Section 5

I. N. Kalinauskas in [23, p. 105] proposes the following refinement of these terms: “extratimity–introtimity is a property inherent in a person constantly; extraversion–introversion is a quality, a state, manifested in him in a specific situation. There are extraverted introtims and introverted extratims.”

The Finds and Losses of I. Kalinauskas, or Constructive Socionics

(a methodological review of the book “Games Played by We”)

Socionics, despite the hostile attitude of the official bosses of science, has been alive and developing for about 40 years now. Philosophers and historians of science can observe in real time all the dramatic vicissitudes of the “wild” formation of a new scientific direction. “Wild” — because from the very first moment of its emergence at the end of the 1960s it was not adopted by scientific institutions and found itself in the hands of a large number of enthusiasts who, for the most part, came from other fields of science and knew almost no psychology, or were self-taught in this sphere. They were in love with socionics, because it was able, by rather simple means (as it seemed to them), to explain what scientific psychology — relying on clinical terminology and a pathological understanding of the key processes in the human psyche — had tried to speak of so inarticulately and at such a remove from the real human being. Socionics, this “psychology with a human face,” not only designated the basic psychic entities in a way accessible to the modern intellectual, but also proposed a symbolic model that made it possible to calculate (I am not afraid of the word) the fundamental features of a personality, and along with that to establish generalized parameters of relations between specific people — which had remained a weak point of psychology.

However, the superficial psychological training of socionics amateurs and their very limited understanding of scientific methodology did not remain without consequences. The “simple,” or rather simplified, image of socionics created the impression that psychological constructs could easily be created and manipulated, and as a result, alongside a full-fledged scientific product, theoretical freaks began to appear — often original and even aesthetically attractive, but false in their essence. These costs of scientific creativity, or of “scientific creativity” (since both cases occurred), quite understandable in a mode of searching, in many cases began to turn into the dogmatic citadels of their creators, who — now in the role of “gurus” — began aggressively to disseminate their homegrown product among a psychologically naive flock, forced to assimilate, along with the simple and comprehensible socionic truths, the froth and chaff of the theoretical “embellishments” of their mentors.

The peculiarities of the methodological complexes of the main players in the subject area of socionics, and theoretical permissiveness, have led to the fact that there now exist more than 25 (!) paradigmatic and semi-paradigmatic variants of socionics. Some of these variants are asserted by their creators to be scientific socionic schools. Among these schools, alongside crude or finely disguised errors, there are unconditional scientific achievements that can and must constitute the core of the new science. However, this understandable, human inability of leading socionicists to come to a consensus, and the absence of real help from academic psychologists, makes the process of the new science’s formation unmanageable, and one can only hope that time will put everything in its place.

In this book, works will be examined by certain socionicists who lay claim to a revision of the basic concepts of classical socionics, whose foundations were laid by Aušra Augustinavičiūtė; and certain constructs will be assessed from a methodological point of view that do not withstand logical analysis and, upon inspection, turn out to be syntactic and systemic errors, blunders, artifacts, delusions, intuitive flights of fancy, or paradigmatic distortions within socionics. The author by no means claims final truth, but would like to receive logical feedback from those scholars who have their own methodologically grounded theoretical position on the subject under analysis.

Igor Kalinauskas is a man talented in many respects. He has an excellent command of psychological knowledge and has made a significant contribution to psychology. He is one of the first students of Aušra Augustinavičiūtė, and his understanding of socionics unquestionably represents a value that must be investigated. His book Games Played by We is written talentedly, vividly, and wittily — at the very beginning of the book the author warns that a jester’s virus, implemented by the author in “smileys,” has crept into the book’s serious text. However, when after an attentive reading of the book one discovers a large number of theoretical errors, the “smileys” begin to be perceived as distracting interference, only lowering one’s trust in the reliability of the main text. Kalinauskas’s understanding of socionics differs greatly from the classical foundation presented in the works of Aušra Augustinavičiūtė, and this gives grounds to speak, at the least, of a different paradigm, which the author has even designated as constructive socionics. At the basis of his interpretation of socionics lies the Method of Qualitative Structures (MQS), and it is there that the source of the divergences from the classics should be sought. In his theoretical constructions Kalinauskas relies substantially on P. V. Simonov’s hypothesis about the physiological basis of human temperaments. However, he attempted to adapt this quite correct hypothesis to a physiological interpretation of his own understanding of informational metabolism, for which he had to substantially rebuild the conceptual apparatus of socionics and to distort Simonov’s hypothesis itself. Do the divergences between classical socionics and what Kalinauskas has called constructive socionics carry a positive meaning, and do they introduce into socionics useful knowledge adequate to its subject? Alas! Not accepting and, apparently, not understanding model “A,” substituting for it the simplified scheme of the “helm,” behind which — if we discard the aesthetic rhetoric — stands not merely a somewhat altered but a distorted model “A-Ju” (Aušra Augustinavičiūtė – Jung), Kalinauskas inevitably finds himself at the level that preceded model “A,” with all the consequences flowing from this. The distortion of model “A-Ju” is concretely expressed in the fact that the vertness of the “third” function of model “A-Ju” has been changed — the function whose semantics is connected with the concept of the PLR, the point of least resistance. By changing the vertness of this function, Kalinauskas substantially altered the result of its possible interpretation, and, by the notions of classical socionics, this introduces an irremediable systematic error into Kalinauskas’s corresponding reasonings.

Kalinauskas’s book, while preserving the basic terminology of socionics, so alters its conceptual order that this may be regarded as a paradigmatic act of sabotage against it. It would be more or less understandable if Kalinauskas had called his book “Anti-Socionics”; but, preserving the authorial name of the new science, he so distorts its primary classical meaning that, encroaching on the authorial brand of socionics’ creator, he only compromises it.

Apparently, while rating Aušra Augustinavičiūtė’s talent highly, Kalinauskas either fails to fully grasp the greatness of what she accomplished, or subconsciously belittles her achievements, inclining to the view that they at the very least require significant further elaboration — and that precisely such elaboration is being performed by the author of Games Played by We, that is, by I. N. Kalinauskas.

Here is how Kalinauskas speaks of Jung and Aušra Augustinavičiūtė: “The works of precisely this scholar (Jung) became the methodological base from which the Lithuanian scholar A. Augustinavičiūtė, pushing off, undertook an attempt to create a science of the regularities of human behavior.” In this quotation, “undertook an attempt to create a science of…” is a clear underestimation of what Aušra Augustinavičiūtė did. She did not “undertake an attempt” — she laid the foundations of a fundamentally new direction in psychology. The words “became the methodological base” also distort the real state of affairs. Aušra Augustinavičiūtė has an entirely different methodological base — the modeling of the structure of the psyche and the theoretical realization of the concept of informational metabolism, which was entirely absent in Jung. Moreover, by calling socionics a science “of the regularities of human behavior,” Kalinauskas distorts, vulgarizes, and crudely narrows its subject. Yes, socionics makes it possible to draw certain conclusions about human behavior, but its subject is different — the study of generalized informational-metabolic processes in the psyche. Already from this quotation one can see the critical tonality and Kalinauskas’s underestimation of Aušra Augustinavičiūtė’s work, and — most importantly — a direct failure of understanding, and as a result a crude distortion, of most of her theoretical constructs.

A direct distortion of the content of socionics can be seen in Kalinauskas’s statement that “…the quintessence of what has been named ‘socionics’ is constituted precisely by the theory of intertype relations.” — Let us grant that this is how Kalinauskas understands socionics — that is his affair. This is usually designated as the “attained level” — as far as a person managed, so far did he understand. Of course, socionics is considerably more, considerably more complex, and considerably more interesting. Socionics is the TIM, and the IR, and the ARP, and a multitude of subtle and fundamental methodological problems extending far beyond the bounds not only of socionics but of psychology. But all this remains outside the scope of Kalinauskas’s attention.

Without delving into a critique of Kalinauskas’s descriptions of socionic types and relations, or of his other psychological passages (sometimes brilliant and profound), let us dwell on the basic paradigmatic divergences in the theoretical positions of Kalinauskas and Aušra Augustinavičiūtė. These include Kalinauskas’s main methodological instrument — the MQS (Method of Qualitative Structures); Kalinauskas’s attempt to rely on P. V. Simonov’s hypothesis to ground the socionic understanding of such psychic functions as thinking, emotioning, sensing, and intuition; Kalinauskas’s limited understanding of informational metabolism; Kalinauskas’s substitution of the concept of the I-conception for the concept of the structure of the psyche; and Kalinauskas’s claims to have discovered the truth of socionics and to have provided its theoretical grounding.

Let us begin with the MQS

This is Kalinauskas’s own invention, and, presumably, he wields this instrument with virtuosity. We will not analyze this construct in itself — perhaps it has merits of its own as an instrument for analyzing complex phenomena. We will merely try to consider how adequately the MQS has been applied by the author to the development, grounding, or interpretation of the ideas of classical socionics, whose foundations were laid by Aušra Augustinavičiūtė.

Kalinauskas: “The Method of qualitative structures is in fact a heuristic principle for considering any object conceived as a whole.”

Commentary: It appears that Kalinauskas, speaking of qualitative structures, opposes them to quantitative ones, and this means that misunderstandings are possible with the default use of terms. Alas, since we are dealing with a new construct, basic definitions of the concepts used are necessary. Are “qualitative structures” simply another name for the familiar philosophical categories? If so, then everything is more or less clear — philosophical categories will be used, but they will be called qualitative structures. This means that all philosophical categories without exception are qualitative structures, and the singling out of four such categories as a special instrument does not justify the use of this term, owing to the conceptual discrimination of other subsets of categories. However, in the present case we will be interested only in the question of how effectively and adequately the categories singled out by Kalinauskas are used in relation to socionics.

Kalinauskas obtains his own model of the psyche (model “K”), identifying it with the vector depiction of the MQS scheme and assigning to its “aspects” the meanings of psychic functions.

What, then, are the categories singled out in the MQS?

Kalinauskas: “The Aspect of Organization (AO) is the construction of the whole, everything that determines its form and boundaries.”

Commentary: Such is the definition of the MQS’s author. Consequently, this category answers the questions: how is something constructed? What is the domain of its existence? What is the principle of the self-unfolding of this entity’s organizational structures? The central subject of socionics is the structure of the psyche. Hence, the AO ought to answer the question of how the psyche is constructed, what its structure is, why it is constructed precisely thus and not otherwise. Kalinauskas does not answer these questions — he simply superimposes the vector scheme of the MQS on one or another psychic structure according to the principle “insofar as this satisfies the author’s intuition.” The author gives no particular explanations, but places the reader before the accomplished fact of the identification of a multitude of psychological categories with the categories of the MQS. Look at Table 01, a). Here Kalinauskas matches the concepts he has singled out from the I-conception with the vectors of the MQS. We are not told what the I is; we do not know how it is organized; yet it is placed in correspondence with the AO. This can be understood thus: since the I exists — which is accepted by default — it presumably possesses organization, and therefore, apparently, this identification is accepted as plausible, and possibly even as a definition of the I. Of course, from the assumption of the I’s existence it should follow with equal persuasiveness that it somehow functions and is somehow connected with the world, and on this basis it could equally well have been identified with the aspects of functioning or of connection; but the author preferred his own arrangement, and, of course, he has the right to do so — while we have the right to expect explanations, definitions, and proofs.

Kalinauskas: “The Aspect of Functioning (AF) is the production, or mode of external realization, of the whole.”

Commentary: In the same table the AF is identified with the category “I as the Other.” Must this be understood to mean that when the I functions, it ceases to be itself and becomes the Other — that is, it produces not itself but the Other? But then why can the I not with equal success produce the We, or generate Self-Relation? The answers to these questions depend on the author’s intuitive impressions.

Kalinauskas: “The Aspect of Connection (AC) is the connection of the given whole with its external environment, a characterization of their mutual influence.”

Commentary: The identification of the AC with the category “I as We” likewise follows from nowhere. Why with We, and not with the Other, not with the World or the Environment? But of course some intuitive insight may stand behind this.

Kalinauskas: “The Aspect of Coordination (AK) is the qualitative determinacy of the whole, binding together all three above-named levels; a change in the aspect of coordination changes the qualitative determinacy of the entire whole.”

Commentary: In the theories of other authors one encounters the concept and notion of wholeness, but no one has spoken of wholeness as a function of an aspect of coordination. It, apparently, ought to answer the questions: how do heterogeneous elements become a single whole, turn into a system, begin to function jointly? However, the identification of the AK with the category “I as Self-Relation” proposed by Kalinauskas contains no answers to these questions. That the I somehow relates to itself may be regarded as one of the moments of its functioning, but it by no means entails the effect of uniting the AO, AF, AC, and AK into a system. That in the process of relating to itself the I can pose to itself questions about its own organization, functioning, and connection with its surroundings by no means specifies the parameters of these aspects, but can merely point to the corresponding problems — to say nothing of the fact that it may find itself facing other problems as well, for example the problem of its essence and existence, of its ends and means, of the limits of its own freedom, and so on down the list of philosophical categories.

The arbitrariness of the identifications considered, their apriorism and subjectivity, turns the MQS into one of the many metaphysical schemes in which world philosophy is so rich, and which have so many times been refuted by real human practice and the historical development of society.

Table 01, b) presents the most general theoretical scheme of those proposed by Kalinauskas, for some reason named by him “Aspects of the structure of the IM type.” The point is that the category of aspect has already been occupied by the author for the basic concepts of the MQS, and it seems that here the term “aspect” is used in a more general sense, somewhere closer to the concept of “element” — although this does not follow from the figure, since there the four categories of the MQS are present in their proper meaning, and it therefore remains unclear whether the term “aspect” is used identically in the scheme itself and in its title.

Let us peer into the proposed scheme. In the center we see a structure of four functions, which the author explains in the text as the basis of the structure of the IM type. However, he immediately makes a substantial reservation: that “these four functional quadrants” are called functions in socionics, whereas a “more adequate designation” of them is “aspects of the structure of the IM type”; but he retains the name “function,” as he says, “to ease the reader’s perception of the material” — which introduces confusion into the understanding of his text. An interesting situation results: the author has one thing in mind but writes another, masking with the reader’s interests the deep differences between his concepts and the concepts of socionics. This is how the generalized functional system of the psyche, which is the principal subject of socionics, is replaced by the metaphysical packaging of the I-conception promoted by the author — which, incidentally, is not at all bad in itself.

In the present case the MQS, acting as Kalinauskas’s principal methodological instrument, leads to the elimination of the functional order of socionics, its replacement by the metaphysical categories of the MQS, and the artificial assignment of the semantics of the psychic functions, which not only fails to reflect the real properties of the psyche but concretely distorts them. And since the author from the very beginning replaced the principal object of socionics — the structure of the psyche — with the concept of the I-conception, what is at issue here is not socionics at all, but what the author has very generally called “the foundations of human behavior” — which, alas, reflects only particular aspects of it (behavior) and does not correspond to the maximally generalized understanding of the functional system in classical socionics.

The aforementioned innovations of Kalinauskas suffice to establish a severe distortion of the primary meaning of socionics and to regard Kalinauskas’s work as a paradigmatic act of sabotage against socionics, and this gives one the right to cease further analysis of Kalinauskas’s reasonings. Nonetheless, it is instructive to see what exactly Kalinauskas distorts in socionics, and how.

So, what turn out to be functions for Kalinauskas, and what is their semantics?

Kalinauskas connects the 1st function with the AO. Its semantics he formulates as “I consume from outside for the perception of myself, which means an assessment of the situation from the point of view of an internal, passive set.”

Commentary: Strictly speaking, functions have no numbers, and the assignment of numbers to them depends on the author’s theoretical premises, although the functions are unambiguously positioned in the psyche. Apparently, in the present case the first number indicates the hierarchical supremacy of this function. In contrast to Kalinauskas’s theory, in socionics the corresponding function is not responsible for consumption. There it is the program-potential function (PPF) and is responsible for forming the internal model of the external environment, for creating programs of adaptive behavior, for the generalized potential capacities of the personality. The work of this function is secured by the preceding work of the adaptation-load function (ALF) and the conservative-critical function (CCF). At the base of this function’s positional semantics lies extraverted intuition, and it has no direct contact with the external world.

In Kalinauskas’s interpretation, however, this function is in direct contact with the external world and provides the subject’s recognition of himself through the products consumed. In itself this is an interesting image with its own proper meaning: the subject, in Kalinauskas’s thought, does not from the outset know who he is, and only by running up against the object, against its resistance, does he begin to form his own qualitative determinacy. This is precisely how the process of self-identification is understood in socionics — only it does not begin with the first function, as it does with Kalinauskas. This intuitive process must be secured by the preceding work of the sensory system, which provides the reception of primary signals from the environment. Then the work of the emotional system is necessary, securing the acceptability of the received signals from the standpoint of self-preservation. And only after this does the intuitive system form the internal model of the external environment and the images of self-identification.

From a functional point of view, the AO must be regarded as the function that generates the organization of the psyche — but here one must note a contradiction, since the functional system of the psyche already exists and functions. On the example of this function one can see how Kalinauskas, by connecting the 1st function of the socionic type with this aspect, replaces the socionic model: in the latter, the 1st function performs the task of forming the personality’s programs of behavior and determines its potential capacities, which is what defines its positional semantics as the program-potential function.

Kalinauskas: “The 4th function (aspect of connection) — I consume from outside for the perception of the world, which means perception of the external situation from the point of view of an unconscious assessment of it as good or bad, pleasant or unpleasant, i.e., from the point of view of an external, passive set.”

Commentary: Of course, when Kalinauskas correlates the 4th function with the AC, the question immediately arises: what, did the 1st function have no connection with the external world — after all, it too consumed from outside? Such contradictions point to the muddled character of the attribution proposed by Kalinauskas. In socionics the corresponding function is generalized sensing, responsible for the subject’s perception of the habitat, and in this capacity it produces no assessments whatsoever — its task is to transmit information about the external environment with maximal adequacy.

Kalinauskas: “The content of this function characterizes a person’s requirements for such a place in the world as the person subjectively considers good for himself.”

Commentary: By socionic notions, this function demands nothing, but merely expects — which is precisely why it can “serve as a channel for suggestion,” as Kalinauskas says further on. The presence of this kind of contradiction, small and large, makes Kalinauskas’s text dubious in many respects.

“The 3rd function (aspect of coordination), according to Kalinauskas — which means an assessment of the situation from the point of view of an internal, active set.”

Commentary: For describing this function Kalinauskas uses a system of symmetric categories, securing a unification of concepts and thereby creating an illusion of the plausibility of the reasonings. There it was “I consume from outside,” here it is “I produce outward.” First of all, it is unclear why the AK should produce anything outward. Is that not within the competence of the AF? By the sense of the definitions, the AK ought to secure the interaction of all the functions, but here it for some reason substitutes for the work of another aspect. And although Kalinauskas says further that “The content of the aspect of coordination specifies the qualitative determinacy of the whole,” it remains unclear what “I produce outward for the perception of myself” has to do with it. If it “produced” wholeness, that would still be comprehensible. All the rest of Kalinauskas’s reasonings concerning this function follow from nowhere, and are either intuitive insights or are uncritically relayed from other sources — specifically, from the works and lectures of Aušra Augustinavičiūtė. It looks like a fitting of the meaning of the MQS aspects to an answer known from other sources.

“The 2nd function (aspect of functioning), according to Kalinauskas — I produce outward for the perception of the world, which means an assessment of the situation from the point of view of an external, active set.”

Commentary: At this point the semantics of Kalinauskas and the semantics of socionics intersect to a significant degree — well, something must remain of socionics even after its repeated reworking — but here too the metaphysical character of the categories used in the MQS introduces its distortions. Yes, this is a productive function, but it produces not for the perception of the world (the world has already been perceived) but for obtaining feedback from the external environment: if the environment accepts this production, then adaptation has occurred. The latter can be understood thus: if adaptation has occurred, then the subject has constructed his behavior adequately to the environment’s requirements — but this is, rather, an indirect assessment of oneself, not of the environment. Here the production is not “demanded from outside” but is offered for the purpose of a check on adequacy, and these are not the same thing.

Kalinauskas: “The most characteristic features of the 2nd function are a creative approach, a high degree of consciousness, and a broad differentiation of the kinds of ‘production’ produced.”

Commentary: This assertion agrees well with the notions of classical socionics, but in Kalinauskas they do not follow from his model and look like a relay from other sources.

Schemes c) and d) of Table 01 give additional examples of the subjective identification of psychological categories with the aspects of the MQS, and the sets of categories themselves look like a random fitting to the MQS aspects. Scheme e) of Table 01 is an example of superimposing the vector scheme of the MQS onto a socionic model — in this case, the ILE. The binding of informational aspects to MQS aspects looks especially unconvincing here because of the mismatch between the real semantics of the functions of the ILE model and what follows from model “K.”

In the socionic model, each of the 8 functions has its own functional semantics, in accordance with which it functions. In model “K” (Kalinauskas’s), it appears that, by definition, one function is singled out which determines — and in fact substitutes for — the functioning of the entire model. This aspect in model “K” is matched with the aspectual content of the 2nd socionic function, whose meaning in socionics is defined by its orienting contact with the environment for the purpose of a preliminary assessment of the success of a specific psyche’s adaptation to the environment. However, since the psyche has a final product, this function of model “K” could be assessed quite realistically — but because of Kalinauskas’s special understanding of the model of the psyche as the structure of the I-conception, and his different understanding of the aspectual content of the functions, serious divergences from model “A” arise for him. In fact — that is, according to the definitions — model “K” would need to be understood as a totality of four functions: the function of organization, the function of functioning, the function of connection, and the function of coordination. Each of these functions ought to fulfill its own purpose in the psyche: the AO answers for organization, the AF for its functioning, the AC for the psyche’s connection with the external environment, and the AK for the psyche’s wholeness. But that is a different story altogether.

Let us see how the foregoing looks in a more expanded form.

So: the AF, as applied to model “A,” ought by the sense of the terms to answer the question of how this model functions. This aspect must absorb everything connected with the model’s functioning, and hence includes all the functions, rather than being correlated with any single one. Correspondingly, the AO ought to answer the question of how the model is constructed, or what its structure is. This means that here we discover the order of succession of the functions in the technological chain of IM. Note that here we are not speaking of the work of the functions — that topic remained with the AF. Within this aspect we discuss only the construction of the model out of its structural elements, which are the functions, and we exhaust this topic completely. The next aspect — the AC — ought to answer the question of how functioning and structure are connected with each other. As a result, we arrive at the understanding that model “A” is a kind of conveyor for processing information, in which the whole set of functions is arranged in a definite order and stands in a strictly definite connection, so that each of them produces its own product and, in accordance with the model’s structure, passes this product to another function. Thus we learn about the functioning of each function from the AF; about the structure of their mutual arrangement we learn from the specification of the AO; and finally, from the specification of the AC we learn how the functions and the structure of their set are connected with each other. Within the theme of this aspect an intermediate synthesis is accomplished, but here we are still dealing only with a collection of separate elements. The concluding procedure, as a result of which wholeness arises — the indissoluble unity of all the parts, that is, a system — is accomplished within the limits of the AK. Only after this does the model begin to function as a single whole, that is, as a psychological type. And it produces a product that cannot be reduced either to the work of any one of the model’s functions or to the work of all of them together taken each by itself.

The I-Conception, According to Kalinauskas

The socionic notion of the structure of the psyche as something objective, really existing, independent of opinion, empirically demonstrable, Kalinauskas replaces with the concept of the I-conception, which for him reduces not to the objectively existing organization of the psyche but represents the personality’s subjective notion of itself, attained by it as a result of its personal history. However, as a result of the eclectic superimposition of the I-conception onto the TIM, the possibility arises of regarding the I-conception as an empirically confirmable element and of building an original psychological theory upon this — which is what Kalinauskas does. The concept of the I-conception can be used with success in training work with a person, which Kalinauskas has always done successfully; but that is a different subject, not coinciding with the subject of socionics. From the text of the book it is clear that for Kalinauskas the study of socionics is understood as the mastering of the I-conception, and the socionic type in this process turns out to be an effective final flourish: once a person has already figured out how his I is organized and functions, all that remains is to give his personal I-conception a generalizing name taken from socionics.

Kalinauskas: “The I-conception is the image through the mediation of which a person enters into social relations… The I-conception is a whole formation, having a quite pronounced structure. The structure of the whole is such that not one of its elements exists separately from the others, despite having its own functional significance. In other words, the existence of a separately taken structural element outside the given whole is impossible, and the whole, correspondingly, ceases to be a whole without any of its structural elements.”

Commentary: This statement of Kalinauskas’s has the character of a methodological premise, and there is nothing to object to in it; but from it one can see that the author intends to investigate not the structure of the psyche, but will attempt to objectivize the I-conception — that is, to present it not as a subjective formation but as a really existing structure. Unfortunately, this structure in Kalinauskas is called upon to replace the structure of the psyche. Within the MQS this structure is represented by four general-philosophical categories which, by virtue of their a priori givenness, turn out to be metaphysical constructs — having, of course, their own proper meaning, but this meaning is imposed on a real object, namely the psyche, which possesses its own structure and its own parameters and, generally speaking, has no need of a priori packaging. The MQS analysis of “the structure of the whole is based on singling out within it four blocks, each of which is a fuzzy set.” By imposing an a priori structuring on a real object, the author replaces the generalized psychic functions, which are the subject of socionics, with entirely different structures whose psychological status is highly problematic, but which are forced to act in the role of functions with an artificial semantics.

According to Kalinauskas, the I-conception includes four blocks, named respectively: “the level of organization — I as I; the level of connection — I as We; the level of functioning — I as the Other; the point of the coordinator — I as Self-Relation.”

Commentary: The identifications given look arbitrary, subjectively assigned. Why can I-as-I not be functioning, and I-as-We organization, or I-as-the-Other connection? All the more so since, by the author’s definition, these categories belong to fuzzy sets. While the first three categories have a quite general-scientific meaning, the point of the coordinator (PC) is Kalinauskas’s own invention and therefore requires additional explication. In terms of the coordinate scheme, which looks highly dubious, the PC is indeed represented by the intersection point of the coordinate axes and ought to be the origin of coordinates. But what coordinates are these? Are some measurable quantities relating to organization, functioning, or connection supposed to be plotted along the presumed axes? The author says that “the vector form of the graph makes it possible, in case of necessity, to reflect the relative ‘power’ of a specific aspect,” but, by all appearances, such a necessity has never arisen, and the units of measurement of the introduced categories are not indicated. Thus we are dealing here with purely symbolic terminology, to which no point-like locus corresponds where “coordination” is carried out — which underscores the metaphysical character of Kalinauskas’s categories.

Proceeding from the general-scientific concept of coordination and the context of the I-conception, let us try to figure out in what the coordination among the three “levels” could manifest itself. Let us begin with the very concept of “level.” What is it? Three different dimensionless horizons, on each of which the phenomenology of organization, functioning, or connection unfolds — or is “level” here correlated with the degree of expression, activity, or significance for the subject of coordination? To these questions there is no answer in the text of the book. The doubts arising here force one to think that the categories of the MQS are no more than intuitive pre-meanings, used by the author to organize his own intuitive streams. It is also disquieting that the author connects his basic categories now with the concept of aspect, now with the concept of level, now with the concept of block.

Kalinauskas: “As a result there is formed the IMAGE OF ONESELF FOR OTHERS, which is the IMAGE OF OTHERS FOR ONESELF, corrected in accordance with the IMAGE OF ONESELF FOR ONESELF, presented to others as a true description of oneself.”

Commentary: This phrase is an example of Kalinauskas’s reflexive dialectics, and on quick reading or recitation it produces the impression of a profound thought. And so it is — except that such reasonings exceed the level of functional generalization of classical socionics. Therefore one can say of it that it is not about socionics — it is about something else, possibly correct, but in the present case merely distracting attention from socionic concepts.

Kalinauskas: “The block ‘I as We’ of the I-conception is of enormous interest for a person occupied with mastering his system of social orientation. Its study gives a notion of the extent to which the habitual external image-mask really takes account of one’s own capacities, on the one hand, and corresponds to the social tasks being solved, on the other. Correspondingly, conscious corrections can be introduced into the IMAGE OF ONESELF FOR OTHERS, thereby substantially raising the effectiveness of one’s social interaction.”

Commentary: This quotation is interesting in that it introduces the concept of the mask, concerning which there are several distinctive opinions in the socionic literature. As far as I understand, the mask according to Kalinauskas is a mixture of the typological (since it enters into any phenomenology of the personality), the characterological (since it was worked up in the process of adaptation to society), and the manipulative (as relatively consciously directed at solving specific tasks arising situationally before the personality). This concept here has a different meaning than in the notion of socionic accentuations (S. I. Churyumov) or the communicative model (V. D. Ermak). In any case, the concept of the mask here exceeds the bounds of socionic generalization, though it is not devoid of its own meaning within Kalinauskas’s conception.

Simonov’s Hypothesis

In the 1980s the Soviet neurophysiologist P. V. Simonov advanced a solidly argued hypothesis about the physiological substrate providing temperamental support to human activity. In order to connect physiological organs with psychic phenomenology, Simonov introduces several theoretical distinctions. Among them is the subdivision of needs into dominant and subdominant, as well as a distinction between signals arriving from the environment: signals with a high or a relatively low probability of their reinforcement by factors directly satisfying one need or another. Now, Simonov considers, it has become possible to speak of a need-informational organization of behavior.

The results of Simonov’s own experiments and his analysis of the literature led him to the conclusion that the need-informational organization of behavior corresponds to the functions of four brain formations:

• the frontal sections of the new cortex — the neocortex,
• the hippocampus,
• the nuclei of the amygdaloid complex, and
• the hypothalamus.

Note that these four structures are common to humans and the vertebrates, and it is therefore natural to identify them with the mechanisms determining psychic traits common to all vertebrates, or at least to a significant portion of them. Among such traits in the higher vertebrates one must, above all, count the temperamental component of behavior. The term “need-informational organization of behavior” requires necessary refinements, since it assigns the informational component to a particular case of informational provision. According to Simonov it turns out that information is carried only by the probabilistic characteristic of the reinforcement of the possibility of satisfying a need, while the features of the needs themselves carry no information — and this is obviously incorrect. Both factors — the features of the needs themselves and the probabilistic characteristic of the reinforcement of the possibility of their satisfaction — are of course informationally valid. That is precisely how this process will look from the standpoint of IM. Therefore the correct term here might be the expression “need-probabilistic organization of behavior,” where both parts of the process have equal standing relative to the concept of information.

Simonov writes: “It turned out that thanks to the anterior sections of the neocortex, behavior is oriented toward signals of high-probability events, while reactions to signals with a low probability of their reinforcement are subjected to inhibition.” Although the sense of the process thus described is comprehensible here, from an editorial point of view the expression used for it requires refinement. Apparently the author has in mind that the neocortex singles out from the environment signals with high probability and, by virtue of lateral inhibition, cuts off signals with low probability, eliminating oscillations and uncertainty, and this makes behavior goal-directed and raises its effectiveness. This feature of the frontal neocortex has been verified in a strictly controlled laboratory experiment, where a disturbance of probabilistic prognosis was observed in monkeys with bilateral damage to the frontal cortex. Disturbance of probabilistic prognosis is observed clinically in patients with pathology of the frontal lobes, when there arises easy distractibility, slippage onto side associations, or stereotyped repetition of one and the same actions that have lost their significance. Natural selection also provided for the necessity of effective behavior “in situations with a significant degree of uncertainty amid an evident deficit of pragmatic information,” when it is necessary to take into account the possibility of low-probability events as well — that is, when one must seek the satisfaction of a need in an unaccustomed, nonstandard, or previously unknown way, which belongs to the class of creative tasks. In the norm, the balance of the functions of the frontal cortex and the hippocampus adequately reflects the characteristics of the probabilistic environment. With a shift of the balance toward the dominance of the cortex, the probability of the expected event is overestimated; with a shift toward the dominance of the hippocampus, it is underestimated.

The hierarchy of needs is established by the correlation of the functions of the brain’s “motivational subsystem,” which includes the amygdala and the hypothalamus. Here the hypothalamus determines the dominant need, while the amygdala provides for the accounting of needs that can wait and are even postponed indefinitely. It is essential that the motivational system is anatomically connected with the motor system, and this directly furnishes the need with goal-directed motor behavior; with defects of the motivational system, motor activity is disordered.

Further in his work, Simonov shows how the individual correlation of the organs of the probabilistic and motivational systems determines the form of a specific personality’s temperamental response. Let us represent these dependencies in Table Ka.01.

Table Ka.01

	Neocortex	Hippocampus
Hypothalamus	Choleric	Sanguine
Amygdala	Phlegmatic	Melancholic

1. With the leading position of the pair “hypothalamus — frontal cortex,” this will be a subject with a clearly expressed dominance of one need or another, purposefully directed at the signals of objects capable of satisfying it. At the same time he is inclined to ignore both competing motivations and signals distracting him from advancing toward the intended goal. His interests are constant and stable, but he is not at a loss when meeting difficulties, and is persistent in overcoming them. The subject acts confidently, quickly, assertively. The choleric fits such a characterization best of all. He is oriented toward the dominant need and uses a high-probability strategy to satisfy it. A schoolchild with such a ratio of brain structures listens and works with concentration in lessons, undistracted by extraneous events.

2. With the leading position of the pair Hippocampus – Hypothalamus, the subject finds nonstandard ways of satisfying the dominant need, but is relatively easily distracted in its absence. The Sanguine fits such a characterization best of all. He acts calmly, confidently, but somewhat paradoxically, clearly singling out the dominant motives, with generalized reactions to signals of low-probability events, to signals of unclarified significance. A schoolchild with such a ratio of brain structures is persistent, energetic, hardworking — but only in lessons interesting to him (the dominant motive). In uninteresting lessons he is easily distracted, carried away by extraneous things. Such a person easily grows accustomed to new surroundings; it is not difficult to discipline him.

3. With the leading position of the pair Hippocampus – Amygdala, the subject is mainly oriented toward subdominant needs and is forced to seek nonstandard ways of satisfying them. He avoids competition where possible, shows almost no initiative, and practically renounces active actions. The Melancholic fits such a characterization best of all. The combination “amygdala—hippocampus” will be accompanied by difficulty in singling out the dominant motive and by a set to react to the widest range of objectively insignificant signals. Hence the combination of indecisiveness and endless vacillations with heightened sensitivity, with an overestimation of the significance of external events. Such a person is painfully sensitive to trifles, easily becomes flustered and embarrassed, is unsure of himself. The dominant need easily yields to a subdominant one.

4. If in the system of four structures the subsystem “amygdala—frontal cortex” predominates, we obtain a subject with well-balanced needs without any particular accentuation of one of them. Such a subject ignores a multitude of events occurring around him. Only highly significant signals can rouse him to activity. Such are the Phlegmatics — strong, balanced, inert. They are patient, restrained, in good command of themselves. Schoolchildren of this type are calm in lessons and are not distracted. This inertness has its reverse side as well: they switch with difficulty to solving new tasks and take a long time to grow accustomed to new surroundings.

The need-motivational subsystem (amygdala and hypothalamus) exerts a powerful influence on the probabilistic subsystem (new cortex and hippocampus). Concrete anatomical connections have been discovered between the lateral sections of the frontal cortex and the hypothalamus, the ventral sections and the amygdala, the dorsal sections and the hippocampus — which gives experimental grounds for assessing the totality of these organs as a system. As a result, “the assessment of the probability of external events turns out to depend on the strength and quality of the dominant need, and this assessment in turn influences, in an inhibiting or facilitating manner, the strength of the need and its correlation with other competing motivations” [2]. Simonov considers that “in this way the motivational-probabilistic system may be regarded as a structural-functional subsystem of the brain which ‘determines the strategy and tactics of behavior, where the question is decided of which signals to answer and in what manner.‘” In the present case, strategy can presumably be connected with the features of the needs, and tactics with the probabilities of their satisfaction; nonetheless it is obvious that such a view distorts to a significant degree the scale of the subject’s activity. The structural-functional subsystem of the brain determines not the strategy and tactics of the personality — which exceed the bounds of the individual’s physiology — but answers for the energetic provision of the solution of strategic and tactical tasks. In such cases it is useful to recall the well-known methodological proposition about the inadmissibility of reducing different levels of the functioning of complex systems to one another, but rather to take account of their qualitative determinacy. In accordance with this proposition, it is inadmissible to reduce psychological processes to physiological ones. To some degree the relation of these processes can be compared with the relation of a television set’s construction to the programs broadcast on it.

Socionics offers new approaches to the concept of temperament, drawing a distinction between the four Hippocratic temperaments, common to all mammals, and the sixteen human temperaments, which differ from the Hippocratic ones by the presence, in addition to the energetic component, of an informational one as well — since the human brain and intellect obviously differ from the brain and intellect of animals.

Here is another essential statement of Simonov’s: “We have considered four variants of the functional predominance of the structural ‘pairs’ and discovered their correspondence to the psychological characteristics of the Hippocrates–Pavlov types.” After this, no doubts whatsoever remain concerning the direction of Simonov’s hypothesis and the inadmissibility of reorienting it to service Kalinauskas’s hypothesis.

Thus we see that Simonov’s hypothesis is connected with the discovery of the physiological substrates on which are based the psychic processes of the energetic provision of goal-directed behavior — that is, at issue are the temperaments of Hippocrates, which are a common evolutionary achievement of at least the mammals. And no grounds are visible for ascribing to these substrates responsibility for that part of specifically human behavior which distinguishes the human being from the animal. It is precisely this part that is reflected in initial form by Jung’s psychological typology and represented in developed form in socionics.

Extremely curious, from the socionic point of view, is Simonov’s assessment of yet another, non-temperamental grouping of the organs he investigated — namely, “frontal cortex—hippocampus” and “hypothalamus—amygdala.” Taking into account the consequences of damage to these brain formations in animal experiments, Simonov makes the supposition that on their ratio depends the parameter of extra- and introvertedness. A curious psychological fact is that since Jung’s discovery of these two psychological parameters, their generally valid explication has never been obtained. Jung himself did not give strict definitions of them, and every psychologist has used these concepts according to his own understanding. The most resolute and principled attempt to give a strict assessment of extraversion and introversion was made in his time by the remarkable English psychologist Eysenck — yet their essence eluded him as well.

The common understanding of these concepts reduces to the idea that the reactions and activity of the extravert depend predominantly on external impressions arising at the given moment, while in introverts they depend on images, notions, and thoughts connected with the past and the future. Some consider that the extravert is oriented toward the external world and the introvert toward the internal one, but at the basis of such an understanding lies merely a translation of the words extraversion and introversion into Russian.

The observation that the activity of extraverts is more energy-costly, and that of introverts the reverse, is only a particular feature and cannot be used as a definition of these deep concepts.

As examples of differing understandings of these concepts one can cite the divergences in the positions of L. Marton and J. Urban, on the one hand, and J. Gray, on the other. The former characterize the introvert as a strong, insensitive, unbalanced individual, and the extravert as a weak, sensitive individual inclined to inhibition. Compared with Jung, this is exactly the reverse, but with an additional semantic distortion. According to J. Gray, the higher a subject’s sensitivity to punishment and failure (non-reward), the deeper the degree of his introversion. According to the assertion of L. Marton and J. Urban, extraverts assimilate social norms well and easily establish interpersonal contacts, while introverts establish connections poorly and enter with difficulty into the world of others’ feelings, alien to them. According to Gray, everything is the reverse: introverts socialize well and extraverts poorly. It is also considered that the neurosis of extraverts more often proceeds with symptoms of hysteria and psychasthenia, whereas introvert neurotics are inclined to anxiety, reactive depression, and phobias. However, it is clear that such observations are hard to trust, since it will always remain unknown how precisely the extraverts and introverts were determined in such cases.

Taking into account what has been said above, one can understand the importance and value of the observation made by Simonov. The predominance of the “probabilistic” subsystem (new cortex and hippocampus) yields a hypothetical subject predominantly oriented toward the external environment and behaviorally dependent on the events occurring in that environment — and this can be connected (by definition) with extraversion. However, a more precise formulation of this dependence ought to indicate the extravert’s dependence on high-probability signals, and the introvert’s on low-probability ones. The first set will provoke sociability, a striving toward other people, an inclination toward changes, toward movement, toward mastering the environment; the second, a higher norm of solitude. However, from the socionic point of view, what is discovered here is, rather, the difference between ethical types and intuitive types, and to a lesser degree between extraverts and introverts. But let us not hurry.

Different traits, in Simonov’s opinion, will be discovered in a subject with a predominance of the “motivational” system. Here the sphere of internal motives and sets will prove rather rigid with respect to external influences. In accordance with this, introverts ought to be inclined to hold to previously assimilated ethical norms; they are restrained, strive for order, are shy, and are of little sociability with those around them.

And yet the fundamental conclusions that have been drawn in socionics force one to doubt even this explication of these concepts, since some introverts are exceptionally sociable, strive toward other people, are inclined to changes, movement, and the mastering of the environment, while some extraverts are quite rigid with respect to external influences, inclined to hold to previously assimilated ethical norms; some of them are restrained, some strive for order, some are shy or of little sociability with those around them. So it appears that the mystery of extraversion–introversion does not yield to solution with the help of Simonov’s hypothesis.

Now, apart from any connection with the theory of temperaments, let us consider the following statement of Simonov’s: “Of course, all the types enumerated above are an abstraction. Real life presents us with an infinite diversity of intermediate variants of the interaction of the four brain structures.” This remark of Simonov’s, an outstanding physiologist, is of special methodological interest. In it one can sense a negative attitude toward abstractions as a certain relic of outdated methodological premises — especially in that introductory “of course.” Of course, from the standpoint of modern methodology, it is high time to revise the attitude toward so-called abstractions. How can quite concrete parameters of behavior be considered abstractions? These parameters are not only measurable but are provided with a quite real physiological substrate. From this point of view the temperamental type must be regarded as a totality of behavioral parameters with specified boundaries of their variation. Of course, at the boundaries of the parameters’ definition uncertainties may arise, but this does not negate the sufficient determinacy of the behavior of a concrete bearer of one temperament or another within concrete boundaries of measurement of the corresponding parameters. And is not, in that case, the author’s preference “to speak rather of the properties of the brain than of types in their old understanding” a variety of ostrich policy — evading the problem within the relics of positivist methodology? Such a position seems all the more deficient in that the author immediately says: “At the same time we are not inclined to renounce entirely the typologies of Hippocrates and Pavlov, which have withstood the empirical testing of two millennia.” A methodological duality is evident: types are an abstraction, but we can use it quite effectively. And when the author writes further that “The notions of ‘activity in general,’ as of ‘emotionality in general,’ seem to us very vague and unrefined,” then, of course, it is high time to eliminate this vagueness. Within the informational paradigm there are no particular problems in stating the real existence of the type as a program specifying the generalized parameters of an individual’s behavior, since there are no grounds for considering that the existence of, say, computer programs is more real than the existence of biological programs.

The fact that a disease-induced disturbance of the functions of the subsystem “hippocampus—amygdala” leads to neurasthenia — which, as a rule, does not affect the higher intellectual functions, testifying to the full-fledged activity of the neocortical structures — also indirectly indicates that Simonov’s hypothesis relates to a greater degree to the energetic, not the informational, component of the provision of behavior.

The quotations given above from the book by P. V. Simonov and P. M. Ershov convincingly show the physiologist’s position regarding the role of the four brain structures in the temperamental provision of behavior.

Kalinauskas turned to Simonov’s hypothesis to ground his own understanding of the psychological type, of informational metabolism, and of the content of the work of the psychic functions. In doing so he reoriented Simonov’s hypothesis from grounding the phenomenon of temperament to grounding his own peculiar understanding of the above-mentioned concepts. For this he introduces a distinction between the set (a generalized notion of which, in Kalinauskas’s opinion, is given by the Jungian “psychotype”) and the initiation of behavior, carried out by the TIM. On this basis he draws a strange distinction between Jung’s psychological type and the TIM in socionics.

It is obvious that the substitution of the physiological concept of initiation — something like an energetic provocation — for the psychological concept of motivation represents an attempt to introduce a superfluous concept, which at the very least contradicts the principle of “Occam’s razor.” However, far more important is that it contradicts the real state of affairs.

Kalinauskas’s Understanding of IM

Kalinauskas: “The type of informational metabolism is an evaluative mechanism of thinking, resting on four structures of the human brain (the neocortex, hippocampus, hypothalamus, and amygdala) and mediating the general psychological set and set-based behavior as such. In other words, the type of informational metabolism (henceforth we will call it, in abbreviation, the IM type) is the ‘trigger mechanism’ of the initiation of human behavior.”

Commentary: Such is Kalinauskas’s definition. My definition: the TIM is an essential characteristic of the structure of the psyche, indicating the maximally generalized informational dominants of the personality. For Kalinauskas, IM is not the circulation of information in the structures of the psyche, but merely an evaluative mechanism of thinking. It is astonishing that he does not notice the contradiction in his own definition — after all, thinking as it is understood in the classical paradigm of socionics is only a part of IM, in which, besides thinking, emotionality, intuition, and sensing participate.

Kalinauskas: “Thus, while unable to describe the human personality as a whole, the IM type describes rather precisely the rational-logical part — serviced by thinking — of a person’s interaction with other people and with the world as a whole, with a general functional orientation toward producing set-based behavior. It is a kind of ‘traffic light’ for the psychological set, permitting or forbidding its realization depending on the results of the assessment of oneself and the situation.”

Commentary: In this statement one can see yet another clarification by Kalinauskas of his understanding of IM, and, as we see, it differs significantly from that accepted in socionics. The TIM by no means claims to describe the personality as a whole, but it describes with maximal adequacy the informational frame of the personality’s behavior. Into this frame all the remaining concretizing parameters and data about the personality must correctly fit. The TIM does not reduce to a description merely of the “rational-logical part of a person’s interaction with other people and with the world as a whole,” as Kalinauskas assumes — it describes all sides of a person’s informational interaction with the environment, though with maximal laconicism. The TIM is by no means limited to describing the rational-logical part of a person’s interaction with all elements of the environment, but encompasses all the parameters of the informational aspects, including thinking, emotionality, intuition, sensing, irrationality, rationality, extraversion, and introversion.

Kalinauskas, in order to reassign Simonov’s hypothesis to the grounding of his own understanding of IM — and along with it of socionics — placed particular emphasis on the initiation of behavioral reactions. This could even be counted as some sort of discovery in physiology; but there, within the subject matter under consideration, what is at issue is the energetic provision of behavior, which at the psychic level corresponds to temperament.

Kalinauskas: “…the concrete forms of behavior depend not only on the actual need and the external situation of its satisfaction, but also on precisely which set has formed at the given moment in the personality. Therefore in the structure of the instrumental theory of personality we deal with set-based behavior. Often set-based behavior is behavior that is not realized in an act, remaining at the level of mental actions.”

Commentary: From this quotation one can gather that Kalinauskas, speaking of initiation, has in mind the physiological mechanisms directly responsible for the individual’s muscular activity. In any case, it is obvious that Kalinauskas does not distinguish, or mixes, the physiological and psychological aspects of behavior.

Kalinauskas: “On the other hand, while singling out the type of informational metabolism as the most important mechanism of the reception, processing, and output of information, participating in the initiation of further behavioral reactions, socionics finds no interconnection of these processes with human neurophysiology.”

Commentary: Here we are dealing with an outright misunderstanding. The topic of the localization of the socionic functions on a physiological substrate has long been in development by a number of socionicists; however, first, this problem has not yet found a reliable solution — for which significant funding and modern psychological laboratories are necessary, and this is hard to achieve outside the system of scientific institutions, and inside it too. Second, this problem does not at all belong to the competence of socionics. So it would be reasonable for neurophysiologists to concern themselves with it.

On the other hand, informational processes are directly connected with psychological phenomenology, whereas physiology places the accent on energetic processes.

In this quotation it is quite noticeable that Kalinauskas apparently does not distinguish the material substrate from its psychic production. In fairness, let us note that socionicists are interested in the problem of binding the socionic functions to physiology, and proposals on this score exist — but all the same it is not socionics’ task.

Kalinauskas: “…the mechanism of the initiation of behavior loses its support — it remains unclear in what manner and through the mediation of which organs of the body it manages to exert influence on the person.”

Commentary: Of course, it would be splendid to receive answers to these questions as well — but let professional physiologists occupy themselves with that. In the last two quotations the concept of “the mechanism of the initiation of behavior” is used, which is of special interest. From the text of the book it is not so simple to understand what is meant here. As far as I understand, what ought to be at issue here are such concepts as set, motivation, dominant, and the like — but it seems Kalinauskas has in mind something else, something psychologists have not considered. In any case, this is an important but special question. Many problems connected with it have long since received adequate solutions in psychology and adjacent directions, and socionics too has found its answers on this problem area — see, for example, [3]. It is also not excluded that by the mechanism of initiation Kalinauskas understands the direct switching-on of muscular mechanisms at the level of physiological structures; but this, though interesting in itself, already exceeds the bounds of psychological theory, within which all problems connected with the psychological provision of behavior must be solved.

Kalinauskas: “As already noted, being the mechanism responsible for the initiation of behavior, the IM type interacts with all four psychological functions and therefore necessarily includes all four elements named above.”

Commentary: This phrase follows from the rest of Kalinauskas’s reasonings, but it sounds especially strange. The TIM is the result of the specific work of the psychic functions, and to say of it that it “interacts with all four psychological functions” is roughly like saying that human speech, being a product of the intellect, actively interacts with the larynx, the tongue, the teeth, and the vocal cords. Such a phrase can presumably be interpreted, but, from the standpoint of the real state of affairs, that depends on how someone understands the given process. Still, the initiation of a concrete behavioral act depends only indirectly on the TIM, and is directly carried out by one need or another, motivated by some concrete motive.

Kalinauskas: “Speaking of the problems of the psyche in connection with the initiation and control of human behavior, one should first of all turn to the investigations of the pillars of psychoanalysis: Sigmund Freud, Alfred Adler, and, of course, Carl Gustav Jung.”

Commentary: The pillars of psychoanalysis said nothing about initiation, but spoke of sets, motivation, and temperament.

Simonov: “The basal ganglia (among which is the globus pallidus) are important for the very earliest stages of the initiation of voluntary movements; their nerve cells are activated first.”

Commentary: In this quotation we see the physiologist’s opinion of initiation as one of the problems of his subject area. Obviously, what is at issue here is a physiological, not a psychic, process.

Kalinauskas: “In this connection Simonov singles out as the neurophysiological basis of the initiation of human behavior four brain structures: the neocortex, hippocampus, hypothalamus, and amygdala.”

Commentary: Here it is especially distinctly visible that Kalinauskas does not distinguish the physiological and anatomical substrate, nor the kinetic form of behavior from its semantic content, which is specified by informational programs determining the goals, means, strategy, and tactics of behavior — while physiology and anatomy provide behavior with energy and material support.

Kalinauskas: “…the initiation of behavior as such is mediated by the analytic-evaluative mechanism of the four brain structures, which compares the content of the general set with the possibility of satisfying the actualized needs.”

Commentary: Here brain structures are endowed with analytic-evaluative capacities, which is the same as saying of a computer that it thinks or feels.

Let us also give an example of terminological substitution in socionics found in Kalinauskas’s book. To distinguish extraverted and introverted aspects, the author introduces the concepts of objectal and subjectal functions. Objectal functions, according to Kalinauskas, answer for the processing and assessment of information connected with the external world, and subjectal ones, correspondingly, with the internal. Properly speaking, it is not clear why one should replace the solid Jungian terms with equally Latinized interpretations of them. The genuine reason here, however, could be a failure to understand the corresponding socionic terms. Introverted, in socionics, means occurring on the informational plane, in the subject’s codes, regardless of whether this relates to an object or a subject; extraverted means relating to the external plane — both to objects and to other subjects. Therefore introverted thinking, according to Jung — unhappily replaced by Aušra Augustinavičiūtė with “logic” — is precisely thinking proper, that is, the structural processing of information by the subject; while extraverted thinking is the objectivized product of thinking, namely technology and what is obtained as a result of its application. Extraverted thinking could be replaced by the word technology — after all, they are synonyms — nonetheless there is a deep philosophical sense in preserving this term, since we thereby not only achieve terminological unification but also point to the invariant in the transition from the internal process to its external realization. In the external, apart from materialization, there is nothing that was not previously in the internal.

Moreover, Kalinauskas, as a result of his peculiar understanding of IM, gives definitions of the psychic functions that are completely unacceptable for socionics.

Kalinauskas: “Logic corresponds most closely to the concept of intellect in C. Jung, or, in other words, to directed thinking. It answers for the processing and assessment of information connected with the organization of the space of the external world, based on knowledge of the situation and of the properties of objects (objectal logic) or on understanding of their internal content (subjectal logic). It is serviced by the amygdala, and is oriented toward low-probability events and subdominant needs.”

Commentary: So — the brain center of logic has been found, and its parameters established: oriented toward low-probability events and subdominant needs. How is that? Does logic no longer service dominant needs and high-probability events? Yet dominant needs need not be confined to the basic instincts — although, is logic not needed, for example, on the hunt, when food is being procured? And do we not analyze high-probability events, including in a logical key? Logic, especially in its formal variant, is only a part of the apparatus of thinking, which occupies itself with structural transformations of the information introduced into the psyche. Understanding, however, is carried out by intuition. Thinking, presumably, is serviced by the entire nervous system — and certainly not by the amygdala.

Kalinauskas: “Ethics corresponds in C. Jung to the concept of thinking governed by feeling, i.e., thinking that does not follow its own logical principle but submits to the principle of feeling. Ethics answers for the processing of information about the attitude toward a person of the other people surrounding him in the given situation (objectal ethics), or about his own attitude toward these people (subjectal ethics). As is known, the human being is for the human being a super-stimulus, for it is precisely by the content of his relations with people that a person determines his social value. Ethics is serviced by the hypothalamus, and is oriented toward high-probability events and dominant needs.”

Commentary: Undoubtedly, “ethics” is an unfortunate replacement for the Jungian term “emotioning,” and it is desirable, in this sense, to return to Jung. Equating emotioning with thinking is possible if one introduces suitable definitions, but empirically these are well-distinguishable processes, and such an equation has never been made in psychology. According to Jung, emotioning provides the psyche’s direct reaction to an external signal, bypassing logical reasoning — which from the very moment of the emergence of living things was necessary for survival, and of course preceded developed logical thinking. Is emotioning serviced exclusively by the hypothalamus? Modern psychology inclines to the view that emotionality is connected with the right hemisphere — though it is not excluded that the hypothalamus also has some relation to it.

Of course, emotionality should not be confused with thinking — it is a different function. An attitude (relation) is an introverted emotion, and to connect relations so straightforwardly with the hypothalamus — rather than, say, with the heart — is obviously incorrect.

Kalinauskas: “Intuition corresponds to passive, non-directed thinking in C. Jung, which he calls intellectual intuition. Intuition answers for the processing of information about unpredictable and random situations; it participates in the generation of conjectures and hypotheses, in the analysis of the wholeness and consistency of external situations (objectal intuition) or of the internal state (subjectal intuition). It is serviced by the hippocampus, and is oriented toward low-probability events and subdominant needs.”

Commentary: Here we see the author’s tendency to identify all the generalized psychic processes with thinking. Understandably, this is a matter of theoretical taste; but in Jung and in socionics these functions are distinguished, and this distinction is theoretically grounded and productive. Intuition remains the most enigmatic phenomenon in psychology, though its phenomenology is well known. Yet the fact remains that it is precisely intuition that provides understanding as such. Even the understanding of the simplest sentences would be impossible without intuition. At the same time intuition provides spontaneous knowledge, for which the usual logical requisites are insufficient. In particular, intuition provides creative processes, processes of invention — among which is the process, of ultimate importance for any living creature, of constructing an internal model of the external environment. Still, there are as yet insufficient grounds for unambiguously connecting intuition with the work of the hippocampus, and modern psychology connects intuition, like emotioning, with the work of the entire right hemisphere of the brain.

Intuition is not thinking but a channel of perception over and above the sense organs. And it, presumably, is likewise needed not only for catching low-probability events and orienting oneself in subdominant needs. Can it really be that if an event is high-probability and a need dominant, intuition is not applied to them? What is this — some kind of prohibition?

Kalinauskas: “Sensing answers for the processing of information arriving from the sensory sphere, including sight, smell, hearing, tactile sensations, etc., for the purpose of perceiving the strength, external form, and potential energy of objects and the capacity to manipulate them (objectal sensing), or for the purpose of analyzing internal sensory sensations, assessing the level of comfort of the situation and the state of health (subjectal sensing). In C. Jung it corresponds most closely to such a form of thinking as the formation of representations, and, in the presence of an act of judgment (i.e., the linking of representations by means of concepts), to associative thinking. It is serviced by the neocortex, and is oriented toward high-probability events and dominant needs.”

Commentary: In socionics, sensing is regarded as a maximally generalized function that answers for the perception of the external environment’s impact. It can be subdivided into a large number of particular functions, down to the work of individual neurons. However, the subject of socionics is the study of the work of precisely the maximally generalized psychic functions, and it does not delve even into the study of sensory modalities — other branches of psychology occupy themselves with that. Nor does socionics consider the formation of representations, in which, apparently, not only sensing participates but also emotioning, thinking, and intuition. Extraverted sensing is connected with the load-bearing impact of the environment, and introverted sensing with the reception of resource. Load and resource are the maximally generalized forms of the environment’s impact. It is rather strange that the experienced and knowledgeable psychologist Kalinauskas tries to connect the work of sensing with the neocortex, when the sensory zones and organs of the brain have long been well studied. These include: the visual cortex on the occipital lobes, the acoustic zones of Broca and Wernicke, the olfactory bulbs, and so on. The neocortex, by contrast, has long been connected by neurophysiologists — and, after them, psychologists — with the synthesis of the personality. This follows, in particular, from the dramatic change of personality after frontal lobotomy. It is also strange that Kalinauskas in the given context refers to Jung, saying that subjectal sensing corresponds to “thinking as the formation of representations.” Jung said nothing of the kind in connection with sensing. Moreover, he did not regard the four generalized functions as identical with thinking.

Kalinauskas: “As a result of the given analysis it becomes obvious that in our approach the elements of informational metabolism belong to the psychological function of thinking as described by C. Jung.”

Commentary: In this statement Kalinauskas as it were sums up his anti-socionic elaborations. Of course, nothing here becomes obvious — on the contrary, everything is thoroughly obscured. Jung describes everything differently and relies on different premises. As for the “elements of informational metabolism,” Kalinauskas apparently simply does not know that these are the informational aspects — the simplest informational entities, to which all informational processes can in fact be reduced. And of course IM does not reduce “to the psychological function of thinking,” as Kalinauskas thinks, but is carried out by all the generalized psychic functions.

In conclusion, let us consider certain of Kalinauskas’s judgments about socionics and socionicists.

Kalinauskas: “In the history of socionics as a science there has been everything. There was a period when the creative group of A. Augustinavičiūtė applied considerable efforts to give this science official status. There was also the period, beginning in the USSR in the 1980s, of a mass craze for socionics. At that time the grains of scientific knowledge in this young science were in many ways profaned, and socionics turned into a peculiar game reminiscent of the popular horoscopes from the magazine ‘Otdokhni’ (‘Relax’).”

Commentary: Here almost everything is correct: there was indeed a mass craze for socionics, which continues to this day, and there was profanation, which certain authors continue even now; there is also a play element in socionics — which, incidentally, in no way compromises it: it is simply wonderful that the knowledge of a deep and serious science enjoys such high popularity that people carry it to the level of a game.

Kalinauskas: “Of course, this was facilitated by the situation in which a number of the young science’s propositions were not fully studied and, consequently, looked insufficiently grounded theoretically.”

Commentary: In this phrase too everything is correct — if one takes into account that they are not fully studied even now!

Kalinauskas: “The latter circumstance, of course, does not negate the correctness of the majority of the propositions formulated on the basis of empirical research, but the lack of theoretical groundings nonetheless told on the attitude of scientific circles toward this branch of psychology.”

Commentary: In this quotation there are two inaccuracies: 1) in the research of Aušra Augustinavičiūtė the empirical is harmoniously combined with the theoretical, and the fact that she did not solve all the tasks of formalizing the new knowledge can in no way be held against her; 2) the attitude of scientific circles toward socionics is from the very beginning explained not at all by weak theoretical elaboration — it was quite sufficient for a genuine scholar to be able to make sense of it — but by a genuine conspiracy of the scientific bureaucracy, formed in Kyiv at the end of the 1980s at a gathering of leading psychologists, sociologists, neuropathologists, and even philosophers, where the decision was taken to totally ignore socionics.

Kalinauskas: “Thus A. Augustinavičiūtė, in contrast to C. G. Jung, singles out not eight but sixteen types, which, following Kępiński, she named types of informational metabolism (IM). However, their connection with Jung’s psychotypes can be traced rather weakly.”

Commentary: In order to discuss the problem touched on in this quotation, it is necessary to give definitions of the psychotype and the TIM. True, Jung did not use the abbreviated term psychotype but used the combination “psychological type,” about which he wrote a fundamental work. What difference does it make, one might think? The expanded and abbreviated forms of the term. However, between them there is a subtle semantic difference. The abbreviated term gravitates toward greater univocality, despite the fact that a strict definition is absent in both cases.

So what is a psychological type? Of course, “psychological” means relating to psychology. But this is too broad a predicate, admitting a multitude of psychological typologies — by now there are already more than 300 of them! Jung’s typology is, of course, psychological; but let us try to reveal its specificity — that is, to answer the question of how it differs from other, likewise psychological, typologies. Such a fundamental distinction, first of all, is the positioning of functions, which was unquestionably done by Jung, albeit in simplified form — though he never fully reflected on it to the end. And only in socionics was his discovery brought to theoretical perfection. The second fundamental distinction is Jung’s use of four maximally generalized psychic functions, which, with the extraverted and introverted sets taken into account, turn into eight. But although Jung used all 8 functions, he likewise did not fully recognize this fact. In socionics this theme has been deeply worked through theoretically. Also fundamentally new in Jung’s typology is the use of the concepts of extraversion and introversion, which — despite the fact that Jung nowhere gave precise definitions of these concepts — received a wide and, in the main, distorted dissemination both in psychology and beyond its bounds. It was precisely these features of Jung’s typology that were taken up and developed in socionics. Therefore it is utterly absurd to deny the continuity between Jung’s psychological types and the TIMs in socionics. However, in socionics a deep theoretical refinement of the concept of the Jungian types as types of informational metabolism took place; their deep essence was discovered.

Kalinauskas: “…theoretically unproven remained the very fact of the existence of precisely 16 types of informational metabolism. For, while confirming after Jung the existence of 4 psychological functions (in two variants: extraversion and introversion), the author of socionics was unable to prove with theoretical rigor why these elements form only 16 combinations, and not 24, as follows from the rules of mathematics.”

Commentary: Here Kalinauskas demonstrates evident incompetence on the given question. Everything was proved long ago, and the fact that the author of the text does not know about it is his problem; and the reference to “the rules of mathematics” is simply incompetent, because in mathematics there are many rules. What is at issue here are the rules of combinatorics, which are chosen according to the conditions of the problem. A type is determined not by permutations of features but by their combinations. Apparently Kalinauskas did not notice that Jung grouped the four basic functions by “-nality” (rationality/irrationality), behind which there are deep psychoanalytic grounds. In each pair of functions there is a relation of reciprocity, that is, inverse dependence: if one of the functions is strengthened, the complementary one automatically turns out to be weakened. It is precisely for this reason that in model “Ju” (more precisely, “A-Ju”) complementary functions can occupy not just any places, but only either the extreme or the internal ones. It is precisely these restrictions on the combinatorics that determine the fact that the number of TIMs equals 16.

Kalinauskas: “The reference to the ‘non-viability’ of the remaining eight combinations, unfortunately, has remained unproven even empirically.”

Commentary: The reference to “non-viability” is one of Aušra’s early attempts to explain the combinatorial form of the Jungian typology. She simply did not know that among the multitude of combinatorial forms there are, for example, “combinations with restrictions,” which removes the problem.

Kalinauskas: “Moreover, having gotten carried away, the followers of Augustinavičiūtė began to extend the description of the types of informational metabolism to the personality and the human being as a whole, which for scientific psychology naturally looks like considerable oversimplification.”

Commentary: Since a large number of enthusiasts came into socionics from other fields of science, technology, and culture, with methodological complexes accidental with respect to psychology, they began to apply their ideas — often inadequate in socionics — and easily to obtain “witty” but often psychologically meaningless constructions. Among these are certain constructs of Kalinauskas as well.

Kalinauskas: “The description of the IM types accepted in socionics has a clearly individual, subjective character: the enumeration of scattered characteristics outside any strict scheme or method makes it amorphous, hard to remember, and hence of little use at the level of the ordinary user.”

Commentary: The description of the IM types is no more than one of socionics’ problems. It has constantly been and remains at the center of socionics’ attention, and there already exist convincing results on the standardization of TIM description. Kalinauskas himself, meanwhile, has by no means proposed an effective mechanism for describing the IM type. What can be read in his book by way of such descriptions is plainly subjective and has no advantages whatsoever over classical socionics.

Kalinauskas: “Such a simplified approach, in my view, naturally led to a negative reaction from readers and in no way contributed to the authority of socionics as a science.”

Commentary: There can be no question of any lack of authority of socionics with the reader — though there are rather many psychologists who have proved incapable of making sense of socionic constructions, which are, after all, not so simple.

Vasily Kovtun (Kalinauskas’s commentator): “The attempt to separate the wheat from the chaff, i.e., the attempt to separate scientific data from subjective preferences, was undertaken by Academician I. N. Kalinauskas.”

Commentary: This is written by Kalinauskas’s commentator Vasily Kovtun. Since what is at issue is merely an attempt, there is nothing to object to here. Further, Kovtun enumerates the features of Kalinauskas’s approach.

Vasily Kovtun: “First, the author considers the problem comprehensively — within the composition of the mechanisms of the psyche constituting as a whole the person’s system of social orientation. Special emphasis is placed on the factors of external influence on the formation of the informational-behavioral mechanisms of the psyche, which take their origin in the surrounding society and relate to the individual only insofar as they contain the projections of other people onto the given person: their subjective perceptions, assessments, and expectations.”

Commentary: Apparently it is presumed that “comprehensively” is always good. In the present case, “comprehensively” presupposes reliance on Simonov’s hypothesis about the role of certain brain structures in the energetic provision of generalized behavioral forms. We considered this question above, where it was shown that Kalinauskas committed serious miscalculations in attempting to reorient Simonov’s hypothesis to his own purposes.

Vasily Kovtun: “Second, the author convincingly proves that Jung’s psychotype and the type of informational metabolism are different psychic mechanisms, each of which possesses its own functional purpose.”

Commentary: Alas, this is an erroneous opinion, and a convincing proof is nowhere to be seen in the author. It was shown above that between Jung’s psychological types and the TIMs there is theoretical continuity and a high level of coincidence of their semantic fields.

Vasily Kovtun: “Third, the author reveals the interconnection of the type of informational metabolism with the activity of four structures of the human brain: the neocortex, hippocampus, hypothalamus, and amygdala. In accordance with this, the informational-behavioral mechanism of the human psyche acquires a firm neurophysiological basis, which presupposes the impossibility of its arbitrary alteration, yet does not contradict the possibility of controlling it as an instrument.”

Commentary: This is one of Kalinauskas’s delusions, imposed by him on his students — Simonov’s hypothesis relates to the explanation of the neurophysiological mechanisms of the temperaments, and Kalinauskas here falls into the trap of hasty identification, and in passing misleads not only himself but the reader as well: the beautiful physiological correlation he proposes turns out on inspection to be an empty shell.

Vasily Kovtun: “Fourth, I. N. Kalinauskas considers the type of informational metabolism structurally, as a whole, formed and functioning in accordance with definite, recurring regularities, which makes it accessible to analysis and diagnostics.”

Commentary: The same thing, but more effectively, is done by classical socionics — which Kalinauskas, unfortunately, failed to notice, and he substitutes for socionics his own, unfortunately heavily distorted, understanding of it.

Vasily Kovtun: “Fifth, the theory of I. N. Kalinauskas acquires its lawful, local place among the other psychological disciplines. For it has no claims to describing the entire personality of the human being, still less to describing his entire psyche, but gives a grounded description of its (the psyche’s) informational-behavioral reflexes, which have a neurophysiological basis beneath them. And the original method proposed by the author for the structural and imagistic study of the type of informational metabolism is sufficiently effective for practical use, both in terms of controlling one’s own behavior and in terms of conscious interaction with other people, taking into account the features of their natural constitution.”

Commentary: To acquire “one’s lawful, local place among the other psychological disciplines” is, no doubt, very prestigious — though for this one need not try very hard: it suffices to obtain the appropriate certificate. The description that Kalinauskas gives is very problematic, but apparently very pleasing to the author and his commentators. As for the essence of the description itself, it is indeed quite intricate, but, alas, burdened with metaphysical superfluities. A neurophysiological basis is also splendid — but one should not forget that this is no more than a hypothesis, and it still needs to be verified; and since the author substitutes his own considerations for Simonov’s hypothesis grounding the temperaments, it is additionally necessary to justify the change in the hypothesis’s content.

And now a downright preposterous statement of Kalinauskas’s: “…the IM type, thanks to the careless hand of A. Augustinavičiūtė’s followers, came to be interpreted as the type of the personality, and moreover as the type of the human being. However, the IM type, by its very functional purpose, cannot describe the human personality as a whole. It seems obvious that for any at all serious study of the personality it is necessary to know the person’s life history, his social-psychological world, and much, much else… For an approximate designation of the personality type, descriptions obtained, for example, on the basis of Jung’s psychotype, or of G. Reinin’s system of dichotomous features, can be used with far smaller error.”

Commentary: Yes, Aušra Augustinavičiūtė has very many followers, and it is not excluded that among them there are also quite ill-educated enthusiasts — but that is not her fault. However, Kalinauskas places a strange emphasis on the difference between the TIM and the personality type. The point is that there exists a large number of typologies relating to the personality, and socionics is one of them; but in contrast to other typologies, in socionics the concept of informational metabolism is placed at the basis of the classification, and this criterion has proved highly effective. As for the “type of the human being,” here it is not even clear whether Kalinauskas is joking or “in earnest.” Since “human being” is the name of the species Homo sapiens, the “type of the human being” would have to be an object of the biology of primates. This concept is not used in biology in this form, though one speaks, for example, of races. Classical socionics is not about that.

Analysis of Kalinauskas’s definition. 1) “The type of informational metabolism is an evaluative mechanism of thinking…” — here thinking is opposed to some part of itself — the evaluative mechanism, which is in fact what is understood as the TIM. IM is the entire totality of processes of the psyche’s reception, processing, and output of information. Thinking is only a part of this process. And, as we see, Kalinauskas identifies the whole process not even with a part of it, but with a part of its part. 2) “four structures of the human brain: the neocortex, hippocampus, hypothalamus, and amygdala…” Simonov advanced the hypothesis that the correlation of the functional activity of these structures determines the temperamental component of character, and the reorientation of this hypothesis from developing the theory of temperament to grounding and understanding the FIM requires a deep working-through of the theme, not a mere renaming of concepts from Simonov’s hypothesis.

Kalinauskas: “As such the IM type is presented in the works of A. Augustinavičiūtė — the founder of a new branch in psychology, which she named ‘socionics.’ Notwithstanding that the author of socionics did not draw a strict division between the IM type and Jung’s psychotype. This is quite explicable if one remembers that A. Augustinavičiūtė was concentrated on developing the theory of intertype relations, and the results of P. V. Simonov’s research were unknown to her.”

Commentary: The IM type in the works of Aušra Augustinavičiūtė is presented by model “A,” which is a maximally adequate description of the corresponding psychic structure. However, let us note that Kalinauskas has an important methodological premise: to beware of the ungrounded identification of constructs belonging to different authors, since different authors may invest terminologically and structurally similar constructs with different meanings. In any case, the identity or closeness of constructs from different theories must be specially justified. Above, a scheme was sketched of such a justification of the identity of Jung’s psychological types and the IM types of socionics — so Kalinauskas’s assertion of the absence of shared content in these constructs has proved incorrect. At the same time, Kalinauskas identifies Simonov’s hypothesis about the physiological provision of the temperamental component of behavior by paired combinations of the neocortex, hippocampus, hypothalamus, and amygdala with his own hypothesis that these very same structures not only fully provide IM — which is obviously absurd (what, then, do the remaining structures of the brain occupy themselves with?) — but are also the local substrates of “sensing,” “intuition,” “thinking,” and “emotioning.”

Kalinauskas: “At the same time, while paying due tribute to the brilliant conjectures of socionics’ author and her uncommon capacity for work, which allowed her to process a mass of scattered empirical and theoretical material, one cannot fail to note that the absence of the indicated division gave rise to considerable conceptual confusion and did not contribute to the authority of socionics as a science.”

Commentary: Here “the absence of the indicated division” presupposes a fundamental difference between Jung’s psychological types and the TIMs of socionics; but, as was shown above, such a difference is simply absent, and therefore talk of “considerable confusion” loses any foundation whatsoever — and the hint at socionics’ lack of authority among the psychological establishment is explained by entirely different causes: above all, by the corruption of a part of the officials of science.

At the very end of the book, in the Conclusion, Kalinauskas writes:

“My deepest conviction consists in this: that in relation to the acting subject, the IM type is an executive organ. The consequences of such an approach are many, but in view of the subjectivity of any description I decided to confine myself to those moments which I consider fundamentally important for understanding the structure of the IM type.”

Commentary: 1. Let us again recall the definition of IM: it is the totality of the processes of the subject’s perception of information, its transformation by the subject’s psychic structures, its preservation in memory, and the outward issuance of the product of such processing. The TIM is a concretized variety of the indicated totality of processes with definite informational parameters. The TIM is innate and constitutes the basis of the primary subjective differences. However, the indicated primary differences, having a quite definite informational basis admitting of scientific registration, have an objective character.

So can the TIM be called an organ? One can call anything anything, but for this one must give the corresponding definitions. An organ is a material structure capable of performing some function. Materiality here can be understood in a wide range — the organs of animals, of technical devices, and it is not excluded that virtual energetic organs are possible; but obligatory here is their embodied presence, which alone permits the production of something necessary for further use. The TIM, however, within the informational paradigm, is a totality of programs specifying the maximally generalized parameters of an individual’s behavior. Under such a definition the TIM cannot be called an organ — except in some metaphorical sense. I consider it necessary to preserve the distinction between the material and the informational, since information does not exist without a material carrier, although between the material and the informational levels of existence an arbitrarily close connection is possible. However, in Kalinauskas’s rendition the executive organ is understood quite literally, since he identifies IM with the concrete brain structures from Simonov’s hypothesis — which, as was shown above, is not correct.

2. Yes, any description is subjective. However, one of the tasks of science is precisely the reduction of subjectivity, in the sense of arbitrariness and groundlessness, and the discovery of objectivity as an expression of the essence of things. Excessive insistence on subjectivity and relativity is, from the standpoint of the cognition of nature’s laws, unproductive, and leads to the formation of the reactionary philosophical mindset called relativism. Relativism, insisting that everything is relative, denies the possibility of cognizing nature — though in moderate doses it can quite well be used as a weapon against dogmatism and authoritarianism.

Conclusions

1. Kalinauskas does not use model “A”; apparently he does not know about the informational aspects or denies their reality, having replaced them with the aspects of the MQS; and he has renounced the concept of the structure of the personality, replacing it with the concept of the I-conception.

2. A significant part of Kalinauskas’s descriptions of types and relations follows from nowhere, but is simply relayed from memory from other sources or improvised at the expense of poetic imagination.

3. The book is not recommended for reading or for use in the instruction of beginning socionicists.

Literature

1. Kalinauskas I. N., Games Played by We, Kyiv, 2005.
2. Simonov P. V., Ershov P. M., Temperament, Character, Personality, Moscow, 1984.
3. Churyumov S. I., The Cheshire Cat’s Smile, or The Possible and the Impossible in Socionics, Drohobych, 2007.