Section 3

Bukalov’s Variant: What’s Wrong with Integral Socionics?

“All the Universe I’ve traveled through…” (Russian folk song)

A. V. Bukalov, alongside V. V. Gulenko and others, belongs to the most productive developers of socionic ideas. His book The Potential of Personality, published in 2009, sums up many years of work. Had this book come out in the early 1990s, it would have been an event. At present it is somewhat belated, but its importance lies in the fact that it fixes the finished products of the previous work of the head of the International Institute of Socionics (IIS). We can now consider that Bukalov has left the exploratory mode behind him and is presenting to the socionics community the maximal results of his searches.

A. V. Bukalov, along with a subtle intellect, possesses broad erudition and specific organizational abilities.

The text of the book is written with great emotional pathos aimed in support of socionics; however, much of what goes beyond the classical core presented in the works of Aušra Augustinavičiūtė in the author’s theoretical constructions cannot be considered a finished product, owing to a number of failures to meet methodological requirements.

Among the purely editorial flaws of the book one should count the looseness of its structure, unjustified repetitions, and the stylistic vagueness of many paragraphs. However, without denying the book’s merits, I will dwell only on what can be classed as theoretical imperfections — in this I see my task as head of the IIS methodology department.

Had this book appeared in the early 1990s it would have been an event, but now, at the end of the first decade of the 21st century, it is somewhat belated and looks like a conscientious report on work that was carried on for nearly two decades. It is a useful book. In any case, since Aleksandr Valentinovich is one of the leading specialists in the field of socionics, this book reflects the level of socionic self-awareness at a particular moment in the formation of the young science.

Before Bukalov’s book appeared, more than four dozen books had been written on socionics. Among them were books slightly better, slightly worse, quite decent books, and frankly worthless ones. But almost all of these books repeated sentences about “the new, the amazing, the revolutionary science.” Each of them told of the 16 types — and described them with varying degrees of detail — and of Aušra Augustinavičiūtė’s amazing discovery of the 16 intertype relations — and these too were described, well, as best each author could. And all the books’ authors mentioned in one and the same context the name of A. Kempiński with his information metabolism, and much else was repeated in every book without exception. But A. V. Bukalov managed to breathe new life into this whole well-worn repertoire. And that is not only because Bukalov is one of the best experts in socionics and a talented theoretician, but also because the staff of the International Institute of Socionics he created carried on for many years intensive practical work with numerous organizations and enterprises, helping the latter to optimize their production activity on the basis of socionics. Bukalov’s rich practical experience allows him to demonstrate the consulting effectiveness of socionics from every angle and to make his book a persuasive advertisement for it.

In the book, alongside substantial refinements of socionic concepts, there are also problematic passages, subtly disguised logical errors, and intuitive exaggerations. Assessing the book’s “truth balance” in general terms, I would settle on a formula of 78:22 in favor of truth. The following review of Bukalov’s book is devoted to an analysis of the possible inaccuracies and the successful intellectual moves of the author.

Preface

Author: The book offered to the reader’s attention is based on the author’s 25 years of theoretical and practical work in the field of personality psychology and socionics. Socionics, or psychoinformatics, is not only a coherent and elegant theory of the human psyche that makes it possible to predict a person’s behavior and relations with those around him, but also a powerful applied science. Let us define socionics, or psychoinformatics, as the science of the types of psychoinformational systems (person, collective, ethnos, state) and the interactions between them, or as the science of the types of information metabolism.

Commentary: When an author speaks of his subject using the words “coherent and elegant,” it is clear that he is in love with it. On the other hand, renaming socionics as psychoinformatics — or even simply identifying the two — without prior discussion is incorrect. In that case socionics loses its specificity as a fundamental typology and turns into yet another variety of informatics as a science of formal rules for handling information objects. Alas, informatics did not become the science of IM. After cybernetics it turned into a normative discipline that fixes formal rules for handling information. I, unlike Bukalov, define socionics as the science of information metabolism in the generalized structures of the psyche — among other reasons because, as we may now suppose, the psyche of all living beings has the same structure, which is by no means generally accepted in science.

Renaming socionics as psychoinformatics is not only incorrect — if only because this brand belongs to Aušra — but also wrong in substance, because between psychoinformatics and socionics there is a difference of level, as between a generic and a specific concept.

Author: Everything set forth in the book has been confirmed by real expert-consulting work at more than 100 enterprises, firms, banks, and holdings in Russia and Ukraine, as well as in family and individual counseling.

Commentary: It appears that the author subconsciously identifies practical effectiveness with theoretical impeccability. Here we return to the pragmatic understanding of practice as the criterion of truth. This theme has been well worked out in philosophy, and the well-grounded conclusion is that practice is the criterion of a theory’s effectiveness, not of its truth — which, of course, do not always coincide. One and the same practice — curing a patient, for instance — can be supported by very different paradigms. The shaman’s drum, behind which stands a conception of three worlds and the spirits inhabiting them, may prove more effective than pharmacy pills whose action is grounded in chemical and medical science. Practical activity can turn out to be equally effective under both the heliocentric and the geocentric understanding of the world order. Theoretical truth has its own value status, although, depending on upbringing and TIM, individual persons may neglect absolute values in favor of relative ones, especially if they gain material advantages thereby. It is also known, however, that relative truths can bring a significant payoff over short distances — and there they become a temptation — but over long distances they lose in the end. A scientific truth can prove impeccable only when it has full sensory, logical, intuitive, and ethical support. Any mismatch in any aspectual parameter casts doubt on theoretical constructions. Yet the author offers in his book certain constructs that could not possibly have been confirmed by his practical work — for example, the four-dimensionality of his model or the notion of levion fields.

Author: Let us list the basic propositions of socionics: 1. Human consciousness is regarded as an information system comprising 8 subsystems reflecting particular aspects of the perceived world, or functions of information metabolism: intuition, sensing (sensation), logic (thinking), and ethics (emotions), taking into account extraversion or introversion.

Commentary: Here the author conflates the concepts of consciousness and psyche, which is inadmissible in a theoretically oriented text. Methodological imprecisions-carelessnesses of this kind in the author’s text significantly lower its truth potential.

Author: 2. In contrast to C. G. Jung’s scheme, a concept has been introduced of the hierarchical, discrete arrangement of the functions and the degree of their differentiation both in consciousness and in the unconscious — from the most developed and differentiated to the least developed.

Commentary: Model “A” does not refute Jung’s scheme but develops it, revealing the truth that was present there from the start. It is precisely to Jung that the discovery of the functional hierarchy belongs, though he apparently never fully realized this himself.

Author: 3. On each of the levels (conscious and unconscious) there are placed, in order of degree of differentiation, two pairs of opposite or complementary functions. In one pair are the rational functions, and in the other the irrational ones.

Commentary: Anyone who knows socionics can guess what the author wanted to say, but the sentence is plainly unedited. What does “opposite or complementary functions” mean? Without a comma before “or”? It could mean that some pairs contain opposite functions and others complementary ones, which in no way corresponds to Model “A”. The same applies to the claim that “in one pair are the rational functions, and in the other the irrational” — in each pair of functions forming a block, the functions differ in rationality and differ in version (extraversion/introversion). But perhaps this is a slip of the pen.

Author: 4. According to the character of perception, processing, and output of information, 16 types of IM are distinguished depending on the combination of the 8 functions.

Commentary: The combination of functions in every TIM is one and the same — only the order of the information aspects changes. From an editorial point of view, the expression “16 types are distinguished” comes across somewhat provocatively, above all because of the ambiguity of the word “distinguished,” visible from comparing the expressions “stand out against a background” and “are singled out from.” In this case both expressions are compatible with the context. But both turns of phrase presuppose a set against which one can stand out or from which one can be singled out. Since we are dealing here with a scientific text close in character to an axiomatic one, semantic shades must be handled with special care. So a clarification is appropriate: “From what set are the 16 types of information metabolism singled out?” The point is that from the socionic axiomatics one can obtain a single set of 16 types, from which, by some criterion, some number of types may be singled out (in the second sense); but to say this of all 16 would be rather strange — unless, of course, one accepts the variant in which a set counts as its own proper subset. This is an example of the author’s carelessness in formulating his thoughts, which is characteristic of intuitives.

Author: 5. The character of thinking, the needs, the motivation of behavior, and the behavior itself of a person (and of human communities) are largely determined by his type of information metabolism (TIM).

Commentary: An understandable thought, but unfortunately expressed not quite adequately. Here we get a conflation of the concepts of character and type, which is inadmissible at the theoretical level. The TIM determines the type of thinking, the type of needs, the type of behavioral motivation, and the very type of a person’s behavior; their character is determined by the concrete circumstances of life: the immediate environment, upbringing, living conditions, social position.

Author: 6. Each TIM is characterized by peculiarities of perception of particular aspects of the surrounding world, onto which upbringing and the cultural context of the era are superimposed. This is already individuality, personality.

Commentary: This statement contains an identification — inadmissible at the level of theoretical reasoning — of the concepts of individuality and personality, which are left undefined. Point 6 seems to refine point 5, but because of the vagueness of the terms used, this refinement looks like a tautology. A type specifies the generalized parameters of an object — and that says it all. Typological peculiarities of perception are merely a particular case of the realization of a type, since, besides perceiving, an individual thinks, emotes, demonstrates his position, and so on.

Author: 7. The relations of the sixteen TIMs as information systems are characterized by 16 types of relations: from complete compatibility and complementarity to conflict relations.

Commentary: From the editing standpoint, this judgment employs an unacceptable tautology: relations are characterized by… relations. Moreover, in this claim, which pretends to a high level of generalization since it is assigned to the category of “basic propositions,” the concept of “compatibility” is left undefined, and is furthermore juxtaposed with complementarity. Granted, complementarity can be defined later, where the construct of a relation is described; but a preliminary assessment of relations in terms of compatibility, without defining the latter, turns the judgment under consideration into a non-binding declaration. Besides, from the psychological point of view it is simply incorrect to speak of the complete compatibility of TIMs — because it does not correspond to reality. In an edited version this point might read: “Each pair of TIMs is linked by a definite type of relation possessing distinctive parameters, which at the everyday level manifest themselves, in particular, as various degrees of compatibility.” Here the concept of “compatibility” is concretized by the concept of “degree,” and can therefore be accepted by default as general-scientific.

Author: 8. The sixteen TIMs form the socion, which is subdivided into 4 foursomes of TIMs that are stable in their psychological relations — the quadras.

Commentary: This sentence looks like an axiom, though one violating the requirements for axiomatic statements. But placing this sentence in the group of basic propositions is inadmissible because of its particular character, since of the many properties of the socion only one is indicated — its division into quadras.

Author: Besides the symmetric relations (there are twelve of them) there also exist asymmetric ones (the relations of social order [request] and supervision). These relations form in the socion the so-called rings of social progress, along which the transformation and realization, the embodiment, of information takes place. All four quadras are linked with one another by two rings of social progress — the evolutionary and the corrective.

Commentary: Several myths have formed in socionics, among them the myth of the order rings as some special channels of information transfer. This is partly connected with the fact that asymmetric relations seem mysterious and are therefore subconsciously endowed with special properties. One may even ask: how could it happen that asymmetry appeared in a regular set of types? In connection with the asymmetric relations the impression arises that some important information leaves the pair, whereas in the case of symmetric relations such information stays inside the pair. But this is a misunderstanding. In symmetric relations information can also leave the pair, if someone else connects to one of the partners or to each of them — through any relation whatsoever, even through conflict. If, for example, another dual approaches your dual and communicates with him, then the information you passed to him gets the possibility of leaving the pair. Under exactly the same conditions information can leave the order-giver–order-receiver pair. This happens if another order-receiver approaches your order-giver instead of you, or if your order-receiver’s own order-receiver approaches him. Let us also note that in asymmetric relations information moves in both directions, as in all other relations. Yet the myth of the “rings of progress” tacitly presupposes that here information moves only in one direction. Devotees of the myth of the special role of the order rings may say that along this chain information leaves the quadra and, in the end, having gone round the whole socion, returns to its source. First of all, the mythological character of the situation and its illusoriness are quite obvious here. For if someone has transmitted potentially important information capable of dynamic enrichment (otherwise why bother?), it can return to the sender “in new guise” only in special and, moreover, improbable cases — for example, if an order group actually gathers somewhere and “plays this game.” One may object that it is not at all important for the information to return. Return where? To its sender? The myth of the “rings of progress” tacitly presupposes that the information message returns to a bearer of the same TIM as its sender. What matters is that the initial information, as it moves along the ring, undergoes some changes at each stage and at some point reaches a level of “sufficient maturity.” At just that moment it acquires a special value for society. Thanks to this value, society, relying on it, passes to a new level, ascends “a new step of progress.” Well, a perfectly realistic scheme. But it is no better than schemes based on rings and chains composed of other relations. For example, Ki → Du → Dr → Lo → Ki. Or, if you want all the quadras covered: Ki → Gu → Go → Lo → Na → Gb → Ki. Here each link offers favorable conditions for the transfer of information, and, other things being equal, such information has no less a chance of “dynamizing,” “maturing,” “reaching condition” than in the “order ring.” Yet the “magic” of the term “order ring” creates the impression that here we are dealing with the sole mechanism of the “progressive fine-tuning” of information. It was precisely under the influence of this magical illusion that the term “ring of social progress” was verbalized, which at the subconscious level instills the uniqueness and universality of this channel in the processes of society’s progressive evolution. Incidentally, it is somehow forgotten that reactionary, misanthropic, terrorist, involutionary, and any other negative ideas can be transmitted along this channel with equal success. Thus the author’s claim that transformation, realization, and embodiment of information occur along the rings of social progress — as if this were the only channel in this respect — simplifies and impoverishes the real process of IM in society.

Author: Groupings of the quadra type play a large role in society thanks to the fact that a quadra is united by a common worldview, world outlook, and mutual understanding of the partners.

Commentary: The author’s claim, true in itself, has a restrictive character — as if there did not exist groupings of other kinds that also “play a large role in society.” Incidentally, this role is not necessarily positive, though it has long been clear that any socionic groupings can play any role. For example, quadra-type groupings can be reactionary. Knowledge of socionics makes it possible to optimize the functioning of socionic groupings, but this does not extend to the social content of their informational output.

Author: In turn, the quadra too divides into two dyads, each of which contains complementary or dual TIMs. A. Augustinavičiūtė remarks that “dualization raises a person’s self-respect. Thanks to it, both one’s own usefulness to other people and one’s own place in society are constantly realized. The second [partner] constantly supplies reliable information about this. All feelings of inferiority and fear disappear.”

Commentary: From the editing standpoint, the reasoning quoted, while correct, at the same time falls outside the theoretical format of the section of the book that deals with the basic propositions of socionics. These reflections would of course be more appropriate in the section where the semantics of the quadras will be discussed. At the same time the author overly singles out duality, evidently failing to take into account that the same group of passive synergy also includes semi-duality (SD), mirage (MI), and polar opposition (PO). And, of course, a comma should stand before “or dual,” since what is meant is a clarification, not an opposition.

Author: One encounters claims that socionics is a part of psychology, since its typology is a psychological typology. But this is only a particular case of socionics, for it describes any collection of people and their interaction with one another. Its methods make it possible to describe any aspects of human activity, and at present a whole range of directions and applications is being distinguished…

Commentary: The author, judging by the fragment under consideration, does not regard socionics as part of psychology. But this is a case where one cannot do without definitions. On the one hand, it is obvious that socionics emerged from the psychological types of the psychologist Jung, and its genetic link with psychology is beyond doubt. On the other hand, it is obvious that its subject volume goes beyond the bounds of classical psychology — into the domain of sociology, at the very least. Nevertheless, this is no ground for opposing socionics and psychology, though it does require a redefinition of their subject, method, and function. It is already clear that socionics is capable of playing, with respect to psychology, the role of a fundamental basis and of turning psychology from a prescriptive into an evidence-based discipline. Socionics, with its powerful methodological potential, is capable of playing an instrumental role, adequately structuring psychology’s objects and offering means for effective cause-and-effect assessment, for forming recommendations, and for making decisions aimed at optimizing problematic configurations.

In his previous statements the author proposed psychoinformatics in connection with socionics as its direct embodiment. Let us try to compare the presumptive concept of psychoinformatics with the concept of socionics as they are represented in the socionics literature. Psychoinformatics, apparently, should be understood as the adaptation of concepts connected with the functioning of information to psychic processes, while socionics is, above all, the theory of IM in the structures of the psyche. But is that not one and the same thing expressed in different words? One might try to find the difference in scale or ranges of use, supposing that the field of application of socionics is narrower and that of psychoinformatics wider. Still, such a distinction looks artificial. Aušra derived socionics from Jung’s typology. The latter is unquestionably a branch of psychology. The fact that Aušra added information concepts to the typology can be understood as her thereby entering the field of informatics, broadening the conceptual base of psychology, and laying the foundations of psychoinformatics. But it can also be understood as psychology not only successfully adapting and differentiating the concept of information but joining it with psychological meanings. In this one can see the long-awaited leap in the development of psychology, the preparation of its qualitative transformation, and this fully justifies assigning socionics to the competence of psychology. Moreover, replacing the name “socionics” with “psychoinformatics” is incorrect for the reason that “socionics” is the author’s brand of Aušra Augustinavičiūtė.

As for the long list of “various socionics” given by the author, it represents fields of application of socionics, testifying to its methodological potential. Some of the items on the author’s list, however, are perceived with strain. For example: 1) the socionics of psychology, of personality typology, of intertype relations, and of the family.

Let us begin the analysis of this item from the end. “…the socionics of intertype relations and of the family” — here there is a hidden tautology, so characteristic of the author, since intertype relations are studied precisely in socionics. As for the “socionics of the family,” here too the subject is intertype relations, though within the family. In my view there is not enough content here to make a variety of socionics out of it; otherwise one could propose, say, a “socionics of the doctor’s appointment,” a “socionics of army service,” a “socionics of the navy,” a “socionics of retail,” and so on. Clearly what can be meant here are applications of socionics, not varieties of it. “…the socionics of personality typology” — here, besides a hidden tautology, there is a semantic defect connected with the fact that socionics is a particular typology of personality, not just any typology, and the term used may well imply the latter. And finally, “the socionics of psychology” is a very problematic combination of terms, since it admits several interpretations, including meaningless ones. In any case, socionics can be regarded either as part of psychology or, on the contrary, as a metapsychology, which can strongly change the content of the highlighted combination of terms.

Author: As we have already noted, socionics is an intensively developing field lying at the junction of psychology, informatics, and sociology, and using discoveries in the field of information structures — from the psyche of an individual person to the collective as a whole. It rests on a discovery in the field of the structure of the psyche of humans and collectives, registered in Russia in 1995…

Commentary: Here the author, though contradicting the definition of socionics as psychoinformatics that he gave earlier, successfully fixes the subject coordinates of socionics, and this gives grounds for considering it a new multi-subject science — which, however, does not cancel its psychological orientation, but does give the right to transfer its potential onto psychology.

Author: Socionics makes it possible to predict the character of relations and the degree of business, informational, and psychological compatibility of people even before they are united into one collective — that is, to solve the “inverse problem” of sociometry.

Commentary: A perfectly correct judgment, but with some pre-imposed self-restriction. Of course the author has the right to emphasize one side of the subject he studies, but it would be logical to do so after presenting its full potential. Socionics, first and foremost, makes it possible to establish the typological parameters of an object, to carry out its typological recognition. If there are several objects, this can be done for each of them. And only after that can one proceed to the socionic “computation” of the various shades of compatibility. An essential defect of the highlighted statement, however, is the conflation of the concepts of business, informational, and psychological compatibility, since within socionics they all reduce to socionic compatibility. That is, the author can be reproached here for failing to distinguish the semantic nuances of the concepts he uses.

Author: Many psychological, social, historical, and political phenomena that are poorly understood under the traditional approach become far more understandable and law-governed when examined by the methods of socionics.

Commentary: A very true, but purely phenomenological remark, which leaves aside the essence of the noted difference.

Author: In fact, this is a logically coherent and rather economical conception, and in this sense it is similar to Euclid’s axiomatics in geometry.

Commentary: The formula “in fact,” characteristic of the author, is a form of subjective assessment and has no direct relation to what is in fact the case. The term “rather” introduces indeterminacy into the assessment and needs theoretical refinement. Imprecisions of this kind, and such features of the author’s style, significantly lower confidence in his reasoning, conclusions, and constructs.

Author: The direct continuation of socionics — psychoinformatics — resting on the concept of psychoinformational space, in which the individual and social psyche functions, is an effective instrument for the analysis and structuring, the compression, of any information processed by the psyche — that is, of all human knowledge.

Commentary: This reasoning of the author contains logical imprecisions. Earlier the author identified socionics and psychoinformatics; here he speaks of their hierarchy. The author’s personal interest here is understandable: he proposed the term “psychoinformational space” and is trying to secure its semantic content. But the author evidently fails to catch a subtle defect in the combination of elements he uses. The concepts “psyche” and “information” are not independent, since the psyche is the energo-informational organ of IM, and a psyche without information is an impossibility. It would have been sufficient to speak simply of psychic space, in which the processes of IM in fact take place. By building a logical defect into the term, the author creates the preconditions for a possible distorted understanding and use of the term. It is also logically incorrect to include the concept of “compression of any information” in one enumerative series with the concepts of “analysis” and “structuring” of information, because of their differing scopes — as in the well-known notice: “in the forest it is forbidden to gather mushrooms, berries, and wild strawberries.”

Author: The term “psychoinformational” and its derivatives, including “psychoinformatics,” was proposed by the author in 1989 (Second All-Union Conference on Socionics, Novosibirsk).

Editor: Evidently the author is proud of the term he proposed and stresses his priority. Unfortunately, this term must be judged unsuccessful, though not devoid of scientific-literary charm. The point is that information and the psyche are so closely linked semantically that combining them in one term creates a semantic interference that only complicates its understanding. This is even more vivid in the combination “psychoinformational space,” out of which the psyche itself is supposed to appear as its resonance. At the logical level, defining the psyche through psychoinformational space contains the error “idem per idem” — “the same through the same,” also known as a “circle in definition.” The adequate term here is “energo-informational space,” proposed by Volchenko, which of course should be known to the author given his broad erudition and concrete familiarity with this subject area. Hence the suspicion easily arises that the author is trying, by introducing a term close in meaning, to get around his predecessors. At the base of Volchenko’s term lie two primary concepts — energy and information — which are taken as basic and not subject to definition. The psyche, then, can be regarded as a resonance of the energo-informational space. But additional clarifications are needed here.

The Axioms of Socionics

Author: To show the simplicity and fundamentality of the initial concepts of socionics, let us present its simplest axiomatics.

Commentary: The claim that the axiomatics presented is the simplest is, as we shall see below, unfounded. Simpler variants are possible. Bukalov’s axiomatics (BA) is tantamount to a direct acknowledgment, by default, of the thesis of the truth of socionics — which, from the methodological point of view, is an unjustified simplification and casts a shadow on the author’s theoretical impeccability.

Author: 1) the information flow perceived by the individual or social psyche divides into 8 distinct semantic aspects, just as white light decomposes into the various colors of the rainbow. The combination of these aspects is perceived by consciousness as “semantically colored” information about the external and internal world.

Commentary: The author has abandoned the attempt to give a logical grounding for the existence of the information aspects as objective realities, since the semantic aspects (SA) perceived by the individual or social psyche remain subjective impressions — which cancels the natural-scientific status not only of socionics but also of psychology, which socionics could have supplied with fundamentality. The comparison with the colors of the rainbow further strengthens the subjective status of the aspects. Colors, if anything, are unquestionably the result of subjective perception, though this does not deny the existence of an objective basis of color. This position, incidentally, does not contradict the phenomenological notions current in science about the barrier of subjective perception limiting the human psyche’s direct contact with the “thing-in-itself.”

At the same time, the formulation given by the author does not satisfy the requirements imposed on axioms, since an axiom must contain a statement about one entity. The author speaks not only of the information flow but also of two psyches — individual and social — thereby implicitly asserting their existence.

Author: 2) these eight aspects of the information flow are perceived and processed by the psyche with corresponding specialized psychic functions, the so-called functions of information metabolism (exchange) — special processors of a kind, forming a hierarchical structure.

Commentary: This axiom partly repeats the statement about the perception of the SA by the psyche, but specifies exactly how this perception is carried out. This link between the first two axioms indicates that they are not independent. The comparison of the FIMs with processors has the character of an explication and is superfluous at the level of axiomatics, which points either to the author’s insufficient competence in the methodology of science or to his disregard of it.

Author: 3) any integral sphere of the psyche that perceives and processes the information flow consists of all eight functions forming a hierarchical structure. Depending on the sequence of the functions, various types of psyche, thinking, perception of the world, and strategies of behavior arise.

Commentary: The number of functions was not directly introduced in the previous axioms, though indirectly it could be presumed connected with the number of aspects. But such a connection cannot be considered unambiguous a priori — it must either be introduced axiomatically or derived from the accepted axioms. Hence the expression “consists of all eight functions” is incorrect because of the quantifying pronoun “all.” The underlined claim is incorrect in substance, since the sequence of functions in the models of all TIMs is the same. TIMs differ in the sequence of the IAs — or, as the author designates them, the SAs. The replacement of the term IA by the non-equivalent term SA points directly to the author’s worldview preferences, evidently inclining toward subjectivism.

Author: 4) psychoinformational interaction takes place along functions connected with the processing of one and the same information aspect. The kind of interaction — from attraction and cooperation to repulsion and conflict — is determined by the places of these functions in the structures of the interacting psyches.

Commentary: This assumption, like the three preceding ones, is not elementary, since it can be refined by reference to the causes of interaction “along functions connected with the processing of one and the same information aspect.”

Author: These four axioms fully describe the basic principles of socionics and serve as a base for the rigorous modeling of the overwhelming majority of phenomena connected with the humanitarian and socio-political sphere of the individual and society. In addition to this, one must know the concrete specifics of the 8 aspects of the information flow (their semantics) and the structure of the hierarchy of the psychoinformational functions, expressed in the form of an 8-element table — the model of the psyche.

Commentary: Axioms are the basic principles. Unfortunately, the four axioms presented not only fail to satisfy the requirements for an axiomatic basis but also give no possibility of deriving the semantics of the aspects, the functions, and the relations. The author’s statement about the four axioms can itself be considered an axiom, in which it is acknowledged a priori that the BA “fully describe the basic principles of socionics and serve as a base for rigorous modeling…“. Imprecisions of this kind in the use of the apparatus of axiomatization cast a shadow on the peculiarities of the author’s reflection, which does not take into account the subtle relations between the units of the categorial apparatus.

Author: And this is enough to describe whole worlds of human humanitarian knowledge, both in compressed and in expanded form.

Commentary: This is the author’s characterization of the totality of his axioms, but, alas, for the reasons indicated above it cannot be applied to the BA, though it could apply to a presumptive set of axioms satisfying the methodological requirements.

Author: …many problems in psychology, sociology, philosophy, and politics turn out to be easily solvable if one looks at them from the socionic, psychoinformational point of view. And most importantly — one can offer concrete recipes for resolving many rather complex problems, for optimizing or minimizing various actions, be it effective management and personnel selection, family problems with raising children and the relations of parents, the conflict of Israel with the Palestinians, or the methods of the USA’s struggle with terrorists.

Commentary: This is an assessment of the methodological potential of socionics, and one can fully agree with it, since it rests on the already established practice of socionic consulting. But let us not forget that successful practice does not guarantee the truth of the theory laid at its foundation.

Author: It is noteworthy that the methods of socionics make it possible to compress the analyzed information by factors of thousands and millions without losing the basic parameters of the task or problem. It is a kind of metalanguage which, as practice shows, even a schoolchild can master, to say nothing of a student — given, of course, the right pedagogical approach.

Commentary: A somewhat romanticized but essentially correct characterization of socionics. Nevertheless, a quantitative assessment of the methods of socionics needs substantiation and should not be limited to intuitive-emotional pronouncements.

Author: Nature does nothing chaotically or at random: if a system exists, it can be discovered.

Commentary: Here is an example of an axiom that the author did not include in the BA but uses by default.

Author: And what is it that the psychic function, and the psyche as a whole, carries out? The answer was proposed in the 1950s by the Polish psychiatrist A. Kempiński: the psyche carries out information metabolism (exchange), processing information from the external world, just as the biological organism carries out the process of biochemical metabolism, transforming the structure of nutrients into the components it needs.

Commentary: This reasoning belongs to the class of terminological clarifications, but, alas, it contains no definition of the psychic function, and without that it loses its foundation. The author somehow misses that the psyche as a whole is also a function.

Author: …if a psychic function processes information, then it is already a function of information metabolism (FIM).

Commentary: A piece of reasoning that is at once tautological and logically imprecise. The imprecision consists in the fact that all psychic functions process information, so there can be no question here of the opposition the author’s reasoning presupposes.

Author: The difference of such functions — logic (thinking), sensing (sensation), ethics (feeling), and intuition — both extraverted and introverted, yields the understanding that there exist various aspects of information or of the information flow, which these functions of information metabolism process.

Commentary: The author has already introduced an axiom about the information flow and its division. Here he tries to substantiate the existence of the information flow by reference to the difference between the psychic functions, whose existence he also introduced axiomatically. As a result his reasoning falls under the error “idem per idem,” which, as the text of the book shows, is characteristic of the author. Let us stress once more that the absence of logical rigor in the author’s reasoning raises suspicion regarding the truth of his theoretical constructions.

Author: …we find complete explanation, confirmation, and refinement of A. Kempiński’s views on the nature of the information metabolism of the psyche: to a person as the bearer not simply of a psychological type but of a type of information metabolism (TIM), only that information is acceptable which corresponds to the developed (multi-dimensional) psychic functions. The psyche of a person receiving excessive information through his weak (low-dimensional) functions will overstrain itself, get irritated, tire, and be stressed. If, on the other hand, the subconsciously required information does not arrive, the person becomes an informationally and spiritually hungry being, seeking a way to satisfy his information-psychic (now we say psychoinformational) needs.

Commentary: The categorial opposition of the concepts “psychological type” and “type of information metabolism” is illegitimate here, since the second is a variety of the first. The remark about the acceptability of information looks somewhat oversimplified because of the vagueness of the concept of “excess information.” What should be at issue here is not excess but acceptability. The bearer of a TIM will “overstrain, get irritated, tire, and be stressed” not from excess but from unacceptable information. And this applies not only to the “weak” but also to the “strong” functions. Information not corresponding to a function’s IA is unacceptable for that function. There is, however, a subtle difference here between “weak” and “strong” functions: the “strong” ones discard unacceptable information, while the “weak” ones get bogged down, stuck in it, and as a result overstrain themselves.

The term “psychoinformational needs” is informationally redundant — the term “informational needs” suffices, since socionics distinguishes IAs, which absorb the concept of the psychic.

Author: …if the psyche of one person perceives, processes, and outputs information signals, then it interacts in an informational way with the psyche of another person, and the peculiarities of this interaction depend on the psychic structure of both people.

Commentary: In this reasoning the implication “if…, then” is logically imperfect: the conclusion does not follow from the premise with necessity, though this is not easy to notice. In particular, one psyche might not interact with another precisely in virtue of “the peculiarities of this interaction depending on the psychic structure of both people” — at least as a null variant, which does not contradict logic.

Author: There exist 16 possible stable variants of the structure of the psyche, that is, 16 types of information metabolism. Between them, in a law-governed way, 16 × 16 = 256 modes of information exchange, that is, psychoinformational interactions, can arise. These 256 interactions, however, reduce to 14 distinct kinds. Aušra Augustinavičiūtė called them intertype relations. Among them, at one pole are the relations of complete complement, or dual relations, and at the other the relations of conflict. Between these poles lie the remaining 12 kinds of relations: good, tense, or neutral — in a word, “of varying degrees of pleasantness.” Thus both the structure of the psyche and the intertype interactions constitute a coherent, ordered system.

Commentary: Note that the author, apparently without noticing it, introduces yet another axiom — of the existence of the 16 TIMs — though of course this ought by now to be derived: he has already proposed his axioms. The connective “that is” instead of “or” is logically incorrect here, since the concept is being introduced for the first time and should have been explained earlier. The premature reasoning about the number of relations introduces needless complication here and clarifies nothing — and yet the author will devote ample space to this topic. Moreover, the author commits a logical error in counting the number of relations by squaring the number of types, evidently overlooking that the number of symmetric relations must be divided by two, which yields quite a different number. And of course the author’s fleeting preliminary remarks about types and relations cannot count as substantiation of the paragraph’s closing sentence about a coherent and ordered system.

Information Aspects

The structure of this section in the author’s book is extremely overcomplicated. First, under the general heading “Kinds of Information,” he gives a diagram, nowhere named in the text, whose point, apparently, is somehow to justify what Aušra called information aspects (IA) and what the author calls now aspects of the information flow, now semantic aspects. The difference would seem small — but in fact there is no talking about a difference at all, simply because definitions are absent. Then, under the heading “Semantics of the Aspects of the Information Flow,” the author gives explications of the symbols and terms he uses. Then, under the heading “Information Aspects in Life,” he essentially repeats the same thing, with certain refinements — some of which amplify the author’s errors in understanding the basic categories — and with comments testifying to the author’s rich erudition, which nevertheless does not compensate for the basic flaws. And to conclude the section, under the heading “The Semantic Content of the Symbols,” he presents in a table the explication of the symbols made by Aušra — which triples the necessary text, introducing needless redundancy into the exposition of the fundamentals of the subject.

Author: Just as white light, passing through a prism, decomposes into seven rays colored in the colors of the rainbow, any information perceived by the psyche can be decomposed into 8 aspects of the information flow.

Commentary: It is a beautiful comparison, but the explanatory picture that follows it does not resemble a rainbow at all. It is an ordinary block-and-arrow diagram with given basic concepts and dichotomous divisions, which likewise do not resemble white light. The author is not original in using this diagram — its first version belongs to N. Medvedev. V. D. Ermak also worked with this diagram, trying to improve it. Unfortunately, the author does not cite his predecessors in the attempts to solve the problem of the IAs. I carried out a thorough analysis of the defects of this diagram in [UChK].

The variant of the diagram the author proposes looks like a degraded version of the Medvedev–Ermak diagram. Its organization is less logical — here, on unclear grounds, the categories presumably taken as basic are repeated twice. For instance, if space is placed in the first column of the figure, why does it appear again in the second column? And this repeats for all the other categories as well. In this diagram, unlike the Medvedev and Ermak diagram, there is no logical entailment and corresponding argumentation, but rather an unjustified equating of categories from different subject areas.

Fig. Bu.01. Explanatory diagram for the topic “Information Aspects”: Matter → logic (business logic / structural logic); Energy → ethics (ethics of emotions / ethics of relations); Space → sensing (volitional sensing / sensing of sensations); Time → intuition (intuition of possibilities / intuition of time) — each split into extraversion (material objects, energy, space, time) and introversion (relations of material objects, energetic relations, spatial relations, temporal relations).

A more essential shortcoming of this picture, however, is that the categories presumably assumed as basic have been chosen by superficial impression. The point is that the concepts of space and matter, of time and energy, are pairwise not independent — as the mathematician Emmy Noether proved in her time. These concepts relate to each other as extraverted and introverted entities. There exists no space separate from the contours of matter, and no time apart from the processes of change of material conglomerates and systems. The categories of logic, ethics, sensing, and intuition, on the other hand, are independent, since they cannot be reduced to one another. As a result a semantic contradiction arises: the author tries to express linearly independent concepts through linearly dependent ones. In this diagram it is also unclear how sensing follows from space, intuition from time, logic from matter, and ethics from energy. This looks like an “intuitive estimate” unaccompanied by explications and sufficient grounds. And all such misunderstandings here stem from the fact that the basic concepts were badly chosen from the outset, which introduces a systematic error into all the remaining reasoning.

In plain contradiction with logic and with the notions already established in socionics stands the chain “time” → “intuition” → “extraverted intuition” → “time.” The logical circle here is obvious. As for “temporal relations,” it is entirely unclear how they differ from time. “Temporal relations” — what are they? Earlier, later, in the past, in the present, in the future? Well, and what is time? It is described by the same categories.

Assessing this diagram as a whole, one has to say that it is a conceptual conglomerate without grounded connections between its units.

Author: …extraverted aspects, oriented toward the object; introverted aspects, oriented toward the relations between objects…

Commentary: Here we have an example of incorrect word use. Of an aspect, unlike a subject, one cannot say that it is oriented. An aspect includes. But the author apparently also fails to take into account that the concept of an object is not limited to extraverted entities. An object is anything on which the subject’s attention concentrates. For example, a literary style can be an object, yet it is not an extraverted entity.

Author: Semantics of the aspects of the information flow L — business logic. Information about material objects and their use. Work, labor, activity, economics, benefit, efficiency, enterprise, professionalism, technology, process, method, algorithm, facts. l — structural logic. Information about the system of relations between objects. System, structure, scheme, model, hierarchy, the arrangement and regularities of the surrounding world, logical interconnections between objects, classification, whole and part.

Commentary: Here the author commits a basic error, assigning the meaning of extraversion and introversion on the basis of superficial intuitive impressions, unsuccessfully fixed by the terms “business logic” and “structural logic,” which introduce their own distortions into the understanding of extraversion and introversion — whereas a simple and clear explication of these concepts exists. Introverted thinking is what happens in the brain, the processing of information inside the psyche: thinking a problem through, making a decision, and constructing an algorithm with the use of intellectual operators. Extraverted thinking is what happens outside: the transformation of an algorithm into a technological process. It is the direct performance of any work whatsoever with one’s hands, with or without tools. Extraverted thinking could be replaced by the concept of technology as a synonym, but the original Jungian term is higher in level of generalization and satisfies the principle of terminological unification. In German these terms look more natural, while in Russian, because of its greater concreteness, the term “extraverted thinking” as the direct manufacture of a product looks unaccustomed. In part this is connected with the fact that psychology still has no simple and generally accepted definition of this psychic process. If, within the information paradigm, we define thinking as the transformation of logical information with the aim of obtaining an algorithm, then its extraverted equivalent will be the transformation of material to obtain a product constituting a certain resource. The isomorphism of these two processes — extraverted and introverted — is obvious. The author does not distinguish the algorithm from the technological process: the first is the introverted form of the second; the first is worked out in the mind, while the second is realized on the material plane.

Note that the term “information aspect” has two denotata, that is, two objects standing behind it. In the physical, external world it corresponds to the signal image, or code, of the object, while in the subject’s psychic space it corresponds to the classificational category by means of which the subject distinguishes external objects. Obviously, information comes from outside, from the object, and is processed by the subject — and these are two different situations connected with the concept of the IA. Hence we may call the psychic function logic or thinking, but not the IA. To the function of extraverted thinking correspond the processes of transformation in nature; to introverted thinking correspond the cause-and-effect connections of objects and the structuredness of the whole world, which can be linked with the concept of the logos. With this in mind it becomes clear that the lists of keywords in the specifications of both logics need thorough correction.

Author: E — ethics of emotions. Information about the internal energy of objects. A person’s emotional state (joy, delight, anxiety, fear, sorrow, etc.), mood, intonation, empathy, vibration, sounding. e — ethics of relations. Information about the relations between objects (in particular, between people). Relations, communication, sympathies-antipathies, love-hatred, good-evil, morals, morality, tact, tolerance, sense of duty, kindness, humaneness.

Commentary: Here too the author adheres to superficial-intuitive notions of the presumed categories. Compare the alternative definition. Extraverted emoting is the subject’s externally manifested reaction to a situation. This reaction is expressed in an energetic discharge accompanied by specific intonation, facial expression, gesticulation, etc. Introverted emoting is the subject’s intrapsychic attitude toward a situation, which he can, on occasion, bring outside and turn into emotions.

The author’s terms “ethics of emotions” and “ethics of relations” are jargon formations that do not correspond to the normative use of words in Russian and enter into semantic conflict with concepts already present in the language. Thus Russian has the phrase “ethics of relations,” but it has an entirely different meaning and belongs to a different subject area. The phrase “ethics of emotions,” meanwhile, is a terminological centaur, uncritically used by certain socionists at the level of professional jargon.

The expression “information about the internal energy of objects” does not correspond at all to the specification given in italics. Thus “a person’s emotional state” is a reaction to a situation that has a definite meaning for the person and is one of the forms of IM, and the energetic state of objects has nothing to do with it — though as an element of the situation it may bear some relation to it as part of the information flow (IF). That objects possess some energy — and they always do — is not the equivalent of human emoting, although some analogy can be drawn, say, between a person’s display of anger and a volcanic eruption; but the volcano has no subjective attitude toward what is happening to it. In her time Aušra said that the IA corresponding to the psychic function of emoting includes, in the objective world, the energetic states of objects. For example, a churning volcano, a raging ocean, a boiling kettle correspond to the IA E — but that is a real extraverted process of potential energy passing into kinetic, not information about it and not its reflection in the work of the psychic functions, which can take place only in the subjective picture of the world.

The expression “information about the relations between objects” is likewise used imprecisely by the author. Here objective processes are muddled with subjective experiences. Between objects there is interaction, not relation. Applying the latter term to objects is the error of anthropomorphism. Objective processes take place in the external, extraverted world, while subjective experiences are a phenomenon of psychic life. IAs have two realizations. In the physical world they are signal entities whose bearers are material-energetic objects and processes. In psychic space the IAs are realized as classificational categories. Although we designate these two realizations with the same symbols, mixing them up is inadmissible. The function e deals with information about the relations between subjects and the subject’s relation to an object, while the IA e is the real interaction itself between objects and their parts. The sphere of this same IA also includes such a key parameter of systems as integrity.

Author: S — volitional sensing. Information about the object as a part of space. Form, elasticity, rigidity, willpower, purposefulness, power, resistance to external pressure, persistence, coercion, influence, defense. s — sensing of sensations. Information about the sensations evoked by the objects of the surrounding space. Sensation, beauty, aesthetics, design, coziness, convenience, comfort, well-being, health, quality, taste, color, smell.

Commentary: Here we are dealing with misunderstandings analogous to those in the preceding definitions. The author’s terms are jargon-like, and the definitions of the aspects, alongside adequate concepts, contain concepts that distort the real essence of the IAs. IAs, on the one hand, are real entities as elements of the signal field, behind which stand real objects (denotata); on the other hand, in the subject’s psychic space they are represented by classificational categories of a high level of generality. The IA S is the whole set of extraverted objects with their inherent capacity, on the one hand, to resist external pressure and, on the other, to become themselves a source of danger for a living being. And if “form, elasticity, rigidity” can still be assigned to its sphere, then willpower, purposefulness, power, etc., belong not to the IA but to the psychic function. S as a psychic function is will, volitional confrontation, manifested in defense or aggression.

As for the “sensing of sensations,” the jargon character of this term is obvious — here the words “sensing” and “sensations” have one and the same meaning, and their combination sounds like “buttery butter.”

The Jungian term “introverted sensing,” s, corresponds to the psychic function of perceiving, distinguishing, and evaluating a resource. As an IA, s is a resource really present in the world which a living being can make use of.

Author: I — intuition of possibilities. Information about the internal, hidden possibilities of objects. Ideas, prospects, abilities, integral perception of the world, the unity and interconnectedness of all phenomena, the deep essence of objects and processes. i — intuition of time. Information about events and changes that have occurred, are occurring, or will occur. Time, past, present, future, changes, foresight, forecast, contradiction, sense of danger, dynamics of development, past experience.

Commentary: The deductive meaning of these terms differs from what the author thinks of them. I as a psychic function is the capacity to understand — which is precisely what hides behind the term “intuition.” As an IA, I represents the POTENTIAL POSSIBILITIES of objects. In the subject’s inner space this aspect is realized as MEANING, which is grasped by the corresponding function. The Jungian term “introverted intuition,” i, as a psychic function corresponds to the subject’s understanding of his inner world, while his perception of time is merely a particular case, and not the sole or chief meaning of this archetype. As an IA, i represents the entire totality of processes of change.

Author: We now begin to examine the basic propositions of socionics in more detail. First let us get acquainted with what the aspects of the information flow are.

Commentary: The author has only just introduced these concepts, and now intends to repeat the same thing in an expanded variant. This could be justified as a didactic device in a textbook, but in a book where the author expounds basic concepts it comes across as an unjustified inflation of the text’s volume.

Author: We have already said that information consists of 8 aspects of the information flow and decomposes in the psyche into these aspects, as white light on passing through a glass pyramid decomposes into the colors of the rainbow.

Commentary: An example of repetition: if it has already been said, why repeat it? And with that rainbow metaphor again? Yet the author fails to notice the defect in his comparison: color is the subjective perception of an electromagnetic wave of a definite frequency, an objectively existing mixture of which is seen by a person as white light — whereas the objectively existing information signals are in reality separate and are perceived individually by psychic functions specially adapted to this. Therefore the “rainbow” metaphor is not adequate here.

Author: We shall proceed from the fact that our psyche perceives a number of constituents of the surrounding world, such as the well-known primary concepts — matter (substance), energy, space, and time. It turns out that to these four entities, which a person perceives at the physical level, there correspond at the psychic level the functions of logic, ethics, sensing, and intuition. In turn, each of these functions divides into two aspects: an external one, directed outward, called extraverted, and an internal one, called introverted.

Commentary: The author has already stated all this and repeats it once more. But this time — worse. And suddenly “it turns out”… What does “it turns out” mean? One gets the impression the author is surprised by what he says, though a page earlier he was expounding the very same thing quite confidently as axioms.

Author: Logic (L/l) divides into two aspects: the extraverted — business logic, or the logic of facts (L), and the introverted — structural, or abstract, logic (l).

Commentary: I have deliberately reproduced this fragment of the author’s text so that the reader may be convinced I am inventing nothing — the author really does repeat, with small variations, the previously presented text. Further on, the author repeats what I analyzed just before. Whoever does not believe it, open Bukalov’s book at page 41. Such repetitions might be excused on pedagogical grounds — but why do they extend only to this fragment of the text? In editorial practice repetitions of this kind are associated with the concept of unjustified inflation of a text’s volume. Together with the repetition of the text the author replicates all the misunderstandings connected with his grasp of the basic concepts of socionics. I will give just one example.

Author: Abstract logic (l) is the logic we were taught in mathematics lessons. It is formulas, the immutable laws of nature expressed in formulas. It is also the establishment of systemic regularities, hierarchy. Abstract logic describes the relations between material objects.

Commentary: In mathematics lessons we were taught mathematics. Logic we were taught in logic lessons, and it is represented in at least two variants: as formal logic and as mathematical logic. The term “abstract logic” is not applied as the name of a school subject, but the level of abstractness of logic is higher than that level in mathematics. The explication with which the author accompanies the term “abstract logic” he introduces applies with equal success to mathematics and physics, behind which stand the laws of nature. From this it becomes clear that the author has neither clear definitions nor clear concepts to connect with socionics. There is no sense in replacing or substituting, in socionics, the fundamental psychic process that is thinking with its particular instrument — logic — and on this basis artificially creating complicated terms that amount to a misunderstanding. At the same time, in the names of the TIMs the terms with the root “log” (logico-, logical) may be retained, but referred not to logic but to the logos, that is, to the cause-and-effect order permeating the whole universe.

Author: Business logic, or the logic of facts (L), describes the material objects themselves. Any mathematical formula (for example, a+b=c) is abstract logic (l), while an algorithm as a sequence of actions (for example, a computer program) is business logic (L). An algorithm is not a formula but a concrete procedure that realizes the task of HOW to compute this or that number.

Commentary: The author plainly wants to replace the Jungian terms “extraverted thinking” and “introverted thinking” with his own, which can be considered doubly or even triply erroneous. The point is that Aušra in her time made a mistake by replacing the Jungian terms “thinking, thinking type” with “logic, logical type.” She had her reasons: it seemed to her then that the term “thinking” was too general, characterizing human thinking as such, possessed by all people, whereas logic is individual and, in any case, typological. But after a quarter-century of work with socionic concepts it became clear that this opinion of socionics’ discoverer was mistaken. Logic as a scientific discipline has its own normative scope, and in the general scientific sense the adjectives “extraverted” or “introverted” are not applicable to it. Whereas the psychic function of thinking exists in two hypostases — introverted and extraverted. The difference between them I explained earlier.

Author: The difference between these two logics is well seen in the example of law. There is continental law — an abstract code of statutes (abstract logic — l), and there is Anglo-Saxon law, which is very concrete (business logic — L). What is the difference between them?

Commentary: The basic defect in the author’s understanding of the fundamental terms of socionics enters as a systematic error into all his further theoretical reasoning. The author does not distinguish the IA from the PF (psychic function), and therefore conscientiously produces text embodying the misunderstanding present in his mind. Hence he assigns the algorithm to the sphere of extraverted logic, whereas an algorithm is a program created in the human brain. It is the introverted form of what will be performed by the subject in the materialized (extraverted) process of manufacturing a product. The author’s attempt to demonstrate the difference between introverted and extraverted logic also proved unsuccessful: both examples belong to introverted logic.

Concluding the section on the IAs, the author presents the explications of the IAs made by Aušra Augustinavičiūtė.

To analyze in detail all the remaining misunderstandings presented in this section of the book does not seem necessary, since they are analogous to those already analyzed. What seems astonishing to me here is that an intelligent and talented man commits such a large number of logical, methodological, and cognitive errors, and that the text of his book is loose and badly composed, which significantly lowers confidence in the ideas he expounds.

Signs of the Functions

Author: …the sign of a function is a phenomenon arising from the joining of pairs of functions in the blocks EGO, SuperEGO, SuperID, and ID. Thus, for example, intuition joined with logic differs from intuition joined with ethics.

Commentary: Here the author tries to justify the appearance of the sign in the model. But such an explanation bears no relation to the simple and clear semantics of the mathematical sign, connected with the presence or absence of quantity — which in geometric representation corresponds to the directedness of the coordinate axes. And if the sign is fully determined by the function adjacent in the block, then why introduce it at all — for the role of the sign as a modifier of the function’s semantics is here played by the block-adjacent function itself? It seems the author has followed the lead of one of the most active theoreticians of socionics, Gulenko. Later, however, he began developing his own theory of signs, in which, apart from the very idea of a sign, there was no serious content. Let us analyze the logic of the author’s justification of the sign.

So: if, for example, next to I stands l (for now without a sign), then, by the author’s logic, I acquires the sign “plus.” If next to I stands e, then I acquires the sign “minus.” On the other hand, if next to l stands I (also without a sign), then l acquires the sign “minus.” Such reasoning, apart from the insufficient groundedness of precisely this “assignment” of signs, obviously contains the logical error of “mutual dependence,” or a “circle in explanation,” where certain properties of one object are determined by certain properties of a second object, but those properties of the second object are themselves determined by the very properties of the first that were supposed to be determined. This alone is enough to cast doubt on the idea of the “signs” of functions professed by the author. In any case, the author’s logic turns out to be erroneous and thus grounds nothing.

Gulenko approached this question quite differently. He (what follows is the editor’s reconstruction) at some point apparently intuitively sensed that the same-named functions of kindred types differ “in something.” Having thought it over, he concluded that this difference could be described by “signs of the functions.” This is easy to understand within what might be called the childhood disease of hasty identification: since two isomorphic objects nevertheless differ, the simplest way to explain it is by the signs plus and minus. Later, however, realizing the “insufficient correctness” of his constructions, he abandoned the signs of functions in Model “A”. At first Gulenko tried to link the signs of functions with the direct opposition of the phenomenology of the positive and negative variants of the functions. For example, he began to hold that +E = positive emotions, −E = negative emotions, +L = benefit, advantage…, −L = uselessness, disadvantage…, +I = prospects…, −I = hopelessness…, etc., which agrees perfectly well with the meaning of the signs plus and minus. But it soon became obvious that no type can be described by a single-pole specification — that is, cannot generate only positive or only negative emotions. And then Gulenko devised an explanation that cannot be denied inventiveness and wit, but is obviously too complex compared with the simple semantics of mathematical signs and, above all, does not satisfy the methodological requirements of necessity and sufficiency. Gulenko matched to the signs four (!) properties they express in the functions: 1) plus-minus quality; 2) scale, indicating globality or locality; 3) distance, which can be short or far; and 4) direction, inward or outward. From this list alone (which, incidentally, could be extended) it is clear that the simple mathematical semantics of plus and minus is here considerably complicated. Moreover, it remains unclear in which cases and to what extent the “specifiers” proposed by Gulenko — the units of specification — are to be applied to functions in order to determine their sign. From the methodological point of view, however, the shortcoming of this explication is its empirical character — it is not derived logically but is the result of intuitive “contemplation,” which in certain philosophical cultures is classed as metaphysics in its negative hypostasis. Certainly such a complex construct does honor to its discoverer, but its reliability remains problematic. Compared to Gulenko, Bukalov confined himself to a fleeting intuitive consideration: “the sign of a function is a phenomenon arising from the joining of pairs of functions.” Note one property of this consideration: it is meant to explain a construct invented by another scientist — in this case, Gulenko.

Author: The introduction of signs into the model (V. V. Gulenko, [=15]) refined the understanding of functions that differ somewhat in semantics, especially the first functions of kindred types.

Commentary: The signs, as already said, were not derived by Gulenko logically but were “decreed to be so,” according to Gulenko’s non-mathematical notions of mathematical signs. More is written about the signs in the introduction, where Gulenko is discussed. In the author’s quoted sentence it is unclear how this introduction of signs could have “refined the understanding of the functions.” Things can only stand the other way round: the introduction of the sign could follow from a refined understanding of the functions, not vice versa. Furthermore, for editorial reasons it must be said that the intensifier “especially” introduces an unjustified discrimination among the different functions. How is it that for the first functions the sign plays one role (a “special” one) and for the rest another — a “non-special” one? Such an understanding by the author of the role and meaning of the sign needlessly complicates the “functional situation” while giving nothing in return for now. The solution of the problem lies in the deductive derivation of the semantics of the SF.

Model “B”

Author: …the model remained 8-component, which somewhat narrows its possibilities.

Commentary: It is unclear here how one can judge the possibilities of the 8-component model without presenting its alternative. Which possibilities are narrowed? To assert this, one must explicitly indicate the whole set of such possibilities and then show how, and to what degree, these possibilities are “narrowed.” Model “A” is in itself so perfect and universal that all the potential possibilities for describing maximally generalized psychological situations are contained in it and can be actualized.

Author: The 8-component model can naturally be represented in the form of a 3-dimensional cube (fig. Buk.02).

Commentary: Aušra, in her work “Reinin Traits,” represented the half-cycle cube as shown in fig. Bu.03, holding that “each dyad lives off one energy flow”; but it remained unclear what meaning she put into this term — apparently, on the figure, the side faces correspond to it. Then at the front we can find two dyads from the first quadra: Ki–Du, Gu–Ro, and, going around the faces counterclockwise, we will successively have the second, third, and fourth quadras. As for the formal side of Aušra’s cube, it is easy to see that here the extraverted and introverted functions alternate; but while on the horizontal faces functions of different rationality stand side by side, on the vertical faces stand functions of the same rationality. Thus Aušra’s design, and its realization in constructing this cube, is clear. In Bukalov’s cube the first quadra is placed on the top face, but in such a way that the version (extraversion/introversion) of the functions does not alternate, and the activators are placed parallel on the face. The bottom face, where the third quadra is located, is organized analogously. The second and fourth quadras are placed, respectively, on the front and back faces, but they are organized differently — here, going around the face along its perimeter, both version and rationality alternate, which violates the presumed symmetry of the organization of the quadras and the socion. The author gives no explanations for this, but it is obvious that we are dealing with an error, since the logic of symmetry is violated. Moreover, such a cube cannot be called half-cycle, since it does not possess the corresponding organization.

I, proceeding from Aušra’s idea of the parallel work of the same-named functions of opposite version, proposed my own half-cycle cube, shown in fig. Bu.04. In this model the parallelism of the mental and vital rings is emphasized. And from this it follows that parallel functions must have the same degree of freedom in handling the information they process. I showed in [UChK] that if Bukalov’s idea of the dimensionalities of the functions corresponded to the truth, then in his model the same-named functions of opposite version would have to have the same dimensionality.

In this text it is also not very clear what the author’s word “naturally” means. Pointing to some “natural way” should presuppose that the author has his own ontology, but it ought to have been introduced beforehand. Furthermore, one must not forget that the graphic image of a model is only a conventional sign whose denotatum is the structure of the psyche — and which, of course, does not coincide with the psyche. Hence one cannot derive the ontological properties of the entity that is the psyche from the ontological properties of a diagram. In particular, the real or imaginary dimensionality of a model cannot be transferred to the psyche for the purpose of a categorical judgment about its dimensionality. Such questions can be resolved only at the empirical level, and only afterwards be given theoretical form.

Author: Taking the sign of the function into account “stratifies” the model (fig. Bu.05). In the resulting 16-component model (Model B) there arise an 8-component main constituent and an 8-component shadow constituent. The direction of movement of information in the main and shadow models is predominantly opposite.

Commentary: Here the author describes the mechanics of constructing the 16-component model, but not its content. It seems the author’s attention is focused on the formal peculiarities of obtaining such a model, not on its presumed actual content. One gets the impression that the author first builds the model and then explains its functioning with reference to socionic subject matter, whereas a model ought to appear as the answer to an acute need to explain empirically observed processes.

So the author doubles the number of functions by dividing each function into a positive and a negative part. But the “sign semantics” of these parts the author links with “a phenomenon arising from the joining of pairs of functions,” which, as shown above, contains the logical error of a circle in definition. Yet if the second function, which in the author’s view determines the sign of the first, is always right there — being, in effect, the modifier of the semantics of the block-adjacent function — then why introduce the sign at all? For now every function turns out to have two, and presumably equivalent, modifiers, or in this case signs: the second function, and the mathematical symbol whose meaning is supposed to be exactly determined by that function. As a result of this purely formal operation of ascribing an intuitively grasped meaning to the sign, and the sign to the function, the illusion arises of the appearance of a new entity — the sign of the function. Having made an error in creating the category of the sign, the author, on this basis and now purely formally, splits each function into positive and negative parts, obtaining as a result a “shadow constituent” — apparently forgetting entirely that the sign was determined by the really present second function of the pair. Consequently, the added function of opposite sign must now have a quite different function paired with it. That is, if l₂ standing next to I₁ induces in the latter the sign plus, and e₂ the sign minus, then once the “doubling” of I has occurred and two functions +I₁ and −I₉ have appeared, next to the latter there should stand +e₂. The author, however, doubling the contour with a change of sign of all functions, gets +l next to −I. Note that all the reasoning presented (and not presented) here ought to obey some logic of the construction of socionic models — but that logic should have been set out explicitly beforehand, rather than appealing to intuitive insights. One might see nothing special in this, but it must be reflected in the new model. The point is that if the “plus” of extraverted intuition in the Don Quixote model appeared as an expression of the presence of introverted logic in the pair, then, having doubled that extraverted intuition by adding its negative variant, we must now pair it not with logic but with ethics, as in Huxley. At the level of symbolic equations all this reasoning looks like: I₁ + l₂ → (+I₁; −l₂), I₁ + e₂ → (−I₁; +e₂); when, by doubling the functional set, we create the pair +I₁ : −I₁, then in parallel with the change of sign we double the logic too, obtaining the correspondence −l₂ : +l₂ — which requires explanation in connection with Huxley’s ego block (−I₁; +e₂), where next to minus intuition stands plus ethics.

If, however, we now consider the full mental rings of Don Quixote and Huxley: (Ki) = (+I₁; −l₂; +S₃; −e) and (Ge) = (−I₁; +e₂; −S; +l), we discover an alternation of signs, which certainly cannot be accepted as self-evident, and we would have to explain this peculiarity of the model. Such an alternation of signs belongs to the same class of model features as the alternation of version and rationality in the ring — and this found no reflection in the conceptions of Models “B”, “G”, and “E”.

But a more essential argument against the sign conceptions of Gulenko and Bukalov is that both authors set about placing signs in the models of concrete TIMs without noticing that the functions possess, besides their aspectual semantics, a positional semantics as well. The latter is determined, as shown in [UChK], by the semantics of the aspects of the functions in the Don Quixote model. And this means, at the very least, that if any conception of signs is adopted, every function must have two signs — a positional one and an aspectual one. Of course, with a certain intuitive agility one could invent a justification even for this, but here we enter the zone of competence of methodological notions of truth, which is appropriately considered separately.

As already noted above, the author’s hypothesis that the sign of one function is determined by the semantics of the block-adjacent function contains a “circle of mutual dependence,” which casts doubt on the reliability of his further reasoning.

Very strange, too, looks the author’s remark that “the direction of movement of information in the main and shadow models is predominantly opposite.” Why “predominantly” and not completely? And if not completely, then by what, and to what degree, is this determined? Are we really to understand that for the most part the movement of information in these contours is opposite, but in some, evidently special, cases coincides? Of course, in constructing a new model it is necessary to define the concept of “movement of information” and its direction.

Let us also note that the “signs” of the functions alternate in the rings — which has not received the necessary explanation, though it ought to follow from the presumed logic of the model.

Author: The appearance of an additional dimension in Model A, represented as a 3-dimensional cube, turns it into a 4-dimensional one; correspondingly, Model B can be represented as a 4-dimensional cube with 16 vertices, each of which corresponds to an aspect and a function of information metabolism (fig. Buk.06).

Commentary: Here the author is focused on the appearance of a higher dimensionality, which in itself is something formal. But there are no sufficient grounds for asserting that as a result of the formal doubling of Model “A” an “additional dimension” appears — these could be merely two parallel contours in the same space. The concept of a dimension for a model must be specially introduced and mathematically grounded. The author, however, applies the concept of dimension to the model purely terminologically. And of course there is no particular difficulty in presenting the new model as flat — after all, in the book it is depicted on a sheet of paper! Let us stress again that here the author commits a well-known methodological error — he conflates the sign and its denotatum, that is, the essential object and its communicative substitute. Moreover, the author loses sight of the fact that there can be no talk of “cubes” here — three-dimensional or four-dimensional — since a cube is a well-known geometric figure; more than that, it is a geometric body having edge lengths, face areas, and volume. But Model “A” and Model “B” have none of this. They are no more than topological schemes, which can be “laid out” in the form of a rectangle, a three-dimensional or four-dimensional cube — but other schemes can be applied as well. For example, Model “A” could be depicted as a scheme having the form of a seven-dimensional tetrahedron, where all the functions would be at equal “distances,” thereby postulating their functional equality — but for that one must first be empirically convinced that they are equal, not draw such a conclusion from the topological scheme of the model. That model could prove adequate if it were demonstrated that in the psyche all the functions are directly connected with one another.

The topological scheme of Model “A” in the form of the “half-cycle cube” (Aušra’s term) is partly justified by the empirical circumstance that (1) the same-named functions of opposite version form dipoles; (2) in the psyche there is a mental and a vital technological chain of functions processing information in strict sequence. Closing this chain in the form of a cube is already a matter of taste and aesthetic effect. Aušra changed the scheme of her model several times until she found the form that became classical.

In particular, Model “A” can be represented in the form of a “fishing net” (fig. Buk.08), and, of course, in the form of a table. Incidentally, the representation of Model “A” as a “fishing net” is, from the point of view of the technological chain of IM, the most adequate. The representation in the form of a cube, on the other hand, is precisely problematic, since a cube as a geometric figure has no entrance and exit, and “attaching” them destroys the aesthetic charm associated with this form, which creates subconscious problems.

Moreover, the author apparently forgets that he introduces the sign quite differently from how Gulenko did. With the author, each function, being doubled, occurs in the model with both signs — plus and minus — whereas with Gulenko each function has only one sign, whatever semantics he ascribed to that sign; and this is an essential difference between the models. In the case of Model “B” one can speak of “sign completeness,” which was absent in Model “G” and is absent in Model “E” (Ermak’s), and which creates an unjustified conceptual tension. Perhaps this served the author as a subconscious motive for doubling the set of functions of Model “A”.

Author: (Fig. Buk.06) This model includes 16 FIMs. The point is that each of the 8 FIMs, joining with another function in the blocks Ego, SuperEgo, SuperId, and Id, acquires somewhat different content.

Commentary: The author apparently fails to notice that each of the 8 FIMs in the model of a concrete TIM joins, within a block, with only one function, not two; hence within a single TIM the semantics of each function is perfectly determinate, and for this reason no doubling of the set of functions in the model is required. In other words, in the Don Quixote model I is in the EGO block and only there, and next to it stands l; in the Huxley model next to I stands e — and there can be no question of any semantic confusion here. Of course, this would not rule out other possible reasons for introducing the sign, but it is precisely this one the author cites. Let us emphasize: the author, having accepted a false premise from the outset, builds numerous arguments upon it which, of necessity, will be false — though, owing to their internal coherence, they may seem plausible, above all to himself. It is appropriate to say here that the originality of the author’s design stands in a certain contradiction with the interpretability of Model “B” and with the effectiveness of its practical application. For the author himself, naturally, this may cause no difficulty, since in the hands of a master everything works. He can, relying on an erroneous or defective construct, effectively teach socionics and also give valuable production recommendations — which, of course, does not prove the truth of his constructs.

Author: …the intuition of possibilities (I), joined with objective logic (l), as in the Ego block of the Inventor (ILE), differs from the same intuition combined with the ethics of relations in the Ego block of the Storyteller (IEE). Figuratively speaking, the Inventor sees more the hidden merits (I+), while the Storyteller sees the hidden defects (I−) — in a project, for example.

Commentary: Here the author seems to develop the theme of “signs,” but does so not systematically but “as occasion arises,” mixing different notions of the semantics of the functions’ signs. And when the author uses the expression “differs from the same intuition,” he fails to notice the substitution of concepts, since the intuition here is not the same — which is exactly what the author wants to prove, and why he introduces the sign. Yet the need for it would vanish at once if the author noted that Don Quixote’s intuition is directed at objective reality (l), while Huxley’s intuition is directed at subjective reality (e) and is specified by it. Moreover, the author substitutes the subject matter of the functions when, instead of the potential possibilities that Don Quixote discovers in an object, he speaks of “hidden merits,” and in Huxley’s case of “hidden defects.” No special analysis is needed to be convinced that this cannot correspond to reality. One might think Don Quixote never notices defects — why, he draws attention to them at every turn, when they exist, of course. Just so, Huxley certainly sees a person’s merits, his potential possibilities, but does not pass by the defects either. So the explanation of the signs plus and minus in this manner does not work here. Analogous logical imprecisions are present in all the author’s subsequent reasoning about the difference in the functional manifestations of the TIMs compared. It seems that both Gulenko and Bukalov tried, by means of the signs, to take into account certain additional details, but these attempts introduce characterological subject matter whose level of generality lies below the level of socionic generalization.

Author: In Model B there exist 4 rings of information movement and 8 blocks (see fig. Buk.06). The first ring — the mental one, the strongest — corresponds to the mental ring of Model A. The second ring is vital, and corresponds to the mental block of the activator.

Commentary: It is entirely incomprehensible why the vital ring, which in Model “A” corresponds to the mental ring of the dual, should suddenly, out of nowhere, begin to correspond to the mental block of the activator. To assert such a thing, one must first somehow “disavow” Aušra’s notions of duality and activation. Furthermore, in accordance with the methodological “principle of correspondence,” a new theory must include the previous one as a particular case. In the author’s constructions we see an unmotivated rejection of his predecessor’s well-grounded construct. It is also not excluded that what we have here is model-building in support of more or less accidental empirical observations. An essential shortcoming of Model “B” is the abandonment of the principle of the “dipole” character of same-named functions realized in Model “A”.

Author: For example, the Inventor has in his vital ring the mental ring of the Enthusiast, including the subconsciously manifested EGO block (Es) and the demonstrative SuperEgo block (Li), reminiscent of the mental block of the Entrepreneur. Hence the quasi-identity of the TIMs: the Inventor can sometimes be confused with the Entrepreneur and vice versa, which also becomes a cause of rapprochement between conflicters.

Commentary: So that is how the author sees the Don Quixote model. But why he should have in his “subconscious” the EGO of Hugo, rather than, as with Aušra, the EGO of Dumas, remains unexplained. And the author’s “justification” of the quasi-identity of ILE and LIE by the fact that the ILE model contains a “demonstrative SuperEgo block (Li) reminiscent of the mental block of the Entrepreneur” looks entirely illogical. The point is that the term “quasi-identity” is not an essential but a descriptive term, reflecting a certain similarity of the EGO blocks of the types ILE and LIE, which Aušra captured in her name for it; but the term itself has no direct relation to the behavior of these types, which differs quite definitely. Moreover, this or that similarity in manifestations exists between any TIMs, since any two types have 8 ARP (Augustinavičiūtė–Reinin traits) in common.

That “the Inventor can sometimes be confused with the Entrepreneur and vice versa” is not a problem of the TIM model at all, but a problem of diagnostics, and may be classed as a misunderstanding. As for the “rapprochement of conflicters,” this too is explained not by the model — from the model what follows is precisely their active antagonism — but by the situational scatter of the peculiarities of conflict pairs. Because of this same scatter, many dual and activation pairs do not become oases of well-being, though, by the model, everything there ought to be in order.

Author: The third ring is the mental role ring. Along it a person plays the role of the kindred TIM, covering the 4th function of the first ring. Thus the Inventor “plays” the Storyteller, entering into contact with the external world through offensive sensing S−, which covers his unwillingness to engage in comprehending the received information through concrete logic l+.

Commentary: Of course, in the case of TIMs there can be no question of any “playing of roles.” A TIM corresponds to integral behavior in which everything is purposive, whereas “playing a role” is an imitation of something according to some induced programs. In his life manifestations the bearer of a TIM imitates no one, but always behaves adequately to the situation — and this is what should be reflected in his model and description. Strange, too, looks the explanatory phrase “contact with the external world through offensive sensing S−, covering the unwillingness to engage in comprehending the received information through concrete logic l+.” The bearer of a TIM covers nothing — he behaves in accordance with his potentials, represented in generalized form in the model. In Huxley’s case, l stands in the position of the CCF — the conservative-critical function — and this expresses itself in the TIM bearer’s being “insensitive” to logical argumentation and displaying exceptional evasiveness under attempts to exert “logical pressure” on him; but understanding this as “unwillingness to engage in comprehending the received information through concrete logic” looks accentuated.

Author: The role ring covers the fourth, likewise vital ring. For the Inventor it coincides with the block Ei (Ideologue), and for the Master with iL (Critic). Here the Inventor’s inert positive emotions and striving for some radical transformations E+i− are protected.

Commentary: Here the author introduces the concept of a second vital ring, which, along with the previously introduced second mental ring, looks like an unjustified complication of the TIM model. Introducing into the model constructions that duplicate elements already present there looks as unjustified as, say, introducing a second EGO, a second ID, or a second subconscious. In any case, such innovations must have well-verified argumentation; but apart from formal construction, nothing adequate to the work of the psyche can be discovered here.

Author: It is easy to see that the rings in Model B, their place, correspond to the role of the functions in one of the rings, for example the mental one. This is connected with the fractal structure of the circulation of information in the socion: the regularities by which information systems function are similar at all levels of the hierarchy; from the functioning of the mental or vital [ring] up to the socion they are to a significant degree similar, as if repeating on a wider turn of the spiral, in a more general system.

Commentary: Of course, to see all this is not easy at all. Nor is it easy to understand the rest of the author’s reasoning, when he says that “their place corresponds to the role of the functions in one of the rings” — rings of which model, Model “A” or Model “B”? If the author does mean Model “B”, then this is not visible from fig. Buk.06. Thus, if the first mental ring (+I₁; −l₂; +S₃; −e₄) of Don Quixote is likened to the first function +I₁ of that ring, then none of the remaining rings (+E₁₆; −s₁₃; +L₁₄; −i₁₅)(Gu), (−I₉; +e₁₀; −S₁₁; +l₁₂)(Ge), (−E₆; −i₇; −L₈; +s₅)(Gm) can any longer be likened to the second function −l — if only because they are all “ethical.” The reference to fractality also proves nothing here. Fractality determines a greater or lesser degree of similarity of structures, their more or less explicit analogy, but not their identity. Analogy can be used as a heuristic device, but it cannot serve as a probative argument. Hence, in introducing so complex a construct as Model “B”, full-scale argumentation is required.

Author: Such a model explains where a person of any type gets the psycho-informational resources for reacting in various situations, including extreme ones.

Commentary: It is not excluded that such a model does explain what the author claims — but Model “A” explains the same thing, and that means there is no particular sense in introducing the more complex and insufficiently argued Model “B”. Naturally the author has the right to experiment with the invention of models, but this must be accompanied by high-quality theoretical elaboration and full-fledged logical argumentation.

Author: …we have repeatedly noted that in the situation of adapting to an interlocutor or partner people unconsciously adjust themselves “to the dual” of the interlocutor, manifesting aspects of dual behavior. This is easy to explain, considering that, according to Model B, the dual aspects are joined, and action upon one of them leads to the activation and manifestation of the other.

Commentary: A reference to unrecorded empirical observations may have heuristic value, but cannot serve as an argument in grounding so complex — “four-dimensional” — a construct as Model “B”. Moreover, the reasoning quoted contains the “circular” argumentation already used earlier, where an argument is used to confirm something which is then used to confirm the argument used. Here the author cites an empirical observation as confirmation of the adequacy of his model, and then cites the model to explain the empirical observation.

Author: …the shadow ring of the EGO block allows a person to play the role of the kindred type in certain situations, thereby protecting the fourth, vulnerable function.

Commentary: The author justifies the importance of the “kindred ring” by the need to protect “the fourth, vulnerable function.” Such a theoretical position stands in a certain contradiction with the notions of Aušra’s classical socionics, where the vulnerable function of a TIM can be protected only by the bearer of another TIM — and not any other, but only one whose model provides such protection; and of the remaining 15 types, excluding the identical one, 8 are suited to this role, namely DU, SD, MI, PO, AC, SO [order-giver], OR [order-receiver], SV [supervision pair]. In Model “B” none of these possibilities is reflected.

Author: …since the type of information metabolism, reflecting the structure of a person’s mental body, is five-dimensional, the four-dimensional model considered above is only one of the possible four-dimensional constructions — projections of a more complex, five-dimensional construct. Thus, in the three-dimensional world perceived by the human sense organs, a 4-dimensional cube (its 3-dimensional projection) may look different (fig. Buk.09). Correspondingly, our model in the form of a cube acquires a structure consisting of inner and outer layers.

Commentary: Here, without any proof whatsoever, a claim is made about the five-dimensionality of the human mental body. At present science is capable neither of proving nor of refuting the existence of a mental body, and therefore appeal to it can be regarded as a hypothesis. But there is no sense in building one hypothesis on top of another, when Model “A” quite adequately — without recourse to entities that cannot be fixed in a strictly controlled laboratory experiment, and without any strain — explains generalized human behavior. This does not mean, of course, that its interpretation need not be perfected, but these interpretations must not go beyond the bounds of common sense and scientific methodology.

As for the representation of Model “B” in fig. Buk.09, a proof is needed that this image is topologically equivalent to the image in fig. Buk.06 — that is, can be transformed into it without tearing and gluing. This is very doubtful, since these two images belong to different topological classes. It can also be understood to mean that we should speak not of one but of two topologically different Models “B”.

Author: …our model in the form of a cube acquires a structure consisting of inner and outer layers, reflecting the difference in the type’s behavior at far and close psychological distance.

Commentary: Certainly, this structure could have been obtained from the very start, without transforming the model of fig. Buk.X3 into the model of fig. Buk.X4. But whether this model reflects “the difference in the type’s behavior at far and close psychological distance” is another question. The theme of “far and close psychological distance” is considered more fully in the section devoted to the theoretical constructs of S. Filimonov. Here I will note only that this theme, certainly interesting within general psychology, is indistinguishable at the level of socionic generalization. That is precisely why, in the desire to reflect this theme in the TIM model, one has to complicate the model, loading it with tasks lying below the level of socionic generalization.

Author: …the right [types] are softer in social communication, at far psychological distances, but harder in personal communication; the left, in their turn, are soft at close psychological distances and harder and more uncompromising at the far, social psychological distance. These peculiarities are well described by the 16-component model, in which the outer contour of the model in types from the right ring of social progress (Il and others) contains in the EGO block the first function with the sign ”+” and the functions of the main model subordinate to it. The same function with the sign ”−” and the subordinate functions of the shadow model are contained in the inner contour of the model. In types from the left ring of social progress (lI and others) the “negative” main functions are located in the outer contour, and the “positive” ones in the inner. This is what determines the difference in the behavior of a person as a type of IM at different psychological distances and the difference in the behavior of the right and the left.

Commentary: All the behavioral peculiarities enumerated by the author are fully described by Model “A” without any “signs of functions.” As for the trait properties (extraverts/introverts, left/right…), they are derived from the peculiarities of the models entering into the regular octaves that determine the ARP (Augustinavičiūtė–Reinin traits). This is exactly how Aušra described the DP (differentiating traits). It is precisely in the specifications of the ARP that all the peculiarities of the group behavior of TIMs should be given. Such behavior, as shown in [UChK], constitutes a monotemperament, the number of which equals the number of poles of the ARP, that is, 30.

Author: Let us also note that Model “B” presupposes the possibility of the formation of a greater number of subtypes in one person, both fixed and dynamic, situational. This is connected with the fact that the informational capacity, or power, of the IM functions and IM blocks is much greater than the informational volume of the concrete situation that calls forth the formation of a subtype as a reaction of the consciousness controlling the functions of the model.

Commentary: When the author writes “the possibility of the formation of a greater number of subtypes,” he apparently means relative to Model “A” — otherwise the use of the comparative degree is unintelligible. But after the analysis of Model “B” carried out above, with its presumptive conclusion about the erroneousness of the intuitively adopted hypotheses lying at its foundation, such conclusions, being secondary, need no longer detain us. Still, let us note: since Model “B” tries to include levels of generalization lying below the level of generalization of Model “A”, it is quite understandable that it could describe more details as well — but such details are far more simply connected with other typologies. For if one introduces subtypes of, say, the attentive and the inattentive, the stupid and the intelligent, the responsible and the irresponsible, the generous and the stingy, the brave and the cowardly, the well-bred and the ill-bred, the cultured and the uncultured, altruists and egoists, the honest and the base, etc., there will be as many of them as a given language has psychologically evaluative words. At the level of socionic generalization this would apparently be superfluous, since socionics has other tasks. Is the task of science not to generalize the observed phenomena, to formulate the regularities and laws that make it possible to work with large arrays of objects? That is exactly what socionics does, and Model “A” is the maximally generalized formula containing within itself the law of the functioning of the psyche.

And finally, note the part of the text the author set in bold. In itself this claim looks plausible, though definitions would not hurt for its refinement. No one, after all, knows what the author means by informational capacity. Presumably it is supposed that all people understand this term unambiguously. But let us recall the relation in logic between the volume and the content of a concept: the greater the volume, the smaller the content. Thus, for example, between two people one can find significantly more in common than among a thousand people. This example shows that an abstractly formulated claim may seem to its author both intelligible and perfectly true — but only because the author invests the concepts he uses with a meaning known to him intuitively. It is not excluded that if the author were asked to explain his claim, he could write several pages or even a whole book; but another variant is also possible, where, in attempting to unfold the content of his words, the author would be forced to arrive at an entirely different conclusion. What, then, is informational capacity? I, for example, might say that it is the quantity of information, measured in appropriate units, contained in a given concept. But it can also be understood differently: as the quantity of information that can be recorded, or is already recorded, on a given carrier. The difference between the proposed definitions is enormous. In the first case we are at the level of concepts; in the second we pass to the level of technical devices.

Author: …consciousness… obeys the laws of quantum or wave mechanics and can be described in its terms. Moreover, individual subsystems of consciousness can interact with one another like elementary particles.

Commentary: Here again we have an example of an intuitively understood term, whereas in a scientific text dealing with levels of high generalization it is absolutely necessary to give definitions of the concepts used. What, then, does the author understand by consciousness?

Author: …the principle of superposition of subtypes, following from the quantum properties of consciousness and the IM model…

Commentary: What does “the principle of superposition of subtypes” mean? In accordance with the general scientific use of words, it should mean the coexistence of subtypes within a type — without interference, the mutually independent manifestation of subtypes as the psyche’s reaction to a situation. Such an understanding of superposition has an empirico-axiomatic character, as a really observed phenomenon. It is not very clear how this principle can be derived “from the quantum properties of consciousness”; but deriving it from the properties of the model makes no sense, because it is the properties of the model that depend on this principle, along with other principles.

Author: (fig. Buk.10) (1) The proposed model, by virtue of the principle of fractality, makes it possible to describe the socion as well, which can also be represented as a 4-dimensional cube. (2) In this way the opposition of the movement of the information flows in the right and left rings of social progress is well illustrated. (3) Such a construction also reflects the relation of the informational volumes of the right and the left. The right operate with a larger informational volume; they are more inert and consistent, forming the evolutionary ring of social progress. The left operate with a smaller informational volume (but a larger energetic one); they are more reactive, less consistent, and less stable in the face of a destabilizing situation, more inclined to extreme actions or deeds (the involutionary, or revolutionary, ring of social progress). As one consequence, the smaller informational volume of the left, and their location in the inner contour of the socion, looks like “egocentrism” compared with the “collectivism” of the types of the right ring. In turn the right, by virtue of a smaller energetic volume, are inclined to conserve energy, effort, and resources, expending them only as necessary. (4) At the level of ethnosocionics this is well seen in comparing, for example, Great Britain (integral type Ls — right ring of social progress) and the USA (integral type Li — left ring of social progress). If Great Britain’s style is conservatism, moderation, and gradualness, then the USA is an extraordinarily active style of activity, egocentric in its essence (“America for Americans”), consuming far greater quantities of resources and energy per capita compared with most countries of the world. The necessary informational volume is maintained by the “brain drain” from all countries of the world into the USA, since this ethnos’s own informational volume (unlike its energo-material one), left to itself, has a tendency to decrease. In the countries of the right ring of social progress the situation is the reverse: self-sufficiency of the informational volume and a tendency toward contraction of the energo-material volume, which is compensated by the functioning of an open economic system.

Commentary: (1) Compare figs. Buk.06, Buk.09, and Buk.10 and you will see that the models presented there are not identical at all. The need to prove the identity of the first two was discussed above. The last model differs in that in it the Don Quixote model is placed inside, though according to the concept of fractal similarity it should have ended up outside. Because of such inconsistencies the impression arises that Model “B” has not been worked out to the end and has remained a beautiful design. (2) The author speaks approvingly of the fact that his model well illustrates “the opposition of the movement of the information flows in the right and left rings of social progress.” But was it not he himself who “adjusted” the model so that it would “illustrate” well? If he had built the model not by the formal criteria of “doubling the functions” in order to justify the introduction of “signs of functions,” but had proceeded from the essential peculiarities of the functioning of the human psyche — and it had suddenly turned out that such a model contained everything he speaks of — then we would have had the deductive effect of revealing the potential meaning of the axiomatic basis; as it is, we are faced with the fitting of a model to reality. (3) The author does not unfold the concept of informational volume, using the corresponding term at the level of intuition. That there is an integral difference between the right and the left follows from the existence of a structural invariant in the collections of the corresponding models, as Aušra showed in her time. It is precisely the discovery of such an invariant in a set of inductively constructed models that is the ground for its psychological interpretation. Unfortunately, such interpretations still have an approximate-intuitive character; but that is precisely the problem — to find effective ways of verifying them experimentally. In particular, the intuitive guesses about the smaller and larger informational volumes with which the left and the right operate remain, in the absence of corresponding definitions, unnormed. For example, one may suppose that these volumes are equal — at least theoretically comparable or equivalent — but that in each case different information is at issue. Presumably, with the right the informational accent lies in the verbal-algorithmic sphere, and with the left in the realizational-technological one. But the claim that the difference between right and left is connected with “some being in the outer, others in the inner contour of the socion” is a logical error connected with the failure to distinguish the sign from the object it designates — the denotatum. In this case the model acts as the sign, and the really existing types as the denotatum. The model must reflect the properties of the objects, not be fitted to them. And that means the model must be constructed with regard to the fundamental properties of reality, not by more or less accidental formal criteria such as doubling the functional rings for the sake of satisfying the — in this case problematic — requirement of “sign completeness,” that is, the equal presence in the model of the signs plus and minus. (4) That Great Britain and the USA have a definite ITIM (integral TIM) is determined not from their socionic models at all, but as a result of the empirical detection of a set of traits, as is done in diagnostic procedures. That is how we may arrive at a conclusion about their TIM and ITIM. Let us stress again that examples, while possessing a certain heuristic potential, cannot be probative arguments and can with equal success illustrate different models.

On the Myers-Briggs Typology

Author: When specialists in socionics became acquainted with the American typology, it quickly became clear that the empirically obtained descriptions of the Myers-Briggs types coincide with the corresponding descriptions of the IM types in socionic theory and practice.

Commentary: The author offers his understanding of Jung’s typology as executed by Myers-Briggs. And here one may speak of the closeness of these descriptions, but by no means of their coincidence. The Myers-Briggs type descriptions are of necessity — owing to the absence of an adequate model and of full-fledged interpretation algorithms — approximate, just as their diagnostics is approximate. It has long been clear that the Myers-Briggs questionnaire fails to satisfy many of the requirements imposed on valid psychological tests. However, as a tuning table for operators this questionnaire played, without exaggeration, a very important role — in socionics too. Repeatedly turning to this questionnaire, the leading socionists were gradually able to form an intuitive image of the corresponding psychic parameters represented by the poles of the Jungian dichotomies. Then, relying now on Model “A”, they significantly refined the semantics of these parameters. Along with this they obtained improved keys to the understanding of the socionic types proper as types of information metabolism (TIM), which essentially distinguishes them from the Jung types homonymous with them. The Jung types stand to the TIMs as preliminary blanks, as initial, incomplete concepts brought to their logical completion in the TIMs. But that is only in the ideal; in the real descriptions of the TIMs by various authors of books on socionics there are both significant divergences and substantial defects.

Author: According to Jung, there exist 8 basic psychological types (4 extraverted and 4 introverted) with one dominant psychological function (intuition, sensation, thinking, or feeling) and either an extraverted or an introverted attitude of consciousness. Besides the basic function there also exists an auxiliary one.

Commentary: Here the author commits a terminological imprecision. Jung spoke of the leading function, not of a dominant or basic one. And though at the everyday level of word use these terms may be considered synonyms, in their scientific use their equivalence must be grounded by corresponding definitions. Otherwise unpredictable misunderstandings are possible.

Myers-Briggs: …the dominant process is concentrated in the external world of people and events, and the auxiliary process must look after their inner life, without which extraverts would be extremely extraverted and, in the opinion of their better-balanced colleagues, shallow.

Commentary: An example of psychological metaphysics: the scholar delivers an inspired monologue having only superficial connections with reality. One of the Myers-Briggs axioms is that “the dominant process is concentrated in the external world.” It is unclear why it could not be concentrated on the internal world. Myers-Briggs frankly does not understand this. With her, the dominant and auxiliary processes do not participate in the technological chain of information processing but merely “play roles.” Myers-Briggs apparently regards extraversion and introversion as qualities that can manifest to a greater or lesser degree, which fully corresponds to a superficial, everyday attitude to psychology. Socionic practice, however, has made it possible to understand that extraversion and introversion are integral characteristics of the types, which can to some extent be modified by circumstances but as such always remain equal to themselves.

Myers-Briggs: In introverts, “the dominant process is absorbed in the inner world of thoughts, and the auxiliary process does what it can with respect to their outer life.”

Commentary: If Myers-Briggs had even slightly correlated what she writes with reality, she could have avoided part of the errors she commits. Consider the generalized behavior of some introvert. For example, Dumas has as his dominant process consumption, which includes the process preceding it of detecting the corresponding resource — namely, that which is to be consumed. Thus Dumas actively seeks this resource, and no “inner world of thoughts” can distract him from that. More than that: it supports him in it.

Myers-Briggs: However, “introverts are compelled to use the dominant process with respect to the external world somewhat more than necessary, because of the predictable results.”

Commentary: Where does this measure — “more” — come from? Why should one say of typical behavior that it is compelled? Such a qualification in this case is redundant and mannered. A need as such cannot be greater than itself.

Myers-Briggs: “The dominant process of extraverts strives to be immediately visible. With introverts it is the opposite. The dominant process is usually and stubbornly introverted; when their attention must turn to the external world, they strive to use precisely the auxiliary process. Except for those who are very close to introverts or have taken a great interest in the work they love…, people are admitted into the inner world of introverts without much pleasure.”

Commentary: Reader, do you understand the real meaning of this fragment? Let us take it apart piece by piece. 1) “The dominant process of extraverts strives to be immediately visible.” — Surely the dominant process by itself can strive for nothing. It is the concrete bearer of a type who can strive for something. But what, in that case, did Myers-Briggs want to say? Should the phrase be understood to mean that every extravert strives for his activity to have a demonstrative character, or does it simply mean that the extravert’s dominant process is realized in the form of concrete activity in the habitat? Perhaps in German this phrase is understood in the sense that the extravert’s activity has an external character and can be easily observed? But to say that an extravert’s activity has an external character is the same as saying that his activity is extraverted. It appears the translation of the original text into Russian is far from perfect. It also appears that Myers-Briggs thinks not in meanings but in words. 2) “With introverts it is the opposite. The dominant process is usually and stubbornly introverted.” — Read that sentence closely. Does it not mean that introverts behave introvertedly? But does Myers-Briggs herself grasp the banality of such statements? 3) “…when their attention must turn to the external world, they strive to use precisely the auxiliary process.” — This claim is amusing in many respects. One can just see Myers-Briggs picturing introverts turned away from the external world and deeply immersed in their inner world — probably experiencing something, or already in nirvana. And now, for reasons independent of the introvert, his attention “must turn to the external world,” so the introvert, against his will, has to tear himself away from contemplating what is going on inside him and do something — eat, for instance. Judging by the Myers-Briggs phrase, he has options, but he “strives to use precisely the auxiliary process,” though perhaps he could use some other. Which one? The dominant one, perhaps? Probably he could, but alas — his “dominant process is usually and stubbornly introverted.” True, “usually,” hence not always, but “stubbornly.” Does it not seem to you, reader, that Myers-Briggs has in mind not a normal person at all, but someone afflicted with autism? She writes about introverts as if they were not quite ordinary, normal people but some psychic freaks who, in order to perform even a perfectly simple action — washing the dishes, say, or simply tying their shoelaces — need to “use precisely the auxiliary process.” But what might that mean, translated from Martian Myers-Briggsese into human?

Let us consider the behavior of some introverted type well understood by socionics — Dumas, for example: sE (SEI). The formula of this type, written in bold italics, can be examined by parts — analytically — and interpreted as a whole — synthetically. Introverted sensing (s) in the position of the PPF (program-potential function) has the primary meaning of the capacity for fine discrimination of the resource needed to satisfy needs. Which needs, is not specified at the level of socionic generalization — any. Extraverted emoting in the position of the CPF (communicative-probing function, also the creative one) can be understood as the emotional reaction to the satisfaction of the need connected with the PPF. In the bearer of this type such a reaction can be finely modulated — in other words, it is controllable, and can be used, among other things, for manipulation. In everyday terms Dumas’s behavior, with the above in mind, will look like an active search for a resource, fine discrimination of its nuances, and fine emotional modulation of the process of satisfying the corresponding need by its means. Integrally, synthetically, the joint work of these two functions can be expressed by the motto: “The main thing in life is to be able to satisfy one’s needs to the full,” which can be put briefly as “comfortable consumption.” Dumas is active when he creates coziness in his dwelling, when he thinks about his health, when he lays a festive table, when he chooses wallpaper for renovations, when he prepares an exquisite dish, when he discusses in his circle of friends a fashion show, a much-talked-of play, or a new health system. The Dumas of highest achievement are performers, artists, couturiers, cooks, physicians. But why must all this be described in half-meaningless combinations of words like “when their attention must turn to the external world, they strive to use precisely the auxiliary process”? 4) “Except for those who are very close to introverts or have taken a great interest in the work they love…, people are admitted into the inner world of introverts without much pleasure.” — this phrase cannot be assessed as anything other than a banality, and a banality that misleads. This assessment by no means applies only to introverts — nor does it apply to all extraverts. And so it amounts to an idle sentiment occasioned by certain cases known to Myers-Briggs. Possibly she is speaking of herself. Just imagine a person who “with special pleasure admits into his inner world” just anyone — the first comer, a chance fellow traveler. Yes, such people exist. They are those who long to pour out their soul, to unburden themselves of what has accumulated, who are oppressed by loneliness — or they are simply mentally unbalanced exhibitionists. But the percentage of such people is small, and possibly there are more of them among introverts, though such are also found among extraverts.

Myers-Briggs: Most people see only that side which introverts present to the external world, which for the most part is their auxiliary process, the secondary one… The result is paradoxical.

Commentary: Another example of idle sentiments — that is, irresponsible pronouncements at the level of vague intuitive visions. Is the side that extraverts do not present to the external world really immediately visible in them? Does Myers-Briggs give herself an account of what she is saying? She insists that most people see in introverts not the primary but the secondary process — but that is because she has simplified notions of the psychology of the Jungian types, which in turn is connected with the absence of a full-fledged model of the structure of the psyche. If we turn again to the Dumas type and ask which process — “primary,” per Myers-Briggs, or “secondary” — people can see in him, then of course we must fill these two terms with meaning. In accordance with the Jungian understanding of the leading function (primary process) and the auxiliary function (secondary process), for Dumas these will be, respectively, introverted sensing and extraverted emoting. Of course introverted sensing will be visible in the bearer of this type in his whole appearance, his manner of dress, the furnishing of his dwelling. And of course you will easily see his “secondary process” too, as soon as he begins to display his emotions. Both processes proceed in parallel, though, depending on the situation, one of them may prove more noticeable — but not for long. Tell me: after this commentary, is anything left of the sentiment under analysis? Ah yes — the paradoxicality of the result… Myers-Briggs apparently sees the paradox in the fact that, in her opinion, the “primary process” of a type’s bearer should be visible first of all, and suddenly it turns out that with introverts everything is the other way round… But this only seemed so to the “great typologist” — from the underdevelopment of the theory.

Socionics has found an adequate semantics of the functions, and in it one speaks not of a dominant and an auxiliary process but of the work of the PPF (program-potential function) and the CPF (communicative-probing function). The phenomenology of the joint work of these functions is the integral result of their semantics, and it can be torn into two processes only conditionally — but the Myers-Briggses do not understand this.

One way or another, Myers-Briggs, having replaced the Jungian concepts of rationality and irrationality with the concepts of judging and perceiving — which in itself testifies to her inability to hold on to concepts of a slightly higher level of abstraction — confused both herself and her followers. The mechanism of this confusion is clear and consists in the following. Contact with the external world Myers-Briggs, by external association, ascribes to the extraverted functions. Hence in the case of extraverts the traits she introduced coincide with irrationality and rationality, while in the case of introverts, whose extraverted function is the second one, the overall assessment of the type by the rationality parameter is perverted. As we see, the error here results from a wrong understanding of the type’s functioning. And the inclusion of a systematic error in a typology means that at least half of its results will be wrong.

Conclusion

The book contains many interesting ideas: the four-dimensional models intended to perfect Model “A”; the splitting of the functions; the dimensionalities of the functions; the notion of the quantization of “psychoinformational” space; the law of the succession of quadras; the hypothesis of levion fields, not yet discovered by science but explaining psychic processes well; and much else. But the distinguishing feature of Bukalov’s reasoning is its insufficient, and sometimes complete, lack of grounding, which may not strike the eye at once but reveals itself in attempts to follow the course of his thought. The curious reader may try to sort out Bukalov’s firework display of ideas for himself; I, for my part, have drawn attention to the methodological defects in his work in order to warn the inexperienced reader against repeating errors already made by others.

In fairness it must be noted that Bukalov has exceptionally deep and interesting ideas connected with the concept of the integral TIM of ethnoses, nations, and states. Relying on these ideas, he manages to explain with a high degree of plausibility not only contemporary political and social processes in the leading states of the world and the relations between them, including at the level of geopolitics, but also the historical vicissitudes in the formation and change of civilizational orders. And here his historical and political knowledge shines in all its brilliance. This contribution of his to science will undoubtedly be duly appreciated by the world scientific community. Nevertheless, the integral model still needs thorough further work.

I have carefully analyzed the entire text of this book, but I consider that, to illustrate the errors possible in the reasoning of scholars, the analysis of the book’s introductory part given here is sufficient.

The analysis carried out and the deviations from logical and methodological standards that have been revealed in no way diminish the intellectual merits of the authors, but testify to the exceptional difficulty of the subject of study that socionics is — a subject that only at first glance can seem easy and understandable to the “ordinary person.”

Literature

1. Bukalov A. V. The Potential of Personality and the Riddles of Human Relations. — Moscow: Chornaya Belka, 2009. ~592 pp.

---

Translator’s notes: “IM” = information metabolism; “TIM” = type of information metabolism; “IA” = information aspect; “FIM” = function of information metabolism; “ARP” = Augustinavičiūtė–Reinin traits; “[UChK]” = the reviewer’s own referenced work. Type abbreviations follow the Russian nicknames: Ki = Don Quixote (ILE), Du = Dumas (SEI), Gu = Hugo (ESE), Ro = Robespierre (LII), Gm = Hamlet (EIE), Go = Gorky (LSI), Dr = Dreiser (ESI), Lo = London/Jack (LIE), Na = Napoleon (SEE), Gb = Gabin (SLI), Ge = Huxley (IEE). The chapter is Section 3 of a critical survey; the “Author” passages are quotations from Bukalov’s book, and the “Commentary”/“Editor” passages are the reviewer’s.