish the typological nuances of behaviour speaks only of the absence of the corresponding skills and of the undeveloped state of the corresponding psychological methods.

Here one could easily object by referring to the fact that in the model of any type the extraverted and introverted functions alternate, following the technological chain of the IM — after an extraverted function comes an introverted one and vice versa. One could therefore not merely say but even assert that both mechanisms are represented in every type to an equal degree: four extraverted and four introverted functions. However, this fails to take into account the typological weight of the functions. The greatest weight, by general acknowledgement among socionists, belongs to the PPF, and it is precisely its aspectual vertness that determines the integral vertness of the whole TIM.

Jung: A classic example of this is the extraverting emotional type, who enjoys excellent relations with those around him, but who sometimes happens to utter judgements of unexampled tactlessness. These judgements proceed from his little-differentiated and little-conscious thinking, which is only partly under his control and is moreover insufficiently conditioned by the object, and can therefore act with no regard for anything whatever.

Commentary: Of course it would be more understandable what Jung has in mind if he adduced a concrete example of the utterances of the type he means. What is written in the paragraph adduced may on examination turn out to be no more than a fleeting intuitive impression. Socionics knows four extraverted emotional TIMs: Hu, Ha, Na and Hx. The first two are rational, the latter two irrational. They are capable of quickly establishing contact with people unknown to them. However, to say that their relations will always be excellent is an entirely superfluous exaggeration — concrete bearers of these TIMs may be spiteful troublemakers, insufferable bores, villains and criminals of every specialization. Naturally, even criminals may have excellent — and “excellent,” in the sense of hypocritically manipulative — relations with some individual people, and by no means with everyone around them. And for this there are strict theoretical grounds connected with the qualitative assessment of ITR. But constant everyday practice also confirms such a conclusion many times over. Not improbably, readers too have more than once encountered boorish incarnations of the types listed. For this reason alone Jung’s generalized-optimistic assessment of them is an unjustified simplification of the real situation, which goes beyond the framework of the socionic generalization. As for the “judgements of unexampled tactlessness” of which Jung writes, then, first, they may be generated by concrete representatives of all types, and second, the form of any judgements has no bearing on the level of generality with which socionics deals. As for the attempt at a theoretical grounding of the causes of such judgements by Jung on the basis of their following from their “little-differentiated and little-conscious thinking,” this is no more than a misunderstanding. The peculiarity indicated by Jung is not typological but situational and may be observed in any TIMs, and not only in extraverted emotional ones. And what, in this context, could Jung’s refinement regarding the types indicated mean — that their thinking is “insufficiently conditioned by the object and can therefore act with no regard for anything whatever”? The point is that Jung proceeds from the assumption that the extravert’s thinking is always “conditioned by the object,” so why does the object become an exception, even if an incomplete one, for these extraverted types? This is one of the examples of Jung’s inconsistency. But of course he should not be reproached for it here, and it should be regarded with understanding, since he is dealing with an exceptionally complex and difficult subject, the theme of which he opened up but which, for all his genius, he never did manage to work out to the end.

Jung: The less differentiated functions in the extraverting attitude always exhibit an exclusive subjective dependence on a strongly pronounced egocentrism and personal partiality, whereby they reveal their close connection with the unconscious. In them the unconscious constantly comes to light.

Commentary: In Jung’s scheme there were four functions. The leading one is the most differentiated, the subordinate the least differentiated, while the two auxiliaries should apparently be in some intermediate state — but Jung makes no such refinements. For this reason Jung’s use of the plural with respect to “less differentiated functions” is not entirely clear, since each type has only one least differentiated function. Thus, according to Jung, in the psyche of one person in the extraverting attitude there can be only one least differentiated function — thinking, emotionating, sensorics or intuition. Let us try to assess each of them, proceeding from the formula Jung proposes. This means that subordinate thinking in the extraverting attitude will be directed exclusively at the justification of one’s own egoistic interests, which according to Jung’s formula is a direct manifestation of the attitudes — or, what is the same, the programmes — of the subconscious. Subordinate emotionating in the extraverting attitude will be directed exclusively at the emotional support of one’s own egoistic interests, and this too will be a manifestation of the programmes of the subconscious. Subordinate sensorics in the extraverting attitude will presumably serve the infantile programmes of the subconscious, such as pugnacity, aggressive rudeness or sentimental tearfulness. Subordinate intuition in the extraverting attitude will likewise serve the infantile programmes of the subconscious, such as the endless reading of adventure or fantasy novels. Such conclusions ought to follow from Jung’s psychoanalytic formula. But how do matters stand with the real bearers of the corresponding types? According to socionic theory and practice, the least differentiated functions in the structure of the psyche are the CCF (conservative-critical function) and the MMF (motivational-mobilizational function), but in a concrete type only one of them will be in the extraverting attitude. Thus, for example, in the model of the EII (Dostoevsky) extraverted sensorics is in the position of the CCF, but Dostoevskys are extremely restrained and not aggressive. Moreover, they are against unlawful violence. The same may be said of Robespierres, in whom extraverted sensorics occupies the same position. There are also two types in which extraverted sensorics is in the position of the MMF — these are the LIE (London) and the EIE (Hamlet). The former have an inclination to pugnacity, but it is always a response to a situation. Londons may even be called affable brawlers, since in their pugnacity there always remains something childish (there it is, the infantilism of the weak function!), but bearers of this type are always ready to develop and perfect their skills connected with the possibility of displaying aggression when necessary, especially in its sporting variant. They willingly study martial arts and approach them as a technology. A very large percentage of successful sportsmen belong to this type. Assertiveness and an inclination toward fair struggle are characteristic of them, whence originate the concepts of sportsmanlike and unsportsmanlike. The Klitschko brothers are both of this type. From the survey made one may conclude that Jung’s formula does not work with respect to Dostoevskys and Robespierres, i.e. in connection with the CCF, but is partly valid in cases involving the MMF. Analogous remarks are valid with respect to all the other functions as well. This may be understood to mean that Jung did not fully work out the typology he proposed, but that he laid its beginning and left a broad field for its refinement. The next step in this direction was taken by Aushra, but she too left much unfinished, and the perfecting of the results of Jung and Aushra continues. And here too there are both successes and a great number of varied errors.

Jung: In general, one should not imagine that the unconscious always lies buried beneath some quantity of strata and can in some way be uncovered only through careful excavations. The unconscious, on the contrary, constantly flows into conscious psychological processes, and to so high a degree that it is sometimes difficult for the observer to decide which properties of character are to be ascribed to the conscious personality and which to the unconscious. This difficulty arises chiefly with persons who manifest themselves somewhat more richly than others. Of course much also depends on the attitude of the observer, whether he grasps rather the conscious or the unconscious character of the personality.

Commentary: This reasoning is interesting in that the great analytical psychologist expresses his opinion on the essence of the unconscious — that it may be directly accessible to observation through the signs it leaves. Indeed, Freud’s book The Psychopathology of Everyday Life is about this very thing, discussing the theme of dreams, slips of the tongue, slips of the pen and other forms of manifestation of the unconscious. In particular, this means that a specially prepared person is himself capable of discovering the manifestations of his own unconscious, of becoming aware of its content and of gaining the possibility of self-correction.

Jung: In general the rationally-disposed observer will more readily apprehend the conscious character, while the perceptually-disposed observer is subjected more to the influence of the unconscious character, since our judgement is more interested in the conscious motivation of a psychic process, while perception registers the simple event.

Commentary: This is an example of general reasoning which, although plausible in character, requires as an act of scientific activity both elaboration and proof. Why is Jung so confident of the advantages of the rational observer? From the whole context of this quotation it follows that by rationality Jung means rationality [in the socionic sense], which includes thinking and emotionating. But does not the “perceptually-disposed observer” have the possibility here of seeing the sign of hidden content faster than the rational one — for the perceptual, which includes the intuitive and the sensory, has the possibility of directly observing the markers of the unconscious at the level of zeroth-order factors? One may advance the supposition that any person can use his leading function to penetrate into his own unconscious and decipher its ciphers, but for this a special preparation is needed.

Jung: …since we make use of perception and judgement in equal measure, it may easily happen that some personality appears to us at one and the same time introverting and extraverting, so that we shall not be able to indicate more precisely to which attitude the more full-fledged function belongs. In such cases only a thorough analysis of the properties of the function can assist a correct understanding. Here one must pay attention to which functions are fully subordinated to the control and motivation of consciousness, and which functions have the character of the accidental and spontaneous. The former functions are always more highly differentiated than the latter, which moreover possess somewhat infantile and primitive properties. Ordinarily the former functions produce the impression of the norm, while the latter have in themselves something abnormal or pathological.

Commentary: What may appear to an unprepared person itself stands in need of scientific analysis — what exactly may appear, and why precisely that. Science is science precisely in order to furnish the observer with reliable means of recognition and hence also of the diagnosis of typological details. Nonetheless, it is not very clear why Jung thinks that “it may easily happen that some personality appears to us at one and the same time introverting and extraverting” — and so on through the text. Such confusion can arise only as a result of the absence of the corresponding skills and of a simplistically subjective understanding of extraversion and introversion. Incidentally, Jung immediately adduces his observations and offers recommendations on this score.

Of course, one must understand that when Jung speaks of the former functions, he has in mind only one leading function in all types, and of course they must produce the impression of the norm — although it is precisely by them that deviation from it is determined.

Jung: In consequence of the general extraverting attitude, thinking is oriented toward the object and toward what is objectively given. This orientation of thinking calls forth a clearly pronounced peculiarity. Thinking in general is nourished on the one hand by subjective, ultimately unconscious sources, and on the other by objective data by means of the perception of the sense organs. Extraverted thinking is determined to a far greater degree by this latter factor than by the former. Judgement always presupposes a standard; for extraverted judgement, valid and determining is chiefly a standard taken from objective relations, no matter whether they are expressed directly by an objective, sensuously perceptible fact or by an objective idea — since an objective idea is likewise something externally given, taken from outside, even when it is subjectively approved.

Commentary: In this reasoning Jung continues to draw consequences from his mistaken notions of extraversion and introversion. Let us take them point by point.

“In consequence of the general extraverting attitude.” — What is “the general extraverting attitude of thinking,” according to Jung? From the context of the whole paragraph it is obvious that what is meant is that thinking is always directed “at the object,” and for him the object is always outside. However, the object of thinking may be not only what belongs to the habitat, but also ideal themes, some abstract constructions from mathematics or love lyric. But the difference between extraverted and introverted thinking is not determined by this. The corresponding definitions are given above.
“This orientation of thinking calls forth a clearly pronounced peculiarity. Thinking in general is nourished on the one hand by subjective, ultimately unconscious sources, and on the other by objective data by means of the perception of the sense organs.” — Here Jung comes into contradiction with what he said two sentences earlier, that “thinking is oriented toward the object and toward what is objectively given.” Such features of Jung’s text point to its theoretical incompleteness.
“Extraverted thinking is determined to a far greater degree by this latter factor than by the former.” — Here Jung does not contradict his own understanding of extraverted thinking, but the true definition is quite different.
“Judgement always presupposes a standard; for extraverted judgement, valid and determining is chiefly a standard taken from objective relations, no matter whether they are expressed directly by an objective, sensuously perceptible fact or by an objective idea — since an objective idea is likewise something externally given, taken from outside, even when it is subjectively approved.” — One can only guess what Jung understands by a standard. What is thinking being opposed to here — to emotionating, to intuition, to sensorics, or to all of them together? Surely emotionating is in no way connected with the scale of events and situations? Of course it is connected! People react differently to an earthquake and to a broken cup. The same may be said of intuition and of sensorics. Presumably there is a difference in scale between an intuitive assessment of the current situation and a foresight of remote events. To devise an example with sensorics is harder, but even the difference in extraverted sensory opposition to an adversary, of which bearers of different types are potentially capable, may prove significant. Whether the difference in introverted sensory sensitivity — say, of a taster and of some besotted drunkard — can be assigned here, I do not know; that needs additional investigation. But the capacity for aesthetic assessment in an expert and in an unprepared person is also a difference connected with scale.

Jung: Extraverted thinking, therefore, by no means has to be purely concrete factual thinking, but may equally well be purely ideational thinking, provided only it is demonstrated that the ideas with which one thinks are to a significant degree taken from outside, i.e. are supplied by tradition, upbringing and the course of education.

Commentary: Here it is entirely distinctly clear that by extraverted thinking Jung understands the retention in one’s head of concrete everyday facts and their comprehension, or else the processing of ideas obtained from external sources. As was shown above, this is an error.

Jung: The criterion for deciding whether thinking is extraverted thus consists above all in the question of which standard the judgement follows, whether it is supplied from outside or is of subjective origin. A further criterion consists in the direction of the conclusion, namely in the question whether thinking has a predominantly outward direction or not. Thinking’s occupation with concrete objects is no proof of its extraverted nature, since I may occupy myself mentally with a concrete object while I abstract my thinking from it or concretize my thinking through it. Even if my thinking occupies itself with concrete things and in this respect may be called extraverted, it still remains doubtful and characteristic what direction the thinking will take — namely, whether in its further course it will lead again to objective data, to external facts or to general concepts already given, or not. For the practical thinking of the merchant, the technician, the natural scientist, the direction toward the object is self-evident.

Commentary: Jung is consistent in his errors. Having inexact notions of the phenomena of extraversion and introversion which he discovered, he mistakenly assesses introverted and extraverted thinking. However, as further investigations have shown, introverted thinking is the process of working over any information — objective and subjective — inside the psyche with the use of intellectual operators to obtain the corresponding final product: an algorithm. Extraverted thinking is the direct practical realization of the algorithm obtained by introverted thinking, by converting it into a technological process. Its final result is a product intended for further use as a material resource. Since Jung understands these categories inexactly, the reasoning adduced above contains a systematic error and requires correction.

Jung: In considering the thinking of a philosopher a doubt may arise if the direction of his thinking has ideas as its goal. One must investigate, on the one hand, whether these ideas are not a simple abstraction from experiences of the object and thus represent nothing other than higher collective concepts which contain within themselves the sum of objective facts; on the other hand, one must investigate whether these ideas (when they are not obvious abstractions from immediate experience) are not obtained through tradition, or do not derive from the surrounding spiritual world. If this question is answered in the affirmative, then such ideas also belong to the category of objective data, and consequently this thinking must be called extraverted.

Commentary: In this passage Jung’s understanding of extraverted thinking is brought to the level of an implicit definition, and it is entirely obvious that here he understands as extraverted a thinking that is introverted but connected with “objective data.”

Jung: Although I had proposed to set out the essence of introverted thinking not here but in one of the following chapters, it nonetheless seems to me necessary to give now certain clarifications about this thinking. For if one thinks carefully about what I said above concerning extraverted thinking, one may easily arrive at the conclusion that by it I mean, perhaps, everything in general that is understood by thinking. Thinking which is directed neither at objective facts nor at general ideas does not, one might say, deserve the name of “thinking.” I am aware that our age and its outstanding representatives know and acknowledge only the extraverted type of thinking.

Commentary: Jung found himself in the trap of his own errors and metaphysical reasonings. Intuition prompts him that something here is not right. The asymmetry of the two kinds of thinking is striking, and the great psychologist “goes to all lengths” to justify this imbalance somehow.

Jung: This occurs partly because ordinarily all thinking which appears on the surface of the world in the form of science, philosophy or even art either proceeds directly from the object or falls into general ideas. On either ground it appears, if not always correct, then at any rate in the main comprehensible and consequently relatively serviceable. In this sense one may say that what is known, properly speaking, is only extraverted intellect — namely that which orients itself toward what is objectively given.

Commentary: The prepared reader will readily discover here what in logic is called an “initial error”: he considers “extraverted intellect,” which is here equivalent to extraverted thinking, to be thinking “which orients itself toward what is objectively given.” But what then must thinking be that does “not orient itself toward what is objectively given”? Is such, for example, the thinking of a mathematician when he solves an applied problem on compound interest in a bank? According to Jung, yes. In socionics this is not so: since such thinking is accomplished inside the psyche and ends with the obtaining of an algorithm, it is introverted.

Jung: But there exists, however — and here I begin to speak of introverted intellect — yet another kind of thinking, to which the name “thinking” can hardly be denied: that kind which orients itself neither toward immediate objective experience nor toward objectively obtained ideas. I arrive at this other kind of thinking in the following way: when I occupy myself mentally with a concrete object or with a general idea, in such a way that the direction of my thoughts in the end leads back again to my subject, then this intellectual phenomenon is not the only psychic process which occurs in me at that moment. I leave aside all the possible sensations and feelings which are noticed in the course of my thoughts, more or less disturbing it, and point out that the course of my thoughts, proceeding from what is objectively given and striving toward the objective, is besides constantly in a relation to the subject. This relation is a conditio sine qua non, for without it the course of thoughts cannot take place at all.

Commentary: It seems that Jung acknowledges the existence of introverted thinking more logically than intuitively, and with difficulty seeks an explication for introverted thinking. However, this explication of his cannot be called readily accessible to understanding. It is evident that Jung observes the syncretism of the process occurring in his brain, where thinking is accompanied by “all the possible sensations and feelings.” He separates them off — but what do we then have “in the dry residue”? Jung, besides the objective content of his thoughts, discovers their “relation to the subject.” But in what does this relation manifest itself? Jung, apparently by way of explanation, uses a Latin expression which translates into Russian as “unconditional condition,” i.e. a condition without which one cannot do under any circumstances — and that is all. Nonetheless this is an important assertion, but on its basis one may ask: “And does that thinking which Jung designated as extraverted lack this connection with subjectivity altogether?” Let us answer in Latin — dubito, that is, doubtful, if only because it is a “conditio sine qua non.” Incidentally, in this reasoning of Jung’s one may discern a hint at the a priori forms in which introverted thinking is realized. These a priori forms represent intellectual operators, among which are recognition, identification, naming, comparison, differentiation, the detection of invariants, generalization, and so on. However, Jung does not name this directly, and therefore the exact significance of his hint remains unknown.

Jung: If, however, the chief accent falls on the subjective process, then there is obtained that other kind of thinking which is opposed to the extraverted type, namely a direction oriented toward the subject and toward what is subjectively given, which I call introverted.

Commentary: Jung by inertia passes on to an attempt to describe introverted thinking, unfolding the scheme he had earlier sketched. But here, besides the basic error, it is useful to note the absence of definitions of the concepts “chief accent” and “subjective process” — these are here no better than what he is about to define. Can, for example, thinking as such, i.e. as a psychic function, be called a subjective process? It is not hard to understand that both components are present in thinking — the objective and the subjective. Thinking as a real entity present in the world belongs to objective phenomena, but its personal aspect is to a significant degree subjective.

Jung: From this orientation there arises a thinking which is not determined by objective facts and is not directed at what is objectively given, i.e. a thinking which proceeds from what is actually given and is directed toward subjective ideas or facts of a subjective character.

Commentary: Here we are dealing with a transform of the preceding passage, but one insufficiently edited, as a result of which a semantic confusion arises. Read carefully into this passage, though because of the repeated recurrence of the same and similar words this is not easy. First Jung says that a certain thinking “is not determined by objective facts” and “is not directed at what is objectively given,” and immediately after this he writes “i.e. a thinking which proceeds from what is actually given.” Should not what stands immediately after the “i.e.” be identical with the two preceding predicates? But “to proceed from what is actually given” and “not to be directed at what is objectively given” are negations of one another. However, possibly this is not Jung’s error but a fault of the translation.

Jung: I do not wish to consider this thinking in detail here; I wish only to establish its existence, in order thereby to give the necessary supplement to the extraverted course of thoughts and thus to explain its essence.

Commentary: Here Jung simply declines to give a definition of introverted thinking and lays claim only to a proof of its existence. Yet now in socionics we can give an intelligible and compact definition of this variety of thinking (see above).

Jung: Extraverted thinking is accomplished, consequently, only in that the objective orientation acquires a certain preponderance. This circumstance changes nothing in the logic of thinking; it is only the cause of that difference between thinkers which James connected with temperament.

Commentary: Here we discover a certain refinement of how Jung understands extraverted thinking: it differs from introverted thinking only in that “the objective orientation acquires a certain preponderance.” Naturally, one may here pose a “quantitative” question: “how great must this preponderance be for extraverted thinking to come about?”

Jung: Orientation toward the object changes, as has been said, not the essence of the function of thinking but only its manifestation. Since it is oriented toward what is objectively given, it seems bound to the object, as though it could not exist without external orientation. It seems as if a consequence of external facts, or it apparently attains its height when it issues in a generally recognized idea. It seems as though it were constantly under the influence of what is objectively given and could draw its conclusions only in agreement with it. Therefore it produces an impression of boundness, and sometimes of short-sightedness, notwithstanding all its mobility within the space bounded by objective limits.

Commentary: Here Jung makes an important declaration, from which it is clear that he distinguishes the two varieties of thinking not by their essence but “merely” by their manifestation. But we have the right not to understand him, since we can only guess what meaning Jung puts into these two concepts. How does “essence” differ here from “manifestation”? In effect he acknowledges that extraversion and introversion differ not essentially but only in manifestation. Then why go to all this trouble? Why not say so from the very beginning? Yet over the course of a fat book he intrigued the reader as though behind these concepts stood something essential, and suddenly it turns out “that everything is much simpler.” And this only confirms that Jung, though he discovered the phenomenon of extraversion and introversion, never was able to work it out to the end.

Jung: What I describe here is only the impression produced by the manifestations of extraverted thinking upon an observer who must stand at a different point of view, if only because otherwise he would be unable to observe the manifestations of extraverted thinking.

Commentary: The first part of this sentence I understand to mean that Jung attempts to reduce the difference between extraversion and introversion merely to the impression which the working of a function — in this case, thinking — produces on an observer. He thereby denies these categories an essential status, i.e. the status of there being between them an objective and not a subjective difference, or, in other words, of there lying at the basis of these concepts an objective peculiarity which does not depend on the impressions of one or another observer.

The second part of this sentence I do not understand. What does it mean that the observer “must stand at a different point of view”? At what other one? Surely not at a point of view with a different vertness? That is, if someone observes extraverted thinking, then he must look at it from an introverted point of view — how is that? Or must he simply be an introvert? The latter would have to mean that extraversion can be understood only by an introvert — but that is absurd! Then, possibly, Jung had something else in mind — but what? And, finally, it is possible that this utterance of Jung’s is simply the result of a superficial intuitive handling of the corresponding information.

Jung: In consequence of his other point of view, he sees only the manifestation and not its essence. But whoever has himself penetrated into the being of this thinking is in a position to understand its essence, but not its manifestation.

Commentary: This reasoning resembles some hard-to-fathom metaphysical combinatorics. It turns out that, for example, an introvert sees the manifestation of extraverted thinking but does not understand its essence, and if he understands its essence, then its manifestation is incomprehensible to him. But it is not excluded that I do not understand this reasoning of Jung’s.

Jung: Judgement only by manifestation (externals) cannot be correct with respect to the essence, and therefore it turns out for the most part negative. But in essence this thinking is no less productive and creative than introverted thinking; only it serves other purposes than the latter. This difference is felt especially when extraverted thinking takes up a theme which is the specific subject of subjectively oriented thinking.

Commentary: What is Jung on about? It seems he is here refuting what he asserted a little above. Does he not wish to say here that if a judgement is perceived by an observer as extraverted, then “with respect to its essence” it is certainly not such? If Jung means precisely this, then somehow everything turns out confused. It seems Jung has fallen into the trap of his own errors and, in attempting to clarify the situation with extraversion and introversion, only confuses it more and more.

Jung: This case is observed when, for example, a subjective conviction is explained analytically out of objective facts or as a consequence and inference from objective ideas. But the difference between the two kinds of thinking becomes still more noticeable for our naturalistically-historically oriented consciousness when subjectively oriented thinking attempts to include what is objectively given in connections which are not objectively given, i.e. to subordinate it to a subjective idea.

Commentary: It seems Jung is convinced that there are different forms of extraverted judgements, and that one of them is determined by the fact that “a subjective conviction is explained analytically out of objective facts or as a consequence and inference from objective ideas.” Jung’s line of thought here is clear, but it leads to results which are classified as erroneous consequences from false premises.

Jung: Both the one and the other produce an impression of arbitrariness, whereby the shadow sides of that influence which the two kinds of thinking have upon one another come forward. Subjectively oriented thinking then seems pure caprice, while extraverted thinking, on the contrary, seems a flat and banal incongruity.

Commentary: It is unclear what “arbitrariness” has to do with it — possibly this is an unsuccessful translation from the German. And it also turns out that “the two kinds of thinking” not only act upon one another, but that such an action has shadow sides as well. How can introverted thinking — by itself, outside the framework of the interaction of its human bearers — act in any way at all upon extraverted thinking? Is this not an example of metaphysical construction? If behind these reasonings stand possible mutual claims of concrete people, bearers of these varieties of thinking — say, some “dyed-in-the-wool” practitioners and theoreticians divorced from reality with a metaphysical bent — then that is what should have been said, rather than describing a generally comprehensible everyday situation in terms of the shadow influence of extraversion and introversion upon one another, using a theoretical abstraction as a sort of metaphor.

Jung: Therefore both points of view wage an uninterrupted war against one another. One might think that this dispute could easily be put an end to by separating subjects of a subjective character from subjects of an objective character. Unfortunately, such a separation is an impossible thing, although some have tried to make it. Even if such a separation were possible, it would be a great calamity, since both orientations are one-sided and only to a known degree independent; that is why they need the influence of one another.

Commentary: So Jung has now gone so far as to describe the interaction of psychic functions as an “uninterrupted war against one another.” If one imagines that this occurs within the framework of a single personality — and according to socionic notions all people possess both forms of thinking — then it is impossible to interpret this as anything other than a pathology. Nor is there any necessity to separate “subjects of a subjective character from subjects of an objective character” in order to grasp the specifics of the psychic functions under discussion here: one of them — the introverted — is realized inside the psyche and has as its aim the creation of an algorithm, while the second — the extraverted — is realized outside the psyche, in the habitat, and has as its aim the materialization of the algorithm in the form of productive behaviour as an element of the evolutionary adaptation of the whole species homo sapiens.

Besides, Jung is mistaken when he writes that to separate the objective from the subjective in thinking is “an impossible thing.” This work was carried out in his time, at least partially, by Kant, in introducing the distinction between synthetic and analytic judgements. At the basis of the former lie empirical data, which, other things being equal, have an objective character. At the basis of the latter lie a priori and subjective forms of the working over of information by the psyche. The objective and subjective components in the working of the psychic functions interact closely, but in theoretical reflection they are quite distinctly distinguished as data, or material, and as instrumentarium, or the set of intellectual operators by means of which this material is worked over. Therefore Jung’s excessively dramatized description of the situation with the two functions of thinking can be put down only to misunderstandings.

Jung: When extraverted thinking, in consequence of an intensified determining tendency of the object, submits to what is objectively given, then it becomes entirely lost in the individual experience and produces an accumulation of undigested empirical material.

Commentary: Jung is writing about something of his own, having become entangled in the thickets of the metaphysical labyrinth he has built out of a subjectively erroneous understanding of the psychic functions.

Jung: An overwhelming mass of more or less unconnected individual experiences creates a state of mental dissociation, which usually, on the other hand, requires psychological compensation. It consists in an idea just as simple and general, which is to help bind together what has been collected but is inwardly unconnected — or at least to make such a connection felt; ideas suitable for this purpose are “matter” or “energy.”

Commentary: This fragment consists of a description of some pathological situation which Jung had perhaps met with in his clinical practice as an analytical psychologist, but which has no bearing whatever on the working of both varieties of thinking in the norm.

The second part of the reasoning bears an exclusively metaphysical character, since it is very hard to understand in what way the ideas of “matter” and “energy” could be used for the understanding of extraverted and introverted thinking.

Jung: If, however, thinking is bound not so much with external facts as with an idea it has received, then out of the compensation for the poverty of this thinking there results a still more expressive accumulation of facts, which are one-sidedly grouped according to a relatively limited and barren point of view, thanks to which many valuable and profound sides of things are entirely lost. The dizzying abundance of so-called scientific literature of our days is, unfortunately, in significant proportion indebted for its existence to this incorrect orientation.

Commentary: How much a talented psychologist can invent and say, having simply made an initial error in the understanding of the generalized psychic functions. And the concluding sentence of this part of Jung’s book is quite understandable, where he explains “the dizzying abundance of so-called scientific literature of our days” — to which Jung contributed his mite by writing a very fat book on Psychological Types, in which, alongside a great number of brilliant insights, there is contained an enormous quantity of reasoning from the sphere of psychological metaphysics.

The extraverted thinking type

Jung: As experience shows, the basic psychological functions rarely or almost never have equal force or an identical degree of development in one and the same individual. Usually one or another function outweighs both in force and in development. When primacy among the psychological functions belongs to thinking, i.e. when the individual acts in his life chiefly under the guidance of rational thinking, so that all his more or less important actions proceed from intellectually deliberated motives, or at least ought to occur in accordance with this tendency, then the matter concerns a thinking type.

Commentary: Socionics permits this reasoning to be made more compact: “In the thinking type, thinking — extraverted or introverted — is in the position of the PPF (program-potential function).” As for the force and degree of development of the psychic functions mentioned by Jung, I should like to dwell on these categories in more detail. Moreover, it would be desirable for them to become the object of laboratory investigation. Can a psychic function (PF) be strong but undeveloped, developed but not strong; is there some dependence between these concepts; what further qualitative and quantitative parameters can be discovered in a psychic function?

Jung: (on the thinking extravert) …a man who has the striving — only, of course, to such degree as he is a pure type — to make all the manifestations of his life dependent on intellectual conclusions, which in the end are always oriented toward what is objectively given, or toward objective facts, or toward generally recognized ideas.

Commentary: As we see, Jung considered that a type may be “pure” or “impure,” which contradicts the very concept of a typology. In Jung’s rendering this means that he does not distinguish between type and character. The socionic type (TIM) represents an information frame specifying the behavioural parameters of a definite level of generalization. Character, however, may be represented as a superposition, i.e. an independent overlay of several typological fragments from many typologies. It is another matter that “behind the character one may fail to discern the type,” but that is already a question of developing effective recognition procedures and of training in typological diagnosis.

Jung: (on the thinking extravert) A man of this type gives decisive force not only to himself but also to what surrounds him, in dependence on objective reality, resp. on its objectively oriented intellectual formula. By this formula good and evil are measured, the beautiful and the ugly determined. Correct is everything that corresponds to this formula, incorrect what contradicts it, and accidental what comes from the side, independently of it.

Commentary: The reasoning of Jung under consideration resembles in its structure a definition. This ought to mean that with its help an observer can unambiguously point to people of the type under consideration. Let us, however, attempt to make an equivalent transformation of the paragraph’s first judgement, in order to simplify its perception and to discover a closer identity with Jung’s preceding utterances. According to Jung, people of this type give decisive force to something he calls an “intellectual formula.” The concept of an intellectual formula is not hard to connect with logically ordered mental activity and thereby to correlate with one of the key words in the designation of the type: people of this type are thinking types because intellectual formulae are for them not merely important — they possess decisive force. This may be understood to mean that in taking a decision or drawing some conclusion, such a person relies above all on reasonings that are logically connected with one another — that is, on what constitutes intellectual formulae — and this is equivalent to acknowledging that in people of this type the logical connection of judgements has a high and automatized priority. At the same time their content is oriented toward what is objectively occurring, which, according to Jung’s dictionary, means occurring in the external world. But how might such an intellectual formula look in practice? The first thing that comes to mind is the priority of expediency and obviousness, lying at the basis of common sense. For example, “good is everything that is useful, and evil everything that is harmful.” Despite the factual tautology of such a formula, it cannot be denied logicality. However, it is hard to believe that such formulae should for some reason be ignored by types with a leading emotional function. The point is that human thinking in the norm, in any typological form, is always logical, though logical errors may occur in the reasonings even of very intelligent people and, in particular, of professionals — for example, mathematicians, physicists and logicians. One may speak of the existence of a logical minimum which is necessarily maintained by the function of thinking.

From all this one may conclude that an “intellectual formula” is present in the thinking of any type. Nonetheless, one must seek qualitative and quantitative differences in such formulae, which, alas, Jung did not do. This means that the reasoning of Jung examined is too approximate and contains within it the logical error of “disproportion of scopes.” In the present case this is expressed in the fact that the “intellectual formula” is discussed by him outside of quantitative parameters, and therefore may with equal right be assigned to the thinking of different types.

Jung: Since this formula seems to correspond to the world-spirit, it becomes also a world-law, which must be realized always and everywhere, in the particular and in the general. Just as the extraverted thinking type submits to his formula, so must everything surrounding him submit to it for its own well-being, since whoever does not do so is in the wrong, he resists the world-law and is therefore unreasonable, immoral and unconscionable. His morality forbids the extraverted thinking type to tolerate exceptions, since his ideal must be realized under all circumstances, because it is, as it seems to him, the purest formulation of objective reality and must therefore be a generally recognized truth necessary for the good of mankind.

Commentary: Here, though Jung goes off into the metaphysical spheres of the world-spirit, he commits errors already stereotypical for him, since he is simply developing the theme of the intellectual formula which, as it seems to him, in the thinking extravert turns into a world-law. But of course one can speak here only of a beautiful metaphor, and not of a verified psychological category. Jung’s description fits religious fanatics and hidebound dogmatists, who, alas, may be of any psychological type, and also perfectly sober people who have suffered for and defended their convictions in stubborn discussions with opponents, but who do not necessarily belong to this type.

Jung: This must occur not thanks to love of one’s neighbour, but thanks to a higher point of view of justice and truth. In accordance with the essence of the extraverting attitude, the actions and judgements of these personalities are the more favourable or the better, the further outward they are situated. Their best aspect is at the periphery of their sphere of action. The deeper one penetrates within the bounds of their power, the more noticeable become the unfavourable consequences of their tyranny. At the periphery there still pulses another life, which feels the truth of the formula as a valuable supplement to the rest. But the deeper one penetrates within the bounds of the power of the formula, the more all life that does not correspond to the formula is put to death. For the most part the heavy consequences of the extraverted formula begin to be experienced by the nearest relatives, since inevitably they are the first to receive all the pleasure from it. But most often the subject himself suffers from this, and here we come to another side of the psychology of this type.

Commentary: Here Jung again turns to the image of the formula “the more… — the more…,” as to a universal skeleton key to the psychology of the personality — but alas, reality is significantly more complex.

Jung: There exist extraverted idealists who strive so strongly to realize their ideal of saving people that they themselves do not stop short of lies and other unconscientious means. In science there are many sad examples where highly meritorious researchers, out of the deepest conviction of the truth and universality of their formula, committed forgery of evidence in favour of their ideal. This is according to the formula: the end justifies the means. Only a defective emotional function, which unconsciously seduces, can lead into such an error men who are in general of high standing.

Commentary: Here Jung considers the particular case of extraverted idealists, omitting the fact that the description he gives applies also to introverted idealists, as well as to extraverted and introverted non-idealists: Hitler (EIE), Stalin (LSI), Mao (SEE), Pol Pot (SLE), Lysenko (ESI), and their number is legion. And it is quite “unpsychological” to ascribe to a psychological type behaviour according to the formula “the end justifies the means,” which lies below the level of this typological generalization; and there are no bad or good types.

Jung: The thinking of the extraverted thinking type is positive. This means it creates. It leads either to new facts or to a general understanding of disparate empirical material. Its judgements are in general synthetic. Even in the case where it decomposes, it builds, thanks to the fact that it always strives through decomposition toward certain new connections, out of which what has been decomposed is again combined in another way, or thanks to the fact that something new is added to the given subject.

Commentary: Here Jung gives his definition of positive thinking as creative. This ought to mean that all thinking extraverts without exception are, first, creators, and second, that all wars, revolutions and mass exterminations of people carried out by thinking extraverts have an exclusively positive character. However, Jung packages his thought in scientific-seeming, evasive forms behind which the concrete detail is blurred, while his intellectual formulae appear irreproachable. Nonetheless, we are dealing here with the metaphysical method in action.

Jung: The inherent judgement of extraverted thinking is oriented toward the object, i.e. its establishments always occur in the sense of the objective significance of experience. Therefore it remains not only under the orienting influence of what is objectively given, but it remains even in the power of the individual experience and expresses about it only what is already given thanks to this experience. This thinking is not hard to observe in people who, under the influence of an impression or an experience, do not fail to make a reasonable and doubtless very true remark, which, however, in no way goes beyond the bounds of the given volume of experience. Such a remark at bottom declares only: “I have understood this, I can think about this.” But there it stops. Such a judgement in the best case signifies the inclusion of the experience in a certain objective connection, whereby, however, the experience obviously already falls within these limits.

Commentary: “Inherent” must be understood here as “basic,” “originally intrinsic,” which means that Jung once again — and by now several dozen times — repeats one and the same erroneous “intellectual formula.” Incidentally, Jung himself is a thinking introvert, and his intellectual product refutes his basic error concerning thinking extraverts. Nonetheless, this reasoning contains one sufficiently important refinement and elements of very exact concrete observations. The refinement consists in the fact that Jung broadens the presumed base of extraverted thinking, adding to orientation toward the object “the power of the individual experience.” It is appropriate here to ask whether individual experience really has a bearing only on extraverted thinking. To answer this question, one must define the concept of “individual experience.” I would propose the following: individual experience is a relatively isolated event in a person’s life which has left a noticeable intellectual or emotional trace in his memory. If such a definition is accepted, then it is obvious that the extension Jung has made is incorrect. If individual experience had only intellectual consequences, then Jung, within the framework of his basic error, might have turned out to be right; but the possibility of emotional ones gives such experience a broader typological range.

The concrete observation in the reasoning under consideration relates to the remarks a person may make under the influence of individual experience — it may be both reasonable and true, and at the same time, as Jung notes, “in no way go beyond the bounds of the given volume of experience.” What is interesting here is that despite its almost precision-like factual accuracy, this observation does not necessarily relate only to extraverted thinking — alas, it may relate to any of the 16 socionic types.

Jung: Insofar as thinking is subordinate to the dominant function, it may of course seem positive, but a closer investigation may easily show that it simply repeats the dominant function, reinforcing it with arguments, often in manifest contradiction to the laws of logic proper to thinking. This thinking thus does not now enter into our consideration. We are occupied rather with the properties of that thinking which cannot submit to the primacy of another function, but remains true to its own principle.

Commentary: Here, for reasons unclear, Jung has jumped to an assessment of thinking which is not in the leading position. Still, his remark is interesting in that from it Jung’s attitude to subordinate thinking is clear. He considers that “it simply repeats the dominant function.” Most likely this is carelessness in the formulation of the thought, or an inexactness of translation. A subordinate function cannot repeat the leading one — it works as such, but of course it may serve it, for example, as Jung writes, by reinforcing it with arguments, and not only that.

Jung: It is difficult to observe and investigate this thinking, because in the concrete case it is gradually more or less suppressed by the attitude of consciousness. It must therefore, in the majority of cases, first be extracted from the depths of consciousness, unless it happens to surface in a moment of forgetfulness. For the most part it must be called forth by the question: “But what do you actually think, at bottom and in the depths of yourself, about this subject?” Or one must even resort to a stratagem and formulate the question approximately thus: “What do you suppose I think about this subject?” This latter form of the question should be chosen precisely when the real thinking is unconscious and must therefore be projected. Thinking brought to the surface of consciousness in this way has characteristic properties, which is why I have called it n e g a t i v e. Its habitus is best characterized by the words “nothing but.” Goethe personified this thinking in the image of Mephistopheles. Above all it manifests a tendency to reduce the subject of judgement to some triviality and to deprive it of its own independent significance. This occurs thanks to the fact that it is depicted as dependent on another banality.

Commentary: Jung acknowledges the difficulty of observing and investigating the presumed object, which here is apparently taken to be extraverted thinking in the subordinate function; but the chief problem here is that from the very beginning he created an erroneous metaphysical construct, and his thought does not deviate one iota from this basic error.

The extraverted emotional type

Jung: Emotions in the extraverting attitude are oriented toward what is objectively given, i.e. the object is the necessary determinant of the kind of feeling.

Commentary: In this definition Jung’s basic error concerning extraversion and introversion is even more noticeable than in the case of extraverted thinking. “Emotions in the extraverting attitude” may, from the socionic point of view, be considered a distortion of the essence of the matter. The point is that from the very beginning Jung assumed that the individual has only four functions, whereas in socionics there are eight. For Jung any of these functions could be either, as he understood it, in the extraverting or in the introverting attitude, but it could not be that one and the same function was in both the one and the other. The very concept of attitude in Jung derives from his empirical observation, when he became aware of the existence of a difference between people, designated by him as extraversion and introversion, and which he connected precisely with an attitude, i.e. a readiness to orient oneself — in the one case toward the external, in the other toward the inner world. In socionics, however, this situation does not require recourse to the concept of attitude. In socionics each function is directed outward or inward not because it has an attitude, but because this is its own nature. Extraverted emotionating is a reaction to a situation that is brought outward, and this reaction may be directly observed as characteristic facial expression, gesticulation, intonations and — not necessarily — verbal accompaniment. At the same time a person’s state and the colouring of skin and hair covering may change. And such a reaction is realized reflexively and not by force of an attitude understood as a certain inner assignment. The basic error of Jung described here in the understanding of extraversion and introversion became the cause of numerous distortions in the description of typological phenomenology, which he carried out over the course of several hundred pages. In what follows I shall, so far as possible, note such misunderstandings, as indeed I have been doing hitherto.

Jung: (On emotions in the extraverting attitude) They are in agreement with objective values. Whoever knows emotions only as subjective states will not directly understand the essence of extraverted feeling, since extraverted feeling has, so far as it could, freed itself from the subjective factor and thereby wholly submitted to the influence of the object.

Commentary: So, how is one to understand that extraverted emotions “are in agreement with objective values”? What are objective values? It is clear that the author, in accordance with his understanding of extraversion and introversion, opposes them to subjective values, of which he goes on to write, explaining his position. By definition, objective values represent something that does not depend on subjective relation. However, whereas in the field of ontology there exists a position acknowledging the existence of objects independently of a possible subjective relation to them, it is significantly harder to construct an analogous situation in the sphere of axiology, since value is by definition subjective in principle. Nonetheless one may speak of subjectivity of different levels — from individual subjectivity, the subjectivity of small groups, to the subjectivity of large collectives, social classes, ethnoses, states, and finally the subjectivity of all mankind. And one might try to connect extraverted emotionating with values that lie above the level of the separate individual — though the essence of this function is of quite another nature.

Jung: (On extraverted feeling) Even where it appears independent of the quality of the concrete object, it is nonetheless in the power of a traditional or some other generally significant valuation. I may feel drawn to the predicate “beautiful” or “good” not because from subjective emotional experience I find the object “beautiful” or “good,” but because it is fitting to call it “beautiful” or “good”; and fitting precisely insofar as the opposite judgement would to some degree or other disturb the general emotional situation. In such an applied emotional judgement the matter is by no means one of simulation or of a lie, but of an act of adaptation. Thus, for example, a picture may be called beautiful because it is generally presumed that a picture hanging in a drawing-room and signed by a famous artist is beautiful; or because the predicate “ugly” might distress the family of the happy owner; or because among those present there is an intention to create a pleasant emotional atmosphere, for which it is necessary that everything should appear pleasant.

Commentary: After the analysis carried out, it will no longer seem strange that by extraverted feeling Jung designates precisely the introverted, since it represents not a reaction brought outward but a relation, which may be expressed in words without any affect whatever. Of course one must understand that speech is the objectified form of introverted thinking, i.e. the translation of the inner result of this function into external codes accessible to the perception of other subjects. And if we utter in a neutral form the inner product of the function of introverted emotionating — relation — then the function of extraverted feeling may not be engaged at all. Therefore if out of politeness or for other considerations we give a flattering assessment of something or pay compliments, then the matter here is not one of extraverted emotionating, as Jung thought and as he described it in the last sentence — this is a manifestation of relation, which at the level of socionic terminology corresponds to introverted emotionating.

Jung: Such emotions are directed in accordance with objective determinants. As such they are genuine and express the whole emotional function at hand. Just as extraverted thinking frees itself so far as possible from subjective influences, so extraverted feeling must pass through a certain process of differentiation until it is rid of every subjective admixture. The valuations obtained through the emotional act correspond either directly to objective value or at least to certain traditional and everywhere widespread measures of value. It is precisely to this kind of feeling that we must ascribe the fact that so many people attend theatres or concerts or church with properly measured-out positive emotions.

Commentary: “Such emotions are directed in accordance with objective determinants” — this phrase sounds altogether too bureaucratic, but it confirms Jung’s understanding of extraverted emotionating as motivated by external circumstances, for example by a moral norm obtaining in a concrete society, by how it is customary to react in these or those circumstances. But if a reaction is motivated by politeness, friendship, love, dependence, envy, hatred, then apparently Jung will assign it to introverted feeling, because these may be considered connected with subjectivity. But are the varieties of relation listed not motivated by “external objects”; do there not exist real people who are loved, hated, envied or befriended? Thus we arrive at a contradiction which Jung does not wish to notice. This contradiction arises because from the very beginning he made an error in understanding extraversion and introversion as attitudes rather than as functional parameters. This means that a function is extraverted or introverted not because the personality has such an attitude, but by its nature, i.e. it works from the outset in the external or in the inner field relative to the subject.

“They ((extraverted emotions)) as such are genuine and express the whole emotional function at hand” — This sentence is very hard to understand. It seems Jung is insisting that such emotions are not counterfeit, false or hypocritical, but adequate to the situation, i.e. are the natural reflex response of a representative of homo sapiens to a source of pleasant or unpleasant experiences. But why then does he adduce as an example of such emotions a guest’s assessment of a new picture which his hosts are showing him, while Jung explains that the positive assessment is motivated not by a subjective experience of its beauty but by the fact that in such a situation it is “fitting” to react so? Is such an assessment not a variety of social hypocrisy? But the main thing Jung fails to notice here is the presence of two components in such a guest’s evaluative behaviour — his personal relation, experienced by him on the inner plane, which in socionics is correlated with introverted emotionating, and the possible external expression of the assessment in the form of emotional exclamations, gestures and mimicry of admiration. It is precisely this that in socionics is correlated with extraverted emotionating. Let us also note here that such a guest may at the same time utter some evaluative words, for example “a wonderful picture!” With which function should they be connected? Speech is above all the objectification of introverted thinking, which makes the products of such thinking accessible to other people but does not turn them into material objects, which would allow them to be assessed as extraverted. But speech expressing an assessment, and hence a relation, must by definition be assigned to introverted emotionating. The assertion that such emotions “express the whole emotional function at hand,” in accordance with what has been said above, does not correspond to reality, since Jung does not here distinguish the extraverted and introverted components.

“Just as extraverted thinking frees itself so far as possible from subjective influences, so extraverted feeling must pass through a certain process of differentiation until it is rid of every subjective admixture” — The reader who has grasped the socionic understanding of extraversion and introversion will easily assess the error contained here with regard to extraverted feeling, which of course is by no means obliged to lose its subjectivity, something that practically never happens in the norm, though it may be attained as a result of special training. “The valuations obtained through the emotional act correspond either directly to objective value or at least to certain traditional and everywhere widespread measures of value” — The emotional act is precisely an assessment brought outward by means of intonations, gestures and mimicry, and of course it may be brought up, imposed, or adapted to the requirements and expectations of society; but even in this case it is hard to separate it from personal subjectivity, though it may be connected with the notion of group or social subjectivity. “It is precisely to this kind of feeling that we must ascribe the fact that so many people attend theatres or concerts or church with properly measured-out positive emotions” — In this assertion it is not hard to discern elements of social programming, which prescribes not only a definite behaviour but also norms of the socially acceptable expression of one’s feelings. Of course this affects the psychic function of emotionating, filling it with definite content, but it in no way changes its essence.

Jung: To it also fashions owe their existence, and — what is far more valuable — the positive and widely spread assistance to social, philanthropic and other cultural undertakings. In these things extraverted feeling manifests itself as a creative factor. Without these emotions a good and harmonious society is, for example, unthinkable. In this respect extraverted feeling is just as beneficial and rationally acting a force as extraverted thinking. This beneficial influence, however, is lost whenever the object acquires excessive influence. It is precisely in such a case that too strongly extraverted feeling leads the personality away into the object, i.e. the object assimilates the personality, in consequence of which the personal character of the emotion is lost, which constitutes its most attractive feature. It is precisely thanks to this that feeling becomes cold, objective and undeserving of trust. Hidden intentions are revealed in it; at any rate it arouses such suspicions in the impartial observer. It no longer produces the pleasant and refreshing impression which always accompanies genuine emotions, but a pose or play-acting is felt, when the egocentric intentions may still be entirely unconscious.

Commentary: “To it ((extraverted emotionating)) also fashions owe their existence, and — what is far more valuable — the positive and widely spread assistance to social, philanthropic and other cultural undertakings” — From the socionic point of view, fashion in human society is motivated above all by introverted sensorics, oriented toward the assessment of the consumer qualities of an object, and in this sense there exists a fine but quite definite difference between the two varieties of emotionating, on the one hand, and the discrimination of the peculiarities of the product consumed, including its aesthetic qualities. As for assistance to cultural undertakings — this is the business of patrons — it is connected with introverted emotionating, which in reality manifests itself as relation. Of course patrons, like all people, have the function of extraverted emotionating, i.e. they are capable of expressing their relation by loudness of voice, specific mimicry and gestures, but their charitable activity unfolds within the framework of the archetype of introverted relation. “In these things extraverted feeling manifests itself as a creative factor” — Although in the context of the reasoning under examination there is an error here, the idea itself, that the archetype of extraverted emotionating may act as a creative factor, is interesting. Its generalization is the understanding that any psychic function may likewise become the basis of a creative attitude to life. Still, I think that here one should speak not of a psychic function but of the archetype standing behind it. “Without these emotions a good and harmonious society is, for example, unthinkable” — Strangely, Jung notes only the positive side of the emotional function. But do hatred, spite, envy, grief, sorrow and so on not belong to this function? And let us not forget that he wrote all this in Germany, whose society was in no way either good or harmonious, for in it national socialism was ripening, which brought innumerable calamities to the peoples of Europe. “In this respect extraverted feeling is just as beneficial and rationally acting a force as extraverted thinking.” — After what has been said above it is strange to see a one-sidedly positive assessment of a psychic function which is of course neutral with respect to its social manifestations — as an instrument it may be used both for good and for evil. “This beneficial influence, however, is lost whenever the object acquires excessive influence.” — Here Jung is entirely in the power of the metaphysical unfolding of his errors. And of course, “excessive influence of the object” may yield both a positive and a negative result. “It is precisely in such a case that too strongly extraverted feeling leads the personality away into the object, i.e. the object assimilates the personality, in consequence of which the personal character of the emotion is lost, which constitutes its most attractive feature.” — In the socionic sense, “strongly extraverted feeling” is what appears in accentuations or in manic-depressive psychosis. However, any variations of any function whatever go beyond the framework of the typological generalization which Jung discovered. “It is precisely thanks to this that feeling becomes cold, objective and undeserving of trust. Hidden intentions are revealed in it; at any rate it arouses such suspicions in the impartial observer. It no longer produces the pleasant and refreshing impression which always accompanies genuine emotions, but a pose or play-acting is felt, when the egocentric intentions may still be entirely unconscious.” — When Jung places the objective in one row with the cold and the untrustworthy, the general scientific understanding of the latter term is so distorted that even the meaning he puts into it becomes unclear.

Jung: Such exaggeratedly extraverted feeling, though it justifies aesthetic experiences, ceases to speak to the heart and speaks only to the feeling or, what is still worse, to the reason.

Commentary: From the point of view of socionics this sentence is practically meaningless, since it goes beyond the framework of the typological generalization. What aesthetic experiences does Jung have in mind? How does “to speak to the heart” differ from “to speak to the feeling”?

Jung: It may aesthetically justify a situation, but it is limited to this and does not go beyond it. It has become barren.

Commentary: What is this about, and what bearing does it have on extraverted emotionating?

Jung: If this process goes forward, then there develops a remarkably contradictory dissociation of feeling: it subordinates to itself every object, evaluating it emotionally; numerous relations are established which inwardly contradict one another. Since this would not be possible if there were even the slightest pronounced subject, the last remnants of a really personal point of view are suppressed.

Commentary: Apparently Jung has in mind the process of “exaggeration of extraverted feeling,” which goes forward and reaches some critical level, when “a remarkably contradictory dissociation of feeling develops.” But what is dissociation of feeling? In psychology only some emotional disorder can correspond to this. Is this in any way connected with typology? Can it be asserted that some types are more subject to such a disorder? What does “contradictory dissociation” mean? Is a harmonious dissociation possible? And how is one to understand the words “remarkably contradictory”? The absence of full-fledged answers to the questions posed here makes this and many other fragments of his text undecipherable.

Jung: The subject is to such a degree absorbed by the separate emotional processes that the observer gets the impression as though there were only a process of feeling and no subject of feeling. Feeling in this state completely loses its original human warmth; it produces the impression of a pose, of frivolity, of unreliability, and in the worst cases the impression of the hysterical.

Commentary: It seems Jung has become entirely entangled in his own metaphysics, and what he says has no bearing on typology. Did Jung really observe in his practice healthy people who demonstrated the behaviour he describes? How often in general can we observe such behaviour in life? Is it typologically determinate?

Jung: Since emotional experience is indisputably a more manifest property of feminine psychology than thinking, the most pronounced emotional types are found among the female sex. When extraverted feeling possesses primacy, we speak of the extraverted emotional type. The examples that rise before me at the mention of this type concern almost exclusively women. A woman of this kind lives under the guidance of her emotions. Her emotions, in consequence of her upbringing, have developed into an adapted function subjected to the control of consciousness. In cases which are not extreme, the emotions have a personal character, although the subjective is already to a significant degree suppressed. The personality therefore seems adapted to objective relations.

Commentary: This is an empirical observation, but the causes of the phenomenon he observes remain unknown to Jung. Work with human character becomes more transparent if we understand it as the independent overlay of several psychological fractals, i.e. of mono-causal generalized behavioural programmes. In psychology such fractals are represented by numerous typologies. At the basis of human character lies the socionic fractal, as the most fundamental. Next after it comes the gender fractal, taking into account the sexual differences of people. Analysis of the gender fractal shows that in men the two forms of thinking — extraverted and introverted — predominate, and in women, correspondingly, the two forms of emotionating; but this in no way means that men are incapable of demonstrating full-fledged emotional self-expression or of producing a high-quality emotional product. In just the same way, the strengthening of the emotional component in women does not exclude the full-fledged functioning of their intellect. Jung’s reasoning belongs to the syncretic kind, in which the difference between the two varieties of fractal is not taken into account. As for his assessment of extraversion as applied to emotionality, it is, for the reasons indicated earlier, erroneous.

Jung: Therefore the thinking of the extraverted emotional type, insofar as it is an independent function, is suppressed. I call both the preceding types rational or judging, because they are characterized by the primacy of a rationally judging function. Common to both types is that their life is to a high degree subordinated to rational judgement. Of course we must take into consideration whether we speak in doing so from the point of view of the subjective psychology of the individual or from the point of view of an observer who perceives and judges from without. This observer might easily arrive at the opposite judgement, and precisely when he intuitively simply apprehends what is happening and judges it. The life of this type in its totality never depends only on rational judgement, but almost to the same degree on unconscious irrationality.

Commentary: From the socionic point of view, Jung’s use of the notion of suppressedness of thinking in the emotional type cannot be recognized as entirely correct — it creates the image of some damage to such thinking. In the norm, however, such thinking can only be called one having peculiarities, which are provided by a different balance of intellect and emotionating, and this may be directly observed with the use of Model A. The introduction of the notion of “unconscious irrationality,” however, only complicates and confuses the essence of the matter.

The extraverted sensory type

Jung: In the extraverting attitude sensation is conditioned predominantly by the object. As a perception of the sense organs, sensation naturally depends on the object. But in just as natural a way it depends also on the subject, since there also exists a subjective sensation, which in its kind is entirely distinct from objective sensation.

Commentary: In this case Jung transfers his defective understanding of extraversion as “conditionedness by the object” onto the sensory function. It is obvious that the phrase to the effect that “as a perception of the sense organs, sensation naturally depends on the object” is trivial. Jung is compelled to use assertions of this kind, since he made his understanding of extraversion and introversion dependent on the concepts of “object” and “subject,” whose semantics, compared with their modern use in science, are to a significant degree distorted by him, and this considerably complicates the interpretation of his texts. A non-trivial assertion here would be that extraverted sensorics represents the opposition of a living being to the force pressure of the environment. To this belongs directly not only the will, but also the musculoskeletal system, i.e. the skeleton and the muscles. Less trivial is the assertion that sensation “in just as natural a way depends also on the subject.” That is because it needs at least some substantive clarification. But what clarification does Jung give? He says that “there also exists a subjective sensation, which in its kind is entirely distinct from objective sensation.” But since one cannot at once make out what he means, let us try to work it out. If a person, for example, sees a tree or the sun, then this, according to Jung, is extraverted perception — because it “naturally depends on the object.” What, then, could he have meant by “subjective sensation, which in its kind is entirely distinct from objective sensation”? What, in Jung’s opinion, in sensation depends on the subject? The first thing that comes to mind is the possible difference in the perception of one and the same object by different people. For instance, one person easily endures 25° of frost, while another suffers already at 10°. This is a pure example of extraverted sensorics as it may be understood in socionics, since here we are dealing with the force impact of the environment and the ability to withstand it. Another example: one person drinks beer with pleasure, another cannot stand it. Alas, here, by socionic notions, the matter is one not of extraverted but of introverted sensorics, which deals with the consumer qualities of an object.

Jung: In the extraverting attitude the subjective part of sensation, insofar as the question is of its conscious application, is inhibited and suppressed. In just the same way sensation, as an irrational function, is relatively suppressed when thinking or emotions possess primacy, i.e. it functions consciously only to the degree to which the conscious, judgement-producing attitude permits the conversion of accidental perceptions into contents of consciousness — in other words, realizes them. The function of the sense organs sensu strictiori is of course absolute; for example we see or hear everything so far as is physiologically possible, but not everything reaches that height of the threshold which perception must possess in order to be also apperceived. This changes when no other function but sensation itself possesses primacy.

Commentary: Here we are dealing with echoes of the psychoanalytic maxim that if some function is developed and works fully, then the function conjugate with it by nality will be suppressed. Socionic practice shows that this maxim is too approximate, and from Model A a more exact sense can be extracted concerning the relation of two functions conjugate by nality or by vertness — since both conjugations occur in the psyche. If extraverted sensorics is in the position of the PPF (program-potential function), then conjugate with it by nality will be extraverted intuition, and it in that case will be in the position of the ALF (adaptive-load function). Since the PPF enters the EGO block and in the norm is the leading one, and consequently more time is spent on its development, and with it more information, it receives an advantage in development. However, a function in the position of the ALF, being activated in tense situations which are competing situations for those in which the PPF dominates, receives an additional stimulus for its own development. And since the balance of tense and “favourable” situations may fluctuate within wide limits, the ratio of the development of the leading and the subordinate (in the socionic sense) functions may also be different — in particular, such that to speak of an inhibitedness and suppression of the ALF would simply be absurd. Moreover, whereas for Jung only one function could act as the subordinate one, in Model A seven functions must be considered in such a role, where “subordination” and “auxiliariness” will each time appear in different guises. Their varieties are presented in Table J.01.

Table J.01

Leading	Subord.	Semantics of subordination
PPF	CPF	Performs a communicative role, objectifying the introverted product of the PPF
PPF	ALF	Engages in tense situations, providing a way out of them
PPF	CCF	Protects the PPF from the intrusion of irrelevant information
PPF	ERF	Provides the PPF with the resource necessary for its work
PPF	MMF	Provides the PPF with the energy necessary for its work
PPF	ITF	Ensures the subject’s concentration on carrying out the programmes synthesized by the PPF
PPF	RTF	Ensures the materialization of the psyche’s response to the impact of the environment

Thus, Jung’s notions of the inhibitedness, undevelopedness and suppressedness of one or another psychic function are greatly exaggerated and must be significantly supplemented and refined.

In the passage under consideration Jung speaks of the suppression of the subjective side of extraverted sensorics, since, as he considers, it is “conditioned predominantly by the object” — but what exactly is subjective in the volitional opposition of a personality to unfavourable conditions of the environment? Strange as it may seem, here one must assign, above all, the typological peculiarities of the personality. And indeed, to one and the same tense situation different types respond differently. It is clear that such a typologically subjective component can in the norm in no way be “inhibited and suppressed,” so that in this question too Jung committed an error — one that is, to be sure, connected with his basic delusion concerning extraversion and introversion.

[Translator’s note: in the source these last two paragraphs are interleaved across a page break; they have been reassembled here in the order the argument requires.]

Jung: In this case nothing is excluded or suppressed from the sensation of the object (with the exception of the subjective part, as already mentioned). Sensations are determined predominantly by the object, and those objects which produce the strongest sensation have the greatest significance for the psychology of the individual. Hence arises a clearly pronounced sensuous connection with the object. Therefore sensation is a vital function endowed with the strongest vital force. Insofar as objects give sensations they are actual, and they enter fully into consciousness to the degree to which this is at all possible through sensation, independently of whether they are suited to rational judgement or not. The criterion of their value is only the force of sensation, conditioned by their objective properties. In consequence of this, all objective phenomena enter consciousness insofar as they produce sensation at all. But only concrete, sensuously perceptible objects and phenomena arouse sensations in the extraverting attitude, and precisely exclusively such objects and phenomena as everyone will always and everywhere sense as concrete. The individual therefore orients himself toward a purely sensuous reality. The judgement-producing functions stand below the concrete fact of sensation and therefore have the properties of insufficiently differentiated functions, i.e. a certain negativity with infantile-archaic features. Of course the function opposite to sensation is most strongly suppressed — namely, the function of unconscious perception, intuition.

Commentary: Let us take this paragraph apart in more detail. “In this case nothing is excluded or suppressed from the sensation of the object (with the exception of the subjective part, as already mentioned).” — Jung here has extraverted sensorics in mind. He understood it erroneously, but still: in what does he see its peculiarities as he understands them? If he is describing the normal work of the sensory system, then why must something in it be excluded or suppressed? Has perception in the norm ever in psychology been considered from the point of view of excluding and suppressing something in the object itself? Of course perception as a psychic function is in itself limited by sensory modality, by thresholds of perception, by the state of the environment and so on, which Jung does not mention. However, as regards the task of perception, it consists in perceiving the object as fully as possible, and if this task is hindered by something, then the subject reacts to this negatively.

“Sensations are determined predominantly by the object, and those objects which produce the strongest sensation have the greatest significance for the psychology of the individual. Hence arises a clearly pronounced sensuous connection with the object.” — In this reasoning Jung commits the logical error of “substitution of thesis”: he begins by speaking of sensations, and in the second sentence uses the concept of a “sensuous connection,” which belongs to the sphere of emotionating. This error of Jung’s may be understood in connection with the homonymy of the word “feeling” in German and in Russian. It is clear that in the expressions “his sense of sight failed him” and “he had tender feelings for her” this word has a different meaning, and therefore in a long piece of reasoning their confusion is quite probable. But from the point of view of logic this is impermissible.

“Therefore sensation is a vital function endowed with the strongest vital force.” — Since Jung introduces a superlative degree for the assessment of one psychic function, it is natural to suppose that the other functions too should receive an assessment from the point of view of their vitality; otherwise his assessment creates the impression of the exclusiveness of the sensory function in respect of vitality, and the reader may begin to think that the remaining psychic functions are at least significantly weaker or have no relation to vitality at all. However, this can by no means be said, for example, of emotionality. Therefore the judgement under consideration must be assigned to the category of the emotional but weakly argued.

“Insofar as objects give sensations, they are actual, and they enter fully into consciousness to the degree to which this is at all possible through sensation, independently of whether they are suited to rational judgement or not.” — Here we again find ourselves in the sphere of metaphysics, where a philosopher might need to formulate the conditions of the actuality of an object. From a practical point of view we are dealing with something trivial. However, a stricter analysis of this utterance of Jung’s allows an inexactness to be discovered in it, since sensations may be imitated hallucinatorily and imaginatively in the absence of a real object corresponding to them. Thus, although perception is an important condition of the appearance of objects in consciousness, such an appearance is accompanied and supported by other psychic functions as well, and without such support would be impossible. As for rational judgement in connection with the work of the sensory function, physiologists know that some perceptions are transmitted directly from sensory neurons to motor neurons, bypassing processing by the function of thinking. Thus a person who has accidentally touched something hot with his hand jerks it away sharply, since any delay of reaction might lead to a burn. Generalizing this situation somewhat, one may from this point of view assess the behaviour of a person immersed in the element of sensory experiences — for example, drinking beer and eating dried fish after the sauna. Such experiences may dominate in his psyche to such a degree that their mental reflection will be entirely superfluous. However, Jung does not take into account that situations of this kind are connected not with extraverted but with introverted sensorics.

“The criterion of their value is only the force of sensation, conditioned by their objective properties.” — Here Jung speaks of the value of objects, which he attempts to measure by “the force of sensations” — but what is that? Of the force of which sensations can one speak at all in psychology? In the first place one may assign here touch, smell and taste; but it is clear that the severe pain, revolting stench and unbearable bitterness connected with them belong to anti-values, and their assessment is performed not by extraverted but by introverted sensorics in combination with the function of emotionating. Beautiful music, on the other hand, may in general not be very loud, so that from Jung’s position one would have to invent something like: the force of auditory sensations does not presuppose obligatory loudness but has in view the impression produced — but then that is what should have been said. Analogous reasonings apply also to visual perception, where “the force of sensations” must be replaced by the force of experiences, but these relate not to sensorics but to emotionating. Introverted sensorics establishes the correspondence of the object to needs, while the emotional function carries out the “admission” of the object to its privileged use.

“In consequence of this, all objective phenomena enter consciousness insofar as they produce sensation at all.” — This too is a banality, though pronounced with a certain pathos. It is easy to accept the idea that if an object were not perceived, it could not become an object of consciousness. But here too there are subtleties. The point is that an object may become an agent of the subconscious, bypassing the gates of perception. Such, for example, are inventions, the idea or image of which arises in the inventor’s consciousness not as a product of direct perception but as a product of creativity.

“But only concrete, sensuously perceptible objects and phenomena arouse sensations in the extraverting attitude, and precisely exclusively such objects and phenomena as everyone will always and everywhere sense as concrete.” — Again and again Jung adds to some banalities others, but all this does not clarify the essence of extraversion and introversion; it only confuses the reader more and more. Of course perceived objects are always concrete and are perceived precisely sensuously, and this is no secret to anyone; but perhaps Jung is here talking himself round, since he subconsciously feels that something in his reasonings does not add up. And it is not customary to say of objects that they arouse sensations — they may attract attention, which is important for conscious perception, but there exists also unconscious perception. So on this occasion too Jung may be reproached with the fact that his reasoning proved inadequate.

“The individual therefore orients himself toward a purely sensuous reality.” — What is a “purely sensuous reality”? Of course Jung has in mind “a purely sensory reality,” but to express his thought he uses an ambiguous word. But the question remains — what is “a purely sensory reality”? Apparently one without any admixture of any other modalities; but no such reality exists. Reality is integral, and it acts on a living being integrally. And how is one to understand that “the individual orients himself toward a purely sensuous reality”? Did Jung himself really orient himself toward a “purely sensuous reality”? How is that? Did he diligently avoid everything that is not “purely sensuous”?

“The judgement-producing functions stand below the concrete fact of sensation and therefore have the properties of insufficiently differentiated functions, i.e. a certain negativity with infantile-archaic features.” — Obviously Jung here has in mind an individual with leading sensorics. In accordance with psychoanalytic and analytical-psychological theories the subordinate function ought to lag in development and demonstrate “infantile-archaic features”; only he lost sight of the fact that in a type with leading sensorics the subordinate one is the intuitive and not the thinking function, and therefore the latter, being in Jung’s theory an auxiliary one, is by no means obliged to be so very infantile-archaic.

“Of course the function opposite to sensation is most strongly suppressed — namely, the function of unconscious perception, intuition.” — This judgement corresponds exactly to Jung’s notions of the relation between the leading and the subordinate functions; however, knowledge of socionics permits a more exact and differentiated assessment of such a relation too. Above all, the matter is not one of some total suppression of the other functions. Rather, the matter should be one of an auxiliary but valuable and by no means bad means. Thus the SEI (Dumas) has two intuitive functions — the introverted in the position of the ALF (adaptive-load function) and the extraverted in the position of the ERF (expectational-resource function). The first is engaged in tense situations and provides the search for a way out of a difficult position, which naturally places high demands upon it, and often its external manifestation is hope and a readiness to wait things out. The second is constantly in search of the meaning of life and is ready to receive it from a favourable source. In this position it is hard for extraverted intuition itself to generate a meaning of life, but it is tuned to its parameters and readily accepts it if it appears.

Jung: There is no other human type which would equal the extraverted sensory type in realism. His objective sense of reality is unusually developed. In his life he accumulates experiences from concrete objects, and the more strongly he is expressed, the less use he makes of his experience. His experiencing in certain cases does not in general become what deserves the name of “experience.” Everything that he senses serves him only as an occasion for new sensations; and everything new that enters the circle of his interests is acquired by way of sensations and must serve only for this purpose.

Commentary: Here Jung introduces the notion of “realism,” but since he presupposes it to be understood by default, his reasoning loses logical concreteness and passes into the category of lyrical digressions. However, in this reasoning Jung has to choose not from a large number of human types at all, but merely from two, because the sensory type is opposed only by the intuitive one; and here too he may be reproached with not keeping track of the scope of the concepts he uses.

“His objective sense of reality is unusually developed.” — A socionist would say that the sensory type is to a greater degree than the intuitive immersed in the present, is somewhat more preoccupied with everyday problems; but reality bears down upon everyone, though it touches each type by its own particular aspect. And such epithets as “unusually” are applicable only to a small number of bearers of this type, but by no means to the type itself.

“In his life he accumulates experiences from concrete objects, and the more strongly he is expressed, the less use he makes of his experience.” — Possibly Jung has in mind that sensory types learn from their own experience, but such a conclusion cannot be drawn directly from the model of this type. The most that can be said here with regard to the judgement under consideration is that sensory types need illustrative examples for learning to a greater degree than intuitive types. However, it cannot be asserted that there exists some formula of the type “the more…, the more…,” which links by an inverse dependence the pronouncedness of the object and the practical use of the experience connected with it.

“His experiencing in certain cases does not in general become what deserves the name of ‘experience.’ Everything that he senses serves him only as an occasion for new sensations; and everything new that enters the circle of his interests is acquired by way of sensations and must serve only for this purpose.” — Here it is unclear what “certain cases” Jung is speaking of, and since he gives no positive definition of what he here calls experience but merely puts the word in quotation marks, it is very hard to interpret this reasoning substantively as applied to all sensory types. Can anything of the sort be said with respect to the LSE (Stierlitz) or the ESI (Dreiser)? And as is well known, to refute a universal affirmative judgement a single negative example suffices. Jung’s phrase under consideration is precisely such a judgement.

The extraverted intuitive type

Jung: Intuition, as a function of unconscious perception, is in the extraverting attitude directed wholly upon external objects. Since intuition is chiefly an unconscious process, it is very difficult to grasp its essence consciously. In consciousness the intuitive function is replaced by a certain attitude of expectation, a certain contemplation and looking into, whereby only the subsequent result can show how much was seen and how much was actually present in the object.

Commentary: Here one can agree with Jung in almost everything. The nature of intuition remained unknown to psychology for many years after Jung as well, though rational schemes for describing intuitive processes do exist — but on closer examination they prove defective. For example, it was proposed to understand intuition as a subconscious logical inference from previously accumulated facts. In that case intuition is reduced to the function of thinking. Besides, this does not explain the processes of creativity, in which a fundamentally new product appears. At the same time intuition may be understood as the perfectly habitual human understanding which accompanies all his conscious actions. Strange as it may seem, the nature of understanding is just as incomprehensible as the nature of intuition; however, the constant presence of this process in consciousness and its intimate accessibility create the illusion that its comprehension is unproblematic. What we in a Latinized variant call intuition may be replaced by the Russian words “grasping,” “discernment,” “apprehension,” which are obviously partial synonyms of “understanding.” And however much rationalistic scientists may resist it, one has to acknowledge that understanding is a mystical, i.e. hidden from people’s consciousness, process of the direct contact of the human psyche with ideal information fields. The identity in this case of understanding and intuition becomes obvious.

Jung: Just as sensation, if it possesses primacy, is not merely a reactive phenomenon signifying nothing further for the object, but is rather an action (actio) which seizes and forms the object, so intuition too is not merely perception, a simple contemplation, but…

Commentary: Here Jung compares sensory and intuitive perception, and there is undoubtedly a functional similarity between them — they link the bearer of subjectivity, the psyche, with the objective world, which exists independently of the subject but imperatively imposes on the subject the forms of its existence. The subject cannot dominate without limit in the environment of its existence and is compelled to adapt to it, which explains the concrete forms of its physical and psychic organization. The integral experience of mankind gives grounds for holding that the subject could perceive the world using only intuition — without the sensory devices which the sense organs are. A quite convincing example here is the well-documented life of Vanga, who, being blind, knew much about the world that sighted people did not know.

It is also necessary to emphasize that the sensory function ensures the perception of the object, but that intuition is responsible for its understanding. Figuratively speaking, the eye looks, but the subject sees.

But let us read carefully into the reasoning adduced, in order to understand Jung’s conception of psychic processes. He opposes his understanding of the psychic function to another which understands the psychic function as a “purely reactive formation.” An extreme prototype of such a function could probably be a mirror, simply reproducing in the modality accessible to it the parameters of the object. However, such a notion of a mirror is simplified and possibly reflects the experience of a theorizing scientist. One may imagine more complex mirrors — for example coloured, curved, faceted, changing the scale of the object’s image and so on. All this would introduce “hardware-subjective” distortion. But let us not forget that even a simple mirror is by no means objective, for it not only changes the symmetry of the object, transposing its right and left sides, but shows only part of its parameters; and besides, there may be accidental spots, cracks or dust on it. A more complex model of a “purely reactive organ” might be a camera, which fixes the external appearance of an object within the limits of its technical capabilities. However, modern cameras are able within wide limits to change the parameters of the image, decreasing or increasing brightness, contrast, colour saturation and gamut, passing it through all sorts of filters. All this must be assigned to “hardware subjectivity.” What, then, is the model of the subjectivity of human sensorics? Which parameters of an object does the human psyche transmit objectively, and which does it distort? Of course all this must be taken into account and analysed with regard to the sensory modality of the organ. For example, what does the eye see? The optical device of the eye conforms to physical laws, so that from this point of view the eye is objective. However, vision does not convey real sizes, but on the other hand, thanks to binocularity, it conveys the mutual disposition of objects in space. And if a subject begins special training — say, learns to shoot a bow or to kick a football into the goal — then his ability to determine distances visually and to control the flight of the arrow or the ball is such that one must acknowledge vision to be an instrument of high perfection. It may be reproached, for example, with the fact that it encodes the reflective capacity of the surfaces of objects in the form of colour, which, as some scientists consider, has a purely subjective nature. Still, definitions are needed here.

Jung, however, apparently considers that the function of sensation does not merely fix the parameters of an object represented in various modalities (visual, auditory, etc.), but is a certain action “which seizes and forms the object.” How is this to be understood — as a metaphor or literally? Literally, this means that the object is seized by sensation, transferred from the external environment into the psyche, and “formed.” Is the latter concept equivalent to the concepts “is shaped,” “is assembled,” “is constructed”? I am compelled to acknowledge that I am not ready for such a turn of events, though I could devise a conceptual scheme which might justify it.

Let us consider the metaphorical variant of understanding the terms Jung used. Then the expression “sensorics seizes the object” may be understood as “sensorics detects the object,” and the expression “sensorics forms the object” might mean “sensorics forms the image of the object in the psychic environment.” But why then not say so?

But Jung transfers the general properties of sensorics to intuition as well, considering that it “is an active, creative phenomenon which puts as much into the object as it takes from it.” What does “puts into the object” mean? Adds to the object something that was not in it, is that it? What for? Is not the aim of intuitive penetration into an object its reproduction in the psyche as adequately as possible? If so, why add something to it? I do not know the answers to such questions, and therefore I consider the corresponding reasoning of Jung’s inadequate.

Jung: Just as he unconsciously receives a visual representation, so he produces an unconscious action upon the object.

Commentary: This assertion is more comprehensible. Two ideas may be singled out here. First, this is an analogical proof of a subconscious influence of a person upon an object in the case where such a person has an intuitive insight concerning this object. At the basis of this proof lies an analogy of the type: “since the object acts upon a person through a subconscious intuitive process, so a person acts analogously upon the object.” It is known in logic that proof by analogy has a probabilistic sense, which must be refined in experiment. So far as I know, neither Jung nor anyone after him ever conducted any such experiments.

The second idea consists in the fact that a person-subject, even in merely passively perceiving an object, necessarily exerts some influence upon it. Generally speaking, this is a very strong assertion, and if it corresponds to reality, then very serious consequences must be drawn from it. Possibly it was precisely this reasoning of Jung’s that became the basis of the conviction, widespread in physics, that when a scientist performs an experiment with an object he, independently of his wish, changes the conditions of its existence, and therefore the result of his experiment will always be deformed by the presence of the experimenter. Incidentally, this idea may have another basis, namely the principle of complementarity discovered in physics, which asserts merely that one cannot simultaneously determine the coordinates of an elementary particle and its energy. However, I think that this is by no means a principle but a law, since at its basis lies physical causality. Nonetheless there are certain grounds for generalizing this law to the circumstances of an experiment — namely, that the scientist and the object upon which he experiments jointly form a system, i.e. an organized set in which all the elements depend upon one another.

Jung: Of course, intuition first of all gives the possibility of obtaining only images or visual representations of connections and relations which by means of other functions either cannot be obtained at all or are attained only by a long roundabout path.

Commentary: Jung does not fully understand the semantics of the psychic functions — no combinations of other functions can perform the work of intuition.

Jung: These images have the value of a definite knowledge which decisively influences actions, insofar as intuition has the chief significance. Thinking, feeling and sensation are relatively suppressed, and this relates in the greatest degree to sensation, because it, as a conscious function of the sense organs, hinders intuition most of all. Sensation disturbs the pure, unprejudiced, naive visual representation by importunate stimulations of the sense organs, which direct the gaze upon physical surfaces, i.e. precisely upon those things behind which intuition strives to penetrate.

Commentary: “…intuition has the chief significance” — this is how Jung indicates the case in which intuition is the leading function. The illuminations, insights and graspings supplied by intuition — these are all synonyms of understanding — may of course be assessed as knowledge, though in such cases one must define what one understands by knowledge. If someone defines knowledge as a system of concepts relating to some object, then he may not agree that a separate act of intuition is knowledge; but one may quite agree that intuition can point to knowledge and to the path leading to it. As for the suppressedness of the other functions when intuition is leading, I have already emphasized several times that this is an unfortunate expression. The remaining functions are not suppressed but occupy their own definite place in the technological chain of the working over of information in the psyche. Without their work an intuitive insight would remain a portentous bright spark, the impression of which might for a time disturb or inspire, and then pass into the subconscious, as not infrequently happens with certain dreams. And the assessment of the role of sensorics in intuitive types as something importunately distracting from the main thing is incorrect. Sensorics in irrational intuitive types is the input function, and therefore their sensory thresholds are lowered, and they notice and react to what a sensory type might leave without attention. For example, among intuitive types very many possess not merely good but absolute pitch, while in someone else vision distinguishes the finest colour shades. Naturally, in such cases there is no question of any suppression of sensorics. This is a full-fledged function performing its part of the work in the cognitive or technological process.

Jung: Since in the extraverting attitude intuition is directed predominantly upon the object, it comes, properly speaking, very close to sensation, since the attitude of expectation toward external objects may with almost the same degree of probability make use of sensation. But in order for intuition to be realized, sensation must be to a significant degree suppressed. By sensation in this case I understand simple and direct sensation of the sense organs, as a clearly outlined physiological and psychic fact. This must be established exactly from the very beginning, because when I ask an intuitive person what he orients himself by, he will speak to me of things which resemble sensations of the sense organs exactly. He will often make use of the expression “sensations.” He does indeed have sensations, but he does not guide himself by the sensations themselves; they serve him only as a point of support for visual representations. They are selected by an unconscious presupposition.

Commentary: This is another delusion of Jung’s. He got the impression that an irrational intuitive type can use intuition almost like sensorics. That is because he did not understand the necessary connection of intuition with sensorics — the latter supplies the material for intuition’s work and always precedes it. Failure to understand this becomes the cause of Jung’s leaving to sensations only one of their aspects — to deliver pleasures, as not infrequently happens with irrational sensory types. The other aspects of the sensory function Jung assesses as suppression or defectiveness.

Jung: The chief value is received not by the physiologically strongest sensation, but by some other, which is significantly raised in its value by the unconscious attitude of the intuitive person. By this it accidentally attains chief significance, and to the consciousness of the intuitive person it seems that it is pure sensation. But in reality it is not. Just as sensation in the extraverting attitude strives to attain the strongest actuality, since only thanks to this is the impression of full life obtained, so intuition strives to apprehend the greatest possibilities, because presentiment is most of all satisfied through the visual representation of possibilities. Intuition strives toward the discovery of possibilities in what is objectively given; therefore it, as a merely supplementary function (precisely when primacy does not belong to it), is an auxiliary means which acts automatically when no other function can find a way out of a position closed on all sides. If, however, primacy belongs to intuition, then all ordinary life situations seem closed premises which intuition must open. It constantly seeks exits and new possibilities of external life. For intuitive thinking every life situation becomes in the shortest time a prison, heavy fetters from which one must free oneself.

Commentary: Again and again Jung confuses the semantics of different functions. What does “the strongest sensation” mean? Such, for example, might be pain. So does Jung really have reliable facts testifying that intuitive types always ignore it? There exists an extensive statistics testifying that people can overcome pain in special circumstances — for example, when duty is above all for them; so heroes act, but heroism is not the lot of intuitive types alone. A person may overcome or disregard sensory discomforts when he is absorbed in performing some work important to him, but so do representatives of all types. Therefore it is not very clear what Jung means when he speaks of “some other” sensation which he opposes to “the physiologically strongest sensation.” And why should something seem to the consciousness of an intuitive person in the norm, since everything that a function does in ordinary conditions is the result of the evolutionary adaptation of the whole human race?

Jung: Where intuition dominates, there appears a peculiar psychology which cannot fail to be recognized.

Commentary: This is an introductory sentence, after which a definition of the “peculiar psychology” ought to follow, so that it could be recognized and at least some key obtained for diagnosing the corresponding type; however, Jung offers neither the necessary definition nor sufficient explications. Properly speaking, intuition itself also remains undefined, since it is apparently presupposed by default that this is known to everyone.

Jung: Since intuition orients itself toward the object, a strong dependence on external situations is noticeable, which is entirely distinct from the kind of dependence of the sensory type.

Commentary: I accept that intuition is simply understanding, the direct understanding of anything whatever. It may appear as a result of an instantaneous insight, but may also more or less constantly accompany communicative and technological processes. Such understanding may be shaped by a sensory, thinking or emotional modality, and such shaping may substantially influence the final product of intuition, but the intuitive capacity itself to grasp, to discern and to understand can never be reduced to any other function. In psychology there exist numerous descriptions of the phenomenology of intuition, but its nature still remains ungrasped in psychology. Unfortunately, intuition cannot be explained by references to physiological processes, although in the literature one may find mentions of the role of the hippocampus in processes connected with decision-making under conditions of uncertainty. Therefore, without going deeper into the problem of clarifying the nature of intuition, let us identify it with the direct understanding of the sense of a situation. If such understanding is directed at apprehending the essence of the objects of the external environment, then such intuition we shall consider extraverted, i.e. directed outward.

With such an understanding of extraverted intuition one may say that it “orients itself toward the object,” but this by no means requires the supposition that the personality thereby “has an extraverting attitude,” since the functioning of intuition is determined not by the attitude of the personality but by its intuitive capacity and by the nature of intuition to grasp essential meanings.

In what could one see the “strong dependence on external situations” which Jung indicates in speaking of extraverted intuition? The only thing that comes to mind here is that the personality must observe the object, become interested in it, pay attention to it — which of course there is no necessity to designate as an extraverting attitude of consciousness. This is a normal process of the psyche’s contact with the external world. But why does Jung go on to speak of some fundamental difference in the “dependence on external situations” for intuition as compared with sensorics? Yes, these are different functions, but both the one and the other require concentration on the object, and their product of course depends on the material worked over.

Jung: The intuitive person is never to be found where generally recognized actual values obtain, but always where possibilities are to be found. He has a fine flair for what is nascent and promising for the future. He is never to be found in stable, long-established and well-grounded relations of generally recognized but limited value. Since he is always in search of new possibilities, he threatens to suffocate in stable relations.

Commentary: Of course it is strange to say of intuitive people that they “are never to be found where generally recognized actual values obtain.” Whence such categoricalness? Apparently intuitive people in the norm can and are able not only to take an interest in “generally recognized actual values” but also to rely upon them in their practical life. To deny this is tantamount to acknowledging that intuitive people are abnormal.

Jung: (on the intuitive person) He perceives new objects and paths with great intensity and sometimes with extraordinary enthusiasm, in order, without pity and apparently without recollection, coolly to discard them as soon as their volume has been established and no further significant development is anticipated.

Commentary: One may agree that in certain circumstances an intuitive type may relate to new objects “with great intensity and sometimes with extraordinary enthusiasm,” but could this not happen with a sensory type?

Jung: Still more often than among men, this type is apparently met with among women. In this latter case intuitive activity is revealed not so much in recognition as in the social milieu. Such women are able to make use of all social possibilities, to establish social connections, to find men with possibilities — in order for the sake of a new possibility to renounce all this.

Commentary: Possibly Jung had in his clinical practice some statistics on the difference he indicates between men and women; but most likely this is a misunderstanding connected with the fact that Jung did not distinguish sufficiently clearly between the two forms of intuition — extraverted and introverted. The point is that analysis of the gender fractal [The Smile of the Cheshire Cat, ch. 18] gives grounds for the conclusion that extraverted intuition is relatively strengthened in men, and introverted intuition in women. Extraverted intuition manifests itself most vividly in scientific and inventive activity, and here primacy statistically belongs to men. As for introverted intuition, it is closely connected with presentiment and foresight, where women lead by a certain margin. Such refinements show that Jung’s texts must be approached with caution.

Jung: Psychological relations in the extraverting attitude are always regulated by objective factors, external conditions. What another person is within himself never has decisive significance.

Commentary: We have already met analogous declarations of Jung’s more than once in the course of his book, and the enlightened reader remembers that extraversion and introversion are connected not with the attitude of the personality but with the essence of the extraverted and introverted functions.

How is it that “what another person is within himself never has decisive significance” in the extraverting attitude? That among extraverts there is no struggle of ambitions, no corruption on the basis of personal sympathies, no frank envy — and moreover “never”? Is that the lot of introverts alone? No, this is a misunderstanding — Jung simply did not work these concepts out.

Jung: For our modern culture the extraverting attitude serves in principle as the foundation for human relations; the introverting principle of course has its place, but is considered an exception and appeals to the tolerance of contemporaries.

Commentary: Since Jung gives no full-fledged definitions, he may fantasize as his intuition prompts him. Knowledge of socionics allows a negative assessment of this utterance of Jung’s — in modern culture both extraversion and introversion are fully represented, though some deviations from exact equality are probably inevitable. In the end, what Jung himself was occupied with — analytical psychology — is oriented toward the cognition of the inner nature of man; but it seems Jung did not notice this.

Introverted thinking

Jung: As I have already set out in chapter 1, the introverting type differs from the extraverting in that he orients himself predominantly not toward the object and what is objectively given, as the extraverting type does, but toward subjective factors.

Commentary: It would be simply splendid if Jung had enumerated the subjective factors in plain terms; but apparently he considers this something self-evident. Had he done so in his very fat book, he would easily have seen that there exist neither such objective nor such subjective factors as would have significance for extraverts while remaining outside the attention of introverts, or vice versa.

Jung: One must never forget — the extraverting mode of thinking forgets this too easily — that all perception and cognition is conditioned not only objectively but also subjectively. The world exists not only in itself, an und für sich, but also as it appears to me. Indeed, we have, properly speaking, not even a criterion for a judgement about the world that does not assimilate itself with the subject. To overlook the subjective factor means to deny the existence of a great doubt and of the possibility of absolute significance.

Commentary: But here Jung demonstrates a dialectical approach with respect to perception and cognition — both the one and the other are conditioned by both varieties of factors, objective and subjective; but why then, for him, are “psychological relations in the extraverting attitude always regulated by objective factors, external conditions”? Because he had not worked this out.

The second part of the reasoning is an example of the metaphysical thinking of the beginning of the twentieth century.

Jung: It is characteristic of our modern extraverted valuation that the word “subjective” usually sounds almost like a reproach; in any case “only subjective” signifies a dangerous weapon, intended to strike down whoever is not finally convinced of the necessary superiority of the object. We must therefore clearly understand what is meant in this investigation by the expression “subjective.” By the subjective factor I call that psychological action (Aktion) or reaction which, combining with the influence of the object, produces a new psychic fact.

Commentary: In this paragraph Jung gives a definition of the subjective factor as he understands it. However, for me personally, the comprehension of this definition is difficult. He assigns this factor to the genus of psychological actions. But the concept of a psychological action he does not define, apparently considering this something self-evident. Yet one may ask the question: “how does a psychological action differ from a physical one?” To this one might answer that a physical action is performed with objects of the physical world, while a psychological one is determined by the subject. But, in the first place, any physical action performed by a person is determined by him, and the person is the subject of such an action. It therefore turns out that in human activity it is not so simple to separate the physical and the psychological. In the second place, one does not succeed in separating the psychological and the subjective. These considerations discredit Jung’s definition of the subjective factor.

Jung: Just as to the introverting man it seems incomprehensible that the object should always play the decisive role, so for the extraverting man it remains a riddle how a subjective point of view can prove stronger than the objective situation. He inevitably arrives at the opinion that the introverting man is either an egoist with a high opinion of himself or a fanatical doctrinaire. He would soon come to the hypothesis that the introverting man is under the influence of an unconscious complex of power.

Commentary: Here we have an example of generalizing conclusions from erroneous premises accepted by Jung at the very beginning of his elaboration of the theory of psychological types. It in no way follows that “to the introverting man it seems incomprehensible that the object should always play the decisive role,” while “for the extraverting man it remains a riddle how a subjective point of view can prove stronger than the objective situation” — no such dilemma exists at the level of the psychological type. It in no way follows that the extraverting man “inevitably arrives at the opinion that the introverting man is either an egoist with a high opinion of himself or a fanatical doctrinaire.” All of this lies below the typological generalization and all of it is Jung’s pure invention, connected with justifying his understanding of extraversion and introversion.

Jung: To this prejudice the introverting man doubtless contributes by the fact that his definite and strongly generalized mode of expression, which apparently from the very outset excludes every other opinion, assists the extraverting prejudice.

Commentary: Here again we see reasoning that leads us beyond the bounds of the typological generalization. Besides, here the qualifier “definite” itself remains indefinite, and therefore the whole utterance loses in concreteness. As for the “strongly generalized mode of expression,” within the socion it could typologically be connected with two types in whose bearers it occurs more often than in others — the ILI (Balzac) and the ILE (Don Quixote), whose vivid representatives are, respectively, Hegel and Marx. As we see, one is an introvert and the other an extravert. But among the bearers of this type we shall find a great many people with very practical and concrete thinking. For example, Honoré de Balzac himself, taken as the prototype of the type Balzac, being a brilliant writer who created a whole gallery of highly artistic images, unfolded his narrative very concretely, with many everyday details and fine psychological observations. And if we take such representatives of the Don Quixote type as Darwin and Mendeleev, then their thinking can hardly be reproached with any abstract divorce from life; being highly scientific, it solved practical problems of biology and chemistry. It must also be noted that such thinking by no means necessarily “from the very outset excludes every other opinion.” That happens only in extreme cases of its dogmatic degeneration.

Jung: The personality as a whole and the world are commensurable magnitudes, in consequence of which the normal introverting attitude is just as suitable for the testing of being as the normal extraverting attitude. But if the conscious personality strives to give itself the significance of subject, then, naturally, as compensation, an unconscious strengthening of the influence of the object occurs. This change manifests itself in the fact that, upon a sometimes simply convulsive effort to secure the superiority of the conscious personality, the object and what is objectively given exert an extraordinarily strong influence, which is all the more insuperable in that it takes possession of the individual unconsciously and thanks to this is imposed upon consciousness without any counteraction. In consequence of the incorrect relation of the conscious personality to the object, the striving toward domination is not adaptation; in the unconscious there arises a compensatory relation to the object, which manifests itself in consciousness as a necessary and insuperable connection with the object. The more the conscious personality tries to secure for itself every kind of freedom, independence, freedom from obligations and superiority, the more it falls into slavery to what is objectively given.

Commentary: It is beautifully said that the personality and the world are commensurable magnitudes — very generalized and very philosophical; but in the context of a scientific typology a more developed argumentation for such a comparison would be needed, since, if one approaches this literally, it is not hard to see the colossal difference in the scales of these two concepts. But the conclusion from this premise — that “the normal introverting attitude is just as suitable for the testing of being as the normal extraverting attitude” — although it does not strictly follow from it, is perceived as quite plausible. Of course it would not hurt to specify the “degrees of suitability” of each of the adaptations under consideration, but the very fact that both survive may well serve as grounds for acknowledging the relative effectiveness of both types.

Jung: …if the conscious personality strives to give itself the significance of subject, then, naturally, as compensation, an unconscious strengthening of the influence of the object occurs.

Commentary: If one translates this judgement from Jungian language into modern language, it comes out that if someone strives to act actively and to introduce his own subjective convictions into the world, then he will have to overcome a resistance of the environment proportional to his persistence. It is, to be sure, unclear then what compensation has to do with it — for Jung uses this concept in a special psychoanalytic or analytical-psychological sense, since he opposed his own analytical psychology to Freud’s psychoanalysis. And in both these approaches the concept of compensation has the sense of a variety of psychic balance, when in response to a change in one psychic magnitude a counterbalancing change occurs in another psychic magnitude connected in one way or another with the first. However, in the case of the interaction of personality and environment the term “compensation” requires rethinking and refinement. One may, for example, speak of a resistance of the environment which may increase as pressure upon it increases, but to understand such resistance as compensation would be a conceptual strain. Of course it is not excluded that Jung had something quite different in mind.

Jung: This change manifests itself in the fact that, upon a sometimes simply convulsive effort to secure the superiority of the conscious personality, the object and what is objectively given exert an extraordinarily strong influence, which is all the more insuperable in that it takes possession of the individual unconsciously and thanks to this is imposed upon consciousness without any counteraction. In consequence of the incorrect relation of the conscious personality to the object, the striving toward domination is not adaptation; in the unconscious there arises a compensatory relation to the object, which manifests itself in consciousness as a necessary and insuperable connection with the object. The more the conscious personality tries to secure for itself every kind of freedom, independence, freedom from obligations and superiority, the more it falls into slavery to what is objectively given.

Commentary: Here Jung continues the theme of “compensation,” making it somewhat more concrete. And here he speaks directly of the resistance “of the object and of what is objectively given,” in which it is not hard to recognize the resistance of the environment, which he describes in terms of subjective relation as he understands it. Jung attempts to formulate here something like a psychic law of compensation, but since he says that this happens “sometimes,” his reasoning points only to a particular case. Nonetheless, his observation is of interest as pointing to a possible manifestation of psychic causality. It may be understood to mean that a “convulsive effort,” something like the maximum pressure a personality can exert upon the environment — both objectal and subjectal — meets with an “extraordinarily strong” resistance. Moreover, this resistance proves insuperable in proportion to the force of the personality’s unconscious attitude, which “is imposed upon consciousness without any counteraction.” The latter may be understood to mean that a personality may assimilate certain ideas uncritically, at the level of suggestion, but these ideas turn into imperative programmes compelling the personality to assert itself in a concrete environment, which may offer that personality strong resistance, and this resistance may be the greater the more stubbornly the personality attempts to realize its subconscious intention. This reasoning is quite plausible, but in connection with it the concept of “compensation” is not entirely adequate, since it contains the seme of a subjective relation to the expenditure of a resource, whereas the resistance of the environment is an objective phenomenon with its own objective causality.

Jung: Freedom of spirit is chained to a shameful financial dependence; independence of actions from time to time makes a timid retreat before public opinion; moral superiority falls into the mire of defective relations; the striving toward domination ends in a sad longing for love; the unconscious above all establishes a relation to the object, and precisely of such a kind and image as radically destroys the illusion of power and the fantasy of the superiority of consciousness.

Commentary: Here Jung adduces concrete examples of the “compensation” of actions, positions and intentions by the peculiarities of the environment in which the personality finds itself. A person wishes to demonstrate freedom and independence from the milieu in which he has found himself, but financial difficulties, hidden and direct threats, as well as frank violence on the part of the milieu, compel him to restrict himself, and this may be experienced within a wide emotional range — from slight regret to dramatic sufferings up to suicide. Of course a person may also set himself extreme tasks in relation to nature. For example, to climb Everest, to swim the Atlantic Ocean, or to defeat a tiger in hand-to-hand combat. There are people in the world who have attained success in such undertakings, and they experienced pride in their deed. But there was also a great number of failures. These are examples of situations in which resistance of the environment may arise, but here there is no occasion to speak of compensation. However, in this reasoning of Jung’s there is a hint of his understanding of how “the unconscious establishes a relation to the object” and of what this means. It seems this may be understood to mean that in the subconscious a dominant is somehow formed which impels a person to throw down a challenge to society or to nature, and once such a dominant has been formed, almost nothing depends on the personality. Let us recall the tragic death of Pushkin, when on the appointed day he sets off for the duel while his subconscious prompts him that he is doomed. Could he have refused the duel? Theoretically, yes. And in the history of duels such cases exist. But Pushkin, under the influence of a subconscious dominant, goes to certain death and receives a mortal wound.

But why does Jung describe the psychic situation of the personality in such hard-to-access concepts? It seems this is connected with the intellectual atmosphere of the beginning of the twentieth century. In order for us now to make sense of it, we must learn to translate the theoretical constructs of those times into the language of the beginning of the twenty-first century. But of course one should not think that Jung is theoretically infallible. The analysis carried out above of his understanding of extraversion and introversion shows that, notwithstanding his undoubted discovery of aspects of the personality unknown to science before him, he did not manage to work everything out and admitted a whole series of theoretical errors which his nearest followers were unable to correct.

Jung: The object, notwithstanding conscious diminution, takes on terrible dimensions. In consequence of this the conscious personality strives still more to separate itself from and to overcome the object. In the end the conscious personality surrounds itself with a formal system of protective measures (as Adler has truly depicted), which try to justify at least the phantom of superiority. In describing extraverted thinking I have already given a brief characterization of introverted thinking, to which I may here refer again. Introverted thinking orients itself above all toward the subjective factor. The subjective factor is represented at the least by a subjective directedness, which in the end determines the judgement. Sometimes a more or less ready image serves as the standard. Thinking may occupy itself with concrete or abstract magnitudes, but at the decisive place it always orients itself toward what is subjectively given. Thus, from concrete experience it leads again not to the objective thing but to a subjective content. External facts are not the cause and the aim of this thinking, although the introverting man very often gives his thinking this appearance; rather, this thinking begins in the subject and leads to the subject, even when it undertakes the most extensive excursions into the region of real actuality.

Commentary: Let us take this paragraph apart in more detail.

“The object, notwithstanding conscious diminution, takes on terrible dimensions.” — “Conscious diminution of the object” is something like a psychological defence of the rationalization type — “to the eye it is fine, but it is green,” says the fox in the fable about the grapes she cannot reach. A person, aware of the difficulty of a possible task, may under a pretext favourable to himself decline it. One may agree here also with the “terrible dimensions of the object,” since behind this stand human tragedies.

“In consequence of this the conscious personality strives still more to separate itself from and to overcome the object.” — Here the matter is one of the use of psychological defences, but these defences are realized not by consciousness but by the subconscious. So here Jung commits an error.

“In the end the conscious personality surrounds itself with a formal system of protective measures (as Adler has truly depicted), which try to justify at least the phantom of superiority.” — Protective measures are those same psychological defences, but this theme was first introduced by Freud, not by Adler, though the latter made his own contribution to this important theme.

“In describing extraverted thinking I have already given a brief characterization of introverted thinking, to which I may here refer again. Introverted thinking orients itself above all toward the subjective factor.” — Here Jung confirms, for the umpteenth time, his understanding of extraversion and introversion. As for the “subjective factor,” the logical errors in the definition Jung gave of it were shown somewhat above.

“The subjective factor is represented at the least by a subjective directedness, which in the end determines the judgement.” — This judgement is very hard to understand. From it it ought to follow that the “subjective factor” has at least more than one component, and that one of them is “subjective directedness”; but Jung makes no refinements here, and this too complicates the understanding of his text. What, then, is “subjective directedness”? In accordance with the general scientific understanding of the components of this term, it might mean “an attitude of the personality to act in this world in accordance with its own notions of expediency and effectiveness.” Such a definition presupposes that the personality may not reckon with notions of expediency and effectiveness accepted, for example, in its immediate milieu or even considered universally human. Of course this is by no means necessarily expressed in some extreme actions, but it is always something that distinguishes one person from others. These differences may relate to hairstyle, clothing, the decoration of a dwelling; they may manifest in vocabulary, plasticity, mimicry; and they may attain the level of heroic deeds too. But does this not apply to the overwhelming majority of people, independently of their typological characteristics? If so, then Jung’s tying of the concepts of extraversion and introversion to what he calls “subject and object” proves untenable.

“Sometimes a more or less ready image serves as the standard.” — Here it is unclear in what sense Jung uses the word “standard.” It is quite plausible that he has in mind something like “the scale of subjectivity,” which in that case may be motivated in some accidental way.

“Thinking may occupy itself with concrete or abstract magnitudes, but at the decisive place it always orients itself toward what is subjectively given.” — Of course Jung has introverted thinking in mind here, as he understands it, and he understands it erroneously.

“Thus, from concrete experience it leads again not to the objective thing but to a subjective content.” — And this is already some strange, metaphysical conclusion. The point is that Jung here offers us one single one out of several possible scenarios. A person begins with concrete experience E. This experience may be objective (Eo) or subjective (Es). In both cases the person may arrive either at an “objective thing” (To) or at a “subjective content” (Cs). Thus four scenarios are possible: (Eo) → (To), (Eo) → (Cs), (Es) → (To), (Es) → (Cs), along which the thinking process may unfold, but not one of these scenarios has a typological basis.

“External facts are not the cause and the aim of this thinking, although the introverting man very often gives his thinking this appearance; rather, this thinking begins in the subject and leads to the subject, even when it undertakes the most extensive excursions into the region of real actuality.” — This again is an unfounded and categorical conclusion of Jung’s relating to introverted thinking. Of course an introvert’s thinking may begin both with an external fact and with an inner experience, and may develop along one of the scenarios adduced above.

“But just as extraverted thinking rarely succeeds in squeezing a workable empirical concept out of concrete facts or in creating new facts, so introverted thinking is just as rarely fortunate in the constant conversion of the primordial image into an idea adapted to the facts.” — This is an example of exaggeration with regard to both kinds of thinking. Both kinds of thinking, each in its own sphere of realization, may be highly effective. Only, the final product of introverted thinking is an algorithm as an inner plan for the construction of an action, while extraverted thinking is a direct technological process ending with a consumer product.

“Just as in the first case a purely empirical accumulation of facts mutilates thought and suppresses the mind, so introverted thinking manifests a dangerous inclination forcibly to give the facts the form of its own image, or else to ignore them entirely in order to be able to unfold the picture of its fantasy.” — It is even hard to believe that a profound thinker such as Jung undoubtedly is could think that in the norm any thinking whatever could be so unproductive that in one case work with facts must mutilate and suppress it, and in the other forcibly fit the facts to some subjective pattern or “ignore them entirely.” Human thinking is a highly effective instrument of mankind’s self-assertion.

“In this case the idea depicted will not be able to deny its origin from a dark archaic image. This gives it a mythological feature, which is explained as ‘originality’ and in the worst cases as whimsicality, since its archaic character is not recognized as such by learned specialists unacquainted with mythological motifs.” — This is an interesting and profound idea, connected with Jung’s understanding of the collective unconscious, one of whose structural elements are the archetypes lying, in Jung’s opinion, at the basis of any varieties of mythology and representing “dark archaic images.” And here Jung attempts to tie this elaboration of his to the assessment of the product of introverted thinking, which he designates as “the picture of fantasy.” Of course thinking may generate fantasies too, but even behind them stand potential algorithms. Yes, thinking may generate fantasies too, but even behind them stand potential algorithms of possible activity. In just the same way, behind the loftiest abstractions of philosophical reflection there stands, in the final analysis, an algorithm which sooner or later breaks out and turns into a technological process.

“The subjective force of conviction of such an idea is usually great, and all the greater the less it comes into contact with external facts.” — In general, ideas may be exceptionally convincing, but precisely in those cases where behind them stands an algorithm of possible productive behaviour; but Jung’s proposed formula of the type “the more…, the more…” seems to be introduced by him as a habitual stereotype.

“Just as Darwin might be depicted as the normal extraverted thinking type, so one might point by way of example to Kant as the opposing introverted thinking type.” — By socionic notions Darwin is an extravert, and specifically an ILE (Don Quixote); but for writing his works he of course relies on introverted thinking, which is present in the structure of the psyche of people of all types. However, Darwin’s leading function is extraverted intuition, and since it is directed toward the cognition of the laws of the external world, Darwin makes discoveries relating to the external world. Kant, on the other hand, is an LII (Robespierre), and his leading function is introverted thinking, while his auxiliary extraverted intuition he applies to the discovery of the laws of thinking, to which he made his significant contribution.

“Just as the former speaks with facts, so the latter is based on the subjective factor. Darwin strives toward the broad field of objective actuality; Kant, on the contrary, reserves to himself the critique of cognition in general.” — Strange as it may be, Jung commits elementary errors in his judgements: it is not true that Darwin speaks with facts — he relies on facts and draws from them inductive conclusions, which belong to the category of laws, not of facts. And to say of Kant that he “reserves to himself the critique of cognition in general” is to misinform the reader, presenting the great thinker as a sceptic all but rejecting the possibility of cognition. Is Jung not judging Kant merely by the title of one of his works, The Critique of Pure Reason? Kant’s critique is constructive. By it he sums up several centuries of the development of European thought and brings it out onto a qualitatively new level. Yes, through the insolubility of the antinomies he shows the limitedness of formal logic, but human thinking is not reducible to that alone. After him will come thinkers of other types and will raise thinking to a new level. But one of the greatest problems posed by Kant is the problem of the deductive construction of the whole of human science, and this problem is still unsolved, though after Kant steps in the development of this idea were taken. So Kant’s thinking is highly productive, which does honour not only to him but to the whole glorious tribe of introverts.

“If we take Cuvier and oppose Nietzsche to him, the contrast will be still sharper.” — Here Jung commits an error unforgivable for the inventor of a typology. He compares Cuvier — an LII (Robespierre), with leading introverted thinking — with Nietzsche — an EIE (Hamlet), with leading extraverted emotionating; and since he wishes to compare two varieties of thinking, his choice of personalities is unsuited to this task.

Jung: Introverted thinking is characterized by the predominance of the thinking described above. It, like the extraverted parallel case, is under the predominant influence of ideas, which originate, however, not from what is objectively given but from a subjective foundation. He, like the extraverting man, will follow his ideas, but in the reverse direction — not outward but inward. He strives toward deepening, not toward broadening. By this foundation he differs to a very significant degree and in an unmistakable manner from the parallel extraverted case. What distinguishes the extraverting man — namely, his intense relatedness to the object — is usually almost entirely absent in him, as indeed in every introverting type. If the object is a person, then this person clearly feels that properly speaking he is regarded only negatively, i.e. in milder cases he is aware that he is superfluous, and in worse ones he feels that he is downright rejected as a hindrance.

Commentary: Apparently not everything here is in order with the translation or the editing, since thinking in this passage is defined through thinking itself. However, Jung’s basic delusion concerning extraversion and introversion deprives him of the possibility of fully separating the two varieties of the fundamental psychic process connected with the direct transformation of reality, in which introverted thinking prepares the algorithms of such a transformation while extraverted thinking realizes these algorithms in the form of concrete technologies.

Introverted feeling

Jung: Introverted feeling is determined chiefly by the subjective factor.

Commentary: In socionics introverted feeling is understood as relation. Relation is localized above all inside the psyche, but when necessary may be brought outward and translated into extraverted emotionating with characteristic intonations, mimicry, gesticulation and plasticity. In its introverted form it may be quite unnoticeable, but may manifest itself in the results of behaviour toward a partner.

Jung: This signifies for emotional judgement just as essential a difference from extraverted feeling as the introversion of thinking from its extraversion.

Commentary: This is one of the examples of tautological reasoning, of which there are very many in this text of Jung’s, and this significantly lowers its scientific quality.

Jung: Without doubt an intellectual exposition, or even an approximate description, of the introverted emotional process belongs among the most difficult things, although the peculiar essence of this feeling inevitably strikes the eye, if only attention is paid to it at all.

Commentary: Jung found himself in the trap of an incorrect understanding of the psychic functions — in logic this type of error is called an “initial delusion” — but position obliges, and so one has to invent ever more complex explanations and pile one misunderstanding upon another. In one of the preceding commentaries it was shown how quite comprehensibly and concretely introverted feeling may be described and defined.

Jung: Since this feeling is subordinated chiefly to subjective preconditions and the object has for it a secondary significance, it manifests itself significantly less.

Commentary: In connection with socionics one may speak of at least two levels of subjectivity: 1) the typological level, since already at the level of type each person will react differently to one and the same stimulus; 2) the level of personal history, since each person has individual peculiarities formed under the influence of the particular circumstances of his life. One may therefore say that all a person’s functions are subordinated to the subjective parameters of the personality and, naturally, introverted feeling too. But so, of course, are extraverted emotionating and all the other psychic functions — extraverted and introverted alike. In just the same way all functions depend on objective factors as well. Therefore Jung’s theoretical complications in this case prove useless.

Jung: This stage is mystical-ecstatic and prepares the transition to the extraverted functions suppressed by feeling.

Commentary: So Jung has now talked himself round to a “mystical-ecstatic stage.” Probably this is the only way he can explain the connection between the introverted and extraverted functions in the structure of the psyche — whereas the connection between all psychic functions in the psyche has a perfectly demonstrable cause-and-effect character.

Jung: Just as introverted thinking is opposed by primitive feeling, upon which objects are imposed with magical force, so introverted feeling is opposed by primitive thinking, which finds expression in concretism and slavish subordination to facts.

Commentary: Strange as it may seem, the European scientist C. G. Jung, instead of cause-and-effect explanations, invokes magical forces. In his clinical practice Jung noticed that in every person one of the psychic functions is leading and one subordinate, and thereby he made his typological discovery. As for the developedness of the functions, his judgement on this he made out of psychoanalytic considerations, from which it followed that a developed psychic quality is opposed by an infantile, primitive, underdeveloped property. As the practice of socionics has shown, oppositions of this kind are simplified, insufficiently concretized, and for a great many cases simply incorrect.

To the greatest degree, on socionic notions, what fits Jung’s conception in the sense of the subordination of one function to another is the ERF (expectational-resource function), since it is opposite to the PPF by vertness but of the same nality. This function Aushra in some variants of her model called suggestive, and, taking into account the personality’s openness on this function and the personality’s readiness to accept support on it, it may be called the function of greatest trust, while the PPF is the function of greatest confidence. If on this function some skills are presupposed, then, first, the person has an innate readiness to master them, and second, he has a heightened interest in them. Nonetheless, the skills going along this function remain for the person auxiliary, peripheral, not of first priority; and although he may conscientiously and quite effectively perform work corresponding to such skills, he would still more willingly occupy himself with work along the PPF (program-potential function), if favourable conditions for this existed. Thus, there are no sufficient grounds for assessing any psychic functions whatever too categorically as primitive and infantile.

Let us also note that from the moment of a child’s birth all his functions are undeveloped, and in the process of the formation of the personality the ratio between them may vary within wide limits. Since the TIM is innate, theoretically the leading function should always turn out to be the PPF, and it should also be the most developed. However, in socionic practice cases have been recorded in which, at least by formal signs, the ALF proved to be more developed, which is not hard to explain by the fact that the personality spent a significant part of its life in an extreme environment, when a high information load falls upon it. In this case a person with leading extraverted sensorics may behave like an intuitive type, quickly determining the direction of the search for a way out of the situation and building a line of strategic behaviour, while those whose leading function is extraverted intuition go over into a regime of harsh aggression and may attain high results in the martial arts — which, for example, might testify to a high level of development of the ALF.

Aushra was also the first to notice that some people in some circumstances behave, as she put it, not from the EGO but from the SUPEREGO — for example, they write a dissertation not at all because along the PPF they have discovered and elaborated a theme valuable in a scientific respect and wish to share their discovery, but because this is the done thing in society, and at the same time the corruption mechanisms for advancing such dissertations are well worked out in society. Cases have also been noted in which the PPF lags in developedness behind the CPF (communicative-probing function) or the RTF (realizational-technological function). Theoretically, cases are possible in which the most developed proves to be the ITF (imperative-temporal function). It is, to be sure, significantly harder to imagine that the CCF (conservative-critical function) or the MMF (motivational-mobilizational function) could find itself in such a position — that could be realized only in very weak personalities. Of course such questions stand in need of careful theoretical elaboration and experimental working through. In the present case it is important for us to emphasize that Jung’s categorical assessment of the subordinate and auxiliary functions as undeveloped or infantile stands in need of correction.

Jung: Feeling emancipates itself more and more from relation to the object and creates for itself a merely subjectively bound freedom of action and of conscience, which in the given case diverges from everything generally accepted. But all the more does unconscious thinking fall into the power of the objective.

Commentary: Here Jung as it were sketches the dynamics of the formation of a personality with leading introverted feeling. Apparently he considers that in the process of socialization such a person breaks away more and more not only from objective reality but is also opposed to social standards. In that case one would have to speak of some variety of autism; but in the norm such a development of any type contradicts the principle of adaptation, nor is such a phenomenon actually observed on a wide scale. But how is one to understand the concluding phrase of his reasoning? What does it mean that in such a person “unconscious thinking falls into the power of the objective”?

Let us try to make sense of it. First, in a type of any kind thinking has a conscious and an unconscious part. However, it seems that in this paragraph Jung nonetheless had in mind the conscious thinking of a person with leading introverted emotionating, but possibly made a slip, since he proceeds from the assumption that such thinking is infantile, undeveloped, and may therefore be considered unconscious. Of course this is not correct. It may be subordinate, but this does not mean that there is no conscious component in it. Second, subordination is not the equivalent of undevelopedness. It may, for example, as a result of training, command a great number of logical procedures, use the complex concepts of modern philosophy, and only close attention and analysis of such thinking can discover the signs of its subordination to the leading function.

But Jung is speaking of the dependence of such thinking on the “object.” Yet can thinking be in general independent of objective subject-matter? That could be only some special case of a deep isolation of consciousness from the external world. This means that thinking always works with both objective and subjective subject-matter, though one may speak of certain accents. But then what in particular did Jung have in mind in formulating the thought analysed here? Perhaps some intensification of dependence on external circumstances — for example, on the possibility of earning a living in some production? But what has the thinking process as such to do with it?

Jung: The predominance of introverted feeling I have found chiefly among women. The proverb “Still waters run deep” concerns these women. For the most part they are silent, hard of access, incomprehensible, often hiding behind a childish or banal mask, and often too of a melancholic temperament. They do not shine and do not push themselves forward. Since they are guided predominantly by their subjectively oriented emotions, their true motives remain for the most part hidden. Outwardly they are harmonious, they do not stand out in any way, they manifest a pleasant calm, a sympathetic parallelism which does not wish to compel another, to influence him or even to educate and change him.

Commentary: This is an interesting observation of the outstanding psychologist, and it can of course be checked statistically. But would his conclusion be confirmed in the process? The point is that no theoretical grounds are known that would permit a significant disproportion in the number of bearers of the various types. Presumptively, all types are represented in mankind in roughly equal measure. However, it is not excluded that there may be gender peculiarities in the quantitative distribution of the types. Certain grounds for this exist, though they are insufficient for categorical conclusions.

I have managed to prove rigorously that some SF (socionic functions) are more strongly expressed in men and some in women. In men both varieties of thinking and the two irrational extraverted functions are strengthened, and in women, correspondingly, both emotionalities and the two irrational introverted functions. Possibly the strengthening of the emotional function in women may lead to a systematic error in diagnosing their type, with the replacement of a thinking type by an emotional one.

Jung: If this external side is somewhat more pronounced, then a slight shade of indifference and coldness appears, which may increase to the point of indifference toward another’s well-being and misfortune. Then one clearly feels how the emotions turn away from the object. In the normal type this case of course occurs only when the object in some way acts too strongly. The harmonious parallelism of the emotions therefore takes place only so long as the object, in the average state of the emotions, moves along its own path and does not try to cross the path of the emotions. The genuine emotions of the object are not accompanied but are softened and restrained, or better said, “cooled” by a negative emotional judgement.

Commentary: “If this external side is somewhat more pronounced, then a slight shade of indifference and coldness appears, which may increase to the point of indifference toward another’s well-being and misfortune. Then one clearly feels how the emotions turn away from the object.” — Apparently this is a practical observation of Jung’s; that is, he had occasion to observe women whom he considered bearers of introverted emotionality in the position of the leading function, and they behaved in a detached and cold manner toward someone whom in this case Jung designates as an object. Naturally, representatives of any type may behave in a detached and cold manner toward someone.

In socionics there are two TIMs of whom Jung might be speaking in this paragraph — the ESI and the EII. Women of both these types are sufficiently restrained in the manifestation of their emotions, above all by comparison with the corresponding extraverted types, the ESE and the EIE. Theoretically this is grounded in the fact that in the former the function of extraverted emotionating is in the ID block, and in the latter in the EGO block. The former are “immersed” in relations, the latter in emotions. However, both the one and the other are capable in the corresponding circumstances of emotionally “turning away from the object” — the TIM manifests itself not in this but in the particular shades of how this is done. This Jung does not distinguish, and what he considers essential for the characterization of introverted emotionality is irrelevant with regard to typology.

“In the normal type this case of course occurs only when the object in some way acts too strongly. The harmonious parallelism of the emotions therefore takes place only so long as the object, in the average state of the emotions, moves along its own path and does not try to cross the path of the emotions.” — What Jung describes is characteristic of all normal people independently of their type. Naturally, if “the object moves along its own path and does not try to cross the path of the emotions,” then why should “the emotions” in that case react to it in any way?

“The genuine emotions of the object are not accompanied but are softened and restrained, or better said, ‘cooled’ by a negative emotional judgement.” — Here Jung’s object and subject change places, and if the subject acts upon the object with a “negative emotional judgement,” then it is quite possible that the latter’s emotions are “cooled.” Obviously, one can discover here the psychological content of people’s relations, but it is universal, not typological.

Jung: While, for example, extensive compassion is expressed in the proper place by words and deeds and may at once free itself again from this impression, intensive compassion closes itself off from all expression and attains a painful depth which embraces the misery of the world and therefore falls dumb.

Commentary: What is interesting in this utterance is that Jung here replaces extraverted and introverted with the words “extensive” and “intensive,” apparently understanding them as synonyms. Alas, one cannot agree with this. The first pair of terms corresponds to notions of the external and the internal, while the second corresponds to notions of weakly and strongly connected sets. Of course any author has the right to put into the words he uses whatever sense he likes, but it would be more scientific if he gave the corresponding definitions in doing so. But if one accepts his substitutions, then here he comes very close to an adequate understanding of extraverted and introverted emotionality. The first manifests itself outwardly and is always obvious, while the second is hidden within, is not always noticeable even to an experienced observer, and may attain a painful depth — which of course is not obligatory, since relations may also be pleasant and light; but “extensive” emotions too may attain a painful intensity, up to heart attacks. And they are by no means always and necessarily able “at once to free themselves” from the tension and from the cause producing it.

Jung: Perhaps it will suddenly manifest itself in excess and lead to an astonishing deed of, so to speak, a heroic character, to which, however, neither the object nor the subject can find a correct relation.

Commentary: Undoubtedly, “astonishing deeds” may be performed by representatives of any types, and this subject-matter has no direct bearing on typology.

Jung: Outwardly, to the blind eye of the extraverting man, this compassion seems coldness, since it accomplishes nothing tangible, and extraverted consciousness cannot believe in invisible forces.

Commentary: Here is a vivid example of how Jung follows the lead of a momentary insight — for some reason it seems to him that extraverts understand nothing about compassion, that they are “blind” in this respect. Apparently Jung forgets that there exist emotional extraverts, capable of compassion and understanding people who sympathize. And there exists a great number of extraverts who not only believe “in invisible forces” but also directly sense their action. Of course there is also a great number of introverts who believe in no invisible forces whatever and in no way sense their presence in this world. And this subject-matter too does not belong to the competence of typology.

Jung: It is sensed as an oppressive feeling which distances those around. Thanks to this, this type acquires a certain mysterious force, which may to a high degree fascinate precisely the extraverting man, because it touches his unconscious. This force proceeds from felt unconscious images, but is easily transferred from the unconscious to the conscious personality, thanks to which the influence is distorted in the sense of a personal tyranny. But when the unconscious subject identifies itself with the conscious personality, then the mysterious force of intensive emotions too is transformed into a banal and arrogant striving toward domination, into vanity and tyrannical self-will. Hence arises the type of woman known from her unfavourable side by her suspicious ambition and her spiteful cruelty. But such a direction leads to neurosis.

Commentary: This paragraph too lies outside typological content, but it is interesting in that here an experienced psychologist expresses his opinion concerning the psychological causes of belief in mysterious forces. He connects the mysteriousness of these forces with the peculiarities of people’s experience of the influence of the unconscious. But is the unconscious itself not a receptacle of some forces, and are these forces not mysterious — if only because their physical identification has never been carried out? The very term “unconscious” is the embodiment of science’s impotence before the mysterious phenomena of nature in general and of the human psyche in particular.

As for the “type of woman with suspicious ambition and spiteful cruelty,” here Jung again goes beyond the limits of his own typology into the region of characterology.

Jung: A rational judgement necessarily seems to the introverting man in certain nuances different from what it seems to the extraverting man. The chief error which occurs in this connection consists in the fact that people try to prove an error in the conclusion instead of acknowledging a difference in the psychological premise. Such an acknowledgement comes with difficulty to every rational type, since it undermines the apparently absolute significance of his principle and delivers him over to what is its opposite, which amounts to a catastrophe.

Commentary: “A rational judgement necessarily seems to the introverting man in certain nuances different from what it seems to the extraverting man.” — Jung, asserting the existence of a difference between extraverts and introverts with regard to “rational judgement,” does not say in what it consists.

“The chief error which occurs in this connection consists in the fact that people try to prove an error in the conclusion instead of acknowledging a difference in the psychological premise.” — To those who understand formal logic, this reasoning must appear at the least strange, since conclusion and premises in a logical syllogism constitute a single whole, and there cannot be in the conclusion what was not in the premises. It is also known that there exist several types of errors connected with premises and conclusion; but Jung has in mind something entirely different — for him the matter concerns a supposedly typological difference with regard to rational judgements. Of course logical rules are just as universal as, say, the multiplication table, though the attitude toward them and toward the multiplication table may also be different, including negative and dismissive, notwithstanding the objective necessity of using these instruments in life. Such differences are already quite noticeable at school.

Part of such differences may be explained by the position of the function of introverted thinking in the structure of the psyche. Frank disregard of logical restrictions is most often met with in representatives of the types SEE (Napoleon) and IEE (Huxley), in whom l (introverted thinking) is in the position of the CCF (conservative-critical function). Representatives of these TIMs, having e (introverted emotionating) in the position of the CPF (communicative-probing function), easily and skilfully manipulate people, and when they encounter logical argumentation they can simply sweep it aside, using, for example, the formula “you have your logic and I have mine,” and also many other evasions permitting them to fence themselves off from an inconvenient interlocutor.

“Such an acknowledgement comes with difficulty to every rational type, since it undermines the apparently absolute significance of his principle and delivers him over to what is its opposite, which amounts to a catastrophe.” — The peculiarity Jung indicates is hard to correlate with Model A, and therefore hard to give a typological grounding. But rational types do have sufficient typological grounds for relating to logical rules as to an instrument.

Jung: The introverting type is perhaps still less understood than the extraverting; and not because the extraverting man is with respect to him a still more merciless and criticizing opponent than he himself could be, but because the style of the age, which he imitates, is against him. He finds himself in the minority — and not even numerically, but by his emotions, in relation not to the extraverting man but to our general Western world-view. Since he imitates the general style with conviction, he undermines himself, because the modern style, with its almost exclusive recognition of the visible and tangible, is against his principle.

Commentary: This is an example of reasoning in the style of socio-psychological metaphysics. No fundamental mutual incomprehension between extraverts and introverts follows from the general structure of the psyche; but between concrete types precisely a fundamental or basic mutual incomprehension does follow from the structures of their psyches: for any TIM there exist 4 types with which it stands in relations of active antagonism, and as many again with which it stands in relations of passive antagonism.

Jung: He must devalue the subjective factor in consequence of its invisibility and compel himself to imitate the extraverted overvaluation of the object. He himself values the subjective factor too low and therefore experiences a feeling of inferiority. It is therefore not surprising that precisely in our time, and especially in those movements which run somewhat ahead of the present, the subjective factor is expressed in an exaggerated and therefore tasteless and caricatured manner. I am speaking of modern art. The undervaluation of his own principle makes the introverting man egoistic and imposes upon him the psychology of the oppressed.

Commentary: Probably there is some grain of truth in the reasoning adduced, but a very small one. Speaking of modern art, Jung manifestly demonstrates an absence of taste for it, and this absence of taste, according to Jung, belongs to the subjective factor — in Jung’s case, an exaggerated one. Probably any person, independently of type, may “devalue the subjective factor,” for example by renouncing his own convictions; but this by no means means that he does not sense it in any way. On the contrary, a person may very keenly experience the necessity of renouncing certain values, but this peculiarity itself lies beyond the limits of typology.

Jung: The more egoistic he becomes, the more it seems to him that others, who apparently are quite able to imitate the modern style, are oppressors from whom he must defend and guard himself. For the most part he does not notice that his chief error consists in the fact that he does not hold to the subjective factor with that fidelity and devotion with which the extraverting man follows the object. Thanks to the undervaluation of his own principle, his inclination toward egoism becomes inevitable, and by this, besides, he arouses against himself the prejudice of the extraverting man. But if he remained true to his principle, then the admissibility of his attitude would be confirmed by its general effects and would dispel the misunderstandings.

Commentary: Although the reasoning in question may have a certain psychological value, it of course does not belong to typology. It is below the typological level.

The introverted sensory type

Jung: The predominance of introverted sensation creates a definite type which is distinguished by certain known peculiarities. This is an irrational type, since out of what is happening it makes a choice guided not predominantly by rational judgement, but bases itself on what precisely is happening. Whereas the extraverted sensory type is determined by the intensity of the object’s impact, the introverting man orients himself toward the intensity of the participation of subjective sensation called forth by objective stimulation.

Commentary: “The predominance of introverted sensation creates a definite type which is distinguished by certain known peculiarities.” — An example of a non-concrete assertion: it is not indicated what precisely these peculiarities are.

“This is an irrational type, since out of what is happening it makes a choice guided not predominantly by rational judgement, but bases itself on what precisely is happening.” — Here one may agree with Jung, since he gives an indirect but quite adequate definition of irrationality. The irrational type acts under the influence of an immediate impulse, while the rational type uses for taking a decision a procedure in which logic is used in full measure. However, at the basis of the concepts “rational” and “irrational” lie more fundamental entities. The “irrational” is what is outside the subject and comes to him through the channels of perception. The “rational” is what has been passed through the subject’s psychic environment, what has been worked over by him and is therefore understood.

“Whereas the extraverted sensory type is determined by the intensity of the object’s impact, the introverting man orients himself toward the intensity of the participation of subjective sensation called forth by objective stimulation.” — And here Jung again returns to his primary delusion. “The intensity of the object’s impact” has nothing to do with it — the sensory channel works at any intensity of signal, provided only that it does not go beyond the thresholds of perception. Extraverted sensorics is determined by the opposition of a living being to the force pressure of the environment. Introverted sensorics is determined by a living being’s ability to distinguish the consumer qualities of a resource.

Jung: What is too low is raised somewhat; what is too high is somewhat lowered; what manifests enthusiasm is softened; what is extravagant is restrained; and the extraordinary is brought to a “proper” formula — all this in order to keep the object’s impact within the necessary limits. In this way too this type acts oppressively upon those around him, unless his complete harmlessness is beyond all doubt.

Commentary: Here we see an example of psychoanalytic dialectics, which has no direct bearing on typology but may be of interest as a description of a certain general psychic mechanism, whose universality may nonetheless be called into question, since psychological phenomenology also gives directly opposite examples, in which opposites are strengthened and sharpened. In such a case what is considered hostile is deprived of any signs of positivity whatever. Any moments in it that are even slightly positive are entirely removed, and the hostile takes on the character of a caricature, such as may not infrequently be seen in the political press. And conversely, what is considered positive may be idealized to any extent whatever, being entirely deprived of negative features. Such a case is often met with in the state of being in love. It is curious to note that deformations of reality of this kind are quite naturally connected with the physiological mechanism of lateral inhibition.

Jung: His development distances him chiefly from the actuality of the object and delivers him over to the power of his subjective perceptions, which orient his consciousness in the sense of an archaic actuality — although this fact, in consequence of a deficiency of comparative judgement, remains entirely unconscious to him. In actual fact he moves in a mythological world in which people, animals, railways, houses, rivers and mountains seem to him partly benevolent gods, partly malignant demons. That they seem so to him he is not aware. But they act as such upon his judgements and actions.

Commentary: Here Jung uses psychoanalytic dialectics connected with the concept of compensation — the whole reasoning is built on this, and this in itself creates the impression of meaningfulness, since compensation is a mechanism with causal connections built into it. But whether there is any real psychological sense in this reasoning must be established in the corresponding empirical situation. Translated into everyday language this reasoning might look as follows. 1) “If an introverted sensory type develops in the direction of his leading function, then, since in Jung’s opinion ‘he is determined by the subject,’ he moves away from objective reality.” What could that mean? Among introverted sensory types there are, for example, very many cooks, actors, artists, doctors, and in general they may be found in any profession, though some come more easily to them and some with more difficulty. If, say, a cook, realizing his leading function, invents ever new dishes with original taste and external presentation, and thereby “develops” in the sensory direction, then in what can his break with reality be seen?

If an artist-sensory type — say, some Claude Monet (SEI, Dumas) — plunges ever more deeply into the mastery of colour rendering on canvas and, having found an original variety of paint stroke, paints in the course of a day 12 pictures depicting one and the same haystack under changing lighting, then someone might reproach him with not being occupied in building houses as something belonging to real actuality, or with not catching fish in nets as the captain of a trawler; but he too, after all, produces a product for which there is a demand, earns his living by his pictures, and enjoys respect in society. It is obvious that here no break with reality can be detected. Of such a cook or artist one may in a certain sense say that he is “in the power of his subjective perceptions,” since he experiences the taste and smell of food or the colour range of a picture finely and with a great number of nuances; but why should this be understood as a distancing from reality rather than, on the contrary, as a deeper penetration into it?

But, for example, in the case of Van Gogh (SLI, Gabin) one may speak of an accentuated “power of subjective perceptions,” manifested in particular in the passionate, “nervous” and expressive stroke which permitted him literally to sculpt his pictures in his impetuous manner. He painted many pictures which are now valued at millions of dollars, but during his lifetime this genius of painting lived in poverty, and only a small material support from his brother allowed him to occupy himself with self-expression by means of painting. The example of Van Gogh shows that an irrational sensory type may indeed find himself in the power of “his subjective perceptions” and, in the end, having lost connection with reality, end his life in a house for the mentally ill; but this is by no means a typological peculiarity of people with leading sensorics — it occurs from time to time in brilliant representatives of any types. For example, the philosopher Nietzsche and the artist Vrubel — both EIEs, Hamlets — ended their passionate activity in madness, but the causes of this lie not in typological belonging (it can only influence the peculiarities of the process’s course) but in special life circumstances. One may therefore say that a representative of any type may fall under “the power of subjective perceptions,” which deprives Jung’s reasoning of typological grounds.

“The consciousness of such a sensory type goes deeper into the archaic meanings of the collective unconscious, which leads to his ever greater break with reality.” The subtlety here is that archaic meanings are by no means necessarily something primitive, infantile or simplified, though this too is not excluded. On the contrary, in many cases archaic meanings prove to be the deep foundation of any varieties of creativity — sensory, intellectual, intuitive and emotional. Thus the relation of the conscious and the unconscious is significantly more complex than might follow from notions of the archaic and infantile character of the unconscious.
“Since in the irrational sensory type thinking is subordinated to the leading sensorics, in the case of a sensory accentuation he proves incapable of making use of his intellect in order to withstand the dramatic immersion in the depths of the sensory archetypes, and in fact acts as one non compos mentis.” Yes, this happens both within relative norm and in cases of severe accentuations, but this is by no means an exclusive peculiarity of irrational sensory types and is met with in representatives of all types. Do not representatives of any types fall into dependence, including narcotic dependence, following the lead of primitive sensory impulses? It is astonishing that neither a high intellect nor a penetrating intuition was able to overcome even a dependence on smoking tobacco or on alcoholic drink.
“A person is not aware that he behaves as if people, animals, railways, houses, rivers and mountains were either benevolent gods or malignant demons, but the actions of such people may be understood precisely so.” This idea of Jung’s may most fully be understood as the alienation of man from the products of his own labour; but this, alas, is again not typological and comes up against the nature of social relations. The overwhelming majority of people in an unjust society — and other societies have not existed and do not exist either in the modern world or in antiquity, for at least several thousand years now — cannot realize their subjective potential and become either physical freaks-slaves or moral freaks-exploiters, but this applies to bearers of any psychological type. Here Jung commits a logical error connected with the distortion of the scope of the concepts investigated, since he detects the property he is investigating only in part of the subjects of the statistical sample, whereas it embraces the whole logical universe of the elements of the set under investigation.

Jung: He judges and acts as though he were dealing with such forces. He begins to notice this only when he discovers that his sensations are entirely different from actuality. If he is more inclined toward objective reason, then this difference will seem to him pathological; if, on the contrary, true to his irrationality, he is ready to give his sensation the value of reality, then the objective world becomes for him a phantom and a comedy. But only cases inclined to extremes reach this dilemma. Ordinarily the individual contents himself with his closedness and with the banality of the actuality which he unconsciously treats archaically.

Commentary: A person judges and acts in accordance with the programmes he has assimilated in the process of adapting to society, and, properly speaking, no other possibility exists for him. And since all modern societies are irrational, irrationality becomes an immanent component of the behaviour of any person, independently of whether he belongs to the rational or the irrational types. In the overwhelming majority of cases a person is not capable of reflecting on the inadequacy of his behaviour to the task of self-realization, but merely experiences dramatic or tragic feelings adequate to the impossibility for him of finding an embodiment for his best abilities.

It is clear that moral freaks are not capable even of this. Here the word freak is used not only in the ordinary but in an extended sense, as an indication of a discrepancy with one’s destination, to which the instrumental equipment of abilities points. Social irrationality bears down upon people to such a degree that through its prism the real world is perceived as a phantom and a comedy. But of course not only as a comedy, but as a tragedy too. Do you remember Shakespeare’s “all the world’s a stage…“? This means that Shakespeare too, being the bearer of a rational type (EIE, Hamlet), perceived the world as an irrational stream which may look now like a comedy, now like a tragedy — which is merely a marker of the truth hidden in its depths.

Jung: His unconscious manifests itself chiefly in the suppression of intuition, which has an extraverted and archaic character. Whereas extraverted intuition possesses that characteristic ability to find its way by a “good nose” to all the possibilities of objective actuality, archaic extraverted intuition possesses a flair for all the ambiguous, dark, dirty and dangerous back sides of actuality. For such intuition the real and conscious intention of the subject signifies nothing, but behind it it scents all the possibilities of the archaic preparation of such an intention.

Commentary: In what can the unconscious manifest itself at all? It may both suppress and push forward or activate something that lies outside the zone of consciousness. And this “something” may belong to the sphere of intuition, sensorics, thinking or emotionality. Jung considered that only the content of the subordinate function, and to a lesser degree of the auxiliary ones, could be displaced and infantilized.

However, Jung’s preliminary considerations proved far from perfect, and they were refined and brought to a level of reliability in socionics. Now we can oppose to the leading function seven auxiliary functions, since with respect to the leading PPF (program-potential function) all the rest may be considered as ensuring its work, which gives grounds for understanding them as auxiliary. But they may also be considered subordinate, since their activity depends on the activity of the PPF.

It is obvious that here we are following the lead of Jung’s primary empirical terminology, which he introduced while orienting himself by a psychoanalytic understanding of the human psyche, whose chief regulating mechanism, in his opinion, is the principle of compensation. The simplest expression of this principle may be described in the words: “If some element in the psyche is strengthened, then the element polar to it is weakened.” The deductively constructed model of the psyche, as well as socionics’ methodological foundation, different from Jung’s, permits us to look somewhat differently at the primary model of the psyche constructed by Jung.

Let us note that although Jung did not make use of the concept of a model, his circular scheme with a leading, a subordinate and two auxiliary functions is of course a model of the psyche, albeit a sufficiently simplified one. In the socionic Model A the whole set of functions represents a system. This means that although each function has its own semantics, its work is necessary for the joint working of the whole set of psychic functions. In socionics the work of each generalized function is made concrete in the extreme by its original semantics, and there is therefore no necessity to consider even the PPF to be the leading one, though it is precisely with it that the subjective principle inherent in the psyche as a whole may to the greatest degree be connected.

Socionics permits the conclusion that the psychoanalytic principle of compensation is a mechanistic exaggeration of the several polarities present in the structure of the psyche. These polarities presuppose an opposition of functions along certain parameters, whereas along other parameters they may prove close to one another.

As for the reasoning of Jung’s under consideration, when sensorics is the leading function the two intuitions are in the position of the ALF (adaptive-load function) and the ERF (expectational-resource function). In accordance with the semantics of the ALF, the function connected with it is not, under normal conditions, suppressed but remains unactualized, and is engaged in a tense environment or under the threat of one. Of the function connected with the ERF it also cannot be said that it is “suppressed,” since it continuously scans the environment with a view to detecting a resource.

Jung’s understanding of extraverted intuition manifests itself in his comparison of it with a “good nose,” which of course suits sensorics better, at least in the literal sense. For in order to detect “all the possibilities of objective actuality” and the path to them, this very actuality must be “felt out” sensorily, and in taking the corresponding decisions one cannot do without thinking. Intuition as the function of understanding is of course necessary in this, but it does not replace cunning, which may be connected with a “good nose”; it only makes it more resourceful. Leading extraverted intuition ensures penetration into the regularities of the environment and an understanding of its potential possibilities, and with that everything is said. Its content, like the content of any other function, may be anything whatever, and it is therefore incorrect to introduce “varieties” of intuition according to the peculiarities of the content of separate intuitive acts. So these “ambiguous, dark, dirty and dangerous back sides of actuality” belong to archaic subject-matter, and not to a state of intuition.

The last sentence of this paragraph may be understood to mean that when intuition collides with archaic content, it penetrates into its potential possibilities and thereby detects the hidden motives of the “real and conscious intentions of the subject,” and consequently is not deceived by their apparent soundness and points to what lies behind them. And this may quite well be understood to mean that for intuition such “intentions of the subject signify nothing.” One may also say that in such cases intuition proves to be an instrument of conscience, and here too there are no grounds for assessing it as archaic.

Jung: Therefore it contains in itself even something dangerous, undermining, which is often in sharp contrast to the benevolent harmlessness of consciousness. So long as the individual does not withdraw too far from the object, unconscious intuition acts as a beneficial compensation to the somewhat fantastic attitude of consciousness inclined toward credulity. But if the unconscious comes into opposition to consciousness, then the intuitions come to the surface and manifest their pernicious effects, forcibly imposing themselves upon the individual and calling forth obsessive representations of the most unpleasant kind about the object. The neurosis arising from this is usually an obsessional neurosis, in which behind the symptoms of exhaustion hysterical features are concealed.

Commentary: One gets the impression that Jung here identifies the unconscious complexes with which psychoanalysts work with the normal psychic function of intuition. Well, you know, to reduce typological intuition to “obsessional neuroses behind which hysterical features are concealed” is a bit much even for a psychologist of genius.

Introverted intuition

Jung: These contents are in themselves, of course, inaccessible to experience — a property they share with external objects. Just as external objects are only very relatively such as we perceive them, so relative also are the forms of appearance of internal objects, the products of their essence and peculiarity inaccessible to us, of the intuitive function. Just like sensation, intuition has its subjective factor, which in extraverted intuition is so far as possible suppressed, but in introverted intuition becomes a magnitude serving as a measure.

Commentary: Here it is not hard to catch reminiscences of the Kantian thing-in-itself, with references to the “essence inaccessible to us” of the intuitive function. This essence proves inaccessible because of a primary error in the definition. In general it was difficult to make sense of intuition even when there was only one of it; and when Jung discovered extraversion and introversion, two intuitions appeared, and it is understandable that it was difficult for Jung to make sense of two at once.

Jung: The peculiarity of introverted intuition also creates, when it attains predominance, a man of a peculiar type — namely, on the one hand a mystical dreamer and seer, and on the other a fantast and artist. The latter case ought to be the normal one, since this type too has an inclination to confine itself to the perceiving character of intuition. The intuitive man usually remains at perception; his highest problem is perception, and insofar as he is a productive artist, the conversion of perception into images.

Commentary: Since introverted intuitive types among the whole population of the globe at present number no fewer than a billion and a half, mystical dreamers, seers, fantasts and artists would be quite noticeable — that would be every fourth person; is that not rather a lot?

Jung: But the fantast contents himself with contemplation, through which he manifests, i.e. determines, himself. A deepening of intuition, of course, extraordinarily distances the individual from tangible actuality, so that he becomes a riddle even to those immediately around him. If he is an artist, then his art proclaims extraordinary things remote from the world, which cry out in all colours and which are at one and the same time significant and banal, beautiful and grotesque, sublime and whimsical. If he is not an artist, then he is often an unrecognized genius, a forgotten magnitude, a sort of wise half-fool, a character out of a “psychological” novel.

Commentary: This is how a person with leading introverted intuition looks in Jung’s conception. Yet to them belong remarkable poets, writers, inventors, financiers… As for “wise half-fools,” they occur in the same proportions among all types, and introverted intuition has nothing to do with it.

Jung: Although it is not the custom of the introverted intuitive type to make perception a moral problem, since for this a certain strengthening of the judgement-producing functions is necessary, still a relatively insignificant differentiation of judgement suffices to transfer contemplation from the region of the aesthetic into the region of the moral. Hence arises a variety of this type which differs essentially from its aesthetic form but which, notwithstanding this, is characteristic of the introverted intuitive.

Commentary: This is a reasoning very difficult to understand, especially given that it must be interpreted on typological material. What does it mean “to make perception a moral problem”? For which types is this “the custom”? And does Jung really consider that in “the introverted intuitive type” the “judgement-producing functions” are necessarily weakened? What is interesting here, however, is that Jung speaks of a “variety of this type.” This may be understood to mean that Jung, with his characteristic penetration, distinguished an aesthetic and some other variety of the introverted intuitive type. In socionics this conjecture of Jung’s received strict confirmation in the types IEI (Yesenin) and ILI (Balzac). However, in the typological sense they cannot be ascribed either feeble-mindedness or an absence of moral values, if only because typology is neutral with respect to intellectual and moral values.

Jung: The introverted intuitive most often suppresses the sensation of the object. By this his unconscious is distinguished. In the unconscious there arises a compensating introverted sensory function of an archaic character. The unconscious personality may therefore most easily be described as an extraverted sensory type of a lower, primitive kind. Impulsiveness and a lack of measure are properties of this sensation, together with an exclusive boundness to the impression of the sense organs. This quality compensates the fine airiness of the conscious attitude and gives it a certain heaviness, thereby preventing a complete “sublimation.”

Commentary: It is not very clear what “to suppress the sensation of the object” means. Intuitive types have a sharpened observation and in the norm catch the minutest details of an object. Among them are many people with a fine musical and even absolute pitch (Shostakovich — ILI, Balzac). The logical variety of intuitive introverts is capable of maintaining the technological parameters of productive processes with high accuracy. Incidentally, among them there are many with a sweet tooth… So “suppression of the sensation of the object” has nothing to do with it. And the unconscious has nothing to do with it.

It seems that Jung here proceeds from psychoanalytic notions of compensation: since intuition is the leading function, sensorics is suppressed. It was shown above that this is a simplified notion of the relation of the psychic functions. As for extraverted sensorics in these types, it is connected in them with the ERF (expectational-resource function) and actively seeks and awaits force support from a partner and from the environment. From such a point of view this function may be characterized as relatively weak, but that does not mean that such people cannot, for example, stand up for themselves, though this range is narrower in them than, say, in irrational extraverted sensory types — but this by no means means that they are entirely helpless.

Impulsiveness these types do have, but this is a general property of all irrational types. Jung’s assertion of a lack of measure in the bearers of this type, however, is excessive. In general such a quality may belong to character but has no bearing on type. If one takes, for example, immoderation in the intake of food or alcohol, then a lack of measure of this kind is met with in representatives of all types.

The last phrase in this reasoning is an example of the application of the concept of interfunctional compensation in describing psychological types. However, the matter should be one not of compensation but of a balance of the psychic functions. Compensation presupposes a struggle for a limited resource, whereas balance is connected with systemic links.

Jung: But if, thanks to a forcible exaggeration of the conscious attitude, a complete subordination to inner perception sets in, then the unconscious comes into opposition, and there appear obsessive perceptions with an excessive boundness to the object, which counteract the conscious attitude. The neurosis takes the form of an obsessional neurosis, whose symptoms are partly hypochondriacal phenomena, partly hyperaesthesia of the sense organs, partly obsessive connections with definite persons or other objects.

Commentary: Here we are again dealing not with typological but with psychoanalytic reasonings of Jung’s. This reasoning does not belong among the very comprehensible ones. In the first place, what does “forcible exaggeration of the conscious attitude” mean? One may suppose that this can happen, for example, when a person under the pressure of circumstances is compelled without breaks or rest to perform for a long time some work requiring heightened attention. Thus a person may sit for many hours at a computer, drive a car along a demanding route, or shoot back from a house surrounded by enemies. But how is one to understand that as a result of such efforts “a complete subordination to inner perception sets in”? What is “inner perception”? Is that the same introverted intuition? But it is here in the position of the leading function. The blurredness of the concepts Jung uses devalues his text.

Jung: Both the types described above are almost inaccessible to external examination. Since they are introverted and in consequence of this have an insignificant capacity and inclination for expression, they give very little guiding data for a correct judgement. Since their chief activity is directed inward, from outside only reserve, secretiveness, indifference or uncertainty and an apparently unfounded shyness are visible. If anything is expressed, then it is by indirect manifestations. Expressions of this kind arouse, of course, a prejudice against this type among those around. In consequence of this they are for the most part undervalued or, at the least, not understood.

Commentary: The practice of socionics gives sufficient grounds for holding that all types are quite accessible to “external examination,” and it is simply incomprehensible why there should be any typological discrimination with respect to one type or another. A problem here is possible only in connection with the insufficient development of diagnostic procedures. And Jung repeats erroneous reasonings of this kind again and again, and all because from the very beginning he thought of the “chief actuality” of introverts as something directed inward. Introverts of all varieties, in the norm of course, prepare food, sew clothes, tend plants in the garden and the vegetable plot, make merry, take part in scandals and fights — in short, manifest themselves in all the external spheres of life. There are shy ones among them too, but this happens among extraverts as well. And to assert that from outside in introverts only “defective and relatively unconscious functions” can manifest themselves is a deep misunderstanding. And prejudices against introverts are no greater than against extraverts.

Jung: To the degree to which these types do not understand themselves, because to a significant degree they lack precisely judgement, they likewise cannot understand why they are constantly undervalued by public opinion. They do not understand that their outward-going actions in reality do not possess the necessary qualities. Their gaze is fascinated by the wealth of subjective events. What is constantly happening there is so absorbing and so full of inexhaustible charm that they do not at all notice that what they communicate about it to those around them usually contains only very little of what they themselves experience inwardly in connection with it.

Commentary: It is interesting: what meaning does Jung put into the expression “to understand oneself”? What is it that intuitive introverts do not know about themselves that, say, introverted sensory types do know? Can it be said of Honoré de Balzac, who was an ILI, that he did not understand himself? Is the capacity for self-understanding a typological peculiarity, or is it acquired as a result of upbringing and education? I am certain that people of any type are capable of learning to understand themselves, and that such a peculiarity is not innate — that is, presumptively, a newborn does not understand himself. And did Jung really meet in his life people who could transmit entirely adequately what they experience? A simple counter-example here is dreams. They are seen by people of any type, though not all people see dreams; but hardly anyone succeeds in retelling a dream with the same detail with which it was perceived by the sleeping person.

Jung: The fragmentary and for the most part merely episodic character of their communications places too high demands on the understanding and readiness of those around; and besides, their communication lacks the warmth inherent in the object, which alone possesses the force of conviction. On the contrary, these types very often behave outwardly rudely and dismissively, although they are not at all aware of this and do not intend it. These people would be judged more justly and would be surrounded with greater indulgence if it were known how difficult it is to convey in comprehensible language the results of inner contemplation. But still this indulgence must not go so far as to relieve them altogether of the requirement of communicating their experiences. For such types this would be the greatest harm. Fate itself prepares for them, perhaps more often than for other people, external difficulties requiring to be overcome, which may sober them from the intoxication of inner contemplation. But often, in order finally to extort from them a human means of communication, great need must be encountered.

Commentary: “The fragmentary and for the most part merely episodic character of their communications places too high demands on the understanding and readiness of those around; and besides, their communication lacks the warmth inherent in the object, which alone possesses the force of conviction.” — This is an interesting observation of Jung’s, which points to one of the markers of irrationality, but it applies to all irrational types and not only to intuitive introverts; though it is very hard to understand what “warmth inherent in the object” Jung has in mind.

“…these types very often behave outwardly rudely and dismissively, although they are not at all aware of this and do not intend it.” — This is not a typological property, and to ascribe it precisely to a type rather than to a concrete person is an error.

“These people would be judged more justly and would be surrounded with greater indulgence if it were known how difficult it is to convey in comprehensible language the results of inner contemplation.” — In this judgement one may discern an indication of intertype relations, when the bearers of some types understand the bearers of other types only with difficulty. Jung had these ideas, but he never did manage to bring them to the level of model-based demonstrability.

“But still this indulgence must not go so far as to relieve them altogether of the requirement of communicating their experiences. For such types this would be the greatest harm. Fate itself prepares for them, perhaps more often than for other people, external difficulties requiring to be overcome, which may sober them from the intoxication of inner contemplation. But often, in order finally to extort from them a human means of communication, great need must be encountered.” — Such a description of a type is nonetheless accentuated, which apparently must be connected with Jung’s clinical activity.

Jung: From the extraverted and from the rational point of view, these types are perhaps the most useless of all people. Regarded from a higher point of view, such people serve as living proof of the fact that a rich and mobile world and its full and intoxicating life exist not only outside but also within. Of course these types are one-sided manifestations of nature, but they are instructive for anyone who does not let himself be blinded by any spiritual fashion. People of such an attitude are movers of culture and educators in their own way. Their life teaches more than they say.

Commentary: So this is how Jung understands the extraverted and the rational point of view! These utterances of his may be regarded as part of an implicit definition of extraversion and rationality; but if conclusions about the uselessness of people of some type are drawn from it, then it is not far from there to the idea of the necessity of their physical elimination. Naturally, an objective typology cannot lead to misanthropic conclusions. Extraversion and rationality in themselves, unburdened by a one-sided ideology, are in no way connected with negative assessments of any types whatever. From the fact that the whole set of types was formed in the process of the evolutionary adaptation of the species homo sapiens, and that all types are represented in mankind, one may already conclude that all types are necessary to mankind and that one cannot reduce the whole matter to narrowly understood usefulness.

Besides, Jung forgets that in the structure of a type intuition always goes in pair with auxiliary or leading thinking or emotionating. Socionics knows two types with leading introverted intuition — the ILI (Balzac) and the IEI (Yesenin). The ILI is exceptionally hard-working and persevering; he is able to calculate expenditures of time intuitively and manages to do everything on time. He is able to maintain the parameters of technological processes with high accuracy. Obviously even this is sufficient not to draw conclusions about the uselessness of this type. The IEI is penetratingly lyrical, plastic, and knows how to please certain representatives of the powers that be. Out of them come remarkable actors, poets, singers, commercial travellers, intermediaries, advertising agents — in short, they are good everywhere where it is required to win confidence. In professions where it is required strictly to maintain a technological process, it is significantly harder for these people to realize themselves. But never mind: many of them settle in life quite well, and even significantly better than some extraverts.

As for the “one-sidedness of these types” of which Jung speaks, then, from a typological point of view, all types are the expression of a unique generalized quality, and in this sense they are all one-sided; but each of these sides reflects one of the corresponding unique sides of our world. In the absence of any one of these 16 TIMs, some undoubtedly valuable fragment of information about the world would prove inaccessible to mankind.

Jung: But access to the unconscious and to the most suppressed functions opens, so to speak, of itself and with sufficient protection of the conscious point of view, if the path of development goes through the secondary functions, and also, in the case of a rational type, through the irrational functions.

Commentary: What does “access to the unconscious” mean? Freud in his time came to the conclusion that the unconscious gives signals in the form of dreams, slips of the tongue, slips of the pen and so on, which may be recognized by observers, and in the case of dreams by the subject himself; but besides this, one must still guess what such a signal means. Are markers of the unconscious, for example, the certain incoherence of the self-expression of irrational types or the manifestation of rudeness of which Jung spoke above?

IMAGE

Jung: When in this work I speak of an image, I understand by it not a psychic reflection of an external object, but rather a view which originates from poetic verbal usage — namely, an image of fantasy, only indirectly related to the perception of an external object. This image is based rather on the unconscious activity of fantasy; as its product, it appears to consciousness more or less suddenly, roughly in the manner of a vision or hallucination, without possessing, however, their pathological character, i.e. without belonging to the clinical picture of some illness.

Commentary: This is a clear and useful refinement of the term Jung uses.

DIFFERENTIATION

Jung: Differentiation means the development of differences, the separating out of parts from a whole. I use the concept of differentiation in this work chiefly with respect to the psychological functions. So long as a function is to such a degree fused with another or with several others — for example, thinking and emotions, or emotions and sensation — that it cannot manifest itself in its own right, it is in an archaic state; it is undifferentiated, i.e. it is not separated out from the whole as a distinct part, and as such does not exist in its own right.

Commentary: This reasoning of Jung’s, in the psychological sense, is undoubtedly of interest. Here the great psychologist demonstrates his observation and penetration in connection with the relation of the psychic functions. Jung comes to the conclusion that at certain stages of the personality’s development the functions may fuse to such a degree that they are not perceived as independent. And consequently one cannot speak simply of the thinking of a concrete individual, since it simply cannot be separated out from its alloy with emotionating, sensorics or intuition. Of course such a state of affairs would not merely complicate typological diagnosis — it makes it impossible. And with this one can no longer agree, since it contradicts the innateness of the TIM with its whole functional structure. Here one has to acknowledge that Jung shifts the accent from the definition of the concept of the functions to the difficulties of distinguishing them. The TIM exists independently of whether a psychologist is able to determine it or not.

Moreover, one may say that in any state, even the most developed, the mutual influence, mutual interpenetration and mutual marking of the functions goes nowhere; and, on the contrary, even in a small child, at least from the age of six months, all the functions are not only present but may also be recognized in their specificity. Therefore Jung’s categorical conclusion that in “syncretic” cases no function “as such exists in its own right” is erroneous.

Jung: Undifferentiated thinking is incapable of thinking separately from other functions, i.e. sensations or emotions or intuitions are constantly mixed into it; undifferentiated feeling is mixed, for example, with sensations or fantasies — for example, the sexualization (Freud) of emotions and thinking in a neurosis.

Commentary: Here we again collide with the problem of definitions. Thinking is thinking, and as such is occupied with the working over of information by means of intellectual operators, independently of subject-matter. Jung, however, here confuses the specificity of the functions with the material they work over. If a person, for example, speaks of his impressions in the steam room — that is, thinks about sensations — then the latter are the content of thinking, but they do not change its essence. Moreover, even in the most developed state that same thinking cannot entirely free itself from an emotional component as an additional content. Thus, if a professor of mathematics proves a theorem in a monotonous voice, then it is precisely his monotonous intonation that indicates the specific presence of the function of emotionating, which here works in parallel with thinking and carries out the working over of the information content by means of its own operators.

Jung: Ordinarily an undifferentiated function is characterized further by the fact that it possesses the property of ambivalence and ambitendency, i.e. every lowering noticeably brings with it its own negation, whence arise characteristic inhibitions in the use of an undifferentiated function. An undifferentiated function is still fused in its separate parts; thus, for example, an undifferentiated capacity for sensation is harmed by the fact that the separate spheres of the sense organs are mixed.

Commentary: The use here of the word “ordinarily” as an operator increasing the indeterminacy of a judgement lowers the effectiveness of the latter. This means that there exist cases in which an undifferentiated function does not possess the properties Jung enumerates — that is, it is not ambivalent and not ambitendent. How, in this context, can these two terms be understood? In psychology there exists, for example, the concept of ambivertedness, i.e. the equally valid presence in the psyche of the extraverted and introverted attitudes. Incidentally, socionics, by virtue of the high accuracy of its concepts, denies such a possibility. The bearer of a type may be either an extravert or an introvert, though when other factors are overlaid his true attitude may prove hard to distinguish. So, in speaking of ambivalence, does Jung have in mind the vertness of a function or something else? This remains indeterminate. But if he has in mind precisely vertness, then he is mistaken. And what else could Jung have had in mind? Surely not that thinking might not differ from emotionating, sensorics or intuition? But that too is a confusion over definitions.

FUNCTION

Jung: By a psychological function I understand a known form of psychic activity which under various circumstances remains in principle equal to itself.

Commentary: Let us note that Jung speaks here of a psychological and not a psychic function. We shall return to this, but first let us analyse what Jung has said. So Jung defines the psychological function — but is his assertion a definition? Let us bring Jung’s assertion to normal form: “A psychological function is any psychic activity whose specificity and boundaries can be fixed with sufficient definiteness.” A function is precisely an activity, and therefore Jung’s judgement contains the error idem per idem. Now let us sort out the difference between the psychological and the psychic and try to understand the great psychologist’s line of thought. The psychological relates to the personality and, ultimately, to the subject, and is fixed in social phenomena, while the psychic relates to the individual, to the psychophysiological support of vital activity. For example, sight is a psychic function, while perception is a psychological one;… ((to be continued)). Psychic activity is precisely a psychic function, while psychic activity filled with social content is already a psychological function. The difference here is one of levels. The social level of the functioning of the personality belongs to the competence of psychology, while the psychic functions belong to the competence of psychophysiology. Psychological activity is impossible without the psychic, but it is not reducible to it — an understanding which comes to many scientists with great difficulty. A simple analogy: the content of television programmes cannot be perceived without a television set, but it is not determined by the television set. The computer is a still more convincing example: the content of programmes does not depend on the “hardware,” but different “hardware” supports different programmes.

The fact that Jung did not understand much in his own discoveries is to a significant degree explained by the fact that he did not fully understand — paradoxical as it sounds — the basic categories of psychology. Psychology simply had not yet reached this in the process of its growth. In just the same way many contemporary psychologists still do not understand socionics.

Jung: Regarded energetically, a function is a form of appearance of libido which under various circumstances remains in principle equal to itself, approximately in the same way as a physical force may be regarded as a constant form of appearance of physical energy.

Commentary: This phrase sounds approximately as if someone were to say that an automobile, regarded energetically, is a form of appearance of petrol, or, say, a form of appearance of mechanical energy. Is it not clear that energy is here only a primary substrate, as cloth may be the substrate for a dress — but a dress of course is not reducible to cloth; or a table as an appearance of wood. It is clear that in both the dress and the table the essence has an informational and not a material nature. So too in a psychic function energy is of course present, but its essence has another, informational nature.

Jung: In general I distinguish four basic functions, two rational and two irrational functions — namely thinking and emotions, sensation and intuition.

Commentary: Undoubtedly this is an empirical fact. The functions named are not only directly observed in life and thereby verified, but the intellect of the scientist is besides capable of distinguishing separate functional levels, which is likewise quite sufficient for verifying the presence of these levels.

Jung: Why precisely these four functions I acknowledge as basic functions, I cannot adduce grounds a priori; I can only say that such an understanding took shape in me in the course of many years of experience.

Commentary: This is an exceptionally interesting admission of the great psychologist, which testifies to the fact that beyond the level of distinction indicated he was unable to pass — but that this proved possible in socionics.

Jung: I distinguish these functions from one another because they cannot be reduced one to another. The principle of thinking, for example, is absolutely distinct from the principle of emotions, and so on. In principle I distinguish these four functions from fantasy, because fantasy seems to me a peculiar form of activity which may manifest itself in all four basic functions. Will, like attention, seems to me an entirely secondary psychic phenomenon.

Commentary: Here we are dealing with a remarkable testimony to the limitedness of Jung’s achievements in psychology. He proved able to distinguish four functions of a high level, but he did not go further than that; though it is not excluded that he would have accepted socionics with enthusiasm. Thanks to socionics we understand that the will is an extraverted form of sensorics and thus enters the functional field of one of Jung’s four functions. Analogously, fantasy as the function of invention is one of the manifestations of intuition. Even when fantasy is realized in the form of a caprice, it still remains a manifestation of intuition. Therefore one can now no longer agree with Jung’s assessment of will and fantasy as “entirely secondary psychic phenomena.”

LIBIDO

Jung: By “libido” I understand psychic energy. Psychic energy is the intensity of a psychic process, its psychological value. By this one must understand not an ascribed value of a moral, aesthetic or intellectual kind; psychological value is simply determined according to its determining force, which is expressed in definite psychic actions. By “libido” I likewise understand not psychic force — an error which critics have often made. I do not hypostasize the concept of energy, but employ it as a concept for intensity or value. The question whether a specific psychic force exists or not has nothing in common with the concept of “libido.” I use the expression “libido” often in one sense with the expression “energy.” The grounds for calling psychic energy “libido” I have set out in detail in the works indicated in the note.

Commentary: In the history of psychology this is an important moment. Here Jung comes out against Freud’s understanding of libido, into which the latter put a narrowly sexual sense. However, the problem of psychic energy remains in psychology. Psychophysiologists know that physiological processes are of course accompanied by energetic processes. And they can even tell a great deal about them — from the point of view of chemistry, electrical potentials, the conversion of the latent energy of certain molecules, for example ATP, into the mechanical energy of the musculature, and so on. So in physiology all is in order. But, alas, the psychic cannot be reduced to the physiological, and analogously the psychological cannot be reduced to the psychic. In a living organism psychic phenomenology unfolds against the background of physiological processes, but its content is subject to another causal series. Here one may speak of a certain analogy between the construction of a television set and the content of TV programmes. The integral experience of mankind speaks in favour of the existence of special kinds of energy distinct from those known to physicists. Hypotheses about special kinds of energy have been advanced in science (Adamenko, Volchenko, Shipov and others), but such hypotheses have as yet received no direct scientific-laboratory confirmation. Among scientists professing various forms of pragmatism, positivism and phenomenology, however, the conviction obtains that what cannot be measured does not exist. Nonetheless, the search must be continued.

In conclusion to this small analysis of the judgements of Jung that are key for socionics, connected with his elaboration of the conception of psychological types, it must be said that Jung is thereby exhausted for socionics — in the sense that there is nothing more for it to take from him. He made his contribution to the development of the psychology of personality. But before him and alongside him there were psychologists who prepared the soil on which Jung was able to make his discoveries — it is unlikely that Jung could have attained his summits if there had been no Freud. It is unlikely that Aushra could have discovered socionics if there had been no Jung; but the task of new generations of psychologists is not to stop at what has been attained but to go further. Jung’s psychological types, however, now represent only a historical interest, and enough of referring to his works as to a primary source.

And one more quotation, from the work of A. Daniels, “Jung — the Madame Blavatsky of Psychotherapy,” which Churyumov gives in full: Daniels judges Jung’s contribution to positive human knowledge to be small and contestable, his writings diffuse and self-contradictory, the man himself irresolute, and his present influence confined to a small circle of devotees, though he once enjoyed world fame as an omniscient guru. He charges Jung with being an unnaturally obscure writer and thinker who never brought clarity to a confused question — and says it is now impossible to tell whether this came from want of talent or from an unconscious sense that clarity would invite disagreement or outright rejection; the exact nature and ontological status of the archetypes, he notes, remain unclear to this day. An extreme selectivity toward the facts, Daniels argues, led Jung to false and even wild generalizations — or perhaps, he adds, the false generalizations led to the selectivity. Extracting a definite opinion from Jung’s pronouncements he likens to seizing an eel with soapy hands or catching steam in a butterfly net. Jung, on his account, was in the highest degree superstitious, had no notion of what logical argument is, and could believe utter nonsense; and the thousands of pages he wrote, full of every kind of rubbish, now sit unread and mouldering on library shelves.

Socionists respect Jung for his discoveries in the field of psychological typology, and not for his hypothetical reasonings about the subconscious and his mystical revelations; but socionists have nothing more to take from Jung. The analysis carried out of certain texts of Jung’s shows how raw brilliant conjectures may be, and that much labour must be expended to bring them into working condition — which is precisely what was done by the brilliant Lithuanian thinker Aushra Augustinavichute.

Literature

Jung, C. G., Psychological Types.
Churyumov, S. I., The Smile of the Cheshire Cat, or the Possible and the Impossible in Socionics: Problems, Hypotheses, Solutions, 2007.

Socion Archive

Explorer

Section 3