Section 2

Tatyana Nikolaevna Prokofieva and Her Team — “Socionics for Professionals” — What Does That Mean?

Translator’s notes: The source is a critique chapter (by S. I. Churyumov, author of “The Smile of the Cheshire Cat”, cited throughout as [SCC], Russian [УЧК]) commenting on excerpts from T. N. Prokofieva’s book “Socionics for Professionals”. Abbreviations: TIM = type of information metabolism; IM = information metabolism; IA = information aspect(s); ARP = Augustinavichiute–Reinin traits; SF = socionic functions; PF = psychic functions; IP = information flow/stream; NIIS = Scientific Research Institute of Socionics (Moscow); BES = Great Encyclopedic Dictionary.

Prokofieva is an intelligent and talented scientist, a remarkable organizer of science, who developed an original methodology for TIM identification, founded the Scientific Research Institute of Socionics in Moscow, gathered talented scholars around herself, skillfully combines socionics with personality psychology, and, being a mathematician, commands the concepts of logical rigor. Nevertheless, in her works and in the works of her students one encounters logical and methodological errors which, of course, must be eliminated. Without this, the results of these scientists’ work will remain deficient. Without claiming a complete analysis of all the works published by Prokofieva’s NIIS, I will merely give examples of subtle and not-so-subtle violations of a logical, methodological, and cognitive character.

The pike is in the river so the carp doesn’t doze off…

Commentary: I selected several paragraphs from the author’s articles and commented on them — well, as best I could, as I see the problems the author touches upon, and, of course, without claiming any kind of finality.

Author: The founder of socionics, the Lithuanian scientist, educator, and economist Aushra Augustinavichiute, built this science on the teaching of the Swiss psychiatrist Carl Gustav Jung about psychological types. She combined his teaching with the theory of informational metabolism (exchange) developed by the Polish psychologist and psychiatrist A. Kempinski.

Commentary: Kempinski had no theory of informational metabolism. He spontaneously invented this concept by combining a cybernetic and a physiological term. And he understood the term very narrowly — as one aspect of thinking, as a certain mental function. There is no doubt that A. Kempinski was a remarkable psychiatrist, but to say that he developed a theory of IM is not correct. Well, he simply had no such theory. In his clinical practice he began to use the term he had invented, “informational metabolism,” investing it with a very limited meaning: the positive or negative influence of information entering the patient’s psyche as an agent just as active as a substance, in exact correspondence with the concept of physiological metabolism. Aushra, however, reinterpreted the term, turning it into a global category.

Author: Jung built his typology on the basis of his colossal experience working with patients. Jung’s research and conclusions confirmed many of the postulates of S. Freud, with whom he collaborated closely from 1907. Jung developed Freud’s teaching on the structure of the human psyche, which contains the levels: consciousness (ego), preconscious (super-ego), and subconscious (id). Jung noticed that the structure of the psyche does not manifest identically in all people, but reflects features connected with the psychological type of the personality. Studying these features, Jung constructed not one model of the psyche, as Freud did, but eight.

Commentary: Of course, terms must be used precisely: the super-ego is not the preconscious but the super-conscious. Freud had several modifications of the term consciousness (Bewusstsein), for example, Unbewusstsein — the unconscious — and Vorbewusstsein — the “preconscious,” but for him they had different meanings, and specialists in psychoanalysis attach great importance to distinguishing these concepts.

Moreover, one must not conflate Freud’s and Jung’s concepts of personality structure. In Freud it is a level-based structure common to all bearers of a psyche, while in Jung it is a functional structure with typological particularities — something that, incidentally, was never fully understood by the great psychologist himself: he discovered the positioning of functions in the psyche but was unable to reflect on it fully, and his closest followers never noticed it either. Only Aushra made the positioning of functions in the psyche explicit, revealing their positional semantics.

Author: MBTI is used in psychotherapy and psychological counseling, including in our country. In various countries there are courses teaching how to work with the questionnaire. There are even video courses on cassettes showing how typological features are reflected in people’s appearance.

Commentary: The Americans certainly know how to “promote” a product! Even a typology that, as we now understand, was never brought up to the level of a model — and is therefore deficient — they managed to sell effectively, often misleading the client without even suspecting it.

Author: Socionics went considerably further. A. Augustinavichiute managed to unite Jung’s typology with informatics and developed a system of symbols and models. This system constituted an analytical apparatus for describing the informational structure of the human psyche, which made it possible to assign to each psychological type its own model. The models are used to analyze the processes by which the human psyche processes information, which is why socionics is sometimes called informational psychoanalysis.

Commentary: So that is how the intelligent and talented scientist T. N. Prokofieva understands the position of socionics among the other sciences. Almost everything here is correct, and it is probably a perfectly adequate explanation, but I would like to clarify certain nuances. Aushra did not unite Jung’s typology with informatics. That is, there was no moment when she said: “Why don’t we apply informatics to Jung’s typology?” It did not happen that way. She was working with Jung’s book and intuitively sensed the special possibilities of his typology. When she came across information that a certain Polish psychiatrist, Alfred Kempinski, with whom she was not personally acquainted, was using in his practice not even a term but the word combination “informational metabolism,” her intuition told her that “there is something in this, and it may become the basis for understanding the processes taking place in the psyche.” This made a strong impression on her and, as a result of further work — not in one step, and not immediately in its final form! — it turned into an understanding of IM as a global category. She supplemented Jung’s typology with the concept of IM. And although she took the term itself from Kempinski, she reinterpreted it, making out of a variety of mental function — as Kempinski understood and used it — a fully-fledged scientific category. In doing so it was she who made a contribution to informatics, and not the other way around — she did not borrow from it. It is likewise incorrect to call socionics informational psychoanalysis; that is, of course, pretty, and perhaps even seductive, but this word combination contains a subtle substitution. Psychoanalysis traditionally has a clearly delineated area of competence — it works with the client’s subconscious, uncovering the pathogenic complexes embedded there. Socionics works with maximally generalized psychic functions. If anything, psychoanalysis could, after socionics, also be called informational, since it too deals with a special form of informational transformations in the human psyche. But it is extremely concrete, whereas socionics forms its recommendations on the basis of a high level of generalization. So, apparently, socionics should retain the significance of being the theory of IM in the human psyche, with the understanding that behind this stands the doctrine of the socion. In general, the ultimate fundamentality of socionics should not be substituted with other scientific directions.

Author: Analysis of the processes of information transfer between types of people made it possible to discover the phenomenon of informational interactions, named intertype relations.

Commentary: With the passage of many years we now understand that what Aushra discovered and described is not intertype relations (IR) — these are interfunctional (IF) relations.

Author: Aushra was the first to discover that there exists not only a structure of personality but also a structure of interrelationships. This structure constitutes their objective basis, determined by the models of the types of the participants in the relationship, independent of their aspirations and perceptions.

Commentary: It is true that Aushra discovered the structure of interrelationships, but she did not reflect upon it. The point is that Aushra expressed the structure of personality with model “A”, while she built no fully-fledged model of relations; her interfunctional schemes undoubtedly point to structures of relations, but these are truncated structures which do not make it possible to describe relations in the same volume as TIMs. Only the transition to the complete model of relations [SCC] allows one to assess the structure of relations fully and to analyze it adequately.

Author: Now it became clear why, at first glance, one and the same communication situation looks different to different people. It is refracted through the model of the type, and each person extracts their own information from it. Not every relationship should be required to be equally wonderful; not everything depends on people’s will and desire. The main thing socionics gives is recognition of a person’s right to be themselves, demanding the impossible neither of oneself nor of others.

Commentary: As an editor of many years’ standing I cannot pass over the almost imperceptible inaccuracies of the author’s text. To say that a situation “is refracted through the model of the type” is imprecise. It is refracted through the model of the relation, for one and the same situation will look different to one and the same person depending on who is next to them. Of course, one and the same situation will look different to different people, and in that case one may say that “it is refracted through the model of the type,” but the paragraph is talking about relations. This error is called “substitution of the subject.”

Author: Thus, socionics rests at the junction of three sciences: psychology, as the science of the soul; sociology, as the science of relations in human society; and informatics, as the science of the exchange of information.

Commentary: Oh, Lord! Well, of course psychology is not the science of the soul! Science does not recognize the existence of the soul and does not know what it is. Psychology is the science of the psyche. And informatics is not at all the science of the exchange of information; it is the science of the use of information in technical systems. Can it be that some people do not feel the difference here?

Author: Very often one has to answer the question: can the personality type be changed? No such cases have yet been observed, and it is not needed anyway.

Commentary: It is interesting that the author does not answer the question posed, but performs a “substitution of the subject.” Twice, in fact. First she says that this has not been observed — which, of course, requires the qualifier: in the author’s practice. And since that practice is limited, it cannot serve as proof. The second substitution of the subject consists in the author’s claim that “it is not needed anyway.” This can be understood as the author’s personal opinion, but obviously it cannot be binding for everyone. It is not out of the question that someone might want to change their TIM. From a general scientific point of view, the answer to this question is of profound interest. So: do theoretical grounds exist for asserting that TIM cannot be changed? And do conditions exist under which, even if only experimentally, TIM does change? For example, under the influence of alcohol or drugs? After all, it turned out, for instance, that physicians are capable of changing even a person’s sex! So why can sex be changed but type cannot? The answer may seem paradoxical: TIM, being the more fundamental entity, precedes gender determinacy.

Author: Jung writes that when attempts are made to change the type, a person “becomes neurotic, and his cure is possible only through identifying the attitude naturally corresponding to the individual.” Experience shows that the changes occurring in a person over the course of life take place within the framework of their psychological type, which does not hinder personal growth and development.

Commentary: Tell me, can one in scientific research trust any authority whatsoever 100%? Here Jung wrote such a thing, but has it been proven? After all, the very attempt to change the type must itself be put in question. What does it mean that a person tried to change their type? Did they consciously set themselves such a task? One can imagine such a thing. For example, a teenager, having watched a film with Schwarzenegger, might want to become like Schwarzenegger. But is this about changing type? Does the teenager know what type he has? Is it ruled out that his type coincides with Schwarzenegger’s type? And is this about changing type at all? Perhaps what is at issue here is not type at all but merely certain abilities. In order to pose the task of changing type, several conditions must be met. One must fully know one’s own type. One must fully know the type one would like to possess. And one must have at least some notion of the technology of changing type. And a theoretician, of course, needs to know which typology is actually being discussed. If it is some everyday typology — brave–cowardly, greedy–generous, stupid–clever, weak–strong — then it is not hard to imagine training techniques as a result of which a not-very-brave person can become brave, daring, and even reckless. A person with little knowledge can significantly increase it. A weak person can, through precise physical training, reach the level of Olympic records. Even a person greedy by nature can become both generous and extravagant — if they end up in the corresponding conditions. But what, then, prevents, say, an emotional person from becoming not merely an intellectual but a thinking type as distinct from the emotional one, if that is what he was? Here we approach the main point — the necessity of precise definitions.

Author: Another frequent question: can one develop one’s weak functions to the level of the strong ones? Jung noted that if a person’s thinking, for example, turns out to be on the same level as feeling, then we are dealing with “relatively undeveloped thinking and feeling. Uniform consciousness and unconsciousness of the functions is a sign of a primitive state of mind.”

Commentary: Here one can see clearly how superficially the — unquestionably remarkable — thinker Jung could reason. Tell me, did he possess a way of measuring thinking and feeling? Apparently not. This is no more than his subjective impressions.

Author: Knowledge of the individual features of the personality type helps … to choose a life partner.

Commentary: Among all the praises directed at socionics, this looks the most dubious. Has anyone, ever, really “chosen” a life partner out of typological considerations? Out of material considerations — yes; by the principle “I like them — I don’t like them” — yes. But to choose a life partner out of purely typological considerations, without taking everything else into account, is simply dangerous, because, at the very least, one must be able to determine TIM accurately, and that still remains a problem even for professionals.

Author: The attention of extraverts is directed predominantly toward the external world. They perceive it as a sum of objects: people, things, affairs. They have a wide range of interests. Broadening an interest comes considerably more easily to them than deepening one. Noticing new objects is more natural for the extravert than peering into the relations between them. Extraverts are not inclined to educate and remake people; people are perceived as they are. In an unfavorable communication situation, an extravert will hardly try to influence the person; more likely they will change their own attitude toward or with them.

Commentary: This text looks the same as if one were to write: “The extravert prefers to use his legs when walking and his hands when doing manual work.” Of course the extravert, like any normal person, is very much interested in the external world. But to assess this interest as predominant — that already raises doubts. Predominantly — how much is that in percent: 60, 70, 80, 90? In science that will not do. To say of extraverts that they perceive the world “as a sum of objects: people, things, affairs,” implying that extraverts see nothing (what exactly?) else, is some kind of misunderstanding — as if we were talking about people who are not normal.

Author: Introverts pay attention predominantly to their inner world and to the interrelations between people. Written speech comes to them more easily than oral. Many introverts keep diaries, into which they enter their own thoughts and feelings.

Commentary: One can probably find exceptionally withdrawn introverts who behave exactly as the author writes, but one can also find extraverts who are interested in relations between people more than in anything else in the world. From a scientific point of view it would even be interesting to gather the corresponding statistics. But this is a weak and dubious criterion, and it cannot be made the basis of diagnostics. And as for written versus oral speech — that too is dubious, and about the diaries as well: after all, a great many introverts do not keep diaries.

Author: The function of logic compares the content of a judgment with objective laws, with true statements. Hence the characteristic expressions of representatives of the logical type: “Let’s bring clarity,” “An effective proof,” “Let’s analyze the details,” “Let’s think the decision over,” “Needed (not needed) for the business,” “Deserves (does not deserve) trust,” etc.

Commentary: Of course, socionics is concerned not with a particular side of thinking, which is what logic is, but precisely with thinking — a fundamental psychic function well studied in psychology. It is precisely this that the socionist-scientist must take into account when working on the differential diagnostics of thinking and emotional TIMs.

Author: Ethics compares the content of a judgment with the moral norms and values accepted in society. Representatives of this type also have favorite expressions: “the existing custom,” “an effective detail,” “a beautiful form,” “I like it (don’t like it),” “humane,” “warm-hearted company,” etc. In addition, in conversation they often use colorful adjectives and epithets: remarkable, stunning, likeable, dreadful, disgusting.

Commentary: The ethics of which the author speaks is merely a particular emotional operator within the structure of the fundamental psychic function that is emotioning. Ethical norms are not a psychic but a social level. And ethical norms can be observed or violated by any TIMs. A person of any TIM can be honest or a swindler, a saint or a scoundrel, decent or a villain. Therefore a person’s observance of ethical norms cannot be made the basis of socionic diagnostics.

Author: If ethics is a person’s strong function, then logic, correspondingly, is weak. Though this does not at all mean that they have none whatsoever — it is simply less pronounced in them. In our practice there have been many examples of people with a weak logic function becoming top-class programmers, accountants, and businessmen.

Commentary: The erroneously used term “ethics” gives rise to misunderstandings in judgments. Here, following Jung, it would be correct to say that if a person’s leading function is emotion, then their thinking will first of all serve the emotion, and only secondarily itself. Here thinking is not weak but subordinated. Yet when necessary — that is, in certain life situations — it can be directed to solving any tasks and will cope with them successfully. A vivid example here could be Academician Vavilov, who opened up a fundamentally new direction in biology — the homologous series of plant forms — while by type he was an emotional extravert.

The examples given show how careful one must be in formulating diagnostic criteria in socionics. Many authors sin by contenting themselves with approximate statements which, upon attentive analysis, do not withstand criticism.

Author: Intuition sorts information in time, considers the development of processes from the past into the future, and gives predictions of events that have not yet happened. Sensorics sorts information in space; this is information about well-being, reliability, strength, and endurance.

Commentary: This is an example of significant distortion of the meaning of a function due to an established prejudice. Intuition is, first of all, direct understanding, and time has only an indirect relation to it. But the “beautiful” opposition — intuition : time, sensorics : space — paralyzes the scientist’s consciousness, and as a result we obtain incorrect definitions of the psychic functions.

Author: People of the sensory type live by sensations: they know how to perceive nature and art, to delight in everything visible, audible, tangible. They feel their physical “I” and its needs very precisely and possess a clearly expressed rhythm of life. The sensory type lives as if for one day at a time. Everything that will happen tomorrow is somewhat unexpected for them.

Commentary: All people, regardless of TIM, live by sensations — that is, first of all, they see, hear, touch, and are capable of perceiving their environment. The difference lies in how they dispose of the sensations received. The sensoric uses them directly, as such, while the intuitive extracts from them additional and often non-obvious information. But are people of the Zhukov or Stirlitz types really deprived of the ability to foresee — which pertains to the assessment of events in time? The apparent difference in the description of intuition comes down to a careful choice of words.

Author: Introverted people with a predominance of the sensorics function are oriented toward raising their welfare and quality of life. Hence the stimulus to activity for representatives of these types may be the creation of comfortable conditions and good earnings. For such people it is very important that work provide a reliable piece of bread and make it possible to feed the family.

Commentary: Many other TIMs are also oriented toward raising welfare and quality of life: the Hugos, Zhukovs, Stirlitzes, Napoleons — that is, not introverts at all. Thus the author, perhaps without wishing to, misleads the reader.

Author: … opposite qualities are often combined in a person’s behavior. In one situation a person may behave, for example, like an extravert and an irrational, and in another like an introvert and a rational. Therefore it is often very difficult to determine a person’s TIM by their actions, and even practicing socionists are not insured against errors.

Commentary: The principle of the integrity of the personality states that in a person everything is united by a single quality, which in the Latin formulation of this concept means individuality (in = not; dividi = divide — whence “dividends,” that which is divided). This principle was consistently carried through in Adler’s theory of personality. According to this principle, whatever a person does, in whatever way they manifest themselves, behind it there will always stand a semantic shade invariant for the given individuality. TIM also belongs to such invariant meanings. Therefore, however a person behaves, all their manifestations fit within the framework of their TIM; and if someone cannot see the corresponding markers, it means their diagnostic tools are not effective enough.

Author: Along with game assignments, participants are offered psychological tests, and a diagnostic interview is conducted with each to clarify the personality type. After the collected information is processed, a psychological portrait of the personality is formed, from which one can draw a conclusion about the most favorable spheres of activity for each person.

Commentary: All this is very good — only it is unclear what socionics has to do with it, for if people have answered a sufficient number of various tests, then any professional psychologist will be able to give varied recommendations.

Prokofieva: How should one approach the division of information into aspects so that it reflects the work of the psychic functions described by Jung? There is a very important point here which has not yet been explicitly noted in the socionics literature.

Commentary: So T. N. Prokofieva, in exploratory mode, effectively poses the question of the semantics of the aspects, though she formulates it differently. But did Aushra not answer this question? She did. It was she who arrived at the necessity of dividing the entire information flow into IAs. She named them, gave them a corresponding specification — well, as best she could — and proposed a scheme for grounding them. She also ensured the completeness of their set, though she did not directly introduce the category of completeness. So what is it that fails to satisfy her followers? One might say that they find certain defects in Aushra’s constructions and try to “correct” them — well, as best they can. However, if one is going to refer to the functions described by Jung, then, of course, one ought to add “and by Aushra,” for she made substantial refinements to the Jungian semantics. But what is this important point, not yet noted in the socionics literature, that the author speaks of? Let us look further…

Prokofieva: If the functions process all information about the world, then the division of information into aspects must also be complete, i.e., encompassing all phenomena described scientifically. It must have no “blank spots.”

Commentary: What draws attention here is that the author constructs a simple and at the same time supremely logical statement. Although, strictly speaking, the implication “if…, then…” can in this case well be called into doubt. First, how can we be sure that “the functions process all information about the world”? It is almost obvious that they do not process all of it — if only because the human sensory system works only with certain sensory modalities and within limited ranges. For example, unlike bats, people (with small exceptions) do not perceive ultrasound; the human eye perceives electromagnetic oscillations only in a very narrow range; our sense of smell is considerably weaker than a dog’s, and so on. As for the reference to completeness, that is only a wish — but do we possess the means to ensure it? And the clarification “i.e., encompassing all phenomena described scientifically” raises serious objections. Clearly, in the case of “phenomena described scientifically” there can be no talk of completeness at all — though one may, of course, allow that scientists strive toward it, but that, incidentally, would also have to follow from somewhere. And, of course, many serious contemporary philosophers will be found (see, for example, Rorty, “Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature”) who will call into doubt the very notion of “the whole world” and “all information about it.” Without having a concept of what “the whole world” is, and without solving that problem, it is incorrect to use it in scientific reasoning — except “casually,” at the level of everyday non-obligation.

Prokofieva: When studying the influence of information on the psyche, we must represent it in such a way that any piece of information about everything happening in the world can be assigned to at least one of the components — the aspects — or to a combination of them.

Commentary: This statement is considerably more correct than the previous one. The only thing I would object to is the “we must.” It is rather that “we would like to.” The restrictive expression “assigned to at least one of the components” is here equivalent to the concept of completeness. The problem of completeness belongs to the competence of methodology, and I have raised this problem repeatedly in my articles. Still, Prokofieva’s formulation of the task looks as though the division of information needs to be “fitted” to the empirically observed manifold, whereas this division needs to be derived — so that it is obligatory, and not proposed ad hoc.

Prokofieva: Let us describe the division of information into aspects in socionics, keeping this important requirement in mind. Beginning a conversation about the aspects of information, we must say what information is and how the meaning invested in this word changed in the second half of the 20th century. The Great Encyclopedic Dictionary gives the following definition.

Commentary: So, note that Prokofieva is about to divide information into aspects, but first she wants to clarify the concept of information. And behind the words about the “important requirement” hides the requirement of completeness. But other requirements exist as well!

Prokofieva: “Information (Latin informatio — explanation, exposition) — originally, information conveyed by people orally, in writing, or in another way (by means of conventional signals, technical means, etc.); since the mid-20th century, a general scientific concept including the exchange of information between people, between man and automaton, between automaton and automaton, the exchange of signals in the animal and plant world; the transmission of traits from cell to cell, from organism to organism (genetic information); one of the basic concepts of cybernetics.”

Commentary: Of course, the quoted explication from the Great Encyclopedic Dictionary (BES) is not a definition. The attempt to reduce the concept of information to “the exchange of information, signals, or the transmission of traits” means committing the error “idem per idem” — the same through the same. And this is, after all, the Great Encyclopedic Dictionary! In fact there are even more errors here, but I will not dwell on them now. And, of course, it matters that the authors of the BES understand information as “one of the basic concepts of cybernetics” — but a definition they nevertheless did not give… Thus the author, apparently, contented herself with the illusion of a definition from the BES.

Prokofieva: In order to understand how our psyche processes information and how this affects our psychological state and relations with the world, we must divide the entire flow of information reaching a person into separate components — aspects. This will make it possible to model the process of informational exchange by the human psyche.

Commentary: As an editor, I cannot pass over the incorrect turn of phrase “the process of informational exchange by the human psyche,” since one always wants to deal “with the good Russian language.” Of course, one should have written “the process of informational exchange in the human psyche.” Well, all right, that is a trifle.

Note the formulation of the task contained in the first sentence. Apparently the author wants to understand “how our psyche processes information,” which the author needs in order to understand how such processing “affects our psychological state and relations with the world.” At the same time the author believes that for this the total information flow (IP) needs to be divided into aspects. On what grounds is the author confident of the existence of a connection between these three claims? This is not at all easy to understand without the author’s definitions of the key concepts involved. For example, what does it mean, how our psyche processes information? Aushra took Kempinski’s idea of IM and raised it to the utmost level of generalization, which includes all possible modes of information processing, whose large blocks are: 1) reception of information; 2) evaluation and selection of information; 3) creation of a knowledge base; 4) output of information. These processes do not depend on the division of information into aspects, since this is the standard technological process described in cybernetics. Consequently, within socionics there is nothing here to figure out — one simply needs to take the description of this process from informatics. And since socionics operates at a high level of generalization, the nuances of the influence of generalized forms of information processing on our psychological state — for example, mood — obviously fall outside the socionic level of generalization, since moods are not considered in socionics. But perhaps the author understands something else by psychological state — yet how are we to know? Moreover, when the author says “our psychological state,” it is quite plausible that she means people in general, and not, say, herself personally; but since there is no corresponding definition, the topic is difficult to discuss. As for relations with the world, I answered this question, within the socionic level of generalization, in my book [SCC]; but what the author has in mind is not very clear.

As for the claim that “we must divide the entire flow of information reaching a person into separate components”: first, obligation has nothing to do with it; second, the proposed division by no means guarantees the achievement of the stated goal; and third, why can we not make do with the fact that the psyche performs such a division itself, and does so, evidently, acceptably with respect to humanity’s evolutionary adaptation to its habitat? Acceptably — since humanity still exists. Therefore the impression arises that the author uses the idea of dividing the IP into aspects simply because she knows in advance of their existence. That is, she knows in advance what needs to be obtained and is only refining the means by which it can be done. But it still remains unclear how and why the division into aspects is connected with our psychological state. The vagueness of the author’s thought and the methodological imprecisions engender distrust toward the author’s theoretical constructions.

Prokofieva: An aspect is a type of information. It shows what kind of information is meant, what it is about.

Commentary: Actually, “aspect” is a general scientific term with the meaning of a division, subdivision, side, or facet. To redefine this term within socionics is, it would seem, unnecessary, and the consequences may be unpredictable. In any case, this is a terminological act of sabotage, and one must have exceptionally weighty grounds to venture such a step. Aushra introduced the solid concept of the “informational aspect” (IA), and it is unclear why it should be simplified. The term IA is immediately intelligible — provided, of course, we know what information is — and therefore it needs no synonymic reformattings. Thus this whole passage has the character of a lyrical and even parasitic (in the sense of filler words) insertion. And since what information is has remained unknown to us, this insertion only enlarges the misunderstanding already in place. Clearly the BES reference on information quoted above does not withstand any criticism, and that means we continue to work with an unknown entity. One might object here that we already know what information is, but that may satisfy people at the everyday level. In socionics, for which information is a key category — since it even enters into its definition — it is necessary to get to the bottom of the nature of this entity. All the more so since the author attempted to obtain a definition of information from a solid informational source. Is science really incapable of this? Otherwise the indeterminacy that may persist in this question will enter as a constituent part into all subsequent reasoning of socionists, with all the ensuing consequences. This, in fact, is what we observe in the motley picture that has accompanied the development of the new science for almost fifty years now. Moreover, socionics has enemies and ill-wishers who deny it the status of a science and do so quite artfully, exploiting every slip of its adepts — including, by the way, by citing the ungroundedness of its terminology.

In attempting to sort out the nature of the informational aspects, individual socionist-scientists have proposed theoretical schemes with whose help they tried to clarify the semantics of the aspects, to grasp the essence of these categories, or the reality standing behind them. Priority here belongs to Aushra Augustinavichiute. Aushra, having arrived at the concept of the informational aspects (IA) and having thereby, in essence, made a large-scale discovery not only in science but in philosophy, immediately attempted to make sense of this category. She not only proposed an initial specification of the IAs — that is, attempted to verbalize these archetypal entities — but also took a serious methodological step in trying to derive them deductively. However, what she did rather constitutes a decomposition — a resolution of these concepts into semantic multipliers. For this the founder of socionics proposed three polar constructs: “body — field,” “statics — dynamics,” “external — internal.” What is the nature of these constructs? What are these entities through which the IAs can be represented? Why did she choose precisely these polarities? Could others have been chosen? Combining the poles of these constructs, she obtained eight combinations, each of which she put into correspondence with one of the IAs. Moreover, she ensured the completeness of the set of aspects (see Table Pr.01). However, she did not answer why this is possible, which places the work she carried out in doubt. But more on that below.

Decomposition of the IAs by means of three polar constructs (Aushra) — Table Pr.01

Aspect
I — extraverted intuition	internal	statics	body
i — introverted intuition	internal	dynamics	field
S — extraverted sensorics	external	statics	body
s — introverted sensorics	external	dynamics	field
L — extraverted thinking	external	dynamics	body
l — introverted thinking	external	statics	field
E — extraverted emotioning	internal	dynamics	body
e — introverted emotioning	internal	statics	field

In this case we are dealing with the representation of a set of categories through an ordered system of semantic multipliers. This is one of the powerful techniques of modern methodology. However, in the present case two problems can be pointed out. The first is the choice of the basic polar constructs; the second is the interpretation of the corresponding poles as applied to the categories being explained. Of course, a researcher may choose the basic constructs as intuition suggests; nevertheless, there must be sufficient grounds for this, so that, from the standpoint of common sense — however we understand it here — such a choice is plausible.

First of all, it is necessary to consider the question of why such an explication is required at all, and to note its status: is such an explication used merely as a clarification preliminarily disclosing the semantics of the terms under investigation — for example, through synonymic substitutions — or is its aim to give a strict definition? The point is that when dealing with the ultimate levels of being — and here we reach its boundaries — one may encounter the case where the concepts used turn out to be undefinable. As for the need for the explication itself: however self-evident it may seem, before proceeding directly to the explication one must indicate the level of abstraction of the concepts we intend to explain and the level of the concepts by means of which we intend to do so. This is needed in order to observe the usual logical requirements and not fall into standard logical traps — for example, so that the explication or definition does not turn out to be incommensurate in scope, or so as not to violate the first rule of definition: the unknown must be reduced to the known. It is also necessary to clarify the most general features of the categories being explicated and those doing the explicating. This includes indicating the subject domains to which these categories belong. Evidently, in the present case it is assumed that the IAs belong to the subject domain of psychology, since sensorics, intuition, logic, or ethics are spoken of, while the named polar constructs belong to the subject domain of physical phenomena, since Aushra in her work [4] speaks of the IAs as units into which “the human psyche dismembers surrounding reality.” Thus Aushra explains psychic processes by their correspondence to objective phenomena. Jung had an analogous intention when he tried to link extraversion–introversion with orientation toward object or subject. However, one senses here a certain conceptual vagueness connected with the status of the aspects themselves — what corresponds to them in the habitat? Let us therefore make some clarifications. So: the psychic functions (PF) are the organs of the subject by means of which the latter establishes contact with the environment. These organs are adapted to the environment in such a way that there is a complete correspondence between them and the varieties of elements of the environment. The set of PFs constitutes a hierarchy from the simplest, which, combining, form functions of a higher level, up to the socionic functions (SF) at the top of this hierarchy — which is precisely what determines the significance of socionics in the system of the humanities.

Despite the enormous diversity of the elements of the environment, their set falls into a small number of informationally homogeneous groups. The characteristics of such homogeneity are precisely the IAs. The IAs can be designated by the same symbols as the functions corresponding to them; however, one must not forget that the SFs have a psychic status, while the IAs have an ontological one. Therefore the supposition of a psychic status for the IAs, by whomever it may be advanced, is incorrect. Moreover, the IAs need to be renamed in accordance with their ontological essence.

An essential methodological requirement in solving the problem under consideration is that the level of fundamentality of the basic constructs must be higher than the level of fundamentality of the categories being explained. In the case under consideration, however, this cannot be asserted. For example, on what grounds can one hold that the construct “field — body” is more fundamental than, say, extraverted sensorics? Extraverted sensorics, in its status as an informational aspect, can itself be regarded as a semantic multiplier of the concept “body,” which is precisely what should be understood as its greater fundamentality. Generally speaking, for a construct to be chosen as basic, it must be at least somehow explicated. In the present case, it is necessary to clarify what the researcher understands by “body” and how “body” differs from “field.” One can, of course, accept these concepts by default, but that will again lead us into a zone of indeterminacy. To distinguish the concepts “body” and “field,” one must identify the semantic multipliers to which the scientist’s intuition apparently appeals when bearing these concepts in mind. A body, in contrast to, say, a geometrical figure, is something material, accessible to direct perception by the sense organs. Here we already discover a sensory multiplier present in the concept of body. And if we implicitly embed this seme in the concept of body, then, whether we wish it or not, we prepare the standard logical error “idem per idem” — representing something through itself. It is natural to assign to the body the meaning of extraversion, since it is located in the external world and constitutes a relatively independent part of it. But what then are we to do with the field — does it not, like the body, form part of the external world? It does. Yet Aushra considered the field an introverted entity solely because, as she said, it is located between bodies. But such a juxtaposition is insufficiently obvious: after all, inter is not intro, and between is not inside; yet a certain parallelism between these semes can lead the scientist’s intuition astray. Therefore the field can, perhaps with even greater justification, be regarded as something outer, extraverted, for it is opposed to the body precisely as that which is outside and between bodies, not within them. On the other hand, physics does not hold that fields are located between bodies. Bodies are immersed in fields, and fields permeate bodies, so that fields are both outside and inside bodies. But then bodies, too, are inside fields. Thus we arrive at a certain indeterminacy as to what it is more logical to link the concepts of extraversion and introversion with — and whether it can be done at all. This is a serious hint that the categories we have chosen cannot be regarded as basic — among other reasons because these categories can themselves be resolved into simpler ones.

Let us try to compare the semantics of the concepts of field and body, giving them preliminary definitions first. A body is an individualized material object having more or less definite boundaries that set its form. This object is in principle amenable to perception by the sense organs and to varied instrumental action capable of changing its parameters, including the coordinates of its geometrical elements. This means that a body can change its form and position in space. A field, in the physical sense, is a medium of arbitrary nature which may possess unlimited or indefinite extension and in which bodies are immersed; but many cases can be found where such a medium is bounded. However, the understanding of boundedness here depends strongly on the initial definitions. For example, in the case of fish in an aquarium or a culture of bacteria in a test tube, the habitat is highly restricted — yet both fish and bacteria are capable of living in other places as well. It is also important that the field, as a medium, has essential significance for the bodies immersed in it. The latter means that bodies do not exist outside fields and are not something alien to them. Judging by the results of physics and everyday experience, there are many grounds to hold that fields — at least some of them — are quite accessible to sensory perception. This applies to electromagnetic, gravitational, thermal, and acoustic fields, but it applies also to any media, for example the air. However, it is not excluded that fields exist which are accessible to human perception yet not detectable by the physical instruments available to science. A field can be regarded as concretized space — that is, space which, besides the geometrical parameters characterizing its extension and dimensionality, possesses parameters that directly affect the existence of the bodies located in it. We shall not here specify what existence is, but let us illustrate the above with an example.

The sea is a medium for the creatures living in it. It has geometrical parameters determining its extension and dimensionality. But its basic substance — water — possesses a certain density, salinity, and oxygen saturation, which is important, for example, for the life of fish. In this sense the sea is, for its inhabitants, a field. Of course, an agricultural field on which cows graze is also a field, and not only in the literal but also in the abstract-theoretical sense. But with the concept of the field one can also associate social environments, geopolitical spaces, and cosmic expanses.

To this same category one can also assign the fields of human relations. But here one may ask: what is the substance of such fields? Undoubtedly, many people sense these fields perfectly well, although as yet no physical instruments exist by which these fields could be detected. The question also requires special proof whether fields of human relations exist in the same sense as physical fields, or whether they are some kind of subjective projections of people onto one another and onto their environment — or possibly simply imaginary entities generated by intuitive fantasy. It is quite legitimate to understand such fields as a system of informational interactions imposing specific constraints on all their agents. It suffices to recall how prohibitions and permissions act upon people to realize the real force of such fields. But it is not excluded that their energetic substrates play so essential a role in such fields that replacing those substrates with, say, an electromagnetic field is simply impossible. Such indicators of these fields as the emotional states of their agents, people’s behavioral acts, and the event-content connected with people testify to the existence of such fields, but so far they cannot be verified within science. And this means that, by introducing these concepts into socionics, we risk running up against the resistance of the conceptual system already existing in science.

If, however, the concepts of body and field used by Aushra are intuitively employed abstractions of the human being, of their individuality, and of the totality of their relations to the world — including to the people inhabiting it — then their semantic composition will be somewhat different. In that case, it seems, with the body one should associate the notion of a certain individualized mass possessing relative impenetrability, a limited volume, and some generalized form; moreover, such an abstract body must possess more or less definite typological valences, thanks to which these bodies are capable of entering into relations. And the field, most likely — that is, judging by the character of Aushra’s thinking, insofar as I understand her — is an energetic substance modulated by informational codes. If my hypothesis is correct in this case, then the concepts of body and field are used by Aushra in the same terminological key and at the same level of abstraction as the concepts of the IAs. And this means that her attempt to carry out a decomposition of the IA concepts and to express their semantics through the semantics of the polar constructs she chose can be regarded as a tautology of the “idem per idem” type. This tautology is undoubtedly of interest for understanding the creative process of the remarkable thinker, but at the level of a definition of the IAs it looks like nothing more than the substitution or juxtaposition of one hypothetical object with another. One must also note that if arbitrary objects are put in correspondence with the concept of body, this means that Aushra, without special reservations or explanations, intuitively transfers the typological features of people onto objects of arbitrary nature.

Behind Aushra’s constructions hides yet another shade of meaning, connected with the fact that, as she said more than once, the extravert’s focus of attention falls on the object (body), while the introvert’s attention is concentrated more on relations (field) — which can be regarded as an implicit definition of extraversion–introversion. However, this does not correspond to Jung’s position, the upshot of whose reasoning is that the dominant of the extravert’s attention lies in the external world and the introvert’s in the internal one. To interpret the internal world as a totality of relations and the external as a totality of objects would be incorrect, since it is obvious that informational entities can also be objects, and relations are apparently no less characteristic of the external world than of the internal. Yet the use of blurred terminology — usual for the methodologically unprepared person — makes the comprehension of archetypal abstractions inaccessible to the mass user of socionics, with the inevitable resulting vulgarization and over-simplification. The absence of unambiguity in definitions renders the theorists’ reasoning on this topic pointless. So one is compelled to conclude that the author’s position “on the first division” is ungrounded, and therefore cannot be recommended for further theoretical use.

Regarding the second polarity — “internal — external” — one may say that it is unclear how its content differs from the content of the polarity “introversion — extraversion.” One might say that “introversion — extraversion” belongs to the psychological plane, and “internal — external” to the plane of objective phenomena. The relation to that plane, and manifestation in it, is precisely what determines the psychological type. However, this could be said with respect to properties of the personality, but not with respect to the IAs, which are by no means exclusively modalities of the psychic functions but also point to entities presumably objectively present in the world, whose combinations form the plane of phenomena we can describe in terms of the IAs. Therefore one may say that in describing the modalities of the psychic functions we describe not the IAs themselves but one of their projections — or one of the projections of the archetype standing behind the IA.

The polarity “statics — dynamics” is entirely valid with respect to the topic under consideration, but, as became known after the development of the theme of the Augustinavichiute–Reinin traits (ARP), it has no special advantages over any other trait polarity. Of course, here too one must recognize that, within the theme of explicating the IAs, this polarity is assigned to the plane of physical phenomena, by whose parameters the attempt is made to calibrate the IAs.

Analogous remarks can be made with respect to those scientists who tried to improve Aushra Augustinavichiute’s attempts at explicating the IAs. These include R. Sedykh, V. Filimonov, M. Gut, and among them T. Prokofieva, who made the most serious attempt to represent the IAs through other concepts.

R. Sedykh in his book [3] essentially repeats Aushra’s reasoning regarding the IAs, merely popularizing it somewhat. Trying to overcome something in the polarity “body — field,” he introduces what seems to him an equivalent polarity, “object — interaction.” However, these polar constructs have semantic values that do not permit an equals sign to be placed between them. The construct “body — field” has a physical modality, while the construct “object — interaction” has a philosophical-gnoseological one, though a certain parallelism is present. This construct, as it seems to Sedykh, makes it possible to link extraverted manifestations with the object and introverted ones with interaction — something that, as was shown above, cannot be done relying on the construct “body — field.” And yet the same logical error analyzed above is present here as well, namely that the IAs belong to the ontological, not the psychological plane. That is, to the plane from which information comes, not to the plane where it is consumed. And on the ontological plane the reduction of the IAs to relatively arbitrary polar constructs likewise looks not only accidental and non-obligatory but ungrounded.

Sedykh’s proposal can partly be explained by Jung’s phrases about the extravert’s orientation toward the object — but Jung never spoke of the introvert’s orientation toward interaction. We shall return later to what Jung thought on this matter.

So what does Prokofieva propose?

Prokofieva: The first division: objects — relations. Jung began his description of the psychological types with the attitudes of the human psyche: extraversion — introversion. Any phenomenon in the world can be looked at either from the point of view of the properties of objects or from the point of view of relations.

Commentary: The division of what is the author speaking about, and why is this division first? From what precedes it would seem to follow that the author wants to divide the total information flow into IAs — but into what has she just divided it? If these are IAs, then what was Aushra talking about? It appears that the author is trying to divide the total information flow in two different ways and to explain one of these ways by the other, but she does not explain why the division she proposes has advantages over the direct division of the flow into IAs. That, for example, is how A. V. Bukalov proceeded, simply accepting as an axiom that there are eight IAs of the type accepted in socionics. As for the order of the divisions, the author may, for instance, appoint hers to be first. But in the present case the author motivates the order she proposes by the fact that “Jung began his description of the psychological types with the attitudes of the human psyche: extraversion — introversion.” This is an appeal to authority, and we, it seems, are expected to submit meekly to its charm. Yet it is entirely unclear what the logical connection is between the first and second sentences of the quoted excerpt. Does it really follow from the fact that Jung began with extraversion–introversion that “any phenomenon in the world can be looked at either from the point of view of the properties of objects or from the point of view of relations” — to say nothing of the fact that there are surely far more points of view from which one can look at the world? True, it is not excluded that Prokofieva omitted some intermediate premises because they either go without saying or are easily reconstructed. In logic, inference schemes with omitted premises are called enthymemes, and in human practice they are widely used. Still, in a scientific text all premises ought to be written out. Be that as it may, having adopted the decision proposed above, the author by default establishes a one-to-one correspondence between the two polar constructs considered here, so that for her “objects” correspond to “extraversion” and “relations” to “introversion.” But Jung never correlated relations with introversion! Here is the great psychologist’s basic line of reasoning:

Jung: Considering the course of human life, we see that the fortunes of one are determined predominantly by the objects of his interests, while the fortunes of another are determined, above all, by his own inner life, by his subject.

Commentary: Do you see anything here about a connection between relations and introversion? Obviously, what is meant here is the polarity “object–subject.” From this phrase of Jung’s one can gather that by “subject” he understood the inner life of the personality, though he speaks here of the person. It is simply that within the limits of this reasoning he does not distinguish the concepts of human being, individual, individuality, personality, and subject — which can well be understood as a simplification quite permissible in preliminary reflections; but one must also take into account the philosophical vocabulary of Jung’s times. What, then, does Jung understand by object? Why, of course, external life — and not the philosophical category designating the direction of the interests and efforts of the subject, who here is likewise understood as a philosophical category designating the source of spontaneous activity. Therefore, when translating from “Jungian” into modern language, one must use the corresponding dictionary. And then this statement may look like: “the fate of one person is determined predominantly by his external life, and of another by his inner life.” And, as you see, objects and relations have nothing to do with it, while the orientation of the polar types is quite clear. But of course, “any phenomenon in the world can be looked at either from the point of view of the properties of objects or from the point of view of relations” — only it is unclear what extraversion–introversion has to do with it. After all, both extraverts and introverts certainly deal with both the one and the other — though possibly in different proportions, and that requires experimental verification.

T. Prokofieva [1] made her own attempt to improve the explication of the IAs. Interestingly, she formulates the problem as follows: “How should one approach the division of information into aspects so that it reflects the work of the psychic functions described by Jung? There is a very important point here which has not yet been explicitly noted in the socionics literature.” The point is that the informational aspects were discovered not by Jung but by Aushra. It was she who first in science recognized the objective existence of these entities and, as far as possible, gave their explication. From the objective existence of the IAs it follows that information is already divided into aspects, and the matter can only consist in refining their semantics as far as possible.

Of course, one may adopt an entirely different philosophical position and hold that no division whatsoever exists in the world, and that it is only the human being who, in perceiving, cognizing, and transforming the world, dismembers it — or, more precisely, sees it as dismembered. This is a very lofty point of view, appealing to the unity of the world, and there exist intuitive-logical means allowing one to defend it consistently; but from the standpoint of sensory experience the world obviously has numerous divisions and looks multiple. These two points of view need not be opposed — each has its working zone where it should be used. And further: the dialectical paradigm confidently handles the contribution of each polarity, and here it has indisputable advantages over any forms of positivism.

Prokofieva: So, we have divided the entire information flow into two large parts: — information about objects; — information about relations. Aspects of information about objects are called extraverted. Aspects of information about relations are called introverted.

Commentary: So we see the author’s method in action. What does it consist in? On the basis of separate intuitive impressions, the author offers the reader several statements which she apparently considers intuitively clear and upon which she intends to build all the remaining socionic concepts. In its essence this is an axiomatic approach. Generally speaking, any statements may be used as axioms, but one must remember that all their explicit and hidden meanings will manifest themselves in the constructions based on them, and the defects embedded in the axiomatic statements will later show up in the theory built on top of them. As basic concepts the author adopts objects and relations. She gives them no definitions and consequently considers them intelligible a priori. It is not excluded that for the author this is indeed so, but it is by no means necessarily so for other people. Personally, I suppose that by objects the author understands any items, things, bodies, and possibly any aggregations of bodies, things, and items — for example, galaxies. However, these words have different levels of abstraction. “Object” is the most abstract. “Item” (predmet) is a calque-translation of the word “object” into Russian, though in Russian predmet and object are not full synonyms, as is revealed in the phrases “school subject” versus “school object.” “Thing,” the most concrete word of this series, is above all something made of some material, some substance. We do not apply this word to an apple, a cat, or a forest — while “object” we can. “Body” is something that has form and mass. In philosophy the concept of the object has its own shades of meaning and belongs to the maximally abstract categories — it is that which is opposed to the subject, that upon which the subject’s activity is directed. In the general scientific sense, an object is anything whatsoever on which an observer’s attention is concentrated. This also means that an object can be not only a material item but also an energetic process, an informational complex, an emotional experience, and interpersonal relations. From this one can see that the concept of the object is too polysemous to secure the determinacy of all subsequent theoretical constructions. Thus the author lays a mine of polysemy, indeterminacy, and contradiction — which is exactly what we observe in the numerous present-day variants of the understanding of socionics.

What can be opposed to the author’s position? An adequate understanding of extraversion–introversion. It consists in disclosing the semantics of these concepts. The first concept points to the external, the second to the internal. This is nothing other than a translation of the Latin terms into Russian. So why must some other meaning, not proper to them, be invested in these terms? Why must extraversion, the external, be linked only with objects? After all, in the external there is everything — objects, relations, bodies, and fields — and therefore any information, about objects and about relations alike, must be considered extraverted if it relates to the external world. Analogously, any information about objects and about relations must be considered introverted if it relates to the internal world. What is unclear about that? On the basis of what has been said, I assert that the first division proposed by the author is incorrect, and therefore it should not be recommended as an element of the axiomatic base.

It appears that the author’s disregard of definitions constitutes an essential feature of her methodological complex. So: the author took an authority-motivated decision to begin with extraversion–introversion and, against this background, straightforwardly implemented an idea that came from somewhere (but not from Jung!) about a one-to-one correspondence between the two polar constructs: “objects”/“relations” and “extraversion”/“introversion.” So where did this correspondence come from: “objects” → “extraversion,” “relations” → “introversion”? I want to draw attention here to the fact that, when unfolding a logical justification or proof, all logical rules must be observed. But in the present case that condition is not met. Therefore, when suddenly, out of the blue, as in the Greek tragedies, in the style of “deus ex machina,” two statements appear that claim fundamentality but which are precisely the ones in need of explication, this causes bewilderment in a consistent logician.

And yet Aushra’s semantic juxtapositions are quite intelligible, and her pair “body — field” undoubtedly has a more general meaning than the pair “objects — relations” — so would it not have been better to stop at those? In all other respects, the same considerations that applied to Aushra’s choice apply to Prokofieva’s use of the first polarity. Consequently, one can state that no grounding of the concepts of extraversion–introversion by means of the pair “objects — relations” was achieved by the author.

Let us go further and recall the history of socionics’ far-from-simple searches. Alongside the line of deductive construction of semantics coming from Aushra, another line also developed, whose founder was N. N. Medvedev. He proposed a quite solid scheme which V. D. Ermak later adopted and interpreted in his own way. In the constructions of Medvedev and Ermak, matter, energy, space, and time are chosen as the basic categories. This set looks very convincing. One might say, a decent gentleman’s kit. Relying on these categories, Medvedev quite convincingly derived the eight socionic aspects. The constructions of Medvedev and Ermak are almost impeccable, and it is difficult, even if one wishes, to find a logical breach in them. But, alas, there is one.

Before going further, let us note that at one time a substantive analogy was discovered in physics between matter and space, on the one hand, and energy and time, on the other (Emmy Noether). This analogy is far from accidental and deserves close investigation. To put it briefly, however, the essence of the matter is that physics studies the phenomenology of matter and energy in our world, but describes it in terms of space and time. In this one can discern a hint that space and time are the introverted analogues of the extraverted entities that are matter and energy. And that is precisely why the phenomenology of matter and energy can be described in terms of space and time.

From this one can conclude that the chosen four categories are not independent, contrary to how Medvedev and Ermak intuitively assessed them. And this must entail an unjustified mutual dependence of the IAs.

Medvedev proposed the correspondence between the IAs and the generalized physical categories presented in Table Pr.02.

Examining this table, we note at once that Aushra Augustinavichiute never matched extraverted intuition with time. She always matched it with potential possibilities. It is not entirely clear what the concept of “temporal correlations” might mean. Later, earlier, afterwards, present, past, future? Are these concepts not too concrete from the standpoint of the level of generalization chosen in socionics? But if that is precisely what is meant, then what is invested in the very concept of time? Who among socionists ever answered this question, and when? We shall have to recall Aristotle: “Time is the measure of motion.” Measure is a synonym of information. Thus one can say that time is information about motion, and information is an introverted entity [SCC].

Decomposition of the IAs by means of four polar constructs (Medvedev) — Table Pr.02

Aspect	Category
I — extraverted intuition	Time
i — introverted intuition	Temporal correlations
S — extraverted sensorics	Space
s — introverted sensorics	Spatial correlations
L — extraverted thinking	Matter
l — introverted thinking	Correlations of material objects
E — extraverted emotioning	Energy
e — introverted emotioning	Energetic correlations

Aushra linked extraverted sensorics with form, with the external appearance of items, with wealth; therefore, with some stretch, space can be put in correspondence with it — but something here is disquieting. Yet to link spatial correlations — for example, nearer, farther, big, small, and others — with introverted sensorics is somehow quite illogical, for according to the explication of this concept tried and tested in socionics, the concepts of comfort, an aesthetic attitude toward life, and usefulness must belong to it. And if that is so, then the category of space cannot be matched with the extraverted form of sensorics either. It would seem more logical to put matter in correspondence with extraverted sensorics — but then the logic of the theoretical construct is violated. For if time has been put in correspondence with irrational intuition, then space has to be put in correspondence with irrational sensorics. And here begins the presentiment that something in these matchings does not hold together.

Further, if you are asked with which of the remaining aspects — thinking and emotioning — the categories of matter and energy can be linked, then, in accordance with the logic of “what is left over,” the answer will be unambiguous, as shown in the table. And having made the choice presented in the table with respect to matter and energy, we shall have to resign ourselves to space being put in correspondence with extraverted sensorics, because there is nowhere else to go — it does not work out any other way — although we are dealing here with a logical error. A very subtle one, true. We shall return to this topic later. But let us note in advance that while the four IAs are orthogonal, i.e., semantically independent, there are dependencies among the categories of the physical foursome, since matter and space, on the one hand, and energy and time, on the other, relate to each other as the extraverted and introverted varieties of one and the same entity, one and the same archetype. That is, one can say that no space separate from matter exists; space completely coincides with the contours of matter. Space is an abstraction connected with matter. The habitual understanding of space is tied to the notion of it as a large empty place in which material objects are housed — something like a storeroom stuffed with things. But physics has discovered no large empty place in our world, and the vacuum is merely so called. Space is only the introverted and generalized image of matter. That is precisely why the abstraction of space is convenient to use for describing material objects.

Analogous reasoning applies to the pair energy — time. These are the extraverted and introverted forms of one and the same entity. No flow of time separate from the world exists. Time is the image of energetic processes. That is precisely why it is a convenient means for describing them. Description is a process establishing a correspondence between a directly perceived, objectively existing form and its informational representation. Description is the recoding of objective, first-signal information into a subjective, second-signal form.

Therefore, in the attempt to put two extraverted and two introverted entities in correspondence with the four extraverted IAs, a hidden theoretical contradiction arises. But not everything is so simple.

Prokofieva: Both of these mechanisms are necessary to the psyche of every person. A. Augustinavichiute writes: “A necessary condition for the functioning of any organism is a double connection with the surrounding world… For the brain to function as an apparatus of informational metabolism, it must constantly be supplied with signals received both from outside and from the organism itself” [4].

Commentary: Here Prokofieva refers to Aushra, but in the end the point is not what Aushra thinks about it, but that we find these two mechanisms in the structure of the human psyche. However, as we see, Aushra arrives at a more definite understanding of extraversion–introversion than Jung’s: she points to the existence of two information flows — from within and from without — which in Jung was masked by “orientation toward the object” and “orientation toward the subject.” Continuing Aushra’s thought, it is not difficult to conclude that extraversion–introversion is determined by the ratio of these flows. But in Aushra there is nothing about objects and relations, and so it remains unclear why the author tried to refer to objects and relations. Note that when Prokofieva says that “both of these mechanisms are necessary to the psyche of every person,” she is, of course, right — but what do objects and relations have to do with it? This is an example of logical inconsistency, where correct conclusions are drawn from incorrect premises.

In attempting to solve this problem, Prokofieva used the approach of Aushra and Filimonov, but considered it necessary to refine the choice of polar constructs adequate, from her point of view, to the problem. As the first polarity she chose the pair “objects — relations.” Although the deviation of this pair from where Aushra stopped may seem insignificant, in fact it is not so. In Aushra this pair belonged to the subject domain of physical phenomena, between which, according to the ordinary use of words, there are interactions, not relations. The construct “objects — relations” belongs to the subject domain of mathematics, and only with a stretch can it be readdressed to the sphere of physical phenomena. In psychology, the categories paired with the category “relations” are “types” or “personalities.” In the subject domain of philosophy, the category “relation” is paired with the category of the “subject.” Aushra and Sedykh use the term “relation” in their reasoning on this topic, but they do not elevate it into a polar construct. If this choice was made consciously, it needs at least some explanation. Indeed, can mathematical semantics be juxtaposed to psychological semantics — for example, with the aim of clarifying psychological concepts by means of mathematical ones? Obviously we have here the error of “substitution of the subject domain.” In mathematics we prove by relying on mathematical laws, in physics on physical ones — so why in psychology should we renounce a similar requirement? However, from the further exposition it becomes clear that what is meant is the physical world, any phenomenon in which “can be looked at either from the point of view of the properties of objects or from the point of view of relations” [12]. What relations? Between objects, is it? Or toward objects? But objects do not relate to one another — they interact with one another. It is people who relate to objects and to one another. In this sense the concept “relations” belongs to the subject domain of psychology. Of course, this case can be linked with the conditional synonymic closeness of the concepts “relation” and “interaction,” but that, at the very least, must be recognized and stipulated. And, of course, in that case one would have to speak not of objects but of subjects.

Prokofieva: Differences in personality types are determined by which of these two mechanisms a person uses more often, more habitually, more productively, more confidently, more successfully. Let us recall: we speak of a harmoniously developed personality when a person uses their strong and weak qualities approximately in the proportion of the golden section: roughly 60:40. That is, a harmoniously developed extravert uses the mechanism of extraversion in about 60% of cases: takes an interest in the objects of the external world, in people, in affairs, etc. And about 40% of their attention they devote to the inner world: to themselves, to their attitude toward objects (toward people, toward affairs). The introvert, correspondingly, the other way around.

Commentary: Here, at least, the author’s understanding of extraversion–introversion is finally clarified — it is only a matter of proportion. But objects and relations, once again, have nothing to do with it. The confusion with extraversion and introversion continues. Thanks to socionics these concepts can be defined quite simply: an extravert is a person whose program function is extraverted. Thus we readdress the definition of extraversion to the definition of the function. Extraverted functions are directly connected with the external world, and introverted ones with the internal. And if we call a TIM extravert or introvert, understanding by this its integral characteristic, then a function is not extravert or introvert but extravert_ed_ or introvert_ed_, since what is at issue is its directedness.

Prokofieva: The second division: statics — dynamics. The next major division of information proposed by A. Augustinavichiute is connected with considering phenomena in statics and in dynamics. This division concerns both objects and relations. Following Newtonian mechanics, we may assert that everything happening in the world can be studied either from the point of view of statics (“stopping,” “freezing” the item of study, be it an object or relations) or from the point of view of dynamics (in motion, in development, in the process of change).

Commentary: So what is the author dividing information into? Into aspects? But those are precisely what the author set out to semanticize. One gets the impression that the author does not know what the three pairs of polarities she has singled out actually are. That alone suffices for the further discussion to be pointless. Nevertheless, for methodological reasons, let us consider the author’s argumentation.

Prokofieva: In the first case we are interested directly in the properties of objects or relations (statics), and in the second in the processes occurring with these objects or relations (dynamics). Aspects of information about the properties of objects and relations that are unchanged over the period of observation are called static. Aspects of information about processes of change, development, motion are called dynamic.

Commentary: The author’s logical inconsistency manifests itself here in that she does not notice the connection and dependence of the categories she is choosing. After all, statics and dynamics for her are not independent entities but properties of those same objects and relations. But objects and relations have many other properties — which points to a situation of indeterminacy and ambiguity in the choice of possible categories. One way or another, it now turns out that behind statics and dynamics stand objects and relations, since statics and dynamics are properties of the latter. But the author fails to notice another logical error as well: “aspects of information” is the same as “informational aspects” (IA), which means the author ends up with at least two sets of IAs. So in what way is one set better than the other?

Prokofieva: To the division of aspects of information into static and dynamic there corresponds in socionics also the division of personality types into static and dynamic.

Commentary: Here one may ask — what claims can a methodologist have against this statement? It is quite intelligible and corresponds to the real state of affairs. Alas, first of all, it is a banality, something self-evident that requires no special statement. But matters are even worse. For everything is exactly the other way around. Aushra performed the division of personality types into static and dynamic earlier, and she did so as a result of analyzing the properties of the TIMs, not of physical reality. Here, however, the concepts of statics and dynamics are introduced not at all as a result of a free flight of intuition, but under the influence of, and by analogy with, their already existing application to the TIMs. So what is surprising in the fact that such a correspondence is found? Yet in the author it is presented as filled with special significance, at the level of a law and a foundational statement from which what was obtained from it is supposed to follow. Do you recognize the disguised form of that same “idem per idem”?

Prokofieva: The mode of information processing is reflected in features of behavior, in reactions. The former — statics — are more static in their manifestations; they have fewer movements, less gesticulation. They are more inclined to observation, to analysis. The latter — dynamics — are more mobile; even sitting in place, they change posture more often, gesticulate. They more often notice changes in the situation.

Commentary: From this we learn that statics are more static, and dynamics more dynamic. But the author apparently does not notice the tautologies in her statements. Also striking is the approximateness, the quantitative indeterminacy of the author’s explanations: “more static, more mobile, more often…” Without reference to statistical data such determinations lose their meaning. Read closely the phrase “even sitting in place”! Where does this “even” come from? And yet it is meant to make an impression.

And now let us recall how Aushra introduced these terms. No, she did not invent them, did not tie them to random isolated observations of the sort “more static, less dynamic…,” but derived them from the features of model “A”. Her intuition told her that all the properties of a TIM must be sought in the structural features of the model. She saw that eight TIMs have one set of IAs in the mental ring — I, l, S, e — while the others have another: i, L, s, E. In Aushra’s methodological complex there is an axiomatic postulate according to which any structural invariants of model “A” must find expression in the parameters of concrete TIMs. The group of IAs I, l, S, e Aushra’s intuition recognized as static. What grounds are there for this? The IAs I and S set the image of the goal; this image is stable, static; it must attract like a magnet; while the IAs l and e indicate the analytical and ethical features of the corresponding images. Therefore Aushra called such rings static, and likewise called the TIMs with such mental rings static. And only then did she begin to look closely at the concrete bearers of these types and to discover the corresponding markers in them. Conversely, the group i, L, s, E she linked with dynamics, because the IAs L and E constitute the means of achieving goals, of obtaining the product, while i and s determine the resource-consumption features of the product. That is all — and no arbitrariness or approximateness, though it is very abstract. Statics have statics in the mental ring and dynamics in the vital one. Aushra interpreted this in the sense that statics are oriented toward the formation of goals, but in this goal-setting they are dynamic — that is, they change their goals more easily depending on the situation. In dynamics, the static IAs are located in the vital ring, which makes them steadier, more “static” in their movement toward the result. In the most vivid dynamics this feature manifests itself as drive.

Prokofieva: The third division: explicit — implicit. Information on each of the four aspects analyzed can manifest itself in two qualities: — as noticeable “to the naked eye,” explicit, visible, manifested; — as unnoticeable for the time being, unmanifested, though objectively existing.

Commentary: Prokofieva’s second polarity coincides with what her predecessors had. But the third polarity not only differs from what her predecessors had — there is also the author’s own explanation of this choice, which is of interest from the methodological point of view. Prokofieva writes: “At first I too wanted to call the aspects of information about relations external and internal, for unity of terminology, as R. K. Sedykh did, but it does not work. A simple question causes perplexity: is a sensation external? And how one feels? That way one can get even more confused.” Prokofieva goes through several polar pairs — “concrete and abstract,” “factual and supposed,” “objective and subjective,” “tangible and ephemeral” — and settles on the pair “explicit — implicit.” This is a good example of scientific search, where it is evident that intense preliminary work preceded the final decision. Prokofieva does not insist that this is the most felicitous choice and offers it as a working variant. And that is understandable. But it is not clear in what way the chosen polarity “explicit — implicit” is better than the polarity “external — internal.” Let us carry out their semantic comparison. Explicit — manifested — discovered — come out into the open — outer — external. This chain of concepts, in which every two neighboring concepts are synonyms, suggests that its two extreme members have at least a common part of their semantic field. And, in this sense, there would seem to be no point in exchanging one for the other. Wherein they are similar is clear. But how, after all, do they differ? It is quite plausible that the pair “explicit — implicit” gravitates toward the cognitive process at the stage of perception and answers the question “is something accessible to perception?”, while the pair “external — internal” relates to parameters of position and is connected with the answer to the question “where is something located?” — that is, a question of place, which can be regarded as a generalized geometrical parameter. Proceeding from what has been said, one can assert that the two pairs under consideration are not identical, and therefore sufficient grounds are needed to choose one of them as valid for solving the task posed. Apparently this choice depends on the accents the researcher singles out in the concepts used. If the accent is placed on the cognitive process, the pair “explicit — implicit” corresponds to it; if the accent falls on spatial location, preference must be given to the pair “external — internal.” The process of cognition is a subjective process, while spatial location belongs to the objective parameters. Since the solution of the problem under consideration, as it is done in Aushra, is based on using the objective situation to calibrate psychic parameters, it turns out that preference must be given to the polarity “external — internal.” That is precisely what Aushra did. Therefore, when Prokofieva motivates the rejection of this pair by the fact that the terms external — internal could be confused with extraversion — introversion, what is not taken into account is that the latter terms, within the framework of the problem being solved, may be considered unknowns — which means they are exactly what needs explication, and precisely therein lies the point of the problem.

Further, Prokofieva says that “extraverted and introverted aspects are, respectively, external and internal in relation to the observer,” whereas if what is at issue are “the explicit and hidden properties of the object itself (or of relations), then we are already speaking of the external and internal properties of that object (or relation), i.e., in relation to the object under consideration.” It is unclear here how such an opposition can be made and what it consists in. What are explicit and hidden properties? Presumably this is an assessment of the object’s properties from the standpoint of the accessibility of those properties to observation. And the object’s properties will be explicit or hidden for the observer precisely because, in relation to the observer, they turn out to be on the outside or the inside of the object. Of course, in conducting reasoning of this kind one must take into account the level of abstraction of the concepts used; and since the problem under consideration is formulated in an almost maximally abstract form, the competing pairs here can be distinguished only by subject domain — whether we place the accent on the cognitive capacity of the subject or are interested in the objective parameters of the environment.

Prokofieva: Why does a new name have to be introduced? A. Augustinavichiute divided information about objects into external and internal. For the division of information about relations no such general principle was proposed. Relations in statics A. Augustinavichiute divided into objective and subjective. For relations in dynamics no term was given. Nevertheless, a unifying name for the third division of information into aspects is necessary for a clear understanding of the informational structure of the world and the psyche.

Commentary: The answer to the question posed by the author may be entirely different: the author introduces a new name because she — like a great many psychologists after Jung, and indeed Jung himself — did not fully understand the meaning of extraversion–introversion. Hence all the endless searches and refinements, while the result remains muddled and unreliable. I showed above that Aushra’s attempt to carry out a semantic decomposition of the concepts of extraversion–introversion turned out to be methodologically deficient. Had Prokofieva known this, she could have directed her efforts along a different path.

Prokofieva: A simple question causes perplexity: is a sensation external? And how one feels? That way one can get even more confused.

Commentary: And the author did get confused. The author should by no means take this assessment as offensive — after all, it was not she alone who got confused; everyone did. They got confused because socionics is difficult. So then: is a sensation external or internal? Answer: internal — because it is realized not merely inside the human body, but because it is the inner plane of human existence; because no one except the sensing person themselves can know and control what exactly that person senses.

Prokofieva: Such a general term took quite a long time to choose. Concrete — abstract? Factual — supposed? Objective — subjective? Tangible — ephemeral? Obvious — improbable? As a result of a long search we settled on the terms “explicit — implicit (hidden).”

Commentary: This list is interesting in two respects. First, it is evidence of the author’s scientific search; and second, this list — incomplete, of course — shows how many as yet unused possibilities for dividing the IP there are.

Prokofieva: The terms “explicit — implicit” are introduced as working names; possibly in the future someone will propose more felicitous ones.

Commentary: I propose abandoning it and seeking a solution in an entirely different direction, since the direction chosen by the author has proved to be a dead end.

Prokofieva: …an act and a feeling. An act is something obvious, explicit. If an act has been committed, then to the people who observed it, it is obvious that it took place, and they can confirm it. A feeling arises in a person’s soul. They may manifest it in words, gestures, acts, or may not manifest it. But observers cannot assert what exactly the person felt; they can only guess at it.

Commentary: Here we have a good example of the author’s use of fuzzy concepts. The author has been engaged in socionics and psychology for many years, and she cannot fail to understand that the word “feeling” in everyday usage has at least three meanings: 1) emotion; 2) sensation; 3) attitude/relation. Such polysemy is inadmissible in science. Jung spent several years separating these meanings — this is clearly visible in his “Tavistock Lectures.” In socionics this has already been done and is reflected in the terms “extraverted emotioning” (emotion proper), “introverted emotioning” (this is attitude/relation), and “introverted sensorics” (this is sensation). Unfortunately, many socionists quite irresponsibly try to replace these Jungian and perfectly scientific terms with their semi-jargon and jargon home-grown novelties, such as “ethics of emotions,” “ethics of relations,” or “sensorics of sensations.” So then: if, as the author says, “a feeling arises in the soul,” then this is its introverted form of emotioning, which corresponds to attitude/relation. If “they may manifest it in words, gestures, acts,” then this is emotion brought outside — that is, extraverted.

Prokofieva: For convenience of notation, A. Augustinavichiute assigned graphic designations to each of the aspects. In doing so she designated the aspects of information about objects with black symbols, and the aspects of information about relations with white ones.

Commentary: The author somewhat confuses the events. Aushra introduced the symbols not at all for convenience of notation — they are decidedly inconvenient in writing and burdensome in printing, especially when scanning socionics books. For her this was a means of direct appeal to the then-unknown content of the corresponding archetypes, about which she wrote very precisely in one of her articles devoted to Jung. Having played their positive role at the stage of discovery, these symbols gradually began to play a — not always obvious — reactionary role. Their graphic form and color began to deform the semantics of the IAs — it is clear to what subconscious images a term like “black ethics” or “black logic” may appeal.

And if the author’s theoretical errors are an understandable and to some degree forgivable thing — it happens to everyone — then the author’s uncritical use of jargon socionics terminology deserves direct reproach, since it is an act of sabotage against the Russian language. And if in the rendition of the Ukrainian Gulenko this can still somehow be understood, it is completely unforgivable in the mouth of a natively Russian person.

Prokofieva: The aspect of information about the explicit dynamics of an object — actions, movements — is called the logic of actions.

Commentary: Here is a vivid example of an erroneous understanding of an IA, and together with it of erroneous terminology. What the author explains so complicatedly and laboriously, and then also names incorrectly, can be understood very simply as the direct performance of a purposeful action, as a real rather than imagined technological process.

Prokofieva: The aspect of information about the implicit dynamics of an object — inner energetics, excitement, impulses to action, emotional states, moods — is called the ethics of emotions.

Commentary: What is at issue here is extraverted emotioning, and it can be described just as simply as extraverted thinking. Namely: extraverted emotioning is an outwardly manifested impulsive evaluative reaction to the subjectively significant parameters of a situation, accompanied by a discharge of energy, specific facial expressions, and gesticulation. So what do “the implicit dynamics of an object and inner energetics” have to do with it?

Prokofieva: The second group of observers — extravert-dynamics — will see in the family we are analyzing first of all the dynamics of objects.

Commentary: This is a very telling statement. A group of novices can be taught anything at all, including with the use of erroneous — and, on top of that, ugly — terminology, and they will recognize “the dynamics of objects”; and if an authoritative person, instead of “the dynamics of objects,” had introduced for his students the concept of “the bald devil,” then they would, “in all seriousness,” observing the corresponding socionic situation, use that term — and then teach it to their own students. Meanwhile socionic practice, despite the incorrect terminology and incorrect understanding of the subject, could be quite successful, and people could quite legitimately be proud of themselves.

Prokofieva: Statics of relations. These are relations between static objects.

Commentary: An example of the use of tautology: relations between static objects are called the statics of relations. How much have we learned from such a report?

Prokofieva: Objective relations: distances between objects, mutual arrangement, comparative characteristics of their sizes. Subjective relations between objects: attraction — repulsion, feelings and interrelations of people. In accordance with our agreement, we shall here too apply the generalizing terms: objective relations are explicit relations, while subjective relations are implicit ones; they are not always manifested, sometimes hidden; not everything in them can be seen with the naked eye.

Commentary: This excerpt is a convenient example for showing how the author’s incorrect understanding of the basic terminology distorts the real state of affairs. Once, in a conversation with me, Aushra said: “…well, what is logic? It is a Greek word that says nothing to the intuition of a Russian-speaking person. And what really stands behind it? Spatial correlations, like nearer–farther, bigger–smaller, and so on; distances between objects and their sizes belong here too.” At the time, these simple words became, for me, literally a semantic revelation, when I understood that it is not enough to use the deceptive shells of words — one must look deep and discover their actual meanings. In this excerpt the author wrote everything correctly, though she used muddled terminology. Indeed, distances between objects, mutual arrangement, comparative characteristics of their sizes — all this exists objectively and can be directly observed and measured. But the author does not catch the subtle semantic nuances. The object in itself, whatever it may be — if we are talking about its real presence in the world — belongs to the semantic field of extraverted sensorics S; whereas measurable parameters such as distances, since they are measured — and hence transferred into the inner plane — already belong to the semantic field of introverted thinking. The author’s terminology only obscures a simple understanding of the real situation. And although the author’s calling objective relations explicit relations is correct, the means by which she tries to designate them mask the fact that the measured magnitudes of distances pass into the subject’s inner plane and their semantics already acquires an introverted character. As for “subjective relations between objects”: first, between physical objects there can be no felt experiences, and no unification of terminology of the “attraction — repulsion” sort will help here — here it is perceived as fitting things to the desired result. But relations between people, where attraction–repulsion is nothing but a metaphor, psychologically are sympathies–antipathies, like–dislike, love–hate (let us call things by their names). As relations they belong to the inner plane, to the personality — hence this is the domain of introversion. When transferred to the external plane they turn into emotions and are accompanied by a discharge of energy, a change of intonation, specific facial expressions, and gesticulation. The author’s distorted understanding of the basic terminology leads to such agglomerations as “the logic of relations” and “the ethics of relations.” The first term prompts one to think that what is meant are sciences — a “logic of relations” and an “ethics of relations.” The second, of course, has no relation whatsoever to the branch of sociology where the ethics of relations is considered, but is a distortion of the normal Jungian term introverted emotioning.

Prokofieva: I confess, for the author of these lines too — also an extravert-static — it was at first not easy to figure out how to describe these aspects.

Commentary: The analysis carried out above shows that the author — no reproach intended — still has not figured it out, and the reason is that socionics really is difficult.

Prokofieva: So, sensations are the explicit dynamics of relations. Why? A sensation is dynamics: we sense a taste only when it changes…

Commentary: Here is an example of the author persuading herself and in doing so committing an error. She entered sensations under the wrong rubric and is now captive to her mistake. Sensation is an introverted entity, since it belongs to the inner plane of human life — no one outside can observe them for you.

Prokofieva: A sensation is a relation: it depends on us how we perceive taste, color, pain: everyone has their own taste; someone likes “sweet pain,” and the sensation of “pleasant fatigue” is quite relative. A sensation is explicit: it is palpable.

Commentary: I would never have believed it had I not seen it with my own eyes… It turns out the author does not distinguish sensations — that is, the result of the work of the SF of introverted sensorics — from introverted emotioning, that is, attitude/relation. And yet she correctly names some modalities of sensation: taste, color, pain… And although for the one sensing it, it is palpable and they may consider it explicit — though not always — this does not transfer the sensation from the inner plane of subjective life into the external plane of physical objecthood.

Prokofieva: Sensorics is a local view of the process of change of relations. Intuition is a global one: it sees relations as a whole, in development. For example, outwardly relations have worsened, but it sees on the whole a positive dynamic of development, if there is one. Compare: “I feel (sense) cold” — “I feel (have a presentiment of) coming changes,” “it seems to me.” The first is explicit, palpable; the second implicit, indistinct.

Commentary: The author’s inclination toward unambiguous definiteness turns out to be one of the sources of her errors. Socionics works with concepts of a high level of generality, where the laws of dialectics manifest themselves in full force. Sensorics and intuition are two poles of one archetype. These are contrary, not contradictory entities, and therefore they cannot be rigidly separated. Let us recall the famous “struggle and unity of opposites,” so aptly illustrated by the Chinese “YIN–YANG” mandala. What has been said applies fully to the individual properties of these entities. To say rigidly that sensorics is local and intuition global is to conceptually restrict the notions of locality and globality, which are by no means so rigidly tied to intuition and sensorics. In the thinking of Don Quixote and in the thinking of Zhukov globality dominates, while, for example, in the thinking of Dumas and Yesenin locality prevails. However, since the author has offered no definitions of the concepts she uses, freedom always remains for their arbitrary interpretation. And if you read the author’s illustrative examples closely, you will understand that what is at issue there is not globality and locality but a greater or lesser degree of concreteness.

Prokofieva: The aspect of information about the explicit dynamics of relations, about state: how one feels, the qualities of space, what is happening at one and the same time, is called the sensorics of sensations. The aspect of information about the implicit dynamics of relations, about the temporal correlations between processes and events following one another, is called the intuition of time.

Commentary: I categorically do not accept the author’s jargon terminology and will discuss the corresponding phenomena in Jung’s terminology. If by “sensorics of sensations” the author understands introverted sensorics — that is, the generalized result of the work of the sense organs — then this result belongs to the inner plane of human life and is oriented toward discovering the resource possibilities of the environment; or, what is the same, it is a detector of what can assist or hinder survival — of the useful and the harmful. As for introverted intuition, it supplies the individual with information about what can inspire, guarantee perspective, is capable of filling the subject’s life with meaning; it is the subject’s understanding of their inner world. And for the level of generalization with which socionics works, this is sufficient. Fixing the semantics of this function on time narrows and distorts its potential, emphasizing what has a service, background, quantitative — but not qualitative — significance. Ultimately, what matters to the subject is not how much time has passed or will pass, but what it will be filled with. Time here relates only to the form of the process, not to its meaning. An imprecise understanding of the semantics of introverted intuition leads to erroneous interpretations of the socionic categories connected with it. Let us underscore the difference between introverted and extraverted intuition, since this question may arise here. Extraverted intuition is directed toward discovering the potential possibilities of the objects of the external — that is, physical — plane of the subject’s life, while introverted intuition is connected with the meanings of the subject’s own existence, which are formed in their inner world. The relation to the external or internal plane is precisely what is designated by the terms “extraverted” and “introverted.”

In accordance with the intention of this book, aimed at exposing metaphysical distortions of scientific methodology, let us analyze one more example from the author’s reasoning.

Prokofieva: At the beginning of this section we said that the dynamics of relations includes, besides the very process of the flow of relations, also the relations between dynamic processes. Here one must take into account the mutual influence of processes upon one another (one launches another, changing its state). For two parallel-flowing processes one can compare the correlation of speeds and the correlation of states. Dynamics can be of states and of speeds (since constant speed is statics).

Commentary: This and several of the following paragraphs from the author’s book are vivid specimens of the metaphysical method — or rather of its results. I remind the reader that metaphysical thinking can be as sophisticated, abstract, and aesthetically attractive as you like, but there will always be some methodological defect present in it. The style and terminology of this fragment leave no doubt that the author is not simply an intelligent but a very intelligent person. This is a scientist who conscientiously and with full dedication tries to sort out and understand the — as it turned out — far from simple socionic material. Obviously the author is a professional in the subject under consideration, and her successful socionics practice unquestionably does her credit. However, practice, being a criterion of effectiveness, is not an unambiguous criterion of the truth of the theory underlying that practice.

As for the content of the quoted excerpt, it can only be called convolutedly entangled. Tell me, what in this set of terms — intended, mind you, to clarify socionic meanings — can the “ordinary reader,” thirsting to understand a subject interesting to them, actually understand? And was it not for them, the “ordinary reader,” that V. Gulenko invented his “domesticated” and “home-grown” terminology, opposed by him to the scientific terminology proposed by Jung? Gulenko said directly of his terminology that “it is clearer for people this way” and that “it is better for practice this way.” I will not fail to repeat once more that I hold Viktor Vladimirovich in great respect and consider him not only an intelligent but a talented scientist; but our task in working with the object of scientific research is not to “pay each other compliments” but to seek the truth and its adequate expression.

So then: one could probably talk about the dynamics of relations, and the dynamics of states, and the dynamics of speeds — which on the psychological plane may be quite interesting and substantive; but with respect to socionics these are over-complicated theoretical “frills” that lead aside and distract attention, once the author set off down the false path of seeking the semantics of the IAs. Not giving herself an account of the gnoseological status of the polar constructs she uses, she ended up in a dead end of semantic and terminological agglomerations, though she demonstrates high inventiveness and virtuosity in handling the intellectual material employed. Striving to disclose the content of the terms “extraversion–introversion,” the author tried to find concepts by means of which this could be done. But this can be done only by relying on concepts more fundamental than “extraversion–introversion.” It is precisely here that the author committed her main error. The concept of “extraversion–introversion” is more fundamental than the polar constructs to which the author turned. This error is not accidental and can be explained by the author’s failure to take into account the methodological requirements on the hierarchy of explicative categories. As a result there arose a cognitive situation that can be designated as “Ptolemaic.” Its essence is that the scientist unfolds their theoretical constructions having chosen a conceptual basis, or conceptual frame of reference, inadequate to the problem. It is known that Ptolemy, proceeding from the geocentric paradigm, built his calculations of the positions of the planets in the sky and a theory explaining their motion. As a result his theory turned out to be both more complicated and, moreover, inadequate to the actual processes, though his calculations fully satisfied practical needs.

In socionics the concepts of “extraversion–introversion” belong to the highest level of fundamentality, and therefore it is precisely they that must be adopted as axiomatic in order to explain concepts of a lower level. The inversion of the sequence of explicative categories led not only to the complication and entanglement of a multitude of socionic concepts but — mainly — became a source of the end consumer’s incomprehension of these categories; that is, for “ordinary people” and “for practice” this is not better but worse. Those wishing to verify this personally I refer to the author’s book.

Prokofieva: Let us note that information about the world could have been divided into aspects in any way whatsoever.

Commentary: A deeply erroneous statement, which can be linked with a relativist component in the author’s worldview. This statement is tantamount to a denial of the Absolute, which directly entails the loss of truth-orientations. It is tantamount to the assertion that the Laws of Nature — say, those discovered by Newton — could have been anything whatsoever. Moreover, it means that not all socionists, even the leading ones, have yet grasped the fundamentality of socionics as a scientific direction.

Prokofieva: The question of the semantics of the aspects is one of the main questions of socionics. For if socionics is the science of informational metabolism, then its subject is the exchange of information. Of course, we also communicate with one another nonverbally; in the transmission of information a considerable role is played by gestures, facial expressions, and indeed the very outward appearance of the speaker — but the crucial role of words in informational exchange can in no way be denied.

Commentary: I not only fully support the first sentence of this excerpt — I devoted the second chapter of my book [SCC] to solving the problem of the semantics of the IAs: I analyzed the situation with aspect semantics as it stood at the time the book was written and proposed my own solution to this problem. However, in the second sentence we meet a very careless formulation to the effect that the subject of socionics is the exchange of information, while “socionics is the science of informational metabolism” — which contains the logical errors of “incommensurability of the semantic scope of the definiendum and the definiens.” Here it is necessary to add that what is meant is IM in the psyche. Inaccuracies of this kind cast suspicion on the thoroughness of the author’s theoretical analysis, though they cast no shadow on her unquestionably high intellectual abilities. In the third sentence of the excerpt one can see a certain indeterminacy in the author’s understanding of what information is, expressed in the preliminary, vague character of the opposition of verbal and nonverbal information — all the more so since no one denies “the crucial role of words in informational exchange.” This indeterminacy was laid down by the author from the very beginning, when she turned to the BES for clarifications.

Prokofieva: The significance of the semantics of the aspects … is necessary: — in the diagnostics of the socionic type; — in the diagnostics of a person’s problems; — in the diagnostics of interpersonal conflicts; — in building effective interactions between people of different types.

Commentary: Here we have evidence that the author understands well the necessity of precise knowledge of the semantics of the IAs, and consequently must be interested in the most adequate solution of this problem.

Prokofieva: The correspondence of the aspects of information to the Jungian functions was established experimentally over many years of observation. This is both the colossal practice of Jung himself and the enormous work of Aushra Augustinavichiute [5], her students and followers.

Commentary: The IAs were discovered precisely by Aushra, and the reference to Jung here can be assessed simply as a gesture of politeness. In such a presentation of the material one can see a subtle distortion of the real situation, since Jung did not yet know about the IAs.

Prokofieva: Great work on compiling a dictionary of the socionic aspects is being carried out by V. D. Ermak in Kyiv. Many other socionists offer their own semantic tables.

Commentary: It is strange that the author, while justly appraising Ermak’s work, did not mention the pioneers of the semantic lists — Shepetko, Filimonov, and Ritchik. It was after their publication that much from their tables appeared in articles, and later in Ermak’s book.

Prokofieva: To an outside observer this situation probably resembles Mitrofanushka’s attempts to answer the question whether the word “door” is a “noun” or an “adjective.” He arrives at the profound conclusion that if the door is attached (adjoined) to its place, then it is an “adjective,” and if it simply exists in the storeroom, then it is a “noun.” Funny, it would seem — but very much like the current state of affairs in the study of the semantics of the socionic aspects.

Commentary: This very example with Fonvizin’s character came to my mind long before I reached this passage. This image appeared to me at the place where the author began her reasoning about replacing the polar construct “internal — external” with the construct “explicit — implicit” — for she too was led along by superficial semantic associations, though she carried out work deserving of respect. However, the image of the result inherited from Aushra became for Prokofieva a “categorical imperative,” and she “did everything” to preserve and justify that scheme. Alas, her investigation proved insufficiently objective and consistent, and, in any case, she did not reach the Truth.

Prokofieva: Questions of semantics are currently at the stage of scientific search. And how is one to study the new without erring and without advancing various suppositions? How is one to understand what no one has understood before? So one has to study, to advance different versions.

Commentary: A very correct line of reasoning. But allow me to ask a question: “Did the author really not read the corresponding section in Churyumov’s book? Why does she have no references to the article [Churyumov S. I., ‘The Problem of Informational Metabolism and Informational Aspects,’ SMiPL No. 3, 2004], written long before her book?” This problem is also examined in great detail in [SCC] — so it turns out the author either did not read my book or ignores the information it contains on the problem under analysis. Of course, everyone may have their theoretical sympathies, but if someone claims a serious solution of the problem that interests them, then a literature review has to be done. And, finally, if the author disagrees with my reasoning, there exists scientific dialogue for that — to which I have been calling all the leading socionists for many years now, only to run up against the blank wall of the self-assurance of the socionic “maîtres.”

Jung: “In reality we resort to concepts already available in language, which are accessible and clear to everyone. If, for example, I speak of ‘thinking,’ then only the philosopher does not know what is meant by it, while no layman will find it incomprehensible; for we use this word daily and always mean by it approximately one and the same thing — yet if you ask a layman to give a precise definition of thinking, he will find himself in a most difficult position. The same applies to ‘memory’ or ‘feeling.’ As difficult as it is to define such immediate psychological concepts scientifically, they are just as easy to understand in everyday language.”

Commentary: The author quotes this passage from Jung, possibly as a specific justification of her own methodological difficulties. In effect, Jung here states the presence in psychology of a large number of blurred, or fuzzy, concepts. This is an official scientific term of modern logic. However, Jung offers no solution to this problem, though it should be clear to any scientist that without solving it no progress in science is possible. One aspect of the solution consists in supplying all the key concepts in an investigation with definitions. If someone cannot define a concept they use, this directly indicates their level of competence. It is not excluded that in Jung’s times such concepts as “thinking,” “memory,” or “feeling” still remained difficult to define. But after the discovery of cybernetics, the transformation of the concept of information into a scientific category, thanks to the enormous quantity of work in psychology, philology, philosophy, and, finally, the discovery of socionics, this should cause no special difficulty — though a certain amount of labor certainly has to be applied here.

Conclusion: Summing up the analysis performed, one may say that, despite an almost impeccable logic, sophisticated argumentation, and unquestionable command of the subject, Prokofieva obtains a fundamentally erroneous result, and the reason for this is insufficient attention to the methodological side of scientific research. Nevertheless, it is a result on which one can lean in the further path of cognition of a socionics that only seems so simple and comprehensible.

With this I conclude the analysis of this article, since the work done is sufficient to understand the author’s global error in the attempt to solve the problem of the semantics of the IAs. Everything else in this article may be correct or incorrect, but it is always a conclusion from incorrect premises and, consequently, subject to revision.

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Prokofiev, Viktor Grigorievich

Author: …the greater part of the theoretical constructions of socionics were derived logically by Aushra herself and her students; hypotheses were advanced tying the obtained result to real processes in the psyche. This was followed by observations which confirmed or did not confirm the conclusions obtained. Precisely observations, which do not yet claim the role of scientific experiments. Undoubtedly, this is a necessary and lawful stage in the development of a science. But the natural result of this process is that the conclusions and observations made appear convincing to some, and to others incorrect, ill-thought-out.

Commentary: The author gives an adequate assessment of observations in socionics, but attention must nevertheless be drawn to one nuance. Observations constitute an unavoidable stage of scientific search, and it is quite sufficient for advancing initial hypotheses and introducing working terminology. Jung’s work is precisely of this character. And now, knowing what Jung’s typology turned into in America and how socionics appeared, one can say that at the basis of Aushra’s work lie Jung’s observations plus his initial sketch of a typology. Aushra did not add her own observations to this; rather, she saw in Jung’s findings more than the inventor of the fundamentally new typology himself managed to see. Aushra rose to a higher level of theoretical generalization of the results of Jung’s observations and discoveries. It was precisely Aushra’s theoretical findings that gave Jung’s typology a new impulse, turning it into the embryo of a fundamental scientific direction — which socionics became. After that, socionics acquired the possibility of further theoretical refinement and of conducting strictly controlled experiments; moreover, it became possible to test Aushra’s theoretical findings in practice. However, let us ask the question: “What kind of experiments need to be conducted in order, for example, to verify model ‘A’?” What in this model needs to be verified? That it models the system of psychic functions? That the psychic functions entering into the structure of model “A” exist? The model itself is by no means some invention of a provincial scholar — it is the result of a brilliant generalization of the entire massif of psychological knowledge accumulated by European science. By what experiments, and what exactly, can be improved here? Whereas the theoretical possibilities have by no means been exhausted. And, it seems, all that is needed here is a theoretical grounding of this model. I proposed such a grounding [SCC] — why should the theoreticians not take part in discussing it and arrive at some joint conclusion regarding its reliability, thereby completing the stage of verification of model “A”?

Author: …people newly coming into socionics often call the existing theoretical data into question and carry out a revision of the material accumulated by their predecessors, up to and including calls to abolish essential parts of it.

Commentary: Of course, in science there can be no absolute authorities. Everything can and must be subjected to criticism — but it cannot be home-grown criticism from people who know of scientific methodology by hearsay. This criticism, first of all, must be conducted in academic mode, and not in the style of a dashing cavalry raid, and must rely on the entire massif of socionic knowledge, not on superficial intuitive impressions.

Author: Thus over the past years, step by step, successive layers, sections, or projections of the structure of the human psyche identified by Jung were developed and described.

Commentary: It is unclear here what the author has encoded in the terms “layers, sections, or projections.” The point is that Jung did his work, and Jung must depart. Socionics already exists, and that says everything.

Author: At the present moment a multilayered, impressive structure of knowledge has taken shape, conventionally reflected in Diagram 1. In this diagram I saw the image of a layered information pie, which not only cannot be swallowed at once but is not easy to assimilate even by slowly “chewing” it piece by piece.

Commentary: This is an interesting line of reasoning, confirming that socionics is difficult.

Author: The material developed allows that small group of socionists who have had enough energy and purposefulness to master it in reasonably full scope to pass to the professional use of socionics and to choose it as their principal line of work.

Commentary: The possibility of earning one’s living by means of socionics speaks not only of its attractiveness but of its effectiveness. Nevertheless, this does not guarantee the theoretical correctness of some of its constructs.

Author: The “layers” of socionic knowledge: — The dichotomies of the Jungian basis, — Descriptions of the types, — External markers, — The Reinin traits, — Small groups, — Functions, — Aspects, — Models, — Intertype relations.

Commentary: A seemingly quite innocuous diagram and a “simple little” title: “The ‘layers’ of socionic knowledge.” Yet the word “layers” is taken in quotation marks. Does this not mean that the author himself is not entirely satisfied — at least subconsciously — with his “layered” understanding of the informational massif of socionic knowledge? This would seem not to be of special significance, but behind it stands some not entirely clear situation. Of course, when you know the author’s TIM (SEI), you recognize in the article’s title — “The Layered Pie…” — his culinary predilections. But does the author’s “culinary orientation” not affect the quality of his constructs? One can say with near certainty that it does: the “layered pie” is a model inadequate to a scientifically verified system of socionic knowledge.

I am a different type, and to me the image of the informational massif as a layered pie, as applied to socionics, seems completely inadmissible. The point is that the image of a layered pie is bound up with the alternation of dough and filling, where the dough sets the theme of a separating frame and the filling that of some entirely self-sufficient content, separated from all the rest. But such a model does not correspond to the situation in socionics. Here the subject matter presented by the author is in no way isolated or jointly independent. Here everything is deeply interconnected and, in the end, is derived from a small number of empirical axioms. The author, however, speaks of this massif of knowledge as one in which something can be worked with entirely independently: “Having familiarized yourself with even one of the layers presented, you immediately begin to find confirmation of your observations and correspondence of the diagnostic results to the typological descriptions.” But that is because the author, one way or another, knows and takes into account everything else as well.

Further, the author gives his vision of the “cadre” composition of socionists. He divides them into three groups. In the first group he includes “the small group of socionists who have had enough energy and purposefulness to master the developed material in reasonably full scope, to pass to the professional use of socionics, and to choose it as their principal line of work.”

Author: These researchers, regardless of fluctuations in society’s interest in socionics, have worked, work, and will work at the level of a profound scientific approach, helping their clients in various spheres of their activity and personal development. Let us conventionally call this group the first, or the group of researcher-socionists. Unfortunately, amid the new surge of interest in socionics and the significant expansion of the circle of people fascinated by it, this group is very small in number, and no tendency toward its increase is yet visible.

Commentary: Unfortunately, this group, which can be considered the leading one, is already working with more than two dozen variants of socionics, whose authors are incapable of reaching a consensus. Therefore it is not clear why the author expresses regret over the small size of this group. After all, its increase can only increase the difficulties of reconciling positions. And, on the other hand, is it not time simply to analyze, compare, and assess the proposed variants of socionics, rather than continue multiplying them, proceeding from the prejudice current in socionics that every person has the right to see and understand in accordance with their TIM? This prejudice with respect to socionic truth is a sophism — that is, a plausible statement that is false at its core. 2×2=4 is a truth that does not depend on TIM. It is another matter that the bearers of different TIMs could bring into socionics new subject matter which is perhaps obvious to some and escapes the attention of others. So let them bring it in — and not distort the basic concepts of socionics with their own misconceptions.

As the second group the author names people who have taken up the purely external side of socionics as a fashionable topic for socializing and get-togethers.

And the third group are “professionals from other fields of activity who work with people, strive to raise the effectiveness of their work, and have seen in socionics the instrument necessary for this.”

The representatives of this group are oriented toward using socionics to solve not only their personal but also their professional problems. However, alas, the successful use of socionics by this group means that socionics is effective — but this has no direct bearing on the logical impeccability of its theory.

Author: …every socionist has their own opinion about even the most popular personalities, often not coinciding with others’.

Commentary: This precisely means that socionics has not attained theoretical maturity, and the group of socionist-theoreticians is simply obliged to see to it that socionics becomes a fully-fledged science.

Author: To solve this task it is necessary to “build bridges” by means of which professionals from the third group will be able to integrate into socionics without losing touch with their professional interests.

Commentary: I think the bridges will build themselves if socionics receives a fully-fledged theoretical formulation.

Further, the author gives examples of the wretched content of the work of socionists, often culminating in “reading out the type description” and the vulgar recommendations flowing from it, of the sort “You’re a Dumas, you needn’t earn money, you won’t earn any anyway” or “Well, if the relations are conflict ones, what communication can there even be!” Alas, fighting vulgarity is useless — one must bring the methods of working with people to perfection, and first of all socionic diagnostics.

Author: In psychology there exist moral-ethical principles and rules of the psychologist’s work. Evidently it is time for socionics to work out something similar; otherwise everyone communicates with the client as best they can, and this communication often strikes one with the categoricalness of its judgments about types, about intertype relations. “Always,” “never,” “of course,” “you cannot” — are hardly admissible in relation to a living human being. In present-day socionics the principle “do no harm!” is not observed. The danger of incorrect diagnoses for clients remains quite real, yet it is left without due attention. Socionics at the present moment is far from the human personality, from human feelings: descriptions abound in offensive epithets, exaggerated and unverified information.

Commentary: Socionists have already tried to formulate “Ethical Norms of the Socionist’s Work” and a “Socionist’s Code of Honor,” but such enactments can hardly have the force of law; hence each acts as they manage, and people constantly come into socionics for whom resolutions once adopted do not seem binding.

Author: The large volume of socionic knowledge is not ordered or structured. A great number of divergent readings have accumulated in the interpretation of even the basic socionic concepts. Specialists do not study each other’s points of view, do not strive toward their practical verification and the working out of unified conceptions.

Commentary: This work has to a significant degree been done in my book — it simply needs to be read and a dialogue begun, instead of repeating again and again that socionic knowledge is not structured.

Author: The socionic material has not passed the stage of scientific experiment; therefore no screening-out of untenable, erroneous, illegitimate material has been carried out.

Commentary: In this quite understandable remark of the author’s there is a small but fundamental defect. First of all, there are socionic constructs for which Jung’s initial clinical practice is sufficient. Well, no special laboratory experiment is needed to ground the four generalized functions proposed by Jung. On this basis Aushra built her constructs, and this is, first of all, model “A”. Can some laboratory experiment be devised to ground or test this model? It has no need of one, since it is derived from the initial Churyumov–Jung axiomatics. If someone disagrees with this — let us discuss it, and not keep repeating unsupportedly that the socionic material is unordered and not confirmed experimentally.

And one must determine precisely what needs to be verified in an experiment. For example, it is useless to try to ground the ARP with verbal statistics. Their existence has been proven mathematically, while their semantics was only approximately sketched by Aushra. With these constructs one must first of all get clear theoretically, in order to understand in what kind of experiments their semantics could be verified. I assert that even the most familiar ARP, defined by the Jungian dichotomies, are by no means as obvious as it may seem to a simpleton of socionics. Alas, fully-fledged specifications do not exist “even” for extraversion–introversion. But there are none for rationality either, nor for emotionality–thinking, nor for the others.

Author: The wide circulation of mutually contradictory socionic diagnoses and the publication of masses of superficial publications discredit socionics as a science, reducing specialists’ attitude toward it to the level of newspaper astrological forecasts.

Commentary: Unquestionably, the main problem of socionics still remains reliable diagnostics. Without it, diagnostic disputes cannot be resolved. Developing the author’s thought, one can say that socionics has become easy prey for graphomaniacs.

Author: Consumers’ demand for socionic services has matured, while the supply is often far from a professional level. Rules and norms of the socionist’s work have not been officially adopted. Socionics needs to pass to the stage of practical results satisfying clients’ expectations.

Commentary: At the present time there are socionists who fully satisfy the expectations of clients — even such clients as GAZPROM. Unfortunately, such professionals are too few. However, no application of socionic knowledge, however successful, constitutes proof of the logical rigor of the theory. To some, such a requirement may seem almost a whim — but, alas, behind it stand the strict requirements of modern scientific methodology.

Author: People’s need for systematic instruction in socionics has matured, but the quality of the socionic services provided often does not reach the level of professionalism. There are no unified approved curricula; qualification requirements have not been defined.

Commentary: At the present time unified curricula are impossible, simply because there already exist more than two dozen versions of socionics differing significantly from one another, and their authors not only do not want to come to any kind of agreement among themselves but are simply incapable of it.

Author: At the present moment the common goals and tasks facing the socionics community have not been defined. One gets the impression that everyone is “stewing in their own socionics.”

Commentary: In my book [SCC] the key problems of socionics are enumerated — why not take that as a basis, instead of inventing some incomprehensible organizational forms of interaction among socionists?

Author: How to bring socionics to a new level, how to give it a new impulse for development?

Commentary: I have written a fundamental book on socionic problematics — why not take that as a basis? For this it simply needs to be read, and one needs to enter into polemics with me regarding the reliability of the work I have done. If someone agrees with something here, they gain the possibility of working with well-grounded theoretical material. If someone disagrees with something, let them formulate their argumentation, and the dialogue that is so lacking in socionics can begin.

Author: How to overcome the negative consequences of the crisis with the least losses, and to make the most effective use of its positive components? In my opinion, the way out consists in redirecting part of the efforts of those seriously engaged in socionics from the creation of new theoretical superstructures to the development of methods for applying the accumulated material.

Commentary: What theoretical superstructures is the author talking about? What we have are not “superstructures” but the home-grown repackaging of already existing constructs in the garments of one’s own understanding. All that needs to be done is to enter into dialogue in academic mode. Everything is ready for this; only good will is needed.

Author: …working out a system of instruction. And here I mean not simply the study of socionics, but the systematic mastering of certain instruments, the acquisition of skills in using them for diagnosing the causes of the problems arising in a client and selecting the most effective paths to their solution. And a very important point: the structure of the educational process must provide for the completion of each stage of instruction with the working-out of concrete abilities and skills in the practical application of the knowledge mastered.

Commentary: One should teach, first of all, reliable knowledge. Closest to this is the classical core introduced by Aushra. She too had errors and unfortunate terms, but at the time this was not understood, owing to the weak knowledge of socionics among all its adherents. At the present time a significant number of inaccuracies and errors have been identified, and to transmit them in the process of instruction in no way corresponds to the presumed socionist’s code.

Author: Why is the conduct of large-scale socionic experiments impossible at the present moment? Because, even having conducted such an experiment, the author will remain alone with its results.

Commentary: At the present time it is doubtful that even theoretically oriented socionists genuinely picture to themselves what experiments are needed. What should these experiments verify? What has hitherto been conducted under the name of experiment by certain authoritative socionists was merely formatted as experiment, while at the basis of these attempts lay semantically unreliable concepts. To the greatest degree this concerns the ARP, whose level of abstraction was not understood by socionists and remains not understood to this day. Their working names, given them by Aushra in order somehow to designate them, speak of this quite eloquently. What sort of thing is “merry–serious,” or, say, “resolute–deliberating”? Compare, for example, the merry Hamlet with the serious Huxley — anyone who knows socionics will easily feel that in this case it is exactly the other way around. This is connected with the fact that the archetypes standing behind the ARP are very difficult to verbalize, all the more so if single words are used. Strange as it may seem, even the ARP connected with the Jungian basis have no reliable specifications. Recall Eysenck’s attempt to put a strict scientific base under the concepts of extraversion and introversion. He was certain he had solved the problem, but now, knowing socionics, one can state that he erred. As for the specifications that socionic authors copy from one another, they are extremely approximate. And yet, if verbal definitions are not demanded, many socionists will be able with high probability to distinguish an extravert from an introvert.

Author: Other socionists, using other means or other points of view on the same concepts, will hardly assess the results of the experiment adequately. The stage of scientific experiments must be preceded by a stage of systematic instruction, so that groups of specialists form who have identical notions of the basic concepts of socionics.

Commentary: That “groups of specialists having identical notions of the basic concepts of socionics” may form solves nothing. The problem is simply shifted from the level of individuals to the level of groups. And until concepts adequate to the essence of the ARP are formed, there is no special sense in conducting experiments to verify them — except to keep one’s experimental hand in.

Author: …the human psyche is too complex a phenomenon, and for working with it the use of the system of socionic models alone is insufficient. On the basis of this understanding, the search for and introduction of the achievements of psychology, physiology, anatomy, etc., into the methods of conducting socionic consultations is necessary.

Commentary: Here is an example of an author who belongs to the ranks of advanced socionists turning out not to suspect that a method has long since been proposed which makes it possible to work with the real complexity of human character. I mean the principle of fractality in socionics proposed by A. Bukalov, whereby human character is resolved into thematic fractals, each of which is quite surveyable, while their superposition can produce an impression of any complexity whatsoever. As theoretical constructions have shown, the very first in this series turned out to be the socionic fractal, with which socionists have more or less come to terms. The second, strange as it may seem, turned out to be the gender fractal — likewise quite surveyable. But even the superposition of these two fractals is bound up with the problem of the incomplete identity of TIMs of different sexes. And the superposition of the other fractals — astrological, manipulative, psycho-geometrical, psychotic, professional, numerous typological ones, physiological, and many others — turns human character into an equation with many unknowns.

In conclusion the author speaks of “developing methods for certifying socionic knowledge, abilities, and skills,” but for me personally this belongs to the bureaucratic side of the matter — though, incidentally, this question too is already being solved in one way or another at the MIS. But all this, compared with the logical impeccability of the theoretical side of socionics, is of secondary importance.

In his second article, “‘A Bird in the Hand,’ or Is Complete TIM Diagnostics Always Needed?”, the author for the first time introduces the notion of the possibility and usefulness of an incomplete determination of TIM — for example, establishing merely the bearer’s belonging to a particular version-orientation (vertness) or rationality-orientation (nality) — which already gives grounds for making valuable recommendations to the client. This interesting idea resonates with the fact that in my book [SCC] I proved the qualification of TIMs as human temperaments, as a result of which it also proved possible to introduce the concept of partial temperaments, determined by one ARP — monotemperaments; by two ARP — bitemperaments; by three ARP — tritemperaments; and, finally, by four linearly independent ARP — tetratemperaments, coinciding with the TIMs. This poses to psychologists the problem of adequately describing all these varieties of temperament, whose total sum equals 306 — but, of course, the corresponding tests must also be developed. If this is done, then the partial determination of TIM grounded by Prokofiev will become a standard procedure. True, there also exists a considerably simpler solution: having correctly diagnosed the TIM, you can thereby derive from it any partial component. Moreover, it still has to be proven that TIM is harder to determine than to prove a concrete person’s belonging to just one axis. The suggested argument that “one axis is four times easier to determine than all four,” as socionic practice shows, does not always prove correct. The point is that in many cases TIM is determined almost instantly, while one may experience difficulty trying to compute only a single pre-assigned axis. At any rate, such things do happen in socionic practice.

Author: The actually applied reliable and trustworthy methods of personality-type diagnostics, which underlie the socionic methods of consulting, are complex and labor-intensive. Frequently they work only in the hands of their authors.

Commentary: Objective methods of socionic diagnostics do not at present exist. And yet the author, in proposing the possibility of limiting oneself in certain cases to a partial determination of TIM, proceeds from professional limitation, thereby capitulating before the difficulties of developing fully-fledged diagnostic tests. However, when the author speaks of the method of modular mastery of socionic concepts, which ensures the quickest introduction of the knowledge acquired into the learner’s practical circulation, there is hardly anything one can object to.

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Malyushkin, Vitaly Vasilievich

The book “Socionics for Professionals” also includes a text by Vitaly Vasilievich Malyushkin — “Express Diagnostics of the Personality Type by the Method of Eniostyle and Socionics.” I do not know whether Malyushkin belongs to Prokofieva’s team, but the very fact of this material’s placement in the book speaks, at the least, of a tolerant attitude toward it. In itself this material is interesting if only because it demonstrates the kind of methods by means of which post-Soviet psychologists serve the interests of post-Soviet clients.

Below is placed a table giving a sufficient idea of Eniostyle, which evidently must be understood as energo-informational style.

Author: …this method, having pushed off from socionics … went down the path of mixing the methods of different schools with the aim of a quicker determination of the Eniotype of the personality, relying in doing so on more many-sided criteria and assessments.

Commentary: Here is a vivid example of practicing eclecticism. What matters to the authors is not the theoretical quality of the methods used but the possibility of selling them effectively. Here the main thing is the bright packaging of the product, its easy memorability, and elements of fashionable prestige embodied in the terminology. However, this does have a certain relation to socionics as well, since the basic categories of Jung underlying it are used.

The authors pay no attention to the internal contradiction of this “gentleman’s set of categories.” Either all the categories in one column are semantically equivalent — and then, if the label “Southern metaphor” has been hung on you, you are forever a CIRCLE, a PLACATOR, an ADAPTIVE CHILD, a KINESTHETIC, a MASOCHIST, etc., while SENSORICS, INTUITION, and LOGIC and all the other delights are closed to you forever; yet from socionics we know that “ethics” combines perfectly well with both “sensorics” and “intuition.” Or the categories from different columns admit combinatorics — and then all the “columnar tidiness” goes down the drain.

For practical consulting it would in some cases be useful to employ not only socionic concepts but to turn to the rich arsenal of means developed in psychology. Clearly, a socionist semi-literate in psychological terms easily slides down to the level of a quack-charlatan who merely deftly manipulates a trusting client, using assorted socionic jargon.

For the theoretician of socionics, what is of interest is the establishment of the psychological validity of any methods whatsoever of working with the client, and the possibility of adapting them to consulting with the aim of helping the client as much as possible. Also of interest is the establishment of connections and correspondences between the concepts of socionics and other typologies, as well as the possibility of refining and enriching socionic concepts through such correspondences. For example, what is the correlation between TIMs and Dellinger’s psycho-geometric forms? Is any juxtaposition possible here at all, and an expansion of TIM specifications through it? Does the “CIRCLE” correspond to socionic emotioning, etc.? Intuitive certainty is not enough here — fully-fledged proofs are needed. As is known, the identification of categories from different subject domains is a dubious thing, and minds unburdened by experience easily fall into the trap of the childhood disease of hasty identification.

I personally know the Panchenko spouses as intelligent and enterprising people; however, part of their constructs, on closer examination, does not withstand methodological analysis. The very term “Eniostyle” is supposed to mean energo-informational style and sounds quite attractive, but, lacking theoretical grounding, cannot be considered scientific. And a self-respecting psychologist ought to take care of the scientific underpinning of the technologies they use.

Table. The Components of Eniostyle

Designation of the metaphor	N (North)	E (East)	S (South)	W (West)
Metaphor	Northern (science)	Eastern (magic)	Southern (art)	Western (religion)
Psycho-geometric figure per S. Dellinger	Square	Zigzag	Circle	Triangle
Category per V. Satir	Computer	Distractor	Placator	Blamer
Ego-state per E. Berne	Adult	Rebellious child	Adaptive child	Parent
Preferred modality	Auditory	Inner dialogue and visual construction	Kinesthetics	Visual
Dominant chakra	Vishuddha, intellectual energy	Ajna, center of intuition	Svadhisthana, sexual energy	Manipura, center of leadership
Function per C. G. Jung	Logic	Intuition	Ethics	Sensorics
Type of bodily defense	Rigid	Schizoid	Masochistic	Psychopathic

The four metaphors N, W, S, E are an outright fabrication, but they may impress the uninitiated with the “depth of symbolic allusion,” though there is no depth here whatsoever. Why, for example, is science linked not with the West but with the North? The northernmost peoples — the Chukchi and the Eskimos — can hardly be considered the founders of this social institution. And as for magic, art, and religion, they have existed from time immemorial among all peoples, and the rigid pinning of these forms of consciousness to specific cardinal directions, though it may strike the layman as something profound, on inspection turns out to be ordinary swindling, widespread among “creative” inventors of fraudulent schemes for relieving the populace of its money. Objections are sometimes offered here to the effect that, well, for theory this perhaps will not do, but for practice it is very effective: the clients are pleased and pay well for the services rendered them. As if it were useful for practice to lie a little — and as for the clients being pleased and paying willingly, is that not precisely the effect of intellectual fraud?

As for the identifications of categories from different practices with one another and with the “metaphors,” this is an example of the superficial frivolity of which blondes are suspected. To ground such correspondences, serious work would have to be done comparing the semantic fields of the concepts under investigation. Obviously, no such work was done. And the elementary fitting-to-four is obvious — where the system lacked items, they were added up to four, as in the case of Berne and NLP, and where there were “many,” the “surplus” was simply discarded, as in the case of the chakras and Shostrom’s types of manipulators. But it is beautiful — and beauty, as G. A. Shulman teaches, is the criterion of truth. QED — quod erat demonstrandum.

What is paradoxical here is that even a typology “dragged in by the ears” can yield positive results. I think this is fully explained by the “redundancy of the human factor” — a strong leader, in whose role the “facilitator” appears (also the trainer, or even the “guru”), turns out to be a catalyst for the solution of personal problems, while the verbal contrivances secure entry into the client’s psychic field.

But the main thing here is that socionics is a science, while all the other components of Eniostyle are empirical contrivances for establishing contact with clients. Of course, we are dealing here with an author’s technology of “communicating with the client,” and if no damage is done to the client, then, under conditions of democracy and pluralism of opinions, whose business is it what form of entertainment the client chooses — people do, after all, pay money, for example, for variety shows, and trainings using an extravagant set of categories may well pass for a kind of entertainment. However, when it is a matter of science, as in the case of socionics, strict scientific proofs of the truth of the knowledge conveyed to the client are needed. If someone uses socionics merely as an instrument for establishing contact with the client, neglecting the scientific quality of the concepts they use, that is a matter for their scientific conscience.

It would be reasonable to supplement a socionic consultation with solid psychological methods — of which, incidentally, there are quite a few — rather than compromise it by ties with spontaneous manipulative instruments, which testifies to insufficiently developed theoretical taste.

Author: ENIOSTYLE is defined by its authors as a synthesis of the factor and typological approaches. The eniostylistic approach today is one of the youngest methodological principles. The key conceptions of Eniostyle were developed by Tamara and Anatoly Panchenko in 1982–1994 on the basis of studying the health, harmoniousness, and success of people by the methods of socionics, analytical psychology, NLP, the Ericksonian model, transactional analysis, bodily psychoanalysis, and psychotronics.

Commentary: “A synthesis of the factor and typological approaches” is a beautiful and very scientific combination of words, but very weakly supported by the presented set of categories, and in effect it misleads the trusting reader. The typological approach means singling out, in the multitude of human characters, fundamental features corresponding to some practical criterion; and in the proposed variant of Eniostyle even a large number of types is offered, though on attentive analysis it turns out that many of them are pseudo-types, since they reflect no reality whatsoever.

Factor analysis, on the other hand, presupposes a special theoretical processing of empirically gathered material — for example, with the use of such serious mathematical instruments as statistical data processing and correlation analysis. There is nothing of this in Eniostyle. There is a prettified set of categories with fuzzy meaning, which makes it possible to manipulate the client’s consciousness using NLP concepts. It suffices to name the four metaphors, and the Ericksonian trance is assured.

The psycho-geometric type is, first of all, a metaphor establishing a certain mnemonic correspondence between the features of generalized behavior and a geometrical figure. The creator of psycho-geometry, S. Dellinger, was very proud of her invention and managed to introduce it in more than twenty countries. The method is extremely simple and paltry, but the Americans know how to “promote” anything whatsoever and to earn on it. Nevertheless, this simple little typology is easily assimilated by people and raises their psychological competence.

Satir’s categories single out types of manipulators, but this list can by no means be considered exhaustive — a fuller list can be found in Shostrom; yet the authors fit the sets of categories to a foursome, forcibly establishing a correspondence between the elements of the foursomes, elevating approximateness to the rank of a strict law — which is violence against the client’s consciousness. It turns out that if you are a SQUARE, then you are necessarily a COMPUTER and an ADULT. Can a SQUARE really not be at least a PARENT? There are no such proofs.

The same goes for the pinning to the chakras — there are at least seven of them, but the authors cut their set down to four: the methodological principle they have adopted demands it, which gives grounds for considering certain principles harmful, since they mislead. Such is the face of theoretical eclecticism — an unprincipled hodgepodge of beautiful categories.

With an analogous effect one could use foursomes of plants, animals, or items of technology. For example, introduce the types of the lion — will, sensorics; the bull — strength, stubbornness, logic; the giraffe — caution, foresight, intuition; and the monkey — flexibility, adaptation, ethics. Or divide people into birds — intuition (because from above they can see everything), fish — emotion (because they are in water, and water is emotion), predators — sensorics (because of blood), and herbivores — logic (they eat up the grass on the field consistently).

It would be reasonable to supplement a socionic consultation with solid psychological methods — of which, incidentally, there are quite a few — rather than compromise it by ties with spontaneous manipulative instruments, which testifies to insufficiently developed theoretical taste.

Author: …personally, I am sympathetic to the position of A. Panchenko, who said: “To criticize A. Augustinavichiute and disagree with her is easy nowadays, and many engage in it. However, I believe that if you disagree, you should not correct the founder of socionics — better to create something of your own.”

Commentary: Aushra made one of the greatest discoveries in the history of humanity. She managed to continue the personological line of Freud, Jung, and many of their followers. She realized the relevant part of their theories but, like her predecessors, did not manage to bring her brainchild to its possible perfection, and what she left to people needs further development and refinement. Therefore the point is not to refrain from “criticizing and disagreeing with her,” but to develop her constructs — which, of course, is not at all simple. And the history of socionics is confirmation of that. Whereas to close one’s eyes to certain inaccuracies — of which, incidentally, she herself always spoke — would be a betrayal of her cause. And, of course, to the category of low scientific and moral culture belong those cases where, out of considerations of psychological entrepreneurship, separate chunks are torn out of her legacy and used thereafter as bait for clients and for self-affirmation at their expense.

Author: In express diagnostics — i.e., in a situation of time constraints and the impossibility of diagnosing partners by the usual methods (test, interview, observation) — the Eniostyle method has shown particular value. In the case of negotiations, diagnostics has to be carried out in a very short time. And here Eniostyle gives good results.

Commentary: Clearly, “good results” is the author’s subjective assessment — no independent expert review was carried out here. Socionists know how difficult qualitative diagnostics can be, and how harmful the chummy hanging of superficially assigned labels can be. But I quite allow that the educated psychologists the Panchenkos skillfully avoid critical situations — though this can hardly be presumed of their enthusiast-followers who have received no psychological education.

Author: Among the great variety of personality-diagnostic methods existing today, widely used both in the West and in the East, it turned out that there are not so many working instruments that have proven themselves well in the business environment. In my view, these are, first, socionics, quite widely spread across the expanses of the former USSR. Second, the variant of the Jungian typology of personality represented by the American Typological Association, using the MBTI (Myers–Briggs) and D. Keirsey tests, used mainly in the USA, Europe, and in the HR services of Western companies operating in the CIS. Third, NLP, in the part concerning metaprograms, successfully used both in the USA and in the countries of the former CIS. Fourth place, in my opinion, is occupied by the Eniostyle of Tamara and Anatoly Panchenko, spread mainly in Siberia and the Altai, and after 2000 successfully developing in Moscow as well.

Commentary: The success of the Jungian typology of personality via the MBTI tests in America is an example of the manipulative promotion of a deficient psychological instrument, where the type is determined formally by the filling-in of a test form, with the result fixed by the client’s signature expressing their agreement and guaranteeing the psychologist against judicial prosecution should the client fill in the test form differently the next day and be assigned a different type. And no less important is that this typology has distorted notions of the relations between the types. There, for example, it is held that positive relations are established between ESTJ and INFP, whereas in socionics it has been proven that these TIMs — Stirlitz and Yesenin — are conflictors.

Author: T. and A. Panchenko, socionists well known in the Altai and Siberia, created their own socionic model P. Then, on the basis of this model, a new method was created, named ENIOSTYLE. This method, like model Yu, has four symbol-functions, but they are represented by cells as in model A, without change of their assignments: function 1 — basic, function 2 — creative, function 3 — role, function 4 — painful. The socionic principles of productivity (+) and acceptivity (−) were retained. In place of the designations accepted in socionics, descriptions of the eniotypes were introduced corresponding to the description of S. Dellinger’s psycho-geometric figures: zigzag (intuition), triangle (sensorics), circle (ethics), and square (logic).

Commentary: These are examples of the eclectic joining of different psycho-techniques — the authors simply feel it will be “not bad” this way. Of course, the authors are experienced psychologists with great experience of practical field work, and they built the method “for themselves” — it is more convenient for them that way, and theoretical subtleties do not interest them. The criterion of truth here is one: what sells well is true. And yes, incidentally, they slapped together yet another author’s model, “P”…

Author: …this method, having pushed off from socionics (in its original form there even existed an eighth, socionic “petal”), went down the path of mixing the methods of different schools with the aim of a quicker determination of the Eniotype of the personality, relying in doing so on more many-sided criteria and assessments.

Commentary: “The path of mixing methods” is precisely eclecticism.

Author: Having engaged for 6 years with Eniostyle and 2 years with socionics, I have acquired a certain experience of comparing the effectiveness of these methods in the business environment when using them as an instrument in personnel policy, in the managerial audit of personnel, and also in the negotiation process. Over these years I have had the opportunity to work with, and simultaneously observe, test, and interview, a large number of middle- and top-level managers in a financial-investment holding. I can therefore note that both methods work well and, when skillfully used, yield a significant result in day-to-day personnel work — in hiring, in assessing the strong and weak sides of employees and job candidates, and, consequently, their fitness for the proposed position.

Commentary: This example shows that for practical work one can use anything at all — but above all one needs experience, and in a master’s hands everything works. Thus we arrive at the negation of scientific rigor: anything the public is prepared to pay for will do — the famous “the people lap it up.”

Author: What, then, are the strong sides of ENIOSTYLE when used in the business environment? First of all, given a limited amount of time, the type of bodily defense per A. Lowen (TBD) is determined quite simply. To a large extent, at first glance at a person it is already realistic to make an initial supposition about their TBD or metaphor per Eniostyle. And it is important that TBD works quite well, though it undoubtedly requires further verification. All the figure types — Rigid, Schizoid, Masochistic, and Psychopathic — are, with a certain skill, noticeable at first glance and do not require long and close attention.

Commentary: The authors apparently do not notice that Lowen uses heterogeneous concepts, and with pathological overtones at that. The rigid is opposed by the labile, not the masochistic. And why is the sadistic type absent? The schizoid is opposed by the epileptoid, but it is not in the list.

Author: The Masochistic TBD corresponds perfectly to the Southern eniotype. It is said of them that they are hard to knock off their feet, like a “roly-poly doll,” because their center of gravity is located closer to the bottom; there is a “lower” belly and often full hips. The body looks full or inclined to fullness, as if filled with energy, resilient.

Commentary: So, all who belong to the southern eniotype are masochists. Are there really no psychopaths in the south?

Author: The Rigid TBD, i.e., inflexible, unchanging. These are proportional body forms. Average height. A calm facial expression. The body is proportional, like a Roman statue. It does not change with age, neither grows thin nor puts on weight, and until old age looks young. Corresponds to the Northern eniotype.

Commentary: The psychological term “rigid” refers not to the body but to attitudes. Careless handling of the word will show up in irresponsible handling of the concepts — and the Roman statues came to us from the south, not the north.

Author: The Psychopathic TBD looks like a body strong in its upper part, as if overfilled with energy, willpower, grandeur. It is a monument, a bust. It walks like an icebreaker, pushing everyone aside along the way. The lower part of the body, however, is disproportionate to the upper; the legs are weakish or possibly shortish. Corresponds to the Western eniotype.

Commentary: In the West everyone is a psychopath — that is precisely the thought instilled by the proposed typology. Probably that is why they have the most developed culture and a high level of prosperity.

Author: The Schizoid TBD, i.e., split, dis-integrated. They produce the impression of awkward people. They are often very thin and tall. They feel unsure of themselves in the here and now, often change the position of their arms or legs because they cannot find a permanent place for them. Corresponds to the Eastern eniotype.

Commentary: There you have the enio-image of the Eastern person. How simple and convenient everything is: in the East everyone is a schizoid, and in the West everyone is a psychopath. Is this not what the proverb “simplicity is worse than thievery” refers to? In the case of the quoted interpretation of the enio-approach we have over-simplification carried to absurdity, when instead of understanding people up to the level of science, the facilitator-simplifier lowers them to home-grown labels, forming the primitive consciousness of a consumer and, in the final analysis, of a slave rather than a creator.

Author: The “kinesthetic” comprehends the world not through logic, eyes, or ears, but through the whole body, through the sensations in it. Sensations are their principal mode of communication with the world. They are slow in making decisions.

Commentary: The author does not even notice that sensations are the eyes and ears too — that is, visuals and auditories in this sense do not differ from kinesthetics.

Author: Using S. Dellinger’s metaphor, one can say that the Southern eniostyle leads a “round way of life.” The “circle” is the most economical, harmonious figure, streamlined in motion; it adapts and it adapts others. The outward appearance is unofficial, often “lush” and full. Speech is emotional. A relaxed posture. A benevolent smile. A high need for communication.

Commentary: In this excerpt the contradiction in the symbolic semantics of the “circle” is clearly noticeable: the figure is economical, yet the person may wear glamorous things, which is in no way economical.

The variant of ENIOSTYLE considered is a vivid example of how professional psychologists can be not only unscrupulous in their means of working with the client but can also sink to a level which certainly cannot be called scientific.

I would also like to note the theoretically solid articles by Natalia Lytko, “The TIM of an Organization as a Psycho-Informational System,” and Tatyana Pershina, “Socionics in the Work of an HR Manager” — unfortunately burdened with the socionic jargon from Gulenko.

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References

1. Prokofieva T. N., Socionics for Professionals, “Almaz”, Moscow, 2008.
2. Churyumov S. I., The Smile of the Cheshire Cat, Moscow, “ChB”, 2011, book one.
3. Sedykh R., Informational Analysis, St. Petersburg, 1994.
4. Augustinavichiute A., Socionics, St. Petersburg, 1998.